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Abstract 
 
This thesis investigates the mobilization of sustainability discourses in environmental 
impact assessment (EIA) by looking at two cases, in the United Kingdom (UK) and the 
Netherlands. EIA is a procedure used for predicting the sustainability impacts associated 
with project development. It is reasoned that, where adverse sustainability impacts are 
likely to occur, situated civil society stakeholders involved in deliberating these impacts 
will mobilize discourses on how the proposed development relates to achieving 
sustainability objectives. Yet a pertinent question is whether EIA accommodates 
sustainability discourse mobilization, not least when the mode of public engagement is 
taken into account. Premised on the differences in institutional design and political culture 
between the UK and the Netherlands, the thesis aims to investigate whether and how the 
external influence exerted by institutions and political culture on public engagement is 
manifested in the mobilization of sustainability discourses in EIA. By focusing on the large-
scale infrastructure development projects of High-Speed rail 2 (HS2) in the UK and the A4 
motorway connection between Delft and Schiedam (A4DS) in the Netherlands, it is found 
that institutional design and political culture have influenced sustainability discourse 
mobilization only to a very limited extent. This finding has been consistent across the two 
cases, despite institutional and cultural variance. Furthermore, it is found that EIA did not 
accommodate the mobilization of sustainability discourses, reflecting the absence of 
meaningful spaces for civil society engagement particularly with the scientific justification 
of why the projects are necessary. The thesis concludes that institutional design and 
political culture do not significantly influence sustainability discourse mobilization in cases 
where the use of science and expertise mediates public engagement, further compounded 
by the strict procedural aspects of EIA. It recommends that further research on 
sustainability discourses in infrastructure development focuses on the complex 
relationship between EIA and project justification. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction to the thesis  
 
This thesis concerns an appraisal of the mobilization of sustainability discourses in two 
infrastructure capacity expansion projects: (1) the first phase of a proposed high-speed 
rail network called High-Speed rail 2 (HS2) in the United Kingdom (UK), which entails the 
construction of a rail link between the cities of London and Birmingham (Phase 11 of the 
project); and (2) the construction of a connecting part of the A4 motorway between the 
towns of Delft and Schiedam in the Netherlands (A4DS), which at the time of writing the 
thesis was being constructed. In the UK case the part of the proposed scheme crossing 
an Area of Outstanding Natural Beauty (AONB) known as the Chiltern Hills (henceforth: 
the Chilterns), situated approximately fifty kilometres northwest from London, is the focus 
of the thesis. Both cases are strongly linked to processes of democratic decision-making. 
The principle aim of the thesis is to investigate to what extent sustainability discourses in 
the HS2 and A4DS projects are shaped by democratic institutions and the political culture 
of civil society. This phenomenon is referred to as sustainability discourse mobilization. It 
will be argued that modes of public engagement with decision-making are considered 
instrumental in linking institutions and political culture to the mobilization of discourses. 
 Both HS2 and A4DS involve the expansion of infrastructure capacity. Projects 
proposing the construction of new infrastructures or expanding existing ones, in the UK 
and the Netherlands respectively, require that an environmental impact assessment (EIA) 
be carried out (Department for Communities and Local Government, 2011; Ministerie van 
Infrastructuur en Milieu, 2011). This is compliant with EIA legislation of the European 
Union (EU) (European Parliament and the Council of the European Union, 2011), which 
provides a supranational legal framework for the assessment of environmental impacts at 
the project level (as opposed to policies, plans and programmes). EIA is therefore a tool to 
assess proposed projects that are likely to have significant environmental impacts (Wood, 
2003). It is conceived as a decision-support tool for making decisions in project planning 
better environmentally informed. The thesis perceives EIA as a decision-making arena 
where the mobilization of sustainability discourses is accommodated. Pursuant to this, EIA 
is strongly linked to theory on the role of public engagement in matters concerning the role 
of sustainability discourse in environmental decision-making (Palerm, 2000; Wilkins, 2003; 
Bond et al., 2011).   
 This thesis refers to sustainability discourse as the socially constructed nature of 
values related to environmental decision-making (Rydin, 1999; Wilkins, 2003). Such 
                                                           
1
 In the thesis the project is either named ‘HS2’ or ‘HS2 Phase 1’ and the usage of these names may 
alternate. The ‘Phase 1’ addition emphasizes that the main area of inquiry concerns the London-Birmingham 
rail link and the environmental impact assessment associated with it. Sometimes the project is titled ‘HS2 
(Phase 1)’ to clarify that what is being discussed relates to both the high speed rail network as a whole and 
the first phase of the project. Phase 1 is the construction of the London-Birmingham link and Phase 2 is the 
construction of the lines from Birmingham going northbound (see also Chapter 4). 
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values may for instance reflect the views that people hold on the desired role of the 
environment in the face of economic growth and modernity (Mol et al., 2010). Conversely, 
social constructions of socio-economic or ecological values have the potential to incur 
changes in extant decision-making processes related to achieving sustainability 
objectives. They can thus be of particular importance for the formulation of these 
objectives (Bond et al., 2011) or, in the case of EIA, for the shaping of views on the 
purpose of impact assessment procedures (Cashmore, 2004; O'Faircheallaigh, 2010; 
Rozema et al., 2012). The thesis will argue that sustainability discourses can vary across 
different institutional and cultural contexts. Accordingly, it is investigated whether 
processes of discourse mobilization in the HS2 and A4DS projects, via public 
engagement, are mediated by institutions and the political culture of the democratic state. 
Discourses associated with environmental assessment and the appraisal of 
sustainability principles have received ample attention in recent years (e.g. Wilkins, 2003; 
Runhaar et al., 2010; Runhaar and Van Nieuwaal, 2010; Bond et al., 2011; Hilding-
Rydevik and Åkerskog, 2011). Attention for the role of discourse marks a wider trend in 
the academic literature to focus on the purpose and meaning of environmental 
assessment rather than to focus solely on the technicalities and architectures of 
assessment procedures (Cashmore, 2004). The thesis has gratefully borrowed theory 
from many of the scholarly works associated with this trend, most of which identify the 
need to take environmental values seriously in the conduct of environmental assessment. 
However, very limited scholarly attention has been directed to understanding which, when, 
why and in what way sustainability discourses are mobilized. The potential of external 
factors such as institutional design and political culture in mediating discourses and 
mobilization processes beckons further inquiry. Increased knowledge on the importance of 
external factors for sustainability discourse mobilization may further help emphasize the 
importance of value construction in the conduct of environmental assessment.  
This introductory chapter contains six sections. The first section deals with the 
history of EIA legislation. The second section looks at the procedural aspects of EIA. 
Section 3 explores the relationship between EIA and sustainability. The fourth section 
explains the role of theory in sustainability discourse mobilization and EIA, thereby 
launching the theory associated with sustainability discourse mobilization. This theory will 
subsequently materialize in the empirical chapters of the thesis (Chapters 5 to 7). The fifth 
section introduces the research questions. It will also show the aims and practical 
relevance of the research. Section 6 outlines what can be expected in the remainder of 
the thesis.  
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1.1 A brief history of EIA legislation 
 
The empirical research in the thesis is premised on the HS2 and A4DS projects in the UK 
and the Netherlands, both of which require an EIA prior to their implementation. The EIA 
for the A4DS project was completed in 2009 (Rijkswaterstaat, 2009d); construction of the 
motorway connection started in 2012. During the writing of this thesis a full EIA for the 
HS2 Phase 1 project had not yet been carried out as construction of the proposed rail link 
is expected to start in or around 2017, with the expectation of completion ten years later. 
However, the publications of the EIA Scope and Methodology Report (Arup/URS, 2012a; 
submitted on behalf of HS2 Ltd), and the Draft Environmental Statement (HS2 Ltd, 2013) 
have provided valuable information regarding the scope of the environmental impacts to 
be considered in the next stages of the EIA (see Section 1.2).        
EIA is currently adopted as a decision-support tool in over 120 states (Glasson et 
al., 2012). Many more states have legislation that strongly hints towards the requirement 
for impact assessment of projects, or are signatories to treaties and agreements that 
require the publication of environmental statements prior to decision consent (Morgan, 
2012). EIA is furthermore adopted by other rule-competent authorities (Glasson et al., 
2012), such as autonomous regions and devolved legislatures (e.g. Scotland, Flanders 
and North Rhine-Westphalia), intergovernmental organizations (e.g. the World Bank) and 
the EU, which is a supranational organization. Knowledge on the design and 
implementation of EIA legislation across the world has been generated through empirical 
research in recent years (Wood, 2003; Glasson et al., 2012), and through theoretical 
research on the contributing role of EIA towards sustainability objectives in a variety of 
political contexts (Cashmore et al., 2008; Kolhoff et al., 2009).        
EIA was legally incepted in the late 1960s. Caldwell (1998) has argued that the 
idea to systematically assess environmental impacts can be related to the rise of public 
concern over the unintended adverse consequences of technological innovation. The 
1969 National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) in the United States (US) is widely 
viewed as the first legislation on EIA, thereby marking the inception of a legal imperative 
(Jay et al., 2007). NEPA is part of a wider development in environmental advocacy and 
political ecology. Its enactment roughly coincided with, amongst others, alarmist books 
such as Silent Spring by Rachel Carson in 1962 and The Population Bomb by Paul R. 
Ehrlich in 1968; the foundation of environmental advocacy organizations such as 
Greenpeace or Friends of the Earth; the establishment of environmental government 
departments and academic institutes focusing on environmental matters; and the electoral 
pioneering of green political parties (Carter, 2007). The argument is also made that NEPA 
responded to the Club of Rome’s 1972 influential report Limits to Growth (Meadows et al., 
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1972), which addressed the issue of ecological destruction in the face of unbridled 
economic growth.  
 NEPA marks the beginning of a procedure designed to map the probable adverse 
environmental impacts of federal legislation and actions of government. Caldwell (1998: 
10) has argued that NEPA “was intended to bring ecological rationality to the policy 
process”. This objective refers to the desire to improve the quality of decisions through the 
provision of information on adverse environmental impacts. Since the inception of NEPA 
formalized systems for assessing environmental impacts have gradually become 
embedded in the national legislation of many other states. In the late 1980s EIA legislation 
was adopted by virtually all of the Member States of the EU (Gilpin, 1995), which can be 
envisaged as the inception of EIA across the Atlantic. Being considered by some as the 
most emulated law in the history of environmental legislation (e.g. Eccleston, 2008), 
NEPA is sometimes referred to as the ‘environmental Magna Carta’.     
The UK and the Netherlands have formally transposed EIA legislation in 1988 and 
1986, respectively. In the UK separate EIA legislation is designed for the three devolved 
political regions: Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland. England is governed by the UK 
parliament but, similar to the other three, it has its own EIA legislation. Since the HS2 
project is to be implemented in England, it has to comply with English legislation on EIA 
(Department for Communities and Local Government, 2011). The Netherlands is a unitary 
state and has adopted EIA legislation applicable to all projects eligible for assessment that 
are in its jurisdiction.        
Since the UK and the Netherlands are both EU Member States, it is worth 
investigating supranational legislation on EIA. The supranational structure of the EU 
represents an overarching legal framework that makes it take precedence over national 
legislation, provided supranational legislation does not interfere with national security 
issues. As signatories to the 2008 Treaty on European Union (European Union, 2008a), 
the Member States have agreed to the prevalence of EU legislation over national 
legislation (based on the principle ‘lex superior derogat legi inferiori’, translated: ‘a law 
higher in the hierarchy repeals the lower one’). However, Member States have the 
freedom to choose how to transpose directives into national legislation as the EU “shall 
leave to the national authorities the choice of form and methods” (European Union, 2008b: 
Article 288). Directives are the most prevalent form of supranational legislation. 
 EIA legislation in the EU started with Directive 85/337/EEC in 1985 (see European 
Parliament and the Council of the European Union, 2011 for a list of all the EIA directives 
referred to in the thesis). The directive is important since, for the first time, it was stated 
that an EIA is mandatory in project planning in the EU on the basis of certain project 
characteristics. The directive has been amended three times, beginning with Directive 
97/11/EC in 1997. Amongst other things, this directive sought “to minimise the differences 
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of application (...)2 and to harmonise implementation” between EU Member States 
(European Commission, 2003: 10). Concerns about the application and implementation of 
EIA in Member States have led to subsequent action being undertaken to address them. 
Arguably, this has proved critical in the shaping of a supranational EIA framework 
(Glasson and Bellanger, 2003). 
 A second amendment, Directive 2003/35/EC in 2003, has brought EIA legislation 
up-to-date with the objective to make information on environmental impacts, procedures 
for decision-making and justice accessible to public participants. This entailed the 
provision set forth in the 1998 Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in 
Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters (henceforth: the ‘Aarhus 
Convention’) (United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, 1998). The tripartite aim 
of the Aarhus Convention has been to improve public access to 1) information, 2) 
decision-making and 3) justice. The most recent amendment is Directive 2009/31/EC, 
which has rendered projects involving the transport and storage of carbon dioxide under 
the obligation to submit an environmental statement. When taking stock of the latest 
amendment to the original EIA legislation, Directive 85/337/EEC (as amended) is often 
referred to. In 2011 Directive 85/337/EEC and its three amendments have been 
consolidated into Directive 2011/92/EU, thereby repealing these directives.       
 
1.2 The procedural stages of EIA 
 
The local planning authority (LPA) is responsible for supervising the implementation of 
EIA for projects which fall within the remit of land use planning (Glasson et al., 2012). In 
EU EIA legislation, the LPA is referred to as the ‘competent authority’ (in Dutch: ‘bevoegd 
gezag’). Based on the subsidiarity principle, local government is responsible for 
supervising the implementation of an EIA procedure in most of the cases, or alternatively 
for assessing whether an EIA procedure is necessary (Wood and Becker, 2005). Because 
HS2 and A4DS are both public works and high-profile infrastructure projects that take 
place beyond the jurisdiction of local or regional government, the national governments in 
the UK and the Netherlands are directly responsible for the supervision and 
implementation of EIA.      
 In this thesis an EIA procedure is presented on the basis of references found in the 
academic literature (Therivel and Morris, 2009; Glasson et al., 2012), in EU guidance on 
EIA (European Commission, 2001a; 2001b; 2001c) and on some of the provisions set 
forth in Directive 2011/92/EU. It is important to acknowledge that the EIA procedure used 
in this thesis does not run parallel with the latest developments in EIA legislation. For 
                                                           
2
 The use of (...) in quotations indicates that the quotation has been constructed out of two excerpts of texts 
from the same source. 
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instance, the European Commission’s (2012) proposal for a new supranational EIA 
directive offers substantive changes to existing legislation. Furthermore, various stages of 
the EIA procedure used in this thesis are subject to reiteration. Not least, the ‘position’ of 
public engagement in the chronological order of the stages is a key focus for EIA scholars 
(e.g. Wood et al., 2006). Taking these limitations into consideration, Table 1.1 presents an 
overview of the procedural stages of EIA and the main purpose or question to be 
addressed in each stage. The remainder of this section briefly explains each state.   
 
Stage in the EIA procedure Description of the stage 
Screening Is the project eligible for an EIA? 
Scoping What impacts should be included in the EIA? 
Baseline study What is the current situation in the impact 
area? 
Impact prediction What are the predicted size, magnitude and 
severity of the impacts? 
Impact evaluation To what extent are the predicted impacts 
significant? 
Impact mitigation Which measures can be identified that are able to mitigate the predicted impacts? 
Review of the environmental statement Are the predicted impacts and identified 
mitigation measures documented? 
Public engagement What do public stakeholders think of the 
environmental information received? 
Decision consent Should the proposed project be authorized to 
continue? 
Monitoring How do the impacts and mitigation measures develop in time and space? 
Auditing 
Have the prediction of impacts and 
identification of mitigation measures been 
accurate? 
Table 1.1: The EIA procedure 
 
Screening is the stage where eligibility for an EIA procedure is checked (Glasson et al., 
2012). Directive 2011/92/EU subjects projects to an EIA when they meet the provisions 
stated in Annex I of the directive. Projects not listed in Annex I but which meet the 
provisions stated in Annex II are subject to a consideration of EU Member States, 
determined by the expected or likely significance of the environmental impacts. Member 
States have transposed the provisions stated in Annex I and Annex II of Directive 
2011/92/EU and of previous directives into national EIA legislation, such as the Town and 
Country Planning (Environmental Impact Assessment) Regulations 2011 (T&CP 2011) in 
England (Department for Communities and Local Government, 2011) and the Besluit 
Milieueffectrapportage (Environmental Impact Assessment Agreement) in the Netherlands 
(Ministerie van Infrastructuur en Milieu, 2011). 
Scoping is the stage where the scope of the EIA is determined. It attempts to 
identify “what key receptors, impacts and proper alternatives to consider, what 
13 
 
methodologies to use, and whom to consult” (Therivel and Morris, 2009: 4-5). Adopted for 
the first time in Directive 97/11/EC (Article 5.2), scoping may facilitate consultation of, and 
engagement between, the stakeholders likely to be involved in the project (Wood et al., 
2006). Arguably, scoping is the stage where the public should be involved, although this is 
not mandatory (IEMA, 2011). As the identified receptors, impacts and alternatives should 
be assessed on the basis of a reference situation – the so-called ‘do nothing’ or ‘do 
minimum’ scenarios – scoping is linked to a baseline study. In a baseline study the current 
situation in the impact area is described as well as a description of the (quasi-) 
autonomous development that will take place in the impact area when no project is 
implemented.    
The stages of impact prediction, impact evaluation and impact mitigation represent 
the ‘technical core’ of the EIA procedure. Impact prediction is the stage where the impacts 
of a project are predicted by comparing it to the baseline study (Glasson et al., 2012). It 
aims to predict the impacts identified in the scoping stage. Impact evaluation is the stage 
where the significance of the predicted impacts is determined (Glasson et al., 2012). For 
example, one method for evaluating the predicted impacts is to compare them with 
recognized standards for environmental quality and legal criteria, where available. Impact 
mitigation is the stage where measures are identified to avoid, reduce, repair, restore or 
compensate the predicted adverse environmental impacts (Glasson et al., 2012). For 
instance, it may refer to the financial compensation to people that are affected by the 
project. However, impacts that cannot or will not be mitigated should be properly 
documented.      
In the conduct of EIA, in all EU Member States the publication of an environmental 
statement is mandatory. The environmental statement summarizes the steps taken in the 
previous stages of the EIA. In reviewing the statement the quality of the previous stages in 
the EIA is reviewed (Glasson et al., 2012). In the EU guidance mentioned earlier 
checklists can be found to assist reviewers (European Commission, 2001a). In the public 
engagement stage everyone has a right to comment on the environmental statement 
(Glasson et al., 2012). Stakeholders can provide comments to the LPA prior to decision 
consent but public engagement may also take place at an earlier stage. For instance, the 
UK Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG) (2006: 51) has noted 
that “opportunities taken earlier in the process to engage consultees (...) can provide 
beneficial results with few(er) concerns being raised”. In the decision consent stage the 
LPA decides either to authorize or refuse the planning proposal. When the proposal is to 
receive authorization, an ‘application for authorization’ has to be submitted to the LPA 
(Glasson et al., 2012).  
Generally speaking, the stages of monitoring and auditing compare the outcomes 
with the predictions (Glasson et al., 2012). Representing the so-called ‘follow-up’ stages in 
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EIA (Morrison-Saunders and Arts, 2004), it is important to acknowledge that monitoring 
and auditing are not an official part of the planning procedure. Furthermore, they are not 
made mandatory by Directive 2011/92/EU. Monitoring and auditing take place after the 
decision to implement the project has been made. In the monitoring stage the impacts are 
measured over time and across space (Glasson et al., 2012), with the objectives to 
discern the trends and patterns of the impacts during the implementation of the project 
and to identify further mitigation measures. In the auditing stage the predicted impacts and 
mitigation measures are compared with the measured impacts and effectiveness of the 
mitigation measures (Glasson et al., 2012).  
 
1.3 Sustainability in the context of EIA  
 
It has become clear in the previous two sections that EIA is a decision-support tool 
designed to assess the environmental impacts of proposed projects when this is 
mandatory to do so or, in the case of Annex II (European Parliament and the Council of 
the European Union, 2011), when these impacts are likely to be significant (Wood, 2003). 
EIA is often conducted in a structured and standardized way, comprising various 
procedural stages, and it is an integral part of the legislation associated with project 
planning of many rule-competent authorities (Glasson et al., 2012). An interesting aspect 
of EIA relates to the purpose of assessing environmental impacts, particularly in light of 
which objectives to strive for. This section explores whether EIA contributes to 
sustainability and, if this can somehow be ascertained or measured, how this is being 
done. Whilst there has been considerable debate on the reciprocal influence of EIA and 
sustainability (e.g. Pope et al., 2004; Hacking and Guthrie, 2008; Weaver et al., 2008; 
Bond et al., 2013b), to understand the contribution of EIA towards achieving certain 
objectives in the field of sustainability requires a different kind of inquiry.  
As will be shown in Chapter 5 of the thesis, the role and meaning of sustainability 
in the context of assessing the environmental impacts of the HS2 (Phase 1) and A4DS 
projects have by no means proved unambiguous. Indeed, one of the stakeholders in the 
A4DS project argued that “‘[s]ustainable’ is about the most abused word in recent years. 
(...) It doesn’t mean so much to me”3 (Mijn Partij, Interview). Whether this is a widespread 
sentiment or contained in certain echelons of civil society remains to be seen, but it does 
convey the problematic nature of sustainability. That is, the sustainability concept can 
mean different things to different people. Similarly, the role of EIA in mediating the 
attainment of certain objectives deemed desirable can be interpreted in a variety of ways. 
                                                           
3
 Quotations obtained from the interviews as well as paraphrases associated with them have been annotated 
by using the code ‘(Interview)’. The full references for the stakeholders that have been interviewed can be 
found in the References section at the end of thesis.    
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It is therefore imperative that the relationship between sustainability and EIA be better 
understood.    
As stated earlier, the immediate objective of NEPA was to embed the principle of 
ecological rationality into the conduct of project planning (Caldwell, 1998). The post-World 
War II construction era that preceded the enactment of NEPA can be characterized by an 
increased public concern over the role of new technologies in nature preservation and 
conservation issues (Tamiotti and Finger, 2001), which has been mainly vented at the 
local level. At the time sustainability has not been associated with resolving these issues. 
However, the transposition of EIA into the legislation of the EU and its Member States in 
the late 1980s has coincided with the report Our Common Future, also known as the 
‘Brundtland Report’, which was published in 1987 by the World Commission on 
Environment and Development (WCED). In aiming to align the objectives of sustainability 
and development related to economic growth, the WCED (1987: Article 27) has argued 
that a development is sustainable when it ensures “that it meets the needs of the present 
without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs”.  
The concept of sustainable development has had a strong impact on 
environmental decision-making, thereby also marking the onset of transposing 
sustainability objectives into outlining the substantive purpose of EIA (Cashmore, 2004; 
Cashmore et al., 2007; Morrison-Saunders and Retief, 2012). In the thesis the concepts of 
sustainable development and sustainability are used interchangeably, although the latter 
term will often take precedence. Since the introduction of the definition for sustainable 
development as provided by the WCED other definitions have surfaced, for instance 
policy definitions expressed in terms of development that respects the limits set by the 
perceived carrying capacity of the earth (World Conservation Union et al., 1991) and of 
development that meets the demand for equity when catering for the needs of both 
present and future generations (United Nations Conference on Environment and 
Development, 1992), or definitions based on the formulation of a wide array of principles 
through which sustainable development may be harnessed (Gibson et al., 2005). 
Considerations on how EIA should be conducted have developed in tandem with these 
definitions (George, 1999). Analogous to the variance in defining sustainable 
development, the role of EIA in its approach to sustainability may be variously 
conceptualized. 
 Considerations on the scope and focus of sustainability as an object of study in its 
own right have incurred an ongoing transition from EIA as traditionally concerned with the 
immediate biophysical impacts of a proposed project towards a procedure which envelops 
concerns on broader project impacts (Hacking and Guthrie, 2008). It may as such be 
argued that EIA has become a tool principally to assess whether sustainability objectives 
are achieved in project planning. However, the broad scope and focus of sustainability 
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presents constraints on formulating a singular measure of the effectiveness of EIA and 
other assessment procedures in terms of it representing de facto sustainability 
assessment. Bond et al. (2013b) have identified as many as six standards for measuring 
the effectiveness of sustainability assessment: (1) whether the assessment follows certain 
procedures; (2) whether the assessment incurs certain changes in action or outcome; (3) 
whether the assessment satisfies those involved in its conduct; (4) whether the 
assessment satisfies the attainment of certain norms; (5) whether the assessment yields 
support from third parties; and (6) whether the assessment facilitates processes of 
learning and knowledge generation.           
Whether purposefully or as a strategy to also encompass vested economic 
interests, sustainability is and remains a vague term (Mebratu, 1998). It often 
encompasses a fuzzy mix of various objectives ostensibly far removed from one another 
which, in adding insult to injury, may spark semantic riddles such as the ‘sustainability’ of 
the sustainability concept (Faber et al., 2005). As regards the vexed question of how to 
effectively harmonize EIA and principles of sustainability assessment and governance, 
debates in this realm have the propensity to revolve around formulating the substantive 
purpose of conducting impact assessment in project planning. The six standards set out 
by Bond et al. (2013b) may help formulate several purposes of sustainability assessment 
but continue to, albeit deliberately, envisage the scope and focus of sustainability as 
highly diverse. As will be shown in the remainder of the thesis, such diversity has been a 
prime source of debate amongst the HS2 and A4DS stakeholders.          
 
1.4 The role of theory in sustainability discourse mobilization 
 
The function of EIA in achieving sustainability objectives, however these may be defined, 
is an interesting object of study. Because of the ongoing renewal, adaptation or 
refinement of the sustainability concept, not to mention the rejection of conventional 
wisdom, it can be argued that the observed variance in formulating measures of the 
effectiveness of EIA in achieving sustainability objectives is much the result of variance in 
the formulation of such objectives (Bond et al., 2013b). What is more, it can be argued 
that perceptions towards the means for achieving sustainability objectives as held by the 
actors involved in the conduct of EIA often coincide with perceptions towards the purpose 
of the assessment, both as substance (e.g. Cashmore, 2004) and as procedure (e.g. 
O'Faircheallaigh, 2010). Conversely, the ways by which the roles and responsibilities for 
actors are assigned may be able to mediate the perceived utility of EIA in achieving 
certain objectives. This implies that, to use the semantic riddle presented by Faber et al. 
(2005), the sustainability of the sustainability context of EIA is much contingent on factors 
that influence the purpose of the assessment procedure.    
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In order to build a research agenda around this theme of inquiry, part of the focus 
in the EIA literature has shifted towards theory development (e.g. Lawrence, 1997; Bartlett 
and Kurian, 1999; Cashmore, 2004; Weston, 2010). These studies have often hinted 
towards the need to develop theory on the procedural characteristics of EIA or on the 
purpose of the assessment. For instance, in investigating theory on the purpose of making 
decisions better environmentally informed, Bartlett and Kurian (1999) have identified six 
theoretical models that range from the simple processing of environmental information to 
impacting on, and over time making substantive changes to, the institutional arrangement 
of EIA. Models of causation associated with the role of EIA and the purpose of 
assessment are thereby heavily indebted to values and sustainability appraisals (Bartlett 
and Kurian, 1999; Cashmore, 2004).                
A relatively recent development concerns theory development on the broader 
political context of environmental assessment. For example, it can be investigated how 
the distribution of political power among actors involved in environmental assessment 
impacts on decision-making (Richardson, 2005; Richardson and Cashmore, 2011; 
Cashmore and Axelsson, 2012). Furthermore, efforts have been made to grasp the 
influence of external political factors in real-world impact assessment practices. In the 
Masters Thesis by Morgan Boyco (2010), for instance, for the first time there is an attempt 
to show how the political opportunity structures of states impact on the mode through 
which civil society actors may be able to influence decision-making processes within the 
remit of EIA. In investigating the knowledge base of environmental assessment, the 
potential conflict between civil perspectives and more traditional interpretations on the 
authority of science may also be reviewed (Cashmore, 2004; Owens et al., 2004).    
 Political theory specifically tailored to the case of physical planning and 
infrastructure projects has equally surfaced. For instance, it has been advanced that the 
prevalence of novel forms of deliberative decision-making have instilled a new culture of 
dialogue in the road infrastructure planning sector in Sweden (Isaksson et al., 2009). 
Furthermore, it has been advanced that institutional frameworks are able to mediate the 
degree to which projects intent on achieving sustainability objectives are publicly 
supported (Wolsink, 2010). In another Masters Thesis, this one written by Hans Heukels 
and entitled Building Freeways = Building Consensus (2005), valuable effort has been 
made to understand the institutional characteristics of large-scale road infrastructure 
planning. In comparing a motorway capacity expansion project in Australia with the A4DS 
project, and in particular with a focus on the extent to which consensus between local and 
national government has been reached, Heukels (2005) has argued that institutions 
matter a great deal for establishing dialogue between actors.       
The next step in the analysis is to investigate the potential of institutions and 
political culture to mobilize sustainability discourses. The next chapter explicitly seeks to 
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explore the links between models of representative democracy (majoritarian versus 
consensual democracy), democratic satisfaction and political trust being two indicators of 
political culture, and the manifestation of thought and opinion on sustainability. Ultimately, 
the sustainability discourses discerned in the HS2 and A4DS cases are explained as the 
real-world outcome of this theoretical endeavour. As stated earlier, whilst research on 
sustainability discourses associated with EIA have been on the rise in recent years (e.g. 
Wilkins, 2003; Runhaar et al., 2010; Rozema et al., 2012), limited scholarly attention has 
been devoted to understanding how certain of these discourses came to be. By 
investigating their mobilization through institutional design and political culture, this thesis 
contributes to resolving this paucity in research.       
The argument presented thus far has aimed to demonstrate the interplay between 
institutions, political culture, public engagement and sustainability discourse mobilization. 
This will be projected onto the conduct of EIA in the HS2 Phase 1 and A4DS projects. It is 
proposed that important areas of inquiry into the mobilization of sustainability discourses 
relate to both the potentially adverse impacts of a proposed project and the normative 
foundation of the project. Sustainability discourses can illuminate the values and beliefs 
that civil society actors privilege in these rail and road infrastructure projects. A vexed 
question therefore relates to how sustainability discourses come about and are 
articulated. The thesis will argue that a systemic inquiry into democratic institutions and 
political culture is pivotal for investigating the mobilization of sustainability discourses. 
 
1.5 Research questions, aims and practical relevance 
 
1.5.1 Research questions 
 
• Central research question: 
 
To what extent did institutional design and political culture influence the process of 
sustainability discourse mobilization in the EIAs of the HS2 (Phase 1) and A4DS 
infrastructure development projects in the United Kingdom in the Netherlands? 
 
The central research question is aimed towards understanding how institutional design 
and political culture exert influence on the process of sustainability discourse mobilization 
in the EIAs of the HS2 (either as Phase 1 or as a whole) and A4DS projects. Therefore, 
the question is whether institutions and political culture are two structural factors of 
influence in the mobilization of sustainability discourses in EIA. Public engagement serves 
to envisage how the influence exerted by institutions and political culture becomes 
manifest in the relationship between civil society and decision-makers.  
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• Sub-questions: 
 
The sub-questions are categorized on the basis of the concepts they relate to. Three 
concepts are believed to be at the core of the conceptualization: (1) sustainability 
discourse, (2) institutional design and (3) political culture. Each concept is linked to a pair 
of sub-questions. The sub-questions are meant to support the central research question. 
Chapters 5 to 7 of the thesis each contain detailed empirical inquiry into institutional 
design, political culture and sustainability discourse as examined in the two case studies.            
 
On 
sustainability 
discourse: 
1. Which sustainability discourses held by the civil society stakeholders can 
be identified? 
2. To what extent are sustainability discourses in the projects 
accommodated by the different modes of public engagement? 
On institutional 
design: 
3. Which institutions and institutional design choices have played a central 
role in the projects? 
4. To what extent have the different institutional designs of the projects been 
able to influence the mode of public engagement? 
On political 
culture: 
5. What are the survey results of certain criteria involved with democratic 
satisfaction and political trust in the UK and the Netherlands? 
6. To what extent have democratic satisfaction and political trust been able 
to influence the interaction between decision-makers and civil society? 
Table 1.2: Sub-questions 
 
1.5.2 Aims 
 
This thesis aims to provide a novel theoretical perspective by linking EIA to institutions 
and political culture. Institutions are considered decisive in transposing the political 
preferences of citizens into valued decision outcomes (Goodin, 1996). The UK and the 
Netherlands each represent a distinct model of representative democracy. This is 
embodied in the distinction between majoritarian democracy (the ‘Westminster model’) 
and consensual democracy (the ‘Rhineland model’) (Lijphart, 2012). However, it will be 
debated whether representative democracy is able to reach out to modes of decision-
making that advocate a more direct and reciprocal relationship between decision-makers 
and citizens. Political culture, on its part, designates the attitudes of citizens towards the 
conduct of politics and towards the democratic institutions of the democratic state. A rich 
and heterogeneous landscape of civil society actors may bolster concerted action and 
commitment to influencing decisions bearing a high degree of citizen interest. Almond and 
Verba (1963: 3), founding fathers of the political culture concept, have argued that a 
politically engaged citizenry is an essential element for the “democratic model of the 
participatory state”.  
In linking institutions and political culture to the process of sustainability discourse 
mobilization, the thesis places heavy emphasis on the role of civil society. As Chapter 2 
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will demonstrate, civil manifestations in the conduct of politics are to a large extent shaped 
by democratic institutions. Institutions influence the performance of the democratic 
system, not least with regards to the liberty and equality of people (Foweraker and 
Krznaric, 2000). In the famous 1863 Gettysburg Address Abraham Lincoln advanced that 
freedom is analogous to a “government of the people, by the people, for the people” (cited 
in Schmidt, 2002: 147). This proposition certainly emphasizes the relationship between 
government and civil society but leaves ample room for interpretation on how this should 
best be anchored in the conduct of politics. Furthermore, the attitudes towards democracy 
that citizens hold shape the way with which ‘binding collective choices’ are made 
(Jasanoff, 2005). Civil society is endowed with considerable agency to exert influence on 
the tone of debate, thereby possibly mediating decision outcomes.  
As discourse informs the values and beliefs that people privilege in certain 
decision-making arenas (Hajer, 1995), particularly those that can be characterized by 
matters relating to the public good, it is pertinent to know how such arenas mobilize 
discourses. Put differently, an explicit aim of the thesis is to know how the characteristics 
of a decision-making arena are partially or perhaps even directly proportional to discourse 
mobilization. By having singled out institutional design and political culture as two potent 
characteristics of EIA, consequently mediating public engagement with the conduct of 
impact assessment, valuable research can be conducted on the mobilization of 
sustainable discourses. For example, it is apt to shed light on claims such as those made 
by Dryzek et al. (2002), who have argued that the discourse of ecological modernization 
became popular in Norway, gained limited headway in Germany and was very difficult to 
achieve in the UK, states which have different institutional designs and political cultures.  
Logically derived from the enlisted research question, as well as from what is 
stated above, three aims can be identified. The research questions can be read as some 
sort of a problem statement, i.e. a gap currently identified in the literature that this thesis 
aims to fill. Subsequently, the aims of the research transpose such a problem statement 
into a statement of ambition or motivation. The three aims are the following:     
 
1. To understand the ‘fit’ between the mobilization of sustainability discourses and EIA. 
Whilst EIA is a tool aimed at making decisions better environmentally informed, this by 
no means suggests that this procedure is suitable for investigating sustainability 
discourse mobilization. It is possible that the influence exerted by institutional design 
and political culture cannot be reconciled with the legal context of EIA; conversely, the 
institutional and cultural shaping of sustainability discourses may take place wholly 
beyond the legal context.  
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2. To understand the relationship between sustainability discourses and their institutional 
and cultural contexts. The thesis conceptualizes discourse mobilization as being 
shaped by institutional design and political culture. Institutional and cultural differences 
result in diverse modes of public engagement and which subsequently may lead to 
different sustainability discourses. It is therefore interesting to see how any difference 
between majoritarian and consensual democracy, in conjunction with variance in 
democratic satisfaction and political trust, corresponds with the manifestation of 
sustainability considerations in discourse. 
 
3. To understand the institutional and politico-cultural influences on public engagement in 
the cases. One underlying aim of the thesis is that it aims to illuminate the cross-
linkages and relational fields between core concepts. This certainly applies to the 
influence on public engagement exerted by institutional design and political culture. 
Public engagement is a central tenet in sustainability discourse mobilization, linking 
institutional design and political culture to sustainability discourses (see also Figure 
2.1 in Chapter 2). Considering that public engagement ‘does not fall from the sky’, so 
to speak, it is pertinent to investigate its institutional and cultural origins.   
 
1.5.3 Practical relevance 
 
A statement on practical relevance is intimately linked to the internal methodological logic 
of the thesis. To be able to make theoretical claims on how institutions and political culture 
shape sustainability discourses in the context of EIA is only half the story; for it to gain 
practical relevance they need to be brought into in the real world. This thesis certainly 
alludes to the energy and excitement currently displayed in (sustainability) discourse 
analysis in EIA (e.g. Runhaar et al., 2010), which is still relatively young and unruly. 
However, it attempts to do more than just that: in contrast to most discursive studies, it 
aims to understand why certain discourses are more popular than others by bedding them 
in the concepts of institutions and political culture.  
For example, whilst the statement that ecological modernization has made 
considerable headway in the Netherlands in the 1990s but not in the UK is very valuable 
(Hajer, 1995; Dryzek et al., 2002). Subsequently this inspires critical inquiry into how such 
divergence has come about. Is it something in the system characteristics of the British 
democratic system that prevents ecological modernization from taking off? Have 
radicalism and protest-like forms of public engagement in the Netherlands been 
exchanged for one led by cooptation of the environmental movement? Or does the 
divergence between states coincide with different views as to what extent EIA is an 
effective decision-support tool for achieving sustainability objectives?        
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 These questions place heavy emphasis on the role of civil society within the 
mobilization of sustainability discourses in EIA. It is by no means a certainty that 
democratic states treat citizens and civil society groups as dignified and respected 
interlocutors in decision-making processes. Conversely, being subjected to a political 
system which takes the due representation of the vox populi as its primary object, there 
can be wide convergence to the level of citizens’ satisfaction with democracy (e.g. 
Anderson and Guillory, 1997). When it is accepted that EIA and other sustainability 
arenas should not be regarded in isolation, but rather as a function of the political 
environment, then it becomes practically relevant to come to realize that the decisions 
made for making the world more sustainable are much the result of how people deal with 
each other – instead of finding a rational solution to an identifiable problem.       
 When people feel disgruntled and neglected in contentious arenas of decision-
making – emphatically called the ‘politically embittered’ (Kaase, 1999) – then the 
democratic ideal shows its limitations. Or does it? Experiences from the two case studies 
suggest that very rich and heterogeneous forms of public engagement – within EIA or 
somewhere else – co-evolve with the institutional design choices of states, much 
transpiring beyond the confines of authority. It is the self-organizational capacity of civil 
society to cluster around and exercise voice in issues to which it ascribes a great deal of 
affinity that is relevant for reconsidering orthodox interpretations of the political identity of 
citizens, one which Lippmann (1927) coined ‘bystander’ a long time ago. Thinking about 
new configurations of the interfaces between political authority, civil society and the 
particular designs of the democratic state is therefore a useful explorative exercise.    
The choice to compare the institutions and political cultures UK and the 
Netherlands has been far from arbitrary. Indeed, the difference between Westminster and 
Rhineland versions of representative democracy is now commonplace in the comparative 
politics literature (e.g. Huber and Bingham Powell Jr., 1994; Anderson and Guillory, 1997; 
Hendriks and Michels, 2010; Lockhart, 2011; Lijphart, 2012). Whereas the UK is the 
unofficial birthplace of simple majority rule, the Netherlands befits the broader tradition on 
the European continent that propagates consensus politics. This typology has proved a 
source of continued inspiration for comparative national research. Barring political 
scandals or other extraordinary events that have the potential to undermine democratic 
systems, the UK and the Netherlands showcase an enduring commitment to their own 
principles of making democracy work. Ceteris paribus, the thesis espouses the 
assumption that the democratic systems of the two states are stable, that their democratic 
traditions will endure, and that they therefore qualify for a valid comparison.  
Taking into account all that is said above, it should be stressed that national 
comparative research on sustainability discourse mobilization aims to make insightful how 
and why discourses may thrive at the expense of others. Ultimately, this is where the 
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discursive orientation of civil society is levered. By making this statement, the thesis 
reaches out to a number of academic audiences. For physical planning theorists, the 
thesis articulates that planning disputes should not be disconnected from the broader 
democratic context. For democratic theorists, the thesis provides two exemplary case 
studies where the real-world value of talking about democratic contexts is manifested. For 
EIA scholars, the thesis shows that there is more than meets the eye when a project is 
‘suddenly’ confronted with civil society opposition. And for those interested in public 
engagement, the thesis shows that modes for engagement can be both the result of the 
broader democratic context and the means to understanding discourse mobilization.      
 
1.6 Outline 
 
This thesis comprises nine chapters. Chapter 2 is the theoretical framework and 
investigates four core concepts: institutions, political culture, public engagement and 
sustainability discourses. It provides a conceptual scheme on sustainability discourse 
mobilization where these concepts are linked, and some ideas will be proffered on how 
this can be used to explain the mobilization of sustainability discourses in EIA. Thus, the 
orchestration of participatory mechanisms and institutions in the implementation of EIA is 
an important facet of the theoretical framework.  
Chapter 3 provides the research design. As mentioned, the empirical chapters in 
this thesis will be scrutinizing the HS2 (Phase 1) and A4DS projects in the UK and the 
Netherlands. Whilst some of the methods for data collection and analysis broadly fall 
under the remit of established traditions in the social sciences, such as face-to-face 
interviewing and textual data coding, particularly the use of abductive inference – 
entrenched in a critical realist research approach to understanding social reality – will offer 
potentially new insights on processes of sustainability discourse mobilization.  
In Chapter 4 the case studies are introduced. It will pay particular attention to the 
historical chronology of the project, a detailed description of the infrastructure schemes, 
the project objectives, extant sustainability considerations, the main strategic alternatives 
to the projects, and an overview of the actors involved in deliberating the proposed 
infrastructure capacity expansions – called ‘stakeholders’ by virtue of the project context.   
Chapters 5, 6 and 7 are the empirical chapters of the thesis. Chapter 5 deals with 
the identification of sustainability discourses in the project; Chapter 6 investigates the role 
of institutional design in the projects; and Chapter 7 looks at the role of political culture. 
The empirical investigation dwells on over forty face-to-face interviews with stakeholders, 
as well as the exploration of a number of primary documents and newspaper articles 
reporting on the projects. The outputs will be collated, synthesized and presented as 
findings in these chapters. 
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Chapter 8 discusses the findings from the previous three chapters. In particular, it 
pays attention to a dominant challenger of the tripartite model of institutional design, 
political culture and sustainability discourses: the influence on sustainability discourse 
mobilization exerted by the role of science and counter-expertise. The observed 
prominence of the use of counter-expertise by civil society stakeholders in the two 
projects has beckoned further inquiry into how science has led to hot-headed disputes on 
the rights and wrongs of certain assumptions made in infrastructure project appraisal – 
despite the oft-heard claim on increased rationality in the decision-making process. 
Finally, Chapter 9 concludes by formulating answers to the research questions. It 
will also attempt to convey whether the three formulated overarching aims have been 
achieved and what else can be done to take EIA out of its procedural confinements and 
placing it in the broader democratic context. As a final act, it will provide recommendations 
on future research on sustainability discourse mobilization through an ex post evaluation 
of the findings. It aims to renew interest in research on sustainability governance that 
grapples with the mobilization of new discursive horizons.      
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Chapter 2 Theoretical framework 
 
This chapter sets out the theoretical framework of the thesis. The chapter attempts to link 
core concepts by means of drawing a coherent conceptual scheme that consists of 
democratic institutions, political culture, public engagement and sustainability discourses. 
Ultimately the scheme will represent a phenomenon that is referred to as ‘sustainability 
discourse mobilization’, taking place within the context of EIA and other domains of 
sustainability decision-support. As the introduction (Chapter 1) has already briefly touched 
upon, there is an enormous potential as well as a strong incentive to forge links between 
the various constitutive elements of the analysis in this thesis, particularly in light of the 
much needed extension and expansion of theory on the role of EIA in broader political and 
physical planning contexts (Lawrence, 1997; 2000; Cashmore, 2004; Weston, 2010).  
Throughout the chapter – as well as through the empirical chapters – the concept 
of civil society is deployed. Civil society can be understood as a community consisting of 
individuals and organizations that are committed to political issues of high public interest. 
It can be defined either as a political community (Jasanoff, 2005) or civic community 
(Putnam, 1993), depending on whether the emphasis is placed on institutions or culture 
(see Sub-section 2.2.3). When civil society involvement is reframed in terms of exerting 
influence in decision-making, institutions and a form of culture specifically tailored to 
politics – ‘political culture’ – represent two dominant forms of influencing the modus 
operandi or even modus Vivendi of civil society in the face of political authority, not to 
mention the role and function of public engagement as an integral aspect of the policy 
process. An institutional form of influence broadly refers to the regulated and authority-
sanctioned means through which civil society is able to exercise political voice (Fung and 
Wright, 2003). A cultural form of influence broadly refers to the satisfaction with 
democracy and political trust that may (or may not) be found amongst certain echelons of 
civil society (Inglehart, 1988).  
The chapter aims to show that institutions and political culture represent two forms 
of influence shaping the political manifestation of civil society. Thus, the inclusion of 
institutions and political culture in this thesis serves the purpose of providing a structural 
basis for attempting to explain extant modes of public engagement in the democratic 
state. Whilst previous studies have attempted to show how institutional arrangements 
exert influence on public attitudes towards government performance (e.g. Anderson and 
Guillory, 1997), or conversely how the cultural fabric of society exerts influence on 
government performance (Putnam, 1993), explanations of the shape that public 
engagement takes remain understudied. Therefore, the shaping potential of institutions 
and political culture needs to become analytically anchored, thereby ultimately leading to 
the development of a functional relationship with public engagement.  
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However, the theoretical framework does not limit itself to analyzing this functional 
relationship. Questions remain as to how modes of public engagement influence 
processes of discourse mobilization. That is, once agreed that civil society actors engage 
with policy issues bearing a high degree of public interest, how do discursive engineers 
amongst them organize a regime of ‘think, speak and do’ within a set of institutional and 
cultural opportunities and constraints? The prime driver for taking this next step is the 
assumption that the promulgation of certain discourses is not premised on chance, 
happenstance, contingency or haphazardness; indeed, with regards to sustainability, 
‘popular’ discourses seem to correspond well with dominant views on the tenets of 
democratic representation and deliberation in sustainability decision-making and the 
ascribed role of citizens herein (Hajer, 2003). It is from this perspective that discourses 
should be envisaged as much the result of institutional arrangements as it is a story of civil 
society actors trying to transmit certain values by means of thinking what they think, 
saying what they say, doing what they do and being what they are.         
Conversely, discourses have in recent years become recognized as important for 
studying political manifestations of civil society. Static accounts of ‘civil society’, ‘the 
public’ or ‘citizens’ do not fare well with the formative role of discourse in shaping the 
public engagement landscape, irrespective of whether such engagement is within or 
beyond formal institutions. In referring to emergent discursive criticisms relating to 
traditional ways of analyzing manifestations of public contestation, for instance, 
Koopmans and Statham (1999) have argued that “[f]or the analysis of political contention 
in democratic polities, we can no longer stick to the rigid dichotomies between challengers 
and members of the polity, or between (unconventional, disruptive) protest and other more 
institutional or conventional forms of collective claims-making”. Therefore, besides their 
rapid anchorage as objects of study, discourses reciprocate the political manifestation of 
civil society. Not only is such reciprocity reflected in conceptualizations of sustainability 
policy such as ecological modernization (Dryzek et al., 2002); reciprocity also exists 
between discourse and the institutional system characteristics of the democratic state 
(Hajer, 1995). 
Notwithstanding the many links that have become visible so far, still more links 
describing patterns of reciprocity and interdependence need to be forged between the 
core concepts of the theoretical framework. Although institutions and political culture act 
independently from each other in influencing the mode of public engagement, the thesis 
has adopted the view that they are reciprocal. Various ways have been conceived to 
describe this kind of reciprocity, for example by using the concepts of co-evolution or co-
production (Jasanoff, 2005). Furthermore, dominant sustainability discourses may be 
‘game-changers’ in the longer term. When certain sustainability discourses have a broad 
support base and have proved to be able to endure, such as is the case with the 
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discourse of ecological modernization (Hajer, 1995; Mol et al., 2010), planning authorities 
may want to set up institutions that can be deployed to support them. Simultaneously, 
public attitudes towards planning and decision-making processes and towards those 
elected or appointed to represent are nurtured following the influence of sustainability 
discourses. In bringing it together in a model for sustainability discourse mobilization, 
Figure 2.1 sums up the assumed reciprocity and interdependence between institutions, 
political culture, public engagement and sustainability discourses.        
 
 
Figure 2.1: Conceptual scheme of sustainability discourse mobilization 
 
This chapter comprises four sections. The first section introduces theory on institutions of 
the democratic state. Specifically, it uses the concept of institutional design, which 
designates the assemblage of political institutions in expressing values and reflecting 
public concern with public policy issues (Goodin, 1996; Peters, 2005). The second section 
introduces theory on political culture. In order to pin down this vast concept, the focus is 
on democratic satisfaction and political trust. The third section introduces theory on 
discourses in general and sustainability discourses in particular. By doing so it will put 
centre-stage important concepts in the analysis of (sustainability) discourses. The fourth 
section aims to combine these three theoretical strands by looking at the roles of 
institutional design and political culture in the mobilization of sustainability discourses in 
EIA. Therefore, it will further explore the conceptual scheme as presented in Figure 2.1. In 
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this section the multifaceted roles of public engagement in the conduct of environmental 
impact assessment will take centre-stage. 
 
2.1 Institutions 
 
This section comprises theory on institutions. By being able to set the tone for debate in 
democratic institutions, March and Olsen (1989: 18) have asserted that “political 
institutions define the framework within which politics take place”, thereby referring to 
institutions not only as formal organizations, such as the parliament, but also to informal 
organizational arrangements where rules, norms, routines and values permeate the 
conduct of political decision-making. The importance of institutions has also been 
recognized in specific realms of decision-making, such as planning (Healey, 1997; Moroni, 
2010). It is from this assertion that the theoretical framework has focused on 
understanding norm-driven planning processes that take place within institutions. This is 
in contrast to the assumption of value neutrality in more ‘engineeristic’ approaches to 
decision-making in planning issues, which argues that there is shared agreement over the 
goals to be attained and the issues to be solved (Moroni, 2010).       
 The institutions that will be considered in the thesis are, on the one hand, the 
democratic institutions of the state, and on the other, the institutions which are used in 
decision-making processes, such as the use of citizen juries or adherence to expert 
advice in order to make decisions better informed. As will become clear, institutions are 
conceived as transcending their formal environments ascribed to them by the ‘Old 
Institutionalism’ (Peters, 2005), which argues that ‘institution’ and ‘organization’, are 
relatively similar concepts. Instead, from the viewpoint of looking at the process of the 
mobilization of shared perception, a more valuable perspective is forwarded by the ‘New 
Institutionalism’ (March and Olsen, 1984; 1989; for an application of new institutionalism in 
EIA, see Leknes, 2001), which alludes to the much more fluid conception of institutions as 
rules, norms, values, regulations or routines that shape the actions and behaviours of 
individuals. Therefore, state institutions and those institutions deployed in decision-making 
settings matter a great deal for shaping the political manifestation of civil society.   
 In their function as normative or regulatory frameworks in the democratic state, 
institutions can popularly be regarded as recognized nodes or hubs where interaction with 
citizens is accommodated. What ensues from the civil interaction with institutions may well 
culminate in new understandings of the political desires and ambitions of citizens that 
cannot simply have been the sum of individual preferences. Indeed, something changes in 
the actions and behaviours of the subscribers to institutions and in the fabric of society 
more broadly. Rather than conceptualizing democracy as a system of preference 
aggregation, the thesis has espoused the view that democracy is integrative and that its 
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institutions are heavily involved in creating or modifying ‘democratic citizens’ (March and 
Olsen, 1989). Integrative democracy, as opposed to aggregative democracy, therefore 
alludes to the political emancipation or liberation of citizens and to securing their influence 
in decision-making as a form of public entitlement.            
 Whilst institutions can be considered to unleash the democratic character of civil 
society, the specific nature of norms, rules and routines dealing with political conduct can 
impact substantively on how this will be done. Secondly, and greatly extending inquiry into 
democratic procedure, is whether and how citizens may shape their views on public goods 
issues in conformance with the normative premises of institutional frameworks. March and 
Olsen (1989) have argued that the influence of institutions on their human subjects follows 
a ‘logic of appropriateness’, which proposes that citizens act in accordance as well as 
accept the outcomes of their actions on the basis of what they view as the principles 
underlying the institutions they ascribe to. In the context of the thesis, institution-driven 
views on ‘appropriate’ behaviour that should be expected from democratic citizens exerts 
definitive influence on modes of public engagement            
As has been argued earlier, institutions are active at two different levels: 1) the 
level at which democratic representation is put into practice; and 2) the level at which 
public engagement in arenas of decision-making is accommodated, the prominent arena 
to be discussed being EIA. Although seemingly dualistic, at closer inspection the 
difference between institutions governing at the state level and those in more local 
settings will become increasingly blurred. It is believed that the traditions and routines of 
representation in the democratic process reverberates in even the smallest political 
nucleus; conversely, institutions that form the cornerstone of the deliberation between 
decision-makers and civil society in the governance of public policy issues could well 
facilitate new best practices with regards to democratic representation.      
In order to converge to such multi-level reciprocity, institutions can be assembled 
in the concept of institutional design (Goodin, 1996; Lowndes and Wilson, 2001). 
Following Goodin (1996: 31), institutional design is defined as “the creation of an 
actionable form to promote valued outcomes in a particular context”. Besides giving a 
manifestation of intention of shaping outcomes, possibly to strengthen normative 
institutional underpinnings, institutional design also alludes to a more holistic interpretation 
of the workings and dealings of the democratic system at multiple levels. This holds 
implications not only for a discussion of the conceptual premises of democracy, but also 
for roles and responsibilities ascribed to actors and, ultimately, the acceptance of decision 
outcomes. These implications will be made clear by looking at four aspects of institutional 
design: 1) the foundation of democracy; 2) systems of representative democracy; 3) 
democratic performance; and 4) the deliberative conduct of democracy.             
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2.1.1 The foundation of the democratic system 
 
Democracy can be defined as a political system that is ruled by the people (Held, 2006). 
The idealistic undertone of this definition – dēmos kratos (in ancient Greek): the people 
rule – can be readily discerned. However, research has shown that it is decisively more 
difficult to put the democratic ideal into practice. The variety of democratic systems the 
world over attests to the complexity of letting the people rule (Held, 2006), not to mention 
the myriad democratic sub-types that can be identified. In the search for similarities 
among modern democratic states, virtually all of them adhere to a representative form of 
the people’s rule. In representative democracy people are represented in the legislative 
branch of the state, the latter of which is almost always elected. Most discussions relating 
to the functioning of the democratic system therefore pertain to the breath and width of 
representation (Dahl, 1971).  
 Representative democracy can be characterized as a system where the political 
role of citizens is by no means standardized (Skelcher et al., 2011). The extent to which 
citizens can engage politically in representative democracy, whether as individuals or as a 
group, can be measured by identifying dimensions that deal with engagement. Set within 
this logic, Dahl (1971) has identified public contestation and participation as two 
dimensions imperative to representative democracy. The dimension of contestation deals 
with the opportunities provided to the public by the democratic system to contest 
governments as well as political decisions. The dimension of participation deals with the 
opportunities provided to become included in the political process. It is as such 
synonymous to the concept of inclusiveness (Coppedge et al., 2008). When taken 
together, the dimensions represent a measure with which representative democratic 
systems can be compared. It is also argued that certain political and civil freedoms are 
vital for facilitating public contestation and participation, such as the freedoms of 
expression and association (Dahl, 1971). Without such freedoms the opportunities for 
citizens to contest and participate would be severely constrained. 
 Indicators for the extent of contestation and participation are invaluable for 
measuring the process of democratization. Indeed, reports that relate to the progress of 
states to transit from authoritarianism towards democracy are mainly based on indicators 
associated with contestation and participation (Coppedge et al., 2008). However, 
democratization is subject to ongoing renewal, an observation which reflects the infinite 
character of improvements that can be made on the dimensions of contestation and 
participation (Dahl, 1971). Democratization may therefore also refer to the ‘never-ending 
quest’ of established democracies to improve their responsiveness towards citizen 
preferences (Diamond, 1999). Furthermore, following Tilly (2007), inherent in all 
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democracies is the ‘state-citizen struggle’ which designates the perpetual conflicting 
relationship between the actions of states and the political preferences of citizens.       
 Because of the time period in which Dahl (1971) conceptualized the foundation of 
democracy, contestation and participation have been mainly framed in terms of universal 
suffrage. This type of suffrage denotes the right to vote and the right to become elected. In 
more recent times a discussion has emerged that deals with the extent of citizen 
engagement with democracy, however. This discussion concerns the difference between 
what is coined as ‘electoral democracy’ and ‘liberal democracy’ (Diamond, 1999). 
Electoral democracy limits participation to voting and ascribes political power to the 
political elites of the legislative and executive branches of government (Schumpeter, 
1954). However, the proposed role of voting as the single locus for citizen engagement 
with democracy has been challenged by proponents of liberal democracy. This 
perspective advocates opportunities for citizen engagement beyond suffrage (Diamond, 
1999). Elections cease to be the sole expression of the nation’s political life. In liberal 
democracy the means to contest and participate are continuously available to citizens. As 
will be shown later, the current discussion on the breadth and width citizen engagement is 
in considerable momentum.     
 
2.1.2 Majoritarian versus consensual democracy 
 
Two systems can be discerned that propose distinct interpretations of representative 
democracy (Lijphart, 2012). The first system is majoritarian democracy which embraces 
simple majority rule. Ipso facto, in a majoritarian democracy the majority of the people 
makes the decisions. Majoritarian democracy is mainly practiced in Commonwealth states 
and can be traced back to British democratic rule. The second system is consensual 
democracy where decisions are made by “as many people as possible” (Lijphart, 2012: 2). 
It stipulates the desirability of a wide public mandate to make decisions (Skelcher et al., 
2011). Switzerland, Belgium and the Netherlands are considered good examples of 
consensual democracy (Anderson and Guillory, 1997; Lockhart, 2011; Lijphart, 2012). 
Lijphart (2012) has identified two dimensions where the difference between 
majoritarian and consensual democracy can be fleshed out: 1) the executives-parties 
dimension and 2) the federal-unitary dimension. The executive-parties dimension deals 
with the relationship between the executive and legislative branches of government and 
the distribution of political power amongst political parties. The federal-unitary dimension 
deals with the concentration of political power in core political entities or its diffusion in 
sub-entities. Whilst the first dimension is concerned with the level to which political power 
and responsibility for decision-making are shared, the second dimension is concerned 
with the level to which such power and responsibility are divided (Goodin, 1996). As a 
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strong focus of the thesis is on institutions that facilitate a sharing of the decision-making 
mandate, the executives-parties dimension is used as a prime institutional theory. 
 The executives-parties dimension consists of five variables (Lijphart, 2012). In 
majoritarian democracies 1) the executive branch of government often consists of a single 
political party, 2) the executive branch dominates the legislative branch of government, 3) 
political debate in Parliament is basically made up of two dominant parties focusing on 
socio-economic issues, 4) voting is based on majority rule and the winner-takes-all 
principle, and 5) there is competition between government and interest groups in decision-
making. In contrast, in consensual democracies 1) the executive branch of government is 
often a coalition of political parties, 2) the relationship between the executive and 
legislative branches of government is balanced, 3) political debate in Parliament is made 
up of multiple political parties focusing on multiple issues, 4) voting is based on 
proportional representation and 5) there is coordination between government and interest 
groups in decision-making. Table 2.1 provides an overview of the five variables on the 
executive-parties dimension.      
 
Majoritarian democracy Consensual democracy 
1. The executive branch of government 
consists of a single political party 
1. The executive branch of government 
consists of multiple political parties 
2. The executive branch dominates the 
legislative branch of government 
2. There is balance between the executive 
and legislative branches of government 
3. Two-party system. Focus on socio-
economic issues 3. Multiparty system. Focus on multiple issues 
4. Voting is based on majority rule and the 
winner-takes-all principle 
4. Voting is based on proportional 
representation 
5. Competition between government and 
interest groups in decision-making 
5. Coordination between government and 
interest groups in decision-making 
Table 2.1: The executives-parties dimension in representative democracy (based on Lijphart, 2012)  
 
The electoral rules of the democratic system are directly related to the dimensions of 
public contestation and participation (Dahl, 1971). Electoral outcomes in majoritarian 
democracies are based on the results of individual, single-member parliamentary 
constituency in which the winner of the election ‘takes all’; that is, the single district seat in 
the national parliament (Lijphart, 2012). Two political parties in the majoritarian system 
usually win the preponderance of seats, for instance Labour and Conservatives in the UK. 
Supporters of small political parties may as such feel that voting is a waste of time 
(Banducci et al., 1999). Consequently, small political parties such as green parties are 
often unable to contest the incumbent political powers through their representation in 
parliament. In contrast, in consensual democracies electoral outcomes are proportionate 
to the votes cast by the population of the parliamentary constituency (Lijphart, 2012). The 
number of seats in parliament mirrors the number of votes of all parliamentary 
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constituencies, which together with a low legal threshold often yields a large number of 
political parties (Bingham Powell Jr. and Vanberg, 2000).    
The nature of the relationships between and within the executive and legislative 
branches of government designates the institutional capacity of democratic systems to 
distribute political power. Institutional capacity may subsequently bear consequences for 
the interaction between states and civil society actors. The modality of such interaction 
essentially involves the anchorage of the ‘primacy-of-politics’ principle in the democratic 
system (Klijn and Skelcher, 2007). This principle grants political power to elected 
representatives much at the expense of civil society actors. Skelcher et al. (2011) have 
argued that in a majoritarian democracy power is concentrated in the representative 
institutions of the state. In contrast, the institutions of consensual democracy can be 
considered as better equipped to also devolving power to civil society actors (Skelcher et 
al., 2011). Majoritarian democracy is therefore closer to the primacy-of-politics principle 
than consensual democracy. 
 In order to design institutions that are able to accommodate political plurality in 
consensual democracies, corporatism has come to the advent of state-civil society 
interaction (Hendriks, 2011). Corporatism refers to the mode of institutionalized 
negotiation between states and interest groups taking place at regular intervals. It 
specifically refers to the fifth variable of Lijphart’s (2012) executives-parties dimension. In 
contrast to the confrontational tactics often deployed by both states and interest groups in 
majoritarian democracies, which is reportedly the case in the UK (Gallagher et al., 2005), 
corporatist structures facilitate dialogue, reciprocity of viewpoints and a piecemeal 
transmission of civil interests into the political process. This has been especially true in the 
tripartite negotiations between the state, employer organizations and labour unions. In 
highly dynamic decision arenas, such as sustainability management, corporatism 
continues to seek new spaces for consensual decision-making (De Vos and Van 
Tatenhove, 2011).       
 
2.1.3 Democratic performance 
 
It is important to consider whether the observed difference between majoritarian and 
consensual democracy has an effect on the quality of the democratic system. According 
to Dahl (1971: 1), the basic critical function of representative democracy is “the continuing 
responsiveness of the government to the preferences of its citizens”. However, an 
unambiguous protocol of how to build a responsive democratic system seems to be 
lacking. Responsiveness can be contingent on the institutional capacity to include the 
preferences of all citizens by virtue of a broad landscape of political parties (Dahl, 1971; 
Lijphart, 2012), but the ‘overindulgence’ of partisan representation and the need to 
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establish coalition governments may conversely compromise the ability of citizens to incur 
a change of government  (Kaiser et al., 2002). In having discussed the foundation of the 
democratic system, which is essentially based on the dimensions of public contestation 
and participation (Dahl, 1971), it can be argued that responsive decision-making involves 
a strong focus on procedure and public entitlements in the democratic debate. The 
concept of democratic performance is deployed to accommodate this focus.        
Democratic performance refers to the ability of states to anchor democratic norms 
and rights in the political system. As regards norms, democratic performance is “the 
degree to which a system meets such democratic norms as representativeness, 
accountability, equality and participation” (Lijphart, 1993: 149). As regards rights, well-
functioning democracies must be able to guarantee the anchorage of political rights, civil 
rights, property rights and minority rights (Foweraker and Krznaric, 2000). Norms and 
rights can become legally codified through the constitutional principles of the rule of law 
and the sovereignty of the people (Foweraker and Krznaric, 2000). The principle 
pertaining to the rule of law protects citizens from unlawful state action and safeguards 
essential citizens’ rights and freedoms. The principle pertaining to the sovereignty of the 
people deals with the quality of the democratic system to hold the incumbent government 
accountable to the citizenry (Foweraker and Krznaric, 2000).        
Norms and rights are public entitlements that must ensure the inclusion of the 
virtues of liberty and equality in the decision-making process (Foweraker and Krznaric, 
2000). Liberty corresponds to the idea that citizens must be able to develop their personal 
and political life spheres. Equality is premised on the political equality of all. The concept 
of democratic performance therefore involves measures of freedom and fairness in the 
conduct of democracy, which demarcates it from performance as measured by the 
effectiveness of democratic governments to make decisions (Foweraker and Krznaric, 
2000; Lowndes and Wilson, 2001). Some governments may undoubtedly be performing 
better than others in delivering ‘political goods’ (Roller, 2005), yet such performance refers 
to the quantity rather than the quality of democracy.       
The performance of democratic states can be measured quantitatively. Foweraker 
and Krznaric (2000) have enlisted a large number of quantitative studies that aim to 
measure democratic performance. Quantitative studies often compare states on the basis 
of certain indicators (e.g. Coppedge et al., 2008), such as the ‘Dahlian’ indicators of 
contestation and participation (the latter also being called ‘inclusiveness’). With regards to 
public engagement, however, the quantification of democratic performance fails to 
understand the subjective experience of citizens in the political realm. More specifically, it 
is unable to inquire into the civil legitimacy of democratic decision-making. Civil legitimacy 
involves a public appraisal of the fairness of democratic procedures and of the popular 
support for decision outcomes (Clark et al., 2006). An appraisal of fairness in the context 
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of public engagement can subsequently be linked to the perceived availability of 
opportunities for contestation and participation (Dahl, 1971). 
Civil legitimacy is an integral aspect of democratic performance in the sense that it 
improves the scope for assessing the attainment of democratic norms and rights. 
Furthermore, the concept of civil legitimacy can be extended to discuss the demand for 
legitimacy on the input side and the output side of democracy (Scharpf, 1999). Whereas 
the input side deals with procedural fairness, the output side deals with the competence of 
governments to transpose the political preferences of citizens into real decisions. These 
forms of democratic legitimacy are interrelated as the transposition of political preferences 
is contingent on the democratic norms and rights of the political system, the latter of which 
will more likely be judged as adequate when citizen preferences become transposed. In 
linking the input and output sides to norms and rights, democratic performance may 
therefore be extended to also considering democratic legitimacy (Fung and Wright, 2003). 
Such considerations reflect the need for the inclusion of norms and rights in both 
democratic procedures and decision outcomes.                      
 In returning to the difference between majoritarian and consensual democracy in 
the context of democratic performance, Kaiser et al. (2002) have argued that majoritarian 
systems are generally more responsive to citizen preferences than consensual systems. 
Majoritarian democracy is generally less capable of including citizen preferences due to a 
bare majority in the executive branch of government but its ability to incur a change of 
government through elections greatly improves its overall responsiveness (Kaiser et al., 
2002). When related to democratic performance, particularly in terms of democratic 
norms, this system characteristic scores high on accountability. However, rebuttals to this 
argument have pointed out that winner-takes-all elections in majoritarian democracies limit 
the number of political parties with the potential to rule (Lijphart, 2012). A change of 
government therefore does not necessarily fully reflect the political preferences of the 
citizenry. Notwithstanding minor changes in the executive branch of government, political 
preferences of the median voter are better catered for in consensual democracies (Huber 
and Bingham Powell Jr., 1994; Birchfield and Crepaz, 1998). Consensual democracy 
therefore scores high on representation. 
 
2.1.4 Deliberative forms of democracy 
 
The conceptual foundation of democratic performance is based on the assumption that 
representation is the primary means through which citizens can exercise political voice. 
From a descriptive point of view it may also be argued that the institutional make-up of 
majoritarian and consensual democracy considers representation to be axiomatic. 
However, considerable momentum can be discerned in furthering the concept of 
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representation (Diamond, 1999; Mansbridge, 2003; Brown, 2006). As mentioned earlier, 
the discussion on electoral and liberal democracy denotes the extent to which citizens 
should become engaged within the system boundaries of democratic representation 
(Diamond, 1999). The existential basis of representation itself can furthermore be 
challenged in light of the changing attitude towards the relationship between elected 
representatives and citizens. Rather than democracy being based on either ‘mandate’ or 
‘trustee’ (Mansbridge, 2003), both of which clearly designate a stark division of labour in 
decision-making, novel conceptions of democracy emphasize the more reciprocal 
relationship between elected representatives and citizens.        
 In recent decades a scholarly interest for models of post-representative democracy 
in the democratic theory literature has emerged. A popular concept in this literature 
concerns deliberation (Hendriks, 2011). Indeed, it has been asserted that a ‘deliberative 
turn’ has become apparent in democratic theory (Bohman, 1998; Chambers, 2003; 
Goodin, 2008). Deliberative democracy can be defined in a number of ways, of course, 
but it often refers to a form of democracy where decisions are made and outcomes are 
reached based on the engagement and acceptance of all (Bohman, 1998). Deliberation 
may be linked to public reasoning, mutual justification on the part of decision-makers and 
citizens, and collective action in the pursuit of socially optimal outcomes (Hendriks, 2011). 
Generally, those involved in and compliant with deliberative forms of decision-making aim 
to refrain from becoming engaged in adversarial politics, strife and interest advocacy. 
When deliberation is linked to democracy, decisions that have been made in a deliberative 
fashion are binding to all the actors involved (Mansbridge et al., 2010).   
 Deliberative democracy both deepens and broadens the scope of democratic 
decision-making. In deepening democracy, deliberative democracy is able to transcend 
voting as the ultimate and only means for citizens to exercise political voice (Fung and 
Wright, 2003). The classic recurring pattern of political promise, election and decision 
accountability espoused by representative democracy (Mansbridge, 2003) is supplanted 
with a system that facilitates the goals of continuous information-sharing, reciprocity of 
action and social learning between the actors engaged in decision-making. A number of 
institutions have been identified as able to facilitate these goals, such as public hearings 
(Bäckstrand, 2003), citizen panels (Brown, 2006), consensus conferences (Dryzek and 
Tucker, 2008) and citizen forums (Hendriks, 2011). Because of its focus on the political 
emancipation of citizens, deliberative democracy reinforces the discussion on the 
‘primacy-of-politics’ principle mentioned earlier (Klijn and Skelcher, 2007).    
In broadening democracy, deliberative democracy aims to accommodate interest 
advocacy in such a way so as to achieve socially optimal outcomes in decision-making 
(Mansbridge et al., 2010; Hendriks, 2011). Interest advocacy is inherently triggered by 
‘vote-centric’ democracy (Kymlicka, 2002; Chambers, 2003), for instance the ‘free-for-all’ 
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competitions between interest groups which is a characteristic of the majoritarian 
democratic system (Lijphart, 2012). Elections not only foster the pursuit of private interests 
(Bohman, 1998); they also prescribe interest divergence that becomes manifest through 
the electoral promises of rival political parties. Deliberative democracy argues that the 
institutions of representative democracy can be harmful for the civil legitimacy of 
decisions. Instead, it broadens the scope by shifting the emphasis from majority to 
consensus (Bohman, 1998). Decisions outcomes are based on the shared agreement of 
all who are committed to resolving the issue at stake.     
 Deliberative democratic practice raises interesting challenges for reconciling new 
modes of state-citizen interaction with public contestation (Dahl, 1971). Contestation is 
potentially problematic for the deliberative ideal as it considers political contest in the 
context of democracy to be virtuous. However, deliberative democrats are much aware of 
the potential divergence of interests and argue that contestation should feature 
prominently in deliberation (Hendriks, 2011). Mansbridge et al. (2010: 69), for example, 
have argued that “deliberative democracy must include self-interest and conflicts among 
interests in order to recognize and celebrate in the ideal itself the diversity of free and 
equal human beings”.  It is therefore precisely within deliberative settings that citizens can 
engage freely and fairly (Bohman, 1998), without the distortive influence of partisan 
fragmentation and abuse of political power by elected representatives. Contestation is a 
key characteristic of political reasoning and conferring on the public good, both of which 
thrive on the virtues of liberty and equality.   
 
2.2 Political culture 
 
~ “[I]t is from political discussion, and collective political action, that one whose daily 
occupations concentrate his interests in a small circle round himself, learns to feel for and 
with his fellow citizens, and becomes consciously a member of a great community” ~ 
(John Stuart Mill, cited in Miller, 2000: 92) 
             
The previous section has demonstrated that choices made within the institutional design 
of states entail consequences for the political orientation of civil society in the face of 
political authority. Such consequences may relate to, amongst others, the extent of public 
contestation and participation (Dahl, 1971), the electoral ‘rules of the game’ and the party 
system (Lijphart, 2012), democratic norms and rights (Foweraker and Krznaric, 2000), and 
the deliberative means and mechanisms by which decisions are reached (Bohman, 1998). 
Amongst others, theory on institutional design has demonstrated that the ‘actionable form’ 
created to induce ‘valued outcomes’ in the ‘particular context’ of decision-making 
transcends considerations based on effectiveness (Goodin, 1996), irrespective of how 
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effective government may be defined. Rather, institutional design relates to the civil 
legitimacy of decision-making, both on the input and output side of democracy (Scharpf, 
1999), thereby stressing procedural aspects and responsiveness.      
 The political orientation of civil society is the next stage of the theoretical claim 
advanced in the thesis. Although Walter Lippmann asserted in his book The Phantom 
Public (1927) that the public is merely a latent recipient (‘bystander’) of the decisions 
made by a political elite (‘agent’), it can be argued that much has changed since this 
assertion has been made. Agency in decision-making may now increasingly be ascribed 
to civil society actors, both in their interaction with political authority through state-
sanctioned modes of engagement as well as in the self-organizational capacity of such 
actors to mobilize resources and exercise political voice (Cornwall, 2004). The theoretical 
analysis in this section will argue that decision-making is influenced by dominant cultural 
attitudes of civil society towards the conduct of democracy. Furthermore, it is argued that 
cultural attitudes are imbued with the consequences of choice made in the institutional 
design of states. These attitudes can be embedded in the concept of political culture.      
Drawing on Pye (1968: 218), the thesis defines political culture as "the set of 
attitudes, beliefs and sentiments which give order and meaning to a political process and 
which provide the underlying assumptions and rules that govern behavior in the political 
system". From the perspective of civil society, attitudes, beliefs and sentiments are the 
means through which citizens engage with the conduct of politics, for example by 
expressing feelings of satisfaction with the incumbent government. The definition provided 
makes clear that such means indirectly govern political behaviour. For instance, low voter 
turnout can be regarded as the consequence of a low level satisfaction with the incumbent 
government, or with the way democratic institutions work. 
When talking about political culture, a useful distinction can be made between 
attitudes towards the ‘actually existing democracy’ (Dahl, 1971) – such as is established 
through the conduct of governments, political parties and elected representatives – and 
those made towards the democratic system, which can best be interpreted as an 
assemblage of democratic institutions. This distinction has been proposed by Easton 
(1975), who argued that satisfaction and trust in the actual form that democracy can take 
is a form of ‘specific support’ and that satisfaction and trust in the system characteristics of 
democracy adheres to ‘diffuse support’. Whereas the interpretation of satisfaction and 
trust in relation to the actual form of democracy is in many ways premised on the 
quantifiable performance of institutions or governments to deliver political goods (Roller, 
2005), satisfaction and trust in relation to the democratic system focuses on principles of 
decision-making, rather than actual decision outcomes. As both interpretations make 
sense for understanding how citizens engage with decision-making, both of them will be 
used in the research.               
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  Another convenient way of looking at political culture is by describing it as “the 
systematic means by which a political community makes binding collective choices” 
(Jasanoff, 2005). Based on the context in which it has been provided, this description 
could well have been thought of as linking institutions (‘systematic means’) to the 
members of civil society (‘political community’), both of which are included in the 
conceptual scheme of the thesis. Although it is more output-oriented (‘binding collective 
choices’) that the definition provided earlier, Jasanoff’s (2005) description of political 
culture is a valuable conceptual contribution to considering decision-making power as a 
shared good between elected representatives and civil society.  
However, as will be shown later in this section, it can be discussed where civil 
society ‘fits’ in the concept of political culture or whether its cultural characteristics are 
determinants of the uniformity with which decisions are made. Similar to John Stuart Mills’ 
statement provided at the start of this section, Alexis de Tocqueville stated that, while 
investigating the role of community in the political life of 1830s America, “[n]othing (...) 
deserves more attention than the intellectual and moral associations” (cited in Putnam, 
1997: 28), which are forming the fabric of civil society. Such statements may be 
interpreted as providing sole agency to civil society based on its cultural characteristics, 
such as its ability to confer ‘intellectually’ and ‘morally’ on public goods issues, thereby 
glossing over the political influence exerted by institutions. This thesis nuances this 
potential tension by stressing the reciprocity between institutions and civil society.      
In order to distinguish political culture from more random observations on the 
orientation of citizens in political events, it is assumed that political culture is coherent, 
aggregative, durable and explanatory (Jackman and Miller, 1996). This means that there 
is coherence between, and a widely shared agreement over, certain attitudes associated 
with the political conduct, that these attitudes are resilient over time and that their 
proliferation in the public sphere can explain decision outcomes to a considerable extent. 
Attitudes towards decision-making seep into styles of reasoning and debate but also come 
to the fore in the interminable ways with which the bureaucracy accommodates or aims to 
mediate contestation in the face of issues bearing a high degree of public concern 
(Jasanoff, 2005). Similar to institutional design, political culture is an analytical concept in 
the sense that it investigates ‘attitudes, beliefs and sentiments’ (Pye, 1968) without 
reflecting a code of political conduct.           
In this section three aspects of political culture will be analyzed: 1) democratic 
satisfaction; 2) political trust and 3) reciprocity between institutions and culture in political 
life. As democratic satisfaction and political trust represent public attitudes towards the 
conduct of politics (i.e. ways of representation), they are important aspects of political 
culture. As such they have often been used in research on political culture (e.g. Inglehart, 
1988; Linde and Ekman, 2003). Satisfaction and trust are furthermore precursors to public 
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engagement. The reciprocity between institutions and cultural characteristics of civil 
society subsequently denotes the intimate relationship between top-down and bottom-up 
approaches to political culture, or alternatively between the formal and informal character 
of decision-making in the democratic state. More specifically, the assumed reciprocity 
denotes the endogenous entanglement of institutional design variables and public 
attitudes towards democratic satisfaction and trust (Mishler and Rose, 2001). As this 
inevitably raises questions on causality, in the form of so-called ‘chicken-versus-egg’ 
questions (Inglehart, 1988), the potential influence of exogenous cultural variables will 
also be pondered.  
 
2.2.1 Democratic satisfaction 
 
Satisfaction with democracy is an important element of political culture as it deals with the 
attitudes of citizens towards democracy (Anderson and Guillory, 1997; Linde and Ekman, 
2003). Under the pressures of many political crises and the sensed underperformance of 
governments in providing public services, it has often been asserted that citizens in many 
established democracies feel increasingly dissatisfied with the performance of the 
democratic state (Dahl, 2000). However, at the same time it has been noted that 
democracy proper, to be framed as end rather than means, remains the hegemonic 
political ideal in those states where it is now established practice (Dahl, 2000). This latter 
assertion may also be reversed in that broad support for democracy does not have a 
bearing on democratic satisfaction per se. Therefore, democratic satisfaction could be 
envisaged as an indicator of public support for the institutions that drive democratic 
performance (Anderson and Guillory, 1997). As it can be assumed that public support for 
the democratic ideal is ensured (Dahl, 2000), democratic satisfaction can be reframed in 
terms of the attitude of citizens towards the institutional foundation of democratic 
performance (Linde and Ekman, 2003). 
 Similar to the discussion on democratic performance, civil legitimacy is at the core 
of the discussion on democratic satisfaction (Linde and Ekman, 2003). With regards to the 
input side of representative democracy, the level of satisfaction of citizens after the 
occurrence of elections is of particular interest (Anderson and Guillory, 1997). Quite 
evidently, citizens that are represented by a party in government often show a high level 
of satisfaction. However, it is interesting to measure the level of satisfaction of citizens that 
are not represented by a party in government. In establishing high levels of democratic 
satisfaction it has become imperative for democratic governments to also be supported by 
the ‘losers’ of an electoral contest (Anderson and Guillory, 1997; Norris, 2011). As theory 
on democracy prescribes the anchorage of certain norms and rights in the democratic 
conduct, satisfaction among citizens that find themselves on the losing side of elections 
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therefore mainly revolves around public perceptions on the fairness and impartiality of 
democratic procedures.      
 With regards to the output side of representative democracy, democratic 
satisfaction can be associated with the fulfilment of the political preferences of the 
‘median’ citizen (Huber and Bingham Powell Jr., 1994; Birchfield and Crepaz, 1998). High 
levels of citizen satisfaction may as such be achieved when decision outcomes are in 
accordance with the median political preferences that can be identified, for example 
through polling or in the form of electoral outcomes. In investigating decision-making on 
reducing income inequality, Birchfield and Crepaz (1998) have shown that decision 
outcomes in support of reducing income inequality are almost always supported by the 
median citizen. It is in such a decision-making process in the interest of the median 
citizen, whose income is virtually always below the median income (except in the 
theoretical case of pure equality in income distribution), to vote for political parties that will 
address income inequality when they are in government. The fulfilment of the political 
preferences of the median citizen, and therefore of the median voter, corresponds to 
responsiveness as the basic critical function of representative democracy (Dahl, 1971). 
 There has been surprisingly little research on the relationship between deliberative 
democracy and satisfaction with democracy. Recent research on deliberative democracy 
is mainly concerned with introducing the principle of making decisions based on the 
engagement and acceptance of all, which deviates from the inherent dualism in interest 
advocacy and the notion of electoral winners and losers (Mansbridge et al., 2010; 
Hendriks, 2011). It could be argued that, as a rule of thumb, increased engagement and 
the acceptance of decision outcomes by all is a virtue in its own right and that high levels 
of citizen satisfaction would follow from deliberative democratic procedures. However, 
dissatisfaction may be perceived to arise when the engagement of all those potentially 
affected by a decision leads to suboptimal decision outcomes (Bohman, 1998). Such 
outcomes are made and mandated by the ‘tyranny of the majority’, “the ill-informed mass, 
the passionate and irrational mob” (Dryzek and Torgerson, 1993: 128).  
  Related to this point, it has been demonstrated that politically conscious citizens 
are hesitant towards supporting the use of referenda (Anderson and Goodyear-Grant, 
2010). These ‘critical citizens’ argue that referenda outcomes may pose a threat to the 
liberty and equality of political minorities. A good example is the Swiss referendum in 2009 
where it was agreed to ban the construction of minarets on mosques, something which 
has sparked widespread dissatisfaction with democracy amongst the Muslim minority in 
Switzerland. In exerting the political right to influence decisions the civil right of religious 
freedom has been curtailed, in this specific case, on the basis of a double majority opinion 
(of the people and in the cantons). A critique against the use of referenda therefore 
extends to both procedural fairness and the optimality of decision outcomes as perceived 
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by parts of the citizenry. It has been furthermore argued that the ambition to reach 
consensus on controversial issues may conceal tacit power disparities between the actors 
involved in deliberation (Van den Hove, 2006). Although consensus assumes that 
satisfaction with the decision outcome has been reached, some actors may feel 
marginalized in the process leading up to the outcome (Dryzek and Tucker, 2008). 
In finding a common denominator for accounting for citizen attitudes towards 
democracy, as well as to understand why some citizens can grow out to become ‘the 
politically embittered’ (Kaase, 1999), a low level of satisfaction can be explained in terms 
of a democratic deficit (Norris, 2011). A democratic deficit can be understood as the 
discrepancy between, on the one hand, expectations of procedural fairness and 
responsive government and, on the other hand, the level of fairness and responsiveness 
as perceived by citizens. Democratic dissatisfaction that follows from this discrepancy is 
therefore the result of unfulfilled expectations, aspirations and political ambitions, amongst 
others (Norris, 2011). A perceived lack of procedural fairness can prompt citizens to 
refrain from participating politically, for instance as expressed by low voter turnout (Birch, 
2010) or the electoral success of fringe parties (notwithstanding the legitimacy of voting 
for these parties). Furthermore, the notion of perceived unresponsiveness can lead to 
widespread dissatisfaction with the quality of decision outcomes. In the discussion on 
political trust in the next sub-section it will be demonstrated that expectations also play an 
important role in building trustworthy relations between and amongst decision-makers and 
civil society.                   
 
2.2.2 Political trust 
 
Political trust can be intimately linked to satisfaction with democracy. It stands to reason 
that a high level of citizen satisfaction with democracy induces high political trust; they are 
two sides of the same coin. Political trust is among the most salient features of political 
culture, having received widespread attention in theory associated with the relationship 
between and among institutions, decision-makers and citizens (Almond and Verba, 1963; 
Inglehart, 1988; Putnam, 1993). Dahl (1971) considers political trust to be an essential 
component of ‘true’ democracy, or what he has coined the Polyarchy. Political trust, 
together with democratic satisfaction, is also the focus of various surveys on the political 
values of citizens, such as conducted in the European Social Survey, the European 
Values Study and the World Values Survey, to name just a few. Evidently, the origins of 
political trust can be debated. This has culminated in research on the relationship between 
political trust and substantive changes in the institutional character of the political systems 
of states (Mishler and Rose, 2001). Sub-section 2.2.3 will elaborate on this relationship.      
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In common parlance the existence of trust between two individuals reflects a two-
way relationship between the behaviour of one individual and the expectations of such 
behaviour by the other (Hardin, 1999). Trust does not necessarily imply that individuals 
interact on friendly terms or even share a common cause in a certain situation. Rather, 
trust refers to the fulfilment of expectations, the latter of which have been motivated 
through prior knowledge on what may be expected. It is therefore essentially relational 
(Kaase, 1999). A critical element within theory on trust is the degree of trustworthiness of 
the relationship between citizens that are unknown to one another (Uslaner, 2002). 
Expectations of behaviour are therefore formed on the basis of the perceived cultural 
characteristics of fellow citizens rather than individual characteristics. This type of trust is 
most commonly referred to as interpersonal trust (Inglehart, 1988; Kaase, 1999). 
Interpersonal trust is strongly linked to the social relations of individuals at the community 
level, which itself is contingent on the gradual socialization of norms and values. 
Whilst interpersonal trust involves the relationships between individuals, 
regardless of whether they are reciprocal to one another or enmeshed in a power 
disparity, theory on political trust regards responsiveness of the democratic systems as its 
axiom. Transcending pertinent questions on trust as either ‘specific’ or ‘diffuse’ (Easton, 
1975), at least for the time being, political trust can be defined as “[a] summary judgment 
that the system is responsive and will do what is right even in the absence of constant 
scrutiny” (Miller and Listhaug, 1990: 381). As this definition internalizes the importance of 
responsiveness for establishing levels of civil trust in the conduct of politics, it is 
particularly suitable for navigating the influence of trust on citizens which ‘the system’ 
responds to.       
When trust is extrapolated to the political realm, it is based on the integrity, 
responsiveness and competence of decision-makers (Denters, 2002). Such norms and 
values reflect the asymmetrical relationship between citizens and decision-makers. 
Political trust is different from interpersonal trust as the actors engaged in democratic 
decision-making hold various organizational affiliations, statutory backgrounds and 
political powers. Trust between actors in the political realm is therefore mediated by a 
reciprocal understanding on the division of the roles and responsibilities of the actors 
involved, including one’s own. A salient debate within theory on political trust concerns 
whether there is overlap between interpersonal trust and political trust (e.g. Inglehart, 
1988; Jackman and Miller, 1996). Whilst this debate has the potential to remain 
unresolved, it has been advanced that high levels of interpersonal trust generate 
concerted civil action, such as direct action (Kaase, 1999).   
In the observed difference between citizen satisfaction with democratic institutions 
and satisfaction with the broader democratic ideal (Dahl, 2000), it would stand to reason 
that political trust can also relate to institutions or the democratic ideal. Political trust may 
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be explained in terms of citizens either trusting institutions or elected representatives, 
those individuals populating the executive and legislative branches of government, in 
making good decisions (Easton, 1975). These sub-divisions are certainly interesting but 
fail to address the transposition of political trust into the social realm. Therefore, in 
extending the concept of political trust, it may also be explained in terms of trust between 
citizens on the basis of the political relations that are shaped by institutional and political 
system characteristics (Hardin, 1999). Conversely, the ‘spill-over’ between political trust 
and interpersonal trust may be conceptualized as starting from the community level. 
Reciprocity between individuals then seeps into the informal and formal institutional 
character of representative democracy (Almond and Verba, 1963; Putnam, 1993).  
Because of ongoing changes in the breadth and width of democratic decision-
making, the research agenda on political trust has changed accordingly. Similar to the 
discussion on deliberative democracy and citizen satisfaction, political trust within a 
deliberative setting roughly meanders between input and output legitimacy of the 
democratic process (Grimes, 2006). More specifically, political trust can relate to both the 
fairness of democratic procedures and to decision outcomes based on the engagement 
and acceptance of all. In aiming to reconcile these two interpretations of trust, Grimes 
(2006) has argued that a procedure perceived by citizens to be fair can also facilitate the 
acceptance of the decision outcome. The focus is more on acceptance than on the 
fulfilment of preferences when it comes to political output. Therefore, political trust buoys 
the civil legitimacy of decision outcomes when the criterion of procedural fairness is met 
(see Kaiser et al., 2002 for a general critique on this reasoning).               
In other research on political trust the focus has equally shifted towards adding 
more variables to the interaction between political authority and citizens. For instance, 
Denters (2002) has inquired into the relationship between the unit or size of government 
and trust in elected representatives. The inquiry is aimed towards envisaging the state as 
comprising various layers of government, which invariably triggers debate on the role of 
governmental proximity in building trustworthy relations. Political trust is also increasingly 
applied to specific decision-making areas, such as areas where political issues are 
enveloped in scientific uncertainty (Wilsdon and Willis, 2004). A focus on interaction at the 
executive level marks a shift away from the intellectual underpinnings of political trust, 
thereby making it relevant to issue-related contexts. Attempts to enhance trust in these 
contexts are directed towards creating acceptance for decision outcomes.       
 
2.2.3 Reciprocity between institutions and political culture 
 
In accounting for political culture, the underlying characteristics that mediate the 
orchestration of political life can be discussed. In particular, it can be discussed whether 
45 
 
political culture results from either social or institutional characteristics (Jackman and 
Miller, 1996; Lowndes and Wilson, 2001). Inglehart (1988) has argued that, amongst 
others, life satisfaction, interpersonal trust and acceptance of the social order provide 
fertile cultural soil for improving the quality of democracy. This parallels the main 
conclusions advanced in The Civil Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five 
Nations (Almond and Verba, 1963), one of the earliest accounts of political culture. 
Similarly, Putnam (1993) has argued that exogenous cultural characteristics shape the 
manifestation of civil society in decision-making, which subsequently reverberates in the 
performance of democratic government. In comparing the performance of various Italian 
regional governments, it is asserted that the political orientation of the ‘civic community’ 
determines the quality of democracy through making democracy perform better.  
A salient viewpoint is that cultural values inform democratic practices and that they 
have been formed independently from institutions (Inglehart, 1988; Putnam, 1993). 
Furthermore, these values will continue to exert political influence. It is sometimes 
advanced that cultural values are highly resilient to change, irrespective of time and 
space. For instance, empirical investigation has shown that modern-day Americans from 
European descent cling to relatively similar civic attitudes as do contemporary Europeans 
(Rice and Feldman, 1997), notwithstanding the apparent differences in institutional 
settings across the Atlantic. From this perspective the breadth and width of civil 
manifestation in the conduct of politics is shaped by cultural values alone. The influence of 
civic culture may also be used to explain developments or phenomena in other realms of 
life, for instance economic growth. Such a statement confirms the famous hypothesis 
formulated by Max Weber, who more or less conducted research on political culture avant 
la lettre. Weber argued that values associated with a Protestant working ethos spurs 
economic growth within a capitalist system of production (see Inglehart, 1988 for a brief 
synopsis of this hypothesis).      
Much of the debate on the relationship between the political culture of civil society 
and the institutional performance of government spins around the issue of causation. 
Similar to the debate on the influence of institutions and interpersonal trust on the 
anchorage of trust in the relations between political actors (Mishler and Rose, 2001), a 
debate representing rival hypotheses regarding the origins of political trust, the question 
on ‘what causes what’ can be mainly reframed in terms of cause and effect (Inglehart, 
1988). For instance, it has been investigated how bonding within civil society exerts its 
influence in the conduct of politics. Tavits (2006) has argued that political culture bolsters 
the degree of the political organization of civil society but does not necessarily exert a 
positive influence on the ability of decision-makers to become more responsive. It has 
also been proposed that certain institutions prompt decision-makers to become more 
responsive and which subsequently impact positively on the civic culture (Banducci et al., 
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1999). Notwithstanding the endogenous nature of the problem statement, institutions and 
culture seem to be intimately related.          
 Perhaps best expressed in terms of the ‘civic culture’ (Almond and Verba, 1963), 
the role of civil society in determining the institutional performance of governments is 
certainly worth inquiry. This means that the cultural identity of citizens influences how 
governments use institutions to further political goods. However, with reference to the 
pertinent issue of causation stated above, inquiry into the role of institutions in instilling 
certain civil attitudes towards democracy has equal worth (Mishler and Rose, 2001). That 
is, institutions are ascribed the transformative potential to impact on political culture, 
whether through the ‘logic of appropriateness’ (March and Olsen, 1989) which is ascribed 
to them, the public attitudes directed towards them, or otherwise. This may consecutively 
be applied to research on democratic satisfaction and political trust, both of which have 
been at the core of this theoretical section.   
With regards to democratic satisfaction, for instance, research has focused on the 
relationship between institutions and public attitudes towards voting (Banducci et al., 
1999). It is advanced that electoral proportionality in consensual democracies invokes a 
‘civic spirit’ among the electorate as it spills over into increased political engagement. This 
observation coincides with the notions of the primacy-of-politics and the dispersion of 
political power mentioned earlier (Klijn and Skelcher, 2007). Research on the relationship 
between the institutions and attitudes towards democracy could be used to inquire into the 
level of democratic satisfaction. Comparative research has shown that citizen satisfaction 
in consensual democracies is generally higher than in majoritarian democracies because 
coalition governments execute policies that are more lenient towards the interests of the 
median voter (Huber and Bingham Powell Jr., 1994; Anderson and Guillory, 1997). This 
observation may be of specific relevance as it can help explain how institutional design 
choices influence the performance of the democratic system.     
 With regards to political trust, a similar observation can be made. In a situation of 
electoral reform, for instance, political trust is understood to co-vary with citizens’ 
perceptions towards a more prominent role in democratic decision-making (Banducci et 
al., 1999). Based on the assumption that political power is more dispersed in consensual 
democracies than in majoritarian democracies (Klijn and Skelcher, 2007), a move towards 
greater electoral proportionality increases political trust. This form of trust is furthermore 
present across the full length of the political spectrum, such as amongst supporters of 
political parties that are on the losing side of elections or those that support small and/or 
single-issue political parties. The link between institutions and political trust can also 
extend to the degree to which the former is able to mitigate polarization and antagonism 
between a diversity of political preferences (Banducci et al., 1999). Whilst majoritarian 
democracies can be characterized by adversarial politics and strife, consensual 
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democracies are often able to internalize trust in the political relations amongst citizens 
and decision-makers.          
 
2.3 Sustainability discourses 
 
The previous two sections have focused on institutions and political culture. As identified 
in the introductory note of this chapter, institutions and political culture represent the two 
modes through which citizens can engage with decision-making. It has been made clear 
that design choices in the type of representative democracy – largely reflecting either 
majoritarian or consensual systems – not only exert influence on the breadth and width of 
contestation and participation as forms of public entitlement (Dahl, 1971), for instance in 
the form of legislation or ‘invited’ public consultation, but also on a more qualitative and 
non-coerced approach to shaping the relationship between political authority and civil 
society in the context of decision-making in planning processes (Palerm, 2000). The 
discussions on corporatism, deliberation and the primacy of politics, amongst others, are 
illustrative of this point (Klijn and Skelcher, 2007; Hendriks, 2011). Democratic 
representativeness can as such be seen as a function of liberal democracy, the latter of 
which widens the scope for public engagement within the remit of representative 
democracy (Diamond, 1999). Furthermore, cultural attitudes in the conduct of decision-
making effectively shape the relationship between political authority and civil society. Such 
attitudes, predominantly expressed in terms of satisfaction with democracy and trust in 
politics, designate the cultural attitudes of civil society towards the governing of 
sustainability issues.            
As argued earlier, the research in the thesis develops theory related to the 
mobilization of sustainability discourses. This is currently understudied: institutions, 
political culture, public engagement and sustainability discourses are thus far 
predominantly looked at in isolation. Because of the increased prominence of a number of 
sustainability issues both as a political and public concern – climate change, biodiversity 
loss or pollution, to name just a few – a theoretical analysis of state-civil society interaction 
needs to be situated or primed in the context of emergent challenges, not least due to the 
potential for contestation arising from the use of science and technology as antidotes to 
democratic deliberation (Bäckstrand, 2003). Institutions and political culture therefore 
continue to play a dominant role in this strand of theory as they are understood to exert 
influence on the process of discourse mobilization in the domain of sustainability 
governance and decision-making. Or to put it differently, the process of sustainability 
discourse mobilization is understood to be a function of institutions and political culture.  
The functional relationship between institutions and political culture, on the one 
hand, and sustainability discourses, on the other, dwells on a number of theories. To 
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some extent drawing on the conceptual research conducted by Koopmans and Statham 
(1999) on political claims-making, institutions and political culture are depicted as the 
mobilizing structures through which public-oriented claims in sustainability governance are 
vented in the public sphere. Many such claims adhere to broadly held public perceptions 
towards the governance of controversial sustainability issues, not least when far-reaching 
adverse impacts are considered likely. After having gathered knowledge on these two 
mobilizing structures, perhaps a logical follow-up area of inquiry relates to the, 
accommodation, facilitation and mediation of public perception. That is, are certain 
perceptions favoured by incumbent mobilizing structures? Particularly the proliferation of 
the ecological modernization agenda in some European states, whilst remaining largely 
absent in others (Dryzek et al., 2002), proffers tempting questions in this area of inquiry.            
Before exploring the functional relationship mentioned before in full detail in the 
next section, where processes of sustainability discourse mobilization are inquired into, it 
is important to open up a strand of theory on sustainability discourses and on how best to 
analyze them. Sustainability is often being associated with the oft-cited concept of 
sustainable development; indeed, some scholars present sustainability and sustainable 
development as interchangeable concepts (e.g. Mebratu, 1998; Rydin, 1999). Whilst the 
thesis readily acknowledges that sustainability and sustainable development can mean 
different things to different people, thereby being in agreement with the observation made 
by Bond et al. (2011) that both concepts can have contested meanings, sustainability and 
sustainable development will be used interchangeably. Certain sustainability discourses 
may well share affinity with certain definitions of sustainable development, for example as 
set out by the WCED (1987), whilst other discourses reject the prime objectives that 
motivated its integration in policy-making. 
Following this introduction to sustainability discourses, the section will move on to 
explore the theoretical foundation of sustainability discourses, theory on discourse 
analysis and theory on two concepts that are closely affiliated with research on discourse 
formation: discourse coalitions and storylines. Whilst remarks will be made on occasion as 
to how sustainability discourses may be reconciled with EIA, the decision-making arena 
around which this thesis is centred, a more thorough analysis of the interconnectedness 
between the two will be presented in section 2.4.     
 
2.3.1 The theoretical foundation of discursive research 
 
Definitions of sustainability and sustainable development provide impetus to the 
discussion on sustainability discourses. To start with, a discourse can be broadly defined 
as a “specific ensemble of ideas, concepts and categorizations that is produced, 
reproduced and transformed in a particular set of practices and through which meaning is 
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given to physical and social realities” (Hajer, 1995: 44). Therefore, in putting the definition 
provided by Hajer (1995) into perspective, discourses can be framed as value-laden 
statements on how physical and social realities should look, how they should be looked at 
or how looking at them may impact the meaning given to these realities. A basic yet 
critical function of discourses is their ability to unify people through providing a discursive 
environment where these value-laden statements can be vented. A set of such meaning-
giving and reality-shaping statements is what Hajer (1995) has referred to as ‘specific 
ensemble’. Discourses not only have the ability to formulate the meanings of reality but 
may also be active in creating them. That is, social action is likely to ensue from 
discourses which become dominant over time (Sharp and Richardson, 2001; Jørgensen 
and Phillips, 2002), thereby putting into practice the ‘ideas, concepts and categorizations’ 
introduced in Hajer’s (1995) definition of discourse.     
In recent years, the concept of discourse has received substantial attention from 
scholars working in various social science disciplines, particularly following seminal 
studies conducted by Hajer (1995), Healey (1997), Dryzek (1997) and others. These 
studies investigated the role of discourses in shaping global or national environmental and 
sustainability decision-making imperatives. In more specific areas of decision-making, 
such as EIA or other forms of environmental assessment, research on discourses has 
become centre-stage in investigations on the potential contestation arising from meanings 
given to the purpose of the assessment (e.g. Cashmore, 2004; Rozema et al., 2012), on 
competing claims of when the assessment can be considered effective (e.g. Bond et al., 
2013a; Van Doren et al., 2013), as well as on the degree to which stakeholders involved 
in EIA have been able to deliberate the issues at stake (Wilkins, 2003).             
 What combines most applied research on discourses is the rejection of a single, 
unitary approach to understanding the meaning of the objects of study, such as how and 
what decisions in certain areas of governance are made. The characterization of a 
discourse as a knowledge regime, to short-cut the definition provided by Hajer (1995), 
provides to a variety of discourses the possibility to challenge important questions on the 
validity of conventional wisdom or the taken-for-granted nature of certain truth claims. 
Explicit in the rejection of unitary approaches in studying decision-making is a discussion 
on the norms underpinning rationality, such as has been done in relation to the assumed 
role of EIA in rational decision-making (Richardson, 2005; Elling, 2009; Weston, 2010). 
This discussion reinvigorates interest in the role assumptions play in steering towards 
decision outcomes presented as the result of a neutral, apolitical and objectively verifiable 
decision-making process.      
 As logic would suggest, it can be argued that sustainability discourses deal with 
the formulation of meanings of the physical and social reality of sustainability. However, it 
can be made clear that a wide variety in the formulation of sustainability discourses can 
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be observed. In the discourse map that can be used for environmental governance, 
provided by Bond and Morrison-Saunders (2009), it is shown that sustainability 
development is only a discourse amongst other discourses, a few of which have more to 
do with governance of human agency than with solving environmental or ecological 
sustainability issues. Therefore, sustainability discourses are not necessarily related to the 
environment or ecological sustainability. It will become clear in the empirical chapters of 
this thesis (Chapters 5 to 7) that the majority of identified discourses in the cases adhere 
to the role of sustainability in wider political and socio-economic settings.  
 
2.3.2 Discourse analysis 
 
The studying of discourses is generally known as the field of discourse analysis. In recent 
years a number of contributions have been made in this field (e.g. Hajer, 1995; Jørgensen 
and Phillips, 2002; Hajer and Versteeg, 2005), focusing on, amongst others, the 
theoretical aspects of discourse analysis, the tools and methods that may be used in 
discourse analysis as well as the applicability of discourse analysis in research and 
practice. Thus, discourse analysis is both a theoretical and methodological object of 
inquiry. Discourse analysis presumes that the investigation of discourses can distil 
important understandings particularly of phenomena that are centre-stage in social 
research. It breaks radically from explanatory research traditions by accepting that social 
phenomena require understanding of their underlying meanings. Ultimately, discourse 
analysis has formulated the need to understand these meanings in broader social 
processes as its prime target. Therefore, in premising the field of discourse analysis on a 
certain doctrine or idea, Jørgensen and Phillips (2002: 24) have contended that: 
 
“The overall idea is that social phenomena are never finished or total. Meaning can never 
be ultimately fixed and this opens up the way for constant social struggles about 
definitions of society and identity with resulting social effects. The discourse analyst’s task 
is to plot the course of these struggles to fix all meaning at all levels of the social”.  
 
Within the field of discourse analysis, a number of ways to analyze discourses can be 
identified. From a broad perspective, and in acknowledging that the relatively young 
discipline of discourse analysis is still much in momentum, two distinct ‘traditions’ can be 
discerned (Van Herten and Runhaar, 2012). The first tradition is linguistic discourse 
analysis, which seeks to elicit meaning from text by critically analyzing the use of 
language. Linguistic discourse analysis takes a semantic approach to discourses by 
means of conducting research on linking ideas and knowledge of the use of language. As 
such this analytical tradition is entrenched in the field of linguistics, and variations in 
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discourse analysis can stretch from describing the role of language in providing meaning 
to engage with the social processes that are mediated by the use of language. 
 The second tradition is argumentative discourse analysis, which has developed a 
much broader social research perspective and is more widely applied by discourse 
analysts across various disciplines (Van Herten and Runhaar, 2012). Argumentative 
discourse analysis investigates the relationship between discourses and how they have 
developed under the influence of, for example, institutions, processes, cultural practices or 
societal structures (Runhaar, 2009). The argumentative tradition privileges inquiry into the 
formation of argument, which can perhaps best be regarded as the result of the interplay 
between people and their social and physical environments. Such arguments however, 
reverberating Hajer’s (1995) definition of discourse, reciprocate patterns of influence and 
help transform their ‘building blocks’. This means that argumentative discourse analysis is 
primarily interested in the drivers and outcomes of social processes. As this thesis looks 
at the process of sustainability discourse mobilization, it stands to reason that the 
deployment of an argumentative form of discourse analysis prevails.         
 A third type of discourse analysis which is of much relevance for environmental 
assessment is premised on the reflection of discourses (e.g. Kørnøv and Thissen, 2000; 
Runhaar et al., 2010). Discourse reflection has become an interesting topic of research for 
understanding the dynamics of finding solutions to resolve conflict in the governance of 
controversial issues. Correspondingly, analysis of discourse reflection is of interest for 
understanding how discourses mobilize struggle between the actors involved in such 
decision-making processes (Jørgensen and Phillips, 2002; Runhaar, 2009). This type of 
discourse analysis focuses on decision-making as a process of policy learning, for 
instance by providing actors with the means to articulate, self-assess or rediscover the 
constitutive basis of the discourses they adhere to, as well as to extend such practices of 
reflection to other extant discourses (Runhaar et al., 2010).  
These reflective practices can be of decisive importance in resolving policy 
controversies where the meanings given to the issues at stake seem incompatible, not to 
say antagonistic. Practices related to discourse reflection often stress the role of frames, a 
concept which designates the constitutive ideas underlying discourses. Reflective 
practices facilitate critical engagement between actors involved in a policy controversy, 
many of which can be identified in sustainability policy areas (Rydin, 1999; Bond and 
Morrison-Saunders, 2009), thereby integrating the potential for discourse modification 
(Runhaar et al., 2010). If the role and function ascribed to these reflective practices is read 
in par with the description of the discourse analyst’s role (Jørgensen and Phillips, 2002), 
especially with reference to plotting the course of social struggles, then it will become 
clear that discourse reflection is important for analyzing sustainability discourses.      
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2.3.3 Discourse coalitions and storylines 
 
The assertion that decision-making and policy-making designates ‘struggle’ (Jørgensen 
and Phillips, 2002; Runhaar, 2009) beckons further inquiry. This assertion is of particular 
interest when it is accepted at the same time that that discourses provide meaning to 
reality, something which enables the integration of discourse into policy-making. Indeed, 
the view has been proffered that “policy-making is a constant discursive struggle over the 
criteria of social classification, the boundaries of problem categories, the intersubjective 
interpretation of common experiences, the conceptual framing of problems, and the 
definition of ideas that guide the ways people create the shared meanings which motivate 
them to  act” (Fischer and Forester, 1993b: 1-2).  
 From the view expressed above several messages can be integrated into the 
broader practice of discourse analysis. However, in focusing on one such message, a key 
aspect of discourses is its unifying character at the societal level, thus aggregating 
experiences, interpretations, problem framings and the definitions of ideas as held by 
individual actors. Critical inquiry can therefore be made into the ‘common’ or ‘shared’ 
character of discourses. What is more, Fischer and Forester and a number of other 
authors (1993a) have observed that, before discourses are formed, struggle between 
actors also exists in the formative stages of formulating norms and principles of conduct, 
values and ideas of how to position themselves within the remit of a certain policy issue. 
This means that struggle may not only exist between two or more potentially antagonistic 
groups of individual actors deeply entangled in a policy controversy, but that it may also 
come to the fore in in-group dynamics leading up to this discursive rivalry. 
 In considering ‘struggle’ to be a key aspect in discourse formation, the concepts of 
discourse coalitions and storylines can be used to provide new insights for the analysis of 
how discourses come about. These concepts have been central to Hajer’s (1995) 
research on the role of discourses in environmental decision-making in the United 
Kingdom (UK) and the Netherlands. In discussing discourse coalitions and storylines, 
Hajer (1995) has ascribed a prominent role for power in levering the formation of 
discourses, set within a web of political, economic and legal constraints. The promulgation 
of discourses by means of discourse coalitions and the use of storylines are furthermore 
premised on ‘prevailing structures and interests’ (Rydin, 1999). Therefore, discourse 
coalitions and storylines can be important tools for protecting established interests but 
also for strengthening coordination of resistance against certain policies when this is in the 
interest of emergent challengers.  
 Discourse coalitions change the way actors engage with certain issues, mainly by 
virtue of a change in political claims-making (Koopmans and Statham, 1999). In 
sustainability decision-making (e.g. Van Herten and Runhaar, 2012), it has been shown 
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that civil society actors work together to make claims exerting to political and scientific 
authority for the purpose of strengthening their discourse. The use of such claims to 
support the discourse is often strategic and, as a consequence, claims opposing the 
discourse are apt to be ignored. This shows that, correspondent with the notion of 
‘struggle’ into the formative stages of discourse (Fischer and Forester, 1993a), the ‘actor 
width’ of a discourse coalition can impact substantively on how a discourse is produced, 
reproduced and represented in the public sphere. A discourse coalition is intimately 
connected with the advocacy coalition framework (ACF) (Sabatier, 1988), which is a 
concept that informs the policy core beliefs of actors clustering around certain policy 
issues. Analogous to this, the values that are considered fundamental instruct the core 
beliefs of discourse coalitions, which with regards to sustainability often deal with pertinent 
questions on socio-economic or ecological policy imperatives.  
For discourse coalitions to express their views effectively and to do this with one 
voice, storylines can be used to explain how certain words or phrases can be used to 
empower discourses (or to weaken other discourses), to strengthen the discourse 
coalition as well as to provide a benign discursive environment for the individual coalition 
actors (Hajer, 1995; Smith and Kern, 2009). Storylines can be understood as simplified, 
shorthand versions of discourses. By means of popularizing the use of certain words or 
phrases, such as slogans, much more complex views on how to organize discursive 
support around certain issues can be made comprehensible to a wide array of actors, and 
also function as a sort of ‘discursive denominator’. That is, storylines are able to assemble 
a variety of views on the policy issue, thus literally setting the tone of debate. Smith and 
Kern (2009: 79) have therefore contended that storylines “represent intentional 
mobilisations of discourse”.  
However, the prominence of discourse coalitions and storylines in discourse 
formation should be approached with caution. For instance, a case study on sustainability 
transition management in the Netherlands has shown that powerful policy actors are able 
to mediate discourses by means of joining discourse coalitions and appropriating 
storylines (Smith and Kern, 2009). Situated and relatively weak-positioned actors or 
coalitions that seek support for their discourse run the risk of compromising the strength of 
their message through using a storyline when they are unable to resist the influence 
exerted on them. Within this process storylines may become the subject of appropriation 
by powerful actors, or they may be exchanged between actors holding various – and 
potentially antagonistic – discursive orientations in a policy issue. Discourse coalitions and 
storylines are in such situations rendered epiphenomena, deflecting an underlying power 
disparity in policy-making.                   
 
54 
 
2.4 Bringing it all together: a research position 
 
Thus far this chapter has comprised theory on institutions (Section 2.1), political culture 
(Section 2.2) and sustainability discourses (Section 2.3), each putting centre-stage a core 
concept of the conceptual scheme on sustainability discourse mobilization (see Figure 
2.1). This section investigates how these core concepts relate to public engagement, 
which in the conceptual scheme functions as some sort of a conduit between institutions 
and political culture on the one hand and sustainability discourses on the other. More 
specifically, the conceptual scheme ascribes a great deal of importance to how different 
modes of public engagement resulting from institutions and political culture influence 
sustainability discourses. Therefore, by ‘bringing it all together’, this section details a 
systems analysis of sustainability discourse mobilization. The relationships between public 
engagement and the other concepts at play in sustainability discourse mobilization are 
subsequently linked to EIA or environmental assessment more broadly. It is argued that 
EIA represents an important arena in sustainability decision-making where discourses are 
mobilized.     
 Figure 2.2 illustrates a systems analysis of sustainability discourse mobilization. It 
is borrowed from Rozema et al. (2012: 88), who have conducted a discursive investigation 
of the purpose of environmental assessment. Within the context of this thesis, 
sustainability discourses are seen as the envisaged result from the implementation of 
environmental assessment practices. As can be seen in the figure, the practices 
themselves are dependent on broader decision-making layers, most notably those layers 
comprising environmental governance and democracy. Although the divergence between 
representative and deliberative models of democracy can be reconciled by bringing in the 
concept of ‘liberal democracy’ (Diamond, 1999), stark differences between the institutional 
designs of countries continue to exert their influence on environmental governance. If it is 
accepted that governance prescribes more reciprocity between state and civil society 
actors, then a focus on the primacy of elected representatives in conducting politics is 
worth investigating (Klijn and Skelcher, 2007). This also influences how science can be 
used to substantiate certain claims made in environmental assessment, thereby 
accommodating the articulation of sustainability discourses.   
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Figure 2.2: Systems analysis of sustainability discourse mobilization (Rozema et al., 2012: 88) 
 
Besides portraying the mobilization of sustainability discourses as a systemic outcome, 
Figure 2.2 represents the research position of the thesis. That is to say, EIA is envisaged 
as an arena of decision-support where the interplay of core concepts is clearly 
manifested. Whilst this domain of research is nascent, particularly in relation to research 
on the procedural aspects of EIA (Cashmore, 2004), its relevance has reverberated 
amongst a dedicated group of scholars on environmental assessment. For instance, the 
need to investigate the political role of discourses in environmental assessment has been 
identified by Runhaar et al. (2013), who have argued that the apparent consensus on the 
role of environmental assessment in environmental protection in the Netherlands has 
likely been informed by a tradition of consensual politics. By suggesting that “in countries 
characterised by less consensual political cultures we may expect more extreme 
discourses on [environmental assessment]” (Runhaar et al., 2013: 13), the authors proffer 
the idea that there is valuable research to be done on the systemic relationship between 
consensual political culture and the formation of sustainability discourses in EIA. Needless 
to add, research on this relationship is at the core of the thesis, as well as the 
relationships that exist between discourses and other system components.  
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 One new ‘player’ in the research position is science. Whilst science has not been 
dealt with in the preceding sections of this chapter, it plays a pivotal role in mediating 
public engagement. When this is tailored to the scientific background of EIA, public 
engagement can take the form of counter-expertise. Counter-expertise refers to a conduct 
of science which follows the same rules of scientific inquiry but questions the validity of 
the evidence that is presented, ultimately resulting “in a debate in which the various 
parties provide support for their own claims of truth” (Hommes et al., 2009: 148). In its 
capacity as a support tool for environmental decision-making, EIA dwells on a strong 
physical science basis when providing evidence to make decisions on project approval 
better environmentally informed. The evidence base of the project may be subject to 
discussion and is by no means blindly accepted by all stakeholders, however. When 
counter-expertise is conducted, it means that an engaged citizenry may question certain 
assumptions that are made in the impact assessment of projects. These assumptions can 
pertain to the feasibility of construction or, as will be shown in Chapter 8, they can pertain 
to the necessity to facilitate travel demand and to spur economic growth.  
 In the remainder of the section, the conceptual relationships hinted at in Figure 2.2 
will be unpacked. Central to this endeavour is the focus on public engagement – called 
‘public participation’ in the figure. Public engagement in sustainability discourse 
mobilization becomes particularly relevant when it is used to investigate the ‘opening up’ 
or ‘closing down’ of social appraisal. Drawing on Stirling (2008: 265), social appraisal 
“concerns the ways in which knowledges, understandings, and evaluations are 
constructed”. This statement reciprocates the view adopted in the thesis that public 
engagement informs the mobilization of discourses through social appraisal – often called 
‘stakeholder appraisals’ in the empirical chapters. However, it is important to state that 
social appraisals may be mediated by rationales for engaging the public. In particular, the 
rationale for engaging the public with regard to creating commitment to science and 
evidence warrants further investigation (Stirling, 2006).  
 
2.4.1 Public participation and environmental decision-making 
 
Before looking at modes of public engagement in quality decision-making and their 
institutional and politico-cultural drivers, a formal account of public participation in EIA is 
provided. Although de facto provisions for public participation in EIA existed prior to its 
legal codification (Glasson et al., 2012), the Aarhus Convention marks a watershed in 
managing public participation with environmental decision-making. Adopted in 1998 by the 
United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) and entered into force in 
2001, the Aarhus Convention provides ‘access’ for members of the public to certain areas 
of decision-making which perhaps would have been inaccessible without the legal 
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provisions set forth. The convention entitles the public to access: 1) ‘environmental 
information’; 2) opportunities for public participation; and 3) justice. 
Besides providing access, the Aarhus Convention has been instrumental in 
defining the public in environmental decision-making. The Aarhus Convention has defined 
the public as “one or more natural or legal persons, and, in accordance with national 
legislation or practice, their associations, organizations or groups” (United Nations 
Economic Commission for Europe, 1998: Article 2.4). This definition reciprocates the 
definition of civil society consisting of individuals and groups, presented earlier in the 
chapter. The public therefore consists of both individuals and groups, although the 
recognition that they are entitled to public participation is left to the national legislation of 
the signatory to the convention (Palerm, 1999). The active role of the competent authority 
in guiding public participation has furthermore prevailed in the definition on the ‘public 
concerned. The Aarhus convention has defined this as:  
 
“the public affected or likely to be affected by, or having an interest in, the environmental 
decision-making; for the purposes of this definition, non-governmental organizations 
promoting  environmental protection and meeting any requirements under national law 
shall be deemed to have an interest” (United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, 
1998: Article 2.5). 
 
In recent years some work in the public engagement literature has addressed the concept 
of ‘upstream participation’ (e.g. Wilsdon and Willis, 2004; Burgess and Chilvers, 2006). 
This has particularly been the case in the literature dealing with the trialling of innovative 
science and technologies, but it can also be applied to EIA. The question remains whether 
the Aarhus Convention is an adequate instrument for upstreaming public engagement, 
however. As regards early participation, Hartley and Wood (2005) have observed that the 
Aarhus Convention remains vague in terms of setting the terms of reference for the timely 
involvement of civil society in decision-making. In investigating the implementation of the 
Aarhus Convention in EIA, Hartley and Wood (2005) have identified a number of 
constraints for implementing public participation in a timely fashion. These constraints 
ranged from a poor timing of the participation process to a late disclosure and 
dissemination of environmental information to civil society actors, which prevented them 
from participating (more) effectively.  
 
2.4.2 Modes of public engagement 
 
The Aarhus Convention provides useful insight into the legal provisions of public 
engagement in EIA. Nevertheless, to understand how public engagement functions within 
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the conceptual scheme of sustainability discourses it is pertinent to also take modes of 
public engagement into consideration. By ‘mode’ it is meant the ways in which 
engagement is organized, the institutional spaces that accommodate engagement 
activities as well as the criteria used to select civil society actors for an ‘invited’ form of 
public engagement (Fung and Wright, 2003). Modes of public engagement can also be 
associated with the conduct of counter-expertise, alternative problem framings and 
attitudes on democratic satisfaction and political trust that instruct the degree of 
collaboration or conflict between decision-makers and civil society. Somewhat analogous 
to the definitional scopes of ‘modes of social appraisal’ (Stirling, 2006) and ‘modes of 
political action’ (Dalton et al., 2003), modes of public engagement designate a repository 
of various institutional and cultural pressures exerted on EIA. 
 The conduct of EIA beckons further inquiry into the role of counter-expertise as an 
expression of public engagement, as counter-expertise foregrounds analysis on the use of 
science and technology in various disciplines of environmental assessment (e.g. baseline 
study, impact prediction, identification of mitigation measures). In infrastructure projects, 
for example, technology is required to measure the environmental impacts of the 
reference situation, to predict the impacts of road or rail transport, and to trial measures 
that may be able to mitigate these impacts. Consequently, the science used in EIA may 
reverberate in the social appraisals of civil society actors. Whilst it is often assumed that 
facts and values are incommensurate to one another, it has also been argued that both 
are dependent on one’s worldview (e.g. Hommes et al., 2009). This gives rise to debate 
on the validity of certain scientific claims underlying the main conclusions of the 
environmental statement, thereby inspiring the mobilization of discourses.    
 In dealing explicitly with concepts akin to public engagement, institutional design 
and culture, Jasanoff (2005) has presented a comparative research on the use of 
biotechnologies in the US, the UK, Germany and the EU. Her focus has revolved around 
the intricacies of democracy, political culture and scientific authority in concocting ways to 
govern this technology. It has been shown in this comparative research that decision 
accountability in technology governance is related to public perceptions of legitimate 
democratic rule and national styles of regulation. The ‘opening up’ of the debate on 
biotechnology use in the public sphere has incited social appraisals of its applicability and 
desirability that stirred debate, and where discourses on valid political and scientific 
authority developed in tandem. Jasanoff  has argued, therefore, that “the practices of 
science and of liberal democracy flourished together” (2005: 22).  
Whereas institutional spaces represent the media through which modes of public 
engagement can be fostered, incentives for decision-makers to coalesce with civil society 
actors represent the rationales for public engagement. Put differently, why would decision-
makers want to make any effort to engage the public? Although the ‘right answer’ would 
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be to state that seeking public input is part of the good governance agenda, however 
questionable that may seem for improving the quality of decision outcomes (Bond et al., 
2011), Stirling (2006; 2008) has shown that decision-makers can have private rationales 
for doing so. A normative rationale considers public engagement an end in itself, a moral 
requirement in democratic decision-making. A substantive rationale perceives public 
engagement as a means to an end: decisions will become better when public engagement 
takes place. An instrumental rationale advocates the use of public engagement to justify 
decisions. Justification in the instrumental rationale underpins the public mandate for 
making decisions, as expressed in the concept of social appraisal.  
 When applied to expertise and counter-expertise, social appraisal can serve as the 
lens through which the public commitment to using science and technology can be 
assessed. Largely alluding to the substantive and instrumental rationales, public 
engagement can be a resource to convert public acceptance into discourse. By stating 
that “[b]oth participatory deliberation and technical analysis can be used alternatively to 
‘open up’ or ‘close down’ wider policy discourses” (pp. 102), Stirling (2006) has 
acknowledged that deliberation does not only impose constraints upon the ‘width’ of the 
debate surrounding potentially controversial issues in the science and technology domain 
but also influences the formation of policy discourses. In environmental assessment, such 
policy discourses may revolve around the legitimate use of science and technology when 
adverse ecological consequences are prospected.           
 
2.4.3 Public engagement and discourse mobilization 
 
Implicit in the research position is that public engagement has the potential to form and 
transform sustainability discourses. It is assumed that the engagement of stakeholders in 
projects bearing a high degree of both public contestation and participation inserts new 
values into decision-making. Such values may affect the structures upon which stabilizing 
claims exerting to political and scientific authority are constructed (e.g. Fischer, 2003), 
thereby possibly influencing the quality of decision outcomes. As regards discourse and 
effectiveness, awareness of the predominating importance of values in environmental 
decision-making has been paired with the need for a deliberative conduct of 
environmental assessment (Saarikoski, 2000; Wilkins, 2003; Wiklund, 2005). It has been 
suggested that discourse facilitates the integration of environmental information into 
decision-making, provided the institutional requirements for public engagement are met.         
 As a concluding statement of this theoretical framework, the research position of 
this thesis ascribes value to investigating the interplay of public engagement with 
discourse mobilization. Such an investigation can be done by theorizing how it may impact 
on the quality of decision-support. EIA is a decision-support tool and invokes the use of 
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science and technology for providing evidence, subsequently to be socially appraised 
through the use of counter-expertise. Such a mode of public engagement is potentially 
antagonistic as it creates an ‘us/them’ dichotomy between the ‘insider’ experts and the 
‘outsider’ counter-experts. In Figure 2.2, one so-called discourse area relates to the 
degree to which science is malleable to accept not only social appraisals on the conduct 
of science, but also to accept that there can be more than one scientific conclusion. A 
pertinent challenge that remains is whether some rules or principles for facilitating public 
engagement in EIA or other arenas of decision-support can be agreed upon.   
In developing a framework for reconciling public engagement with EIA in the 
context of deliberative sustainability governance, Wiklund (2005) has proposed that 
assessment procedures adhere to four principles: 1) all those potentially or likely affected 
by proposed developments are included deliberating environmental impacts (‘generality’) ; 
2) everyone involved in the deliberative process have equal opportunities to exercise 
voice (‘autonomy’); 3) power disparities should be neutralized and the “forceless force of 
the better argument” (pp. 286) should prevail (‘power neutrality’); and 4) those involved in 
deliberating the environmental impacts should adhere to the virtues of reciprocity and 
impartiality (‘ideal role-taking’). The latter principle refers to the objective of achieving an 
outcome that serves the common good. According to Wiklund (2005) the ill-defined 
spaces for public engagement in EIA could be a ‘blessing in disguise’ as this increases 
the flexibility of the procedural opportunities for civil society actors to exercise voice. 
There is considerable debate as to whether, how and in what manner discourse 
can be used in EIA to make decisions better environmentally informed through public 
engagement. The potential for deliberative decision-making in EIA is believed to be 
strengthened by the inherent subjectivity of environmental assessment (Wilkins, 2003; 
Runhaar, 2009). That is to say, the diversity in priority-setting and value orientation that 
EIA is rife with helps identify and achieve particular sustainability objectives. Discourse 
plays an important role through its ability to build an all-encompassing argumentative 
framework, thereby promoting “the development of values that foster greater personal and 
social responsibility and has the capacity to increase the importance of long-term 
environmental considerations in decision making” (Wilkins, 2003: 402). Taking centre-
stage in the virtue ascribed to discourse is the idea that these heuristic tools can pre-empt 
conflict and foster the greater good (however defined) by taking stock of different framings 
of EIA.  
Debate on the substantive improvement of the quality of EIA within the context of 
public engagement – measured in terms of effectiveness, however defined (Bond et al., 
2013a) – shows that the ability of civil society to advocate their concerns and interests is a 
core tenet. However, research on public engagement has to take political power seriously. 
For public engagement to deliver its potential for improving the quality of decision-support, 
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the issue of power asymmetry between decision-makers and civil society actors has to be 
better understood. It is important to acknowledge that power does not necessarily 
prescribe coercion, but instead prioritizes the integration of certain values and norms into 
decision-making often at the expense of other values and norms (Richardson, 2005). 
Power may as such be a productive force in the conduct of EIA and deploys public 
engagement to reinforce the structures upon which discourses are built. 
To elaborate on the relational field between power and deliberation, from the 
perspective of discourse mobilization it is interesting to see how these two concepts taken 
together inform a discussion on institutions and political culture. Pellizzoni (2001) has 
argued that deliberation exists by virtue of power relations in the communicative realm 
(‘internal power’), arguing that the “deliberative approach admits that political preferences 
conflict, and that modern society is pluralist and cannot be viewed as a community with 
shared goals and principles” (pp. 66). The internal power dimension, akin to the 
observation made earlier that the pursuit of outcomes in decision-making is rife with 
values and multiple rationalities (Richardson, 2005), is by no means contradicting the 
deliberative goal of a consensus shared by all: rather, it attests to the argumentative 
levering in a plural and heterogeneous landscape of actors, objectives, expectations and 
incentives. Once the conditions of uninhibited dialogue between the participants of a 
discussion are realized, the cognitive virtue of deliberation will prevail, ultimately 
culminating in ‘negotiated knowledge’ (Owens et al., 2004). A productive power relation 
between actors is therefore a key requirement for successful decision deliberation.  
From theory on the productive role of power in deliberation it can be deduced that 
institutional and cultural factors mediating public engagement in decision-making are of 
decisive importance. It can also be deduced that discourses are shaped by these factors, 
via modes of public engagement, considering that styles of reasoning are informed by the 
parameters of debate. By envisaging public engagement as sitting on a continuum 
between consensus and compromise (Van den Hove, 2006), institutions and political 
culture exert influence on whether situated deliberative practice is able to avoid or 
attenuate insurmountable differences that could arise between antagonistic sustainability 
discourses (e.g. ‘critical ecological conservation’ versus ‘unfettered economic growth’). 
This statement induces interest in linking theory on majority-oriented and consensus-
oriented forms of politics to the political emancipation of civil society (Skelcher et al., 
2011). Furthermore, theory on public attitudes towards decision-makers provides insight 
into the viability of governance arrangements, particularly where low levels of satisfaction 
and trust undermine the civil legitimacy of decisions. 
Although ostensibly detached from its immediate project surroundings, ‘discursive’ 
EIA is imbued with the broader institutional structures of the democratic state. The nature 
and origin of institutional structures can be widely discussed within the remit of 
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sustainability governance, taking Lijphart’s (2012) distinction between majoritarian and 
consensual systems of representative democracy as a starting point in discourse 
mobilization. From this perspective it should come as no real surprise that sustainability 
discourses are the result of cooperation between political authority and civil society – most 
pertinently enshrined in the discourse of ecological modernization – has made headway in 
polities where cultures of consensus and trust prevail (Dryzek et al., 2002). Envisaging 
public engagement as a derivative of the institutional and political cultural anchorage of 
cooperation or conflict, sustainability discourse mobilization flirts with the ‘logic of 
appropriateness’ (March and Olsen, 1989). This logic suggests that sustainability 
discourses are enmeshed in their institutional and cultural environments. 
When theory on sustainability discourse mobilization is exported to empirical 
cases, the research position becomes invariably more complex. What prevails are 
questions on power relations between actors, how public engagement is accommodated 
and how actors appraise in different ways the objects, concepts and events that occur in 
the planning process. In the next chapter, more weight is given to how the research 
position this thesis has adopted can be used to formulate answers to these questions. As 
a theoretical exploration of the topic at hand can never be ‘finished’, critical realism and 
abduction are introduced to shed light on thorny ontological, epistemological and 
methodological challenges that need to be met. By doing so, it will become clear that the 
theoretical framework can be enriched by further insights from real-world practice.               
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Chapter 3 Research design 
 
This chapter details the research design of the thesis. The research design is essential to 
a structured research effort as it is able to make a logical connection between theory and 
empirical investigation. That is, it aims to justify the theoretical propositions of the 
research in light of the conduct of empirical inquiry. From a theoretical perspective it aims 
to demonstrate how the use and selection of concepts may reverberate in, amongst 
others, the practical approach and strategy of the research as well as in the use and 
selection of methods for data collection and data analysis. Similarly, empirical inquiry may 
be envisaged as a tool to strengthen the theoretical foundation of the research.  
A key requirement for good research is that it is coherent (Robson, 2002). Many 
research disciplines in the social sciences embrace particular traditions of thought in the 
realms of reality, knowledge and truth. They seep into the selection criteria and 
subsequent orchestration of research methods, which on its part is structured by what 
drives the main purpose of research, thereby alluding to what Tashakkori and Teddlie 
(2003: 679) have coined as the “dictatorship of the research question”. In approaching the 
research question and its implications for conducting research coherently and 
purposefully, this chapter therefore plays a pivotal role.  
A research design aims to answer questions related to ontology, epistemology and 
methodology (Corbetta, 2003). Arguably, the ontological and epistemological question 
mark the philosophical foundation of research in the social sciences, or what may be 
called its meta-theories (Danermark et al., 2002). The ontological question is concerned 
with the existence of social reality (Corbetta, 2003). For example, it may ask whether 
reality is an ‘autonomous state of being’ independent from how it is interpreted, or whether 
it is profoundly shaped by the way it is represented in the human mind. The 
epistemological question pertains to the ‘knowability’ of social reality (Corbetta, 2003). It 
deals with the kinds of knowledge on reality – e.g. objective, probabilistic or subjective 
knowledge, amongst others – that research may be able to elicit. Secondly, it perceives 
social research as a tension between knowledge, human observation and interpretation. 
The methodological question draws upon the ontological and epistemological position the 
research takes (Corbetta, 2003). Methods for data collection and analysis are selected 
according to the philosophical foundation of the research, which typifies inquiry into the 
existence of social reality and the kinds of knowledge through which it may be 
investigated.  
The links between epistemology, ontology and methodology in the research design 
have been illustrated in Figure 3.1. As a starting point, the theoretical framework (see 
Chapter 2) provides the conceptual parameters upon which the empirical investigation is 
based. Consequently, the ontological and epistemological position the research takes is 
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premised on these conceptual parameters, thereby constructing the philosophical 
foundation of the research design (Danermark et al., 2002). Methodological choices result 
from this foundation, covering the areas of data collection and data analysis. Ultimately, 
the methods that are used in the research aim to shed light on the process of 
sustainability discourse mobilization.      
     
 
Figure 3.1: The research design 
 
This chapter contains five sections. The first section introduces the critical realist 
approach to ontology and epistemology. Critical realism constitutes the philosophical 
foundation of the research and permeates all stages of the research design, thereby 
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answering pertinent questions on ontology, epistemology and methodology. Section 2 
deals with the intricate relationship between critical realism, the role of theory in social 
science research and how this resonates in further theoretical development. In framing 
this relationship, Section 3 introduces the research strategy of abduction. Abduction is 
deployed as the preferred scheme of inference and fits comfortably within the critical 
realist approach adopted in this thesis. The fourth section exposes the tenets of case 
study research on the basis of its prospected benefits. These tenets become clearer when 
the criteria for selecting cases and decisions on the appropriate number of cases are 
elaborated. Section 5 enlists the methods for data collection (semi-structured interviews, 
primary documentation, newspaper articles, value surveys and studies, observations) and 
the methods for analysis (textual data coding, gap analysis, content analysis, news 
coverage and statistical analysis) that are used in the research, as well as how they can 
answer the research questions. 
 
3.1 A critical realist approach to ontology and epistemology 
 
The thesis deploys a critical realist approach to ontology and epistemology. Critical 
realism combines elements of positivism and constructivism and is situated somewhat 
between these approaches (for more information, see 'Fig. 2.' in Järvensivu and Törnroos, 
2010). Its starting point relates to the notion of an independent social reality composed of 
concepts, entities and events. However, research in the social sciences is inherently 
limited in being able to readily observe and measure reality (Easton, 2010a). Critical 
realists believe that social science research is unable to make inferences explicit, 
although it does agree on the desirability of causal claims-making. As such it distances 
itself from ‘naive’ realism (i.e. positivism) and relativism (i.e. constructivism), respectively 
(Järvensivu and Törnroos, 2010). Danermark (2002) has labelled critical realism the ‘both-
and’ perspective, contrasting the ‘either-or’ perspective typically espoused by positivism 
and constructivism. It is willing to converge to some of the virtues of both approaches and 
move beyond the often assumed incommensurability of research paradigms (Burrell and 
Morgan, 1979). Whilst seemingly adopting a middle-of-the-road position, however, critical 
realism holds distinct views on, amongst others, knowledge, theory development, truth, 
explanation, empirical inquiry and research justification.   
 Critical realism argues that researchers should “construe rather than construct” 
social reality and the world around us (Easton, 2010a: 122). Critical realism adopts the 
premise that pre-existing structures steer the functioning of society. Because of these 
structures, a critical realist ontology argues that philosophical concepts such as truth and 
universal validity are ‘out there’ (Easton, 2010a). It therefore deviates from constructivism 
precisely because of this proposition. However, critical realism accepts that researchers 
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can only so much as gauge the drivers of social processes and phenomena. Reality 
cannot be readily observed due to the complexity of human relations (Danermark et al., 
2002). A lack of scientific certainty in this respect has prompted Hunt (1990) to deploy the 
more cumbersome, or perhaps more realistic, notion of ‘fallibilistic realism’. Furthermore, 
the concepts and entities that govern the occurrence of events in the social realm have a 
strong subjectivist character (Easton, 2010a). This means that the representation of reality 
in social science research is intrinsically norm-driven. In condensing the ontological and 
epistemological premises of critical realism, Sayer (1992) has formulated eight 
assumptions of critical realism (see Table 3.1).  
 
1. “The world exists independently from our knowledge of it” (Sayer, 1992: 5). Critical realism 
argues that social reality is shaped independently from the conduct of research; 
2. “Our knowledge of the world is fallible and theory-laden” (Sayer, 1992: 5). Critical realism 
assumes incoherence between knowledge and its disposition in research; 
3. Knowledge production is irregular and cannot be captured in a singular conceptual framework; 
4. “There is necessity in the world” (Sayer, 1992: 5). Objects have powers, susceptibilities 
and inclinations that culminate in the course of events; 
5. Social reality is built on structures that exert influence on events and objects. These 
structures are present also when their influence is exerted irregularly; 
6. “Social phenomena such as actions, texts and institutions are concept dependent” (Sayer, 1992: 5). Critical realists should interpret the conceptual meaning of these phenomena; 
7. “Science or the production of any kind of knowledge is a social practice” (Sayer, 1992: 5). The content of knowledge production is influenced by the structures of society; 
8. In the social sciences, researchers must critically approach their object of study, in order to be able to understand and explain them.  
Table 3.1: Eight assumptions of critical realism (adapted from Sayer, 1992) 
 
The eight assumptions clearly hint towards the applicability of critical realism in 
understanding social reality, and hence social science research. However, it may be noted 
that the critical realist approach has a slightly different orientation than other approaches. 
Critical realism places strong emphasis on ontological questions that relate to the 
existence of social reality. It thereby shifts away from more epistemology-oriented 
approaches that inquire into the possibility of knowing social reality (‘logic of justification’) 
(Danermark et al., 2002). For instance, a fundamental critical realist question relates to 
identifying which characteristics of societies and people are objects for social science 
research and knowledge production (‘logic of discovery’) (Bhaskar, 1978). Such an 
objective articulates the distinction between the justification of research practice and the 
discovery of facts, respectively. Another defining attribute of critical realism is its focus on 
mechanisms (Danermark et al., 2002). A mechanism enables interaction between 
concepts, entities and materiality and therefore has the ability to cause, generate or 
precipitate certain events (Easton, 2010a). From these two premises it could be 
suggested that critical realism is strongly focused on the conceptual dimensions of social 
reality.     
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Critical realism in social science and sustainability research 
 
Arguably, critical realism is an underdeveloped research approach in sustainability 
governance. Although its origins can be traced back some four decades (Harré, 1970; 
Bhaskar, 1978), this has not spurred the publication of critical realist-oriented research in 
sustainability governance since then. Perhaps surprisingly, critical realism has surfaced 
quite prominently in business-oriented marketing research and consumer behaviour 
studies (e.g. Hunt, 1990; Easton, 2002; 2010a). It is furthermore salient in information and 
organization studies (e.g. Mingers, 2004; Longshore Smith, 2006), in social science 
teaching methods (Sayer, 1992; 2000; Danermark et al., 2002) as well as in a range of 
other disciplines (for an overview, see Easton, 2010a). It is an interesting topic to inquire 
into the observed reticence of deploying critical realism in sustainability governance, and 
not in the last place of deploying it to investigate the ascendency and withering of 
sustainability discourses over time. Most research approaches in this governance domain 
adhere to either positivism or constructivism. Nevertheless, the thesis aims to 
demonstrate that a critical realist approach can be deployed in research associated with 
sustainability governance.      
One of the few examples of using critical realism in sustainability governance can 
be found in a study on the discursive biases of the Drivers-Pressures-State-Impacts-
Responses (DPSIR) framework (Svarstad et al., 2008). This framework consists of causal 
mechanisms linking its various components. Socio-economic and environmental drivers 
(D) exert pressure (P) on the state (S) of the environment and of environmental change. 
Impacts (I) that ensue from here may subsequently trigger responses (R) to the problem 
at hand, thereby enforcing a new set of driving forces. In appraising the discursive biases 
of the DPSIR framework, Svarstad et al. (2008) have espoused epistemological relativism 
while rejecting ontological relativism. This could mean, for example, that conservation or 
biodiversity issues can be measured quantitatively but that stakeholders nonetheless 
widely diverge in framing the physical evidence provided. Although the research design 
dwells on a moderate constructivist approach, it can also be aligned with the premises set 
forth in critical realism. Indeed, Järvensivu and Törnroos (2010) have discerned only a 
subtle difference in emphasis between critical realism and a more moderate form of 
constructivism. 
The similar philosophical backgrounds of critical realism and moderate 
constructivism warrant an analysis of sustainability discourses. Whilst discourse is often 
depicted as a constructivist concept par excellence (Hajer, 1995), the thesis perceives it to 
be in harmony with the critical realist approach. In investigating constructivism, realism 
and discourse analysis, Burr (1998) has fleshed out several positions in the debate 
concerned with their interrelationship. Arguably, it can be proposed that discourse has the 
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ability to instil or popularize certain ‘versions of reality’ without necessarily changing 
underlying structures of society. In order to resolve potential unease between critical 
realism and discourses, Sims-Schouten et al. (2007) have advocated a form of discourse 
analysis specifically tailored to the critical realist approach. They base their analysis on: 
(1) the choice of certain constructions of reality over others; (2) subjective manifestations 
of reality that that are not confined to linguistic riddles; and most importantly (3) reciprocity 
between discourses and the material world. Discourses lose their ability to explain social 
processes and phenomena without material existence (Sims-Schouten et al., 2007). This 
can be effectively halted by linking discourse analysis to critical realism.                 
 
3.2 Use of theory in critical realism  
 
As is shown in the previous chapter, theory is featured prominently in the thesis. Because 
of the critical realist approach to conducting research, the thesis concurs with Danermark 
et al. (2002) that theory and practice in social science research are inseparable. 
Representations of reality in research are continuously shaped and reshaped by 
theoretical insights. The major contribution of linking theory to the practices in specific 
case settings, as is done in the thesis, is to be able to make analytical generalizations 
(Yin, 2009). Such generalizations can be further specified to contingent or typological 
generalizations (George and Bennett, 2005), which differ in the number of cases under 
investigation. This contrasts with research aimed to provide statistical or quantitative 
generalizations. Analytical generalizations provide the necessary context to make claims 
about the generative mechanisms that underlie the structure of social reality. Pivotal in 
making analytical generalizations is the use of theory. Theory is able to elicit knowledge of 
the structural forces of reality, something which could otherwise remain concealed. In a 
critical realist context, Danermark et al. (2002: 10) have argued that “it is possible to gain 
knowledge of actually existing structures and generative mechanisms, albeit not in terms 
of a mirror image (...) but certainly in terms of theories, which are more or less truthlike”. 
The thesis places heavy emphasis on the knowledge claims that can be proffered 
by using theory. However, it is important to stress that theory, as a major contributor to 
critical realism, generates hypotheses rather than explanations. Causal laws trigger social 
events through generative mechanisms, subsequently to be experienced by people. Yet 
they operate at different levels; they are stratified (Bhaskar, 1978; Mingers, 2004). Theory 
aiming to explain the regularity between these levels will hence prove unsatisfactorily. As 
such theory used in social science research for making causal claims is inherently flawed. 
Or to put if differently, use of theory in critical realism is more a pragmatic effort to 
represent the concepts, entities and events which may be considered the structural 
factors exerting influence on the construction of social reality (Easton, 2010a).   
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 In critical realism, structures and patterns of social reality may best be researched 
through a ‘triadic theory of science’ (Harré, 1986), referring to a tripartite theoretical 
framework. The framework is somewhat consistent with Mingers’ (2004) argument that 
empirical research in a critical realist approach involves a ‘double reduction’ from 
(assumed) causal laws to social events and finally to experiences of people. In applying 
the triadic theory of science to the conduct of research (Harré, 1986), three types of theory 
play a role: 
 
1. Type 1 theories classify and explain things that are real. They relate to manifestations 
of reality that can be measured; 
2. Type 2 theories are representations of reality, for instance through making models. It 
primarily deals with social events. The vast majority of scientific theories may be 
submerged into this category; 
3. Type 3 theories are associated with cognitive concepts, entities, objects and 
structures, all considered “beings beyond all possible experience” (Harré, 1986: 273).  
 
From this framework it can be deduced that social reality is layered. Concepts that 
operate at the structural level (in type 3 theories) have a strong metaphysical dimension, 
yet they exert real-world influence at the levels of representation (in type 2 theories) and 
observation of social reality (in type 1 theories). This proposed ‘division of labour’ in the 
use and applicability of theory is particularly valuable for investigating social reality by 
means of triangulating empirical observation (Järvensivu and Törnroos, 2010). Type 1 
theories are useful data-generating instruments but are unable to probe beyond what is 
measurable. Type 2 theories are useful in making sense of ‘messy’ concepts but are 
nonetheless representations or facsimiles, i.e. not exact replicas, of social reality. Type 3 
theories demonstrate that underlying concepts and structures are at work in constructing 
reality but are too elusive, or fallible (Hunt, 1990), to work with. Mechanisms enable 
interaction to take place between the three types of theory (Danermark et al., 2002).    
 The triadic theory of science as set forth by Harré (1986) is implicit in the 
theoretical framework of the thesis. In following the logic of this theoretical model, its 
application consists of three consecutive steps. Firstly, the institutional differences 
between the UK and the Netherlands as well as results from value surveys and studies 
(see also Sub-section 3.5.1) are observed. Secondly, the theoretical framework proceeds 
by reconstructing the sustainability discourses of the actors involved in the research, the 
institutional design choices made in the projects and cultural attitudes of the actors 
towards the conduct of politics. Such an investigation is a representation of reality as 
these structural factors are difficult to conceptualize (type 2 theory). Thirdly, linking 
discourse construction and articulation to institutional design and political culture is an 
70 
 
inherently cognitive endeavour. The structures that mediate influence of institutions and 
political culture on the mobilization of sustainability discourses are therefore “beings 
beyond all possible experience” (Harré, 1986: 273) (type 3 theory). The three types of 
theory are illustrated in Figure 3.2.    
 
 
Figure 3.2: Three types of theory (based on Harré, 1986) 
 
3.3 Resolving dualisms in the use of theory through abduction 
 
The role of theory in research can vary greatly in relation to the use of research data. Two 
dualisms have by and large marked conventional wisdom in this domain. The first dualism 
relates to whether research is theory-building or theory-testing (De Vaus, 2011). This has 
led to an ongoing debate on the positioning of theory in the overall research design. For 
instance, a great deal of attention may be given to the virtue of theory in furnishing the 
researcher with testable hypotheses, or to what may be called the logic of justification 
(King et al., 1994). Theory is in this context considered a support tool for empirical inquiry. 
Within this goals-oriented strategy theory merely serves as a baseline with which 
hypotheses may be either confirmed or falsified. Such a viewpoint expresses a strong 
preference for conducting research for the purpose of theory-testing. However, it has also 
invited criticisms revolving around the ability of theory to stir that ‘other’ logic, the logic of 
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discovery (George and Bennett, 2005). It is proposed that theory has the inherent capacity 
to find new research trajectories which otherwise would have remained unexplored. 
Similarly, theory-building widens the scope of the research endeavour by challenging 
existing models of causation with alternative hypotheses.  
 A second dualism concerns the chronological order in which theory and research 
data are set. It is based on the difference between induction and deduction (George and 
Bennett, 2005). That is, theory can be induced from the data or theory can be used to 
deduce certain meanings from data. Induction argues that observable facts are the main 
focus of attention in research. Patterns or trends that may be distilled from them can 
consequently lead to the formulation of theoretical propositions (George and Bennett, 
2005). Inductive research is often deployed in theory-building research, for instance by 
means of ‘grounding’ theory in the research data. Conversely, deduction uses theory as 
its starting point and applies it to the conduct of empirical inquiry. Whilst deduction may be 
associated with theory-building (George and Bennett, 2005), it lends itself more towards 
hypothesis-testing. King et al. (1994) have argued that to formulate testable hypotheses is 
‘more art than science’. This statement hints towards a great amount of flexibility in the 
formulation of new theoretical propositions.       
The thesis aims to transcend the assumed dualisms of theory-building versus 
theory-testing, on the one hand, and of induction versus deduction, on the other. It does 
so by selecting and combining the virtuous elements of both research strategies. Taking 
the induction/deduction dualism as its focus of analysis, a good starting point for bridging 
the divide is provided by Eisenhardt and Graebner (2007). They have argued that 
“inductive and deductive logics are mirrors of one another, with inductive theory building 
from cases producing new theory from data and deductive theory testing completing the 
cycle by using data to test theory” (2007: 25). The qualities of each strategy with respect 
to linking theory to data are thus complimentary. However, such a viewpoint continues to 
amplify the distinction and to perceive induction and deduction as separate research 
strategies, to be conducted in isolation from each other. Much in contrast, critical realism 
prescribes a harmonious and mutually reinforcing relationship between theory and 
empirical inquiry (Danermark et al., 2002; Easton, 2010a).  
In the search for a better alternative to induction and deduction, the research 
strategy of abduction has surfaced as most appropriate. Abduction is different in that it 
does not support the logics with which induction and deduction make inferences 
(Danermark et al., 2002). Inference refers to the process of reaching conclusions or 
mapping consequences on the basis of a premise assumed to be true (King et al., 1994). 
This premise can be set in theory (deduction), or the conclusion is a theoretical 
proposition based on research data (induction). Central to inference is that research data 
are only a small sample of what is or may be ‘out there’. A discussion on inference 
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therefore bears an intrinsic epistemological tension. In induction a conclusion may be 
inferred after regularity or repetition in the research data can be observed. In deduction a 
theory can infer a conclusion or real-world consequence by virtue of its confirmation 
through observation. Albeit simplified, these are two either logically induced or deduced 
sets of premise and conclusion.  
In abduction, however, neither logical sequence of premise and conclusion is 
followed. This research strategy infers without making an inductive generalization based 
on theory-building or a deductive conclusion based on theory-building (Danermark et al., 
2002). It is a scheme of inference that can be used for making a premise look more 
plausible than would be the case without it. This is also why abduction is sometimes 
called ‘inference to the best explanation’ (Harman, 1965). A good example of an inductive 
research strategy, a deductive strategy and an abductive strategy applied to one of the 
hypotheses posited in the thesis is provided in Table 3.2.  
 
Induction Deduction Abduction 
Premise (case):  
The Netherlands is a 
consensual democracy 
Premise (rule):  
Public engagement is fostered 
in consensual democracies 
Premise (rule): 
Public engagement is fostered 
in consensual democracies 
Phenomenon (result):  
Public engagement is fostered 
in the Netherlands  
Phenomenon (case): 
The Netherlands is a 
consensual democracy 
Phenomenon (result): 
Public engagement is fostered 
in the Netherlands 
Conclusion (rule):  
Public engagement is fostered 
in consensual democracies 
Conclusion (result):  
Public engagement is fostered 
in the Netherlands 
Conclusion (case): 
The Netherlands is a 
consensual democracy 
Table 3.2: Induction, deduction and abduction in social science research (based on Peirce, 1932) 
 
Drawing on Peirce (1932), the founding father of abduction, to derive a conclusion from a 
premise invariably involves an empirical component. He has argued that ‘rule’, ‘case’ and 
‘result’ enable inference-making. Respectively these terms can be interchanged with 
‘premise’, ‘phenomenon’ and ‘conclusion’, according to their position in the scheme of 
inference. The inductive strategy requires probability in order to make a causal claim, i.e. 
in order to be considered logical (Hacking, 1975). Therefore, the conclusion in the 
example provided holds when the Netherlands is representative for all consensual 
democracies. The deductive strategy advances causal inference when the phenomenon 
in question confirms the premise. In the example provided, the conclusion that the 
Netherlands fosters public engagement is logically derived from the consistency between 
theory and practice. The abductive strategy infers a conclusion that could quite possibly 
befit both premise and phenomenon (Danermark et al., 2002). To conclude that the 
Netherlands is a consensual democracy is a hypothesis and therefore not logically derived 
from the premise. Public engagement is fostered in consensual democracies, however the 
premise does not pre-empt other entities that may be able to foster public engagement. Or 
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to put it differently, the phenomenon fails to make a claim of necessity between premise 
and conclusion.                            
 Table 3.2 demonstrates that abduction combines parts of the logical reasoning 
espoused by induction and deduction but to serve a wholly different research aim. Similar 
to deduction, it assumes that social reality is governed by rules that are assumed to be 
true. Shifting to induction, abduction then goes on to inquire empirically into something 
which is potentially premised on the rule. The position of rule and result in abduction 
corresponds with their position in deduction and induction, respectively. From this it can 
be derived that abduction is intimately linked to both theory-driven and data-driven forms 
of research. Such a stance resonates in the critical realist approach to conducting 
research. Järvensivu and Törnroos (2010) have therefore argued that abduction is a 
particularly valuable attribute to critical realism (and also to moderate constructivism).  
The abductivist scheme of inference has a research aim which is different from 
those of its ‘rival’ research strategies. That is, induction and deduction aim to explain the 
rule which is based on empirical regularity or the empirical regularity which is based on 
the rule, each in its logic of inference. Abduction, in contrast, aims to explain what ensues 
from the interaction between rule and result (Danermark et al., 2002). It is designed to 
conclude on the plausibility of the occurrence or existence of concepts and entities, for 
example the conduct of consensual democratic practice in the Netherlands. As stated 
earlier, an important research aim in abduction is to gauge those mechanisms that may 
cause or mediate certain concepts and entities to exert influence on real-world events 
(Easton, 2010a). 
 In formulating a potential critique to abduction, it could be argued that it is built on 
inconclusiveness. Abduction refrains from envisaging research as a linear progression 
towards logically derived conclusions, either in theory or reality (Danermark et al., 2002). 
Indeed, it privileges the fallibility and uncertainty of research outcomes over the need to 
be able to confirm, corroborate or falsify a causality claim based on theory and data. As 
has been made clear, the epistemological positioning of abduction is contingent on a 
sense of realism. Psillos (1996), for example, has argued that abduction is founded on 
uncertain reasoning, approximate truth and a potentially low chance to infer in a 
meaningful way.  
Because research strategies designed for logical inference are unable to prove 
causality, induction and deduction are intrinsically flawed. However, abduction is also 
contingent on a deliberate choice. It is aimed at identifying the best available explanation 
of social reality (Harman, 1965), but by no means an all-encompassing one. As the 
conclusion is not set in stone, abduction can always stimulate new research to uncover 
other plausible explanations (Danermark et al., 2002). This means that in an abductive 
scheme of inference (see Table 3.2) the theory and data, or what Peirce (1932) has called 
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rule and result, can be re-described and re-contextualized. Abduction is therefore a 
recursive research strategy.   
 
3.4 Research involving cases 
 
The thesis uses the cases of HS2 (Phase 1) and A4DS to inquire empirically into 
sustainability discourse mobilization in EIA. Case study research is deployed to tease out 
a deep exploration of the mechanisms that cause, mediate or accommodate sustainability 
discourse. As has been the situation with choosing abduction as most befitting a critical 
realist approach (Danermark et al., 2002), case study research is also intimately linked to 
critical realism (Easton, 2010a). An analysis of the course of events related to a certain 
case may be able to identify structural factors of influence. In critical realism such a 
research analysis serves the purpose of causal explanation, although it is argued that this 
is impossible (Easton, 2010a). It must be remembered that the intrinsic complexity of 
relations between events, concepts and entities in the social realm prohibits any such 
causal explanation. However, from studying a case thoroughly the occurrence and 
existence of events can be made more insightful. Furthermore, abduction can be linked to 
case study research (Dubois and Gadde, 2002). An abductivist research strategy aims to 
formulate plausible, but by no means certain, explanations for the course of events in a 
certain case. Adopting this strategy also means that theory plays an important role in 
linking concepts to the research premise and empirical reality of the case. Theory builds 
cohesion between the various components of a case.   
Case study research can be defined as “a research method that involves 
investigating one or a small number of social entities or situations about which data are 
collected using multiple sources of data and developing a holistic description through an 
iterative research process” (Easton, 2010a: 119). It may be referred to as a method or 
methodology, although obviously there are many different ways to collect and analyze 
data within the cases to be studied (De Vaus, 2011). Two elements of case study 
research may be extracted from the definition provided which require further emphasis. 
Firstly, case study research is able to provide a holistic description. This can also be 
traced back to Yin’s observation that cases can be studied in their real-life, real-world 
context (Yin, 2009). Therefore, case study research contrasts sharply to other more 
reductionist forms of research, such as statistical analysis. Secondly, case study research 
is a reiterative research process. Within a research process involving cases the technique 
of reiterative abstraction can be consecutively applied (Yeung, 1997). Reiterative 
abstraction allows research on the characteristics of a case to be in alignment with 
research on structures. A case can be better understood when its peculiarities are 
explained as a structured outcome. The character and structure of a case correspond with 
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one another; they are iterative (Sayer, 1992; Easton, 2010a). Thus, combining a rich 
understanding of the case with knowledge on underlying structures is a prerequisite to 
case study research.      
Research based on cases is different from research that is, for example, 
experimental or longitudinal (De Vaus, 2011). Case study research relates uneasily to 
other forms of research that necessarily involves a large number of cases or an expanded 
time frame. Cases are singular events, set in a certain place and time. However, there is a 
considerable freedom for researchers to adjust the parameters of case study research to 
fit their specific purposes. Various design choices can influence case study research. De 
Vaus (2011) has identified some of these choices, for example the selection of cases to 
either describe or explain social phenomena, the quantity of cases to be studied and 
whether the cases are set in the past, in the present or in the future. The design choices 
related to case selection and case numbers are of special interest. They are part of a 
wider debate on the competence of case study research to make its outcomes more 
relevant than mere anecdote or circumstantial evidence. In designing research upon an 
intelligent process of selecting which and how many cases to study, general research 
qualities such as the validity of research and the ability to generalize from the research 
outcomes may be developed (Healy and Perry, 2000).  
 
3.4.1 Case selection 
 
A crucial criterion for selecting cases in research relates to internal and external validity 
(De Vaus, 2011). Internal validity refers to the ability of case study research to separate 
key factors of influence from other non-explanatory factors. As stated earlier, the thesis 
compares a large-scale infrastructure project in the UK with one in the Netherlands. As 
both states are EU Member States, the same legal provisions on EIA are followed – either 
through Directive 2011/92/EU (for HS2 Phase 1) or through Directive 85/337/EEC (as 
amended) (for A4DS). An internally valid comparison is also aided by the fact that both 
projects involve the construction of new infrastructure. The selected cases in the thesis 
are therefore congruent with respect to supranational legislation and the content of the 
proposed development. Internal validity can furthermore be fostered by linking hypotheses 
to existing theory which can be found in the peer-reviewed literature (Eisenhardt, 1989). It 
is hypothesized that institutions and political culture perform a critical function for the 
mobilization of sustainability discourses in the selected cases. Therefore, prior theoretical 
knowledge has helped formulate this hypothesis by identifying institutions and political 
culture as external factors of influence. However, it is important to approach internal 
validity cautiously (Healy and Perry, 2000). Pervasive uncertainty in the ontological realm 
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(i.e. the ‘what is?’ question) may lead to distortion in the inference by external factors 
other than institutions and political culture (see also Chapter 8).          
 The point on prior theoretical knowledge seeps into the issue of external validity. 
This type of validity refers to the ability of case study research to export its conclusions to 
the outside world. External validity is by and large a claim to generalize research 
outcomes through the process of replication (Yin, 2009). Replication can be based on 
generating either similar research outcomes (‘literal replication’) or contrasting research 
outcomes (‘theoretical replication’). These two different forms of replication relate to a 
choice underlying case selection to construct either a ‘most similar’ or ‘most different’ case 
study design (Landman, 2008). Whilst a most similar case study design aims to 
investigate variation in only one factor of influence, a most different case study design 
investigates variation in multiple factors of influence. Thus, the selection of cases as part 
of the case study design is often strategically informed (De Vaus, 2011).  
Perhaps ironically, the selection of the two cases adheres to both a most similar 
and a most different case study design. On the one hand, the design is most similar as a 
common legal framework for conducting EIA exists in both the UK and the Netherlands. 
On the other hand, it is proposed that the British and Dutch cases differ significantly from 
an institutional and cultural perspective, which conversely influence modes of public 
engagement, deliberation, the norms and virtues of democracy, and potentially also the 
articulation of sustainability discourses. Whilst using a common legal framework can be 
envisaged as being useful in the best traditions of comparative research, the proposition 
demonstrates a strong commitment to a plural theoretical replication of the institutional 
and cultural factors that shape the real-world conduct of EIA in project planning in the UK 
and the Netherlands.   
 
3.4.2 Case numbers 
 
~ “What is the general? The single case. What is the specific? Millions of cases.” ~ 
(Goethe, cited in  Easton, 2010b) 
 
The thesis applies the theoretical framework to two cases. Research based on two cases 
requires justification as it may be generally considered a low number. Goethe’s statement 
(see above) refers to research based on a single case but its underlying message is 
equally apt for research based on two cases. At first glance it may seem paradoxical, not 
to say provocative, to attach the virtue of generalization to the conduct of research based 
on a single or few case studies (small-N research). Indeed, criticasters of this form of 
research have been claiming the exact opposite. They have been salient in purporting that 
small-N research is unable to produce reliable outcomes that may consecutively be 
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applied elsewhere (Flyvbjerg, 2006). It is from this perspective that proponents of 
research based on many cases (large-N research) invariably adhere to the research 
strategies of induction and deduction. The larger the number, it is advanced, the better 
theories can be built or tested. However, both induction and deduction can be made 
compatible with small-N research. A single or few case studies have an equal ability to 
generate novel theoretical propositions or to test hypotheses, for example on the basis of 
the falsification criterion (Flyvbjerg, 2006). Abduction can be furthermore applied to small-
N research within the central aim to generalize research outcomes (Dubois and Gadde, 
2002). It builds synthesis between theory-building and theory-testing research traditions 
through a systematic combination between, and ongoing reorientation of, theory and the 
case or cases to be studied. This transcends ‘the specific’ objective to build from or test 
on ‘millions of cases’.       
Small-N research is typically espoused by the critical realist approach (Easton, 
2010b). It is a core objective of critical realism to attempt to explain the effects of deeply 
embedded structures on the societal level (Harré, 1986). Because of its focus on rigorous 
analysis of a particular case, small-N research may facilitate rich inquiry into potential 
structural factors of influence. Similar to critical realism, it thereby investigates the layered 
relationship between structures, entities, concepts and events. Although not necessarily 
embedded in the critical realist approach, a clear example of the ability of small-N 
research to unearth complex relationships can be found in Flyvbjerg’s (1998) study of 
rationality and power in the case of the ‘Aalborg Project’. The project consisted of several 
spatial planning interventions in the 1970s in Aalborg, Denmark, including the landmark 
project of a new bus terminal. A detailed and context-rich analysis of this single case has 
demonstrated that the interaction between powerful actors in decision-making impacts 
substantially on the rationality and evidence base of decisions. Spatial planning in the 
Aalborg Project has been informed by structural, organizational and individual factors of 
influence (Flyvbjerg, 1998). The power dimensions observed have thus provided 
knowledge on the social engineering of rational decision-making. Such insights would 
most likely have been lacking from large-N research. 
 Choosing an appropriate number of cases for analysis can contribute decisively to 
the generalization of research outcomes. Analogous to the link between case selection 
and internal and external validity, the strategy of the research associated with causal 
claims-making may help determine the number of cases (Flyvbjerg, 2006; De Vaus, 
2011). The starting point for the comparative case study undertaken in the thesis is that 
states can adhere to different forms of democratic representation. It is hypothesized that 
this difference tailors institutions for public engagement and mediates the cultural 
orientation of civil society towards the conduct of politics and its commitment to the public 
good. Consecutively, sustainability discourses are imbued with these specific institutional 
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and cultural circumstances. From this analytical perspective, the comparison of an EIA 
case in the UK with one in the Netherlands can be expected to yield interesting results. By 
and large adhering to an ideal type of representative democracy, and with a noted 
difference in political trust and democratic satisfaction, the UK and the Netherlands can be 
representative for sustainability discourse mobilization in many other majoritarian and 
consensual democracies. Inquiry into the British and Dutch EIA case is therefore a 
strategic choice for shedding light on two separate models of causation.  
 
3.5 Methods 
 
Methods for data collection and data analysis are needed to conduct empirical research. 
They are at the core of the ‘methodological question’ in the research design (Corbetta, 
2003), following the questions related to ontology and epistemology. The methods used 
should therefore correspond to other parts of the research design. Similar to the critical 
realist approach and the abductive research strategy, the thesis has used methods that 
facilitate a thorough understanding of the link between structures, concepts and events. In 
doing so, the use of a variety of methods to collect and analyze data is strongly favoured 
over the use of a single method. Danermark et al. (2002) therefore advocate that 
methodological plurality should be the guiding framework in critical realist research. This 
refers to the deployment of a wide array of methods for data collection and data analysis. 
Critical realism does not hold a monopoly over the use of certain methods (Yeung, 1997). 
It allows freedom in choosing appropriate methods for data collection and analysis. 
Nevertheless, methods capable of collecting and analyzing data which otherwise would 
remain unexplored best serve an abductive scheme of inference (Dubois and Gadde, 
2002). They should therefore strongly be focused on the logic of discovery, a quality 
typically espoused by the ontological premise of critical realism.     
Plurality in the use of methods in critical realism is furthermore related to 
triangulation (Sobh and Perry, 2006). Triangulation prescribes the deployment of multiple 
methods in order to increase the validity of the research outcomes. Implicit in triangulation 
is the epistemological viewpoint that reality is structured by social laws (Sobh and Perry, 
2006). This means that its main objective is to find out the ‘truth of the matter’. In its 
objective to find out the truth, triangulation consists of both repeating and mixing methods. 
For example, interview outcomes become more reliable when multiple respondents are 
asked the same question. When mixing methods, triangulation privileges a combination of 
quantitative and qualitative methods within the case studies (Yeung, 1997). As such it is 
able both to observe general trends and to understand why they occur.                 
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3.5.1 Methods for data collection 
 
In order to investigate the two selected cases, data have to be collected. A wide variety of 
methods can be deployed to collect the data, of course to a considerable degree 
dependent on the accessibility and availability of data sources. As cases are set in a 
specific time and place, methods for data collection may be selected according to their 
ability to investigate these situational characteristics (Yin, 2009). Although not deployed in 
the thesis, ethnography is often described as a data collection method typically espoused 
by case study research. However, De Vaus (2011) has argued that a case study does not 
predetermine the methods that can be used in case study research. Thus, there exists 
flexibility in choosing the methods for data collection. The thesis uses five methods: 
 
(1) Conducting semi-structured interviews; 
(2) Retrieving primary documents; 
(3) Retrieving newspaper articles; 
(4) Retrieving value surveys and studies; 
(5) Observing. 
 
(1) Semi-structured interviews 
 
A prime instrument for data collection in the thesis is interviewing. In each case study 
around twenty interviews with stakeholders have been conducted. Interviewees have 
signed an implied consent form prior to their participation in the research (see Appendix 
1). Almost all of the interviews have been recorded – unless the circumstances of the 
interview prevented this from happening – and subsequently transcribed. A semi-
structured interview technique is chosen. Semi-structured interviews have the ability to 
acquire a rich understanding of the research matter. A questionnaire is typically used to 
conduct them (Rubin and Rubin, 2012). 
Semi-structured interviews are better equipped to elicit information from 
respondents for the purpose of this research than structured or unstructured interview 
methods. Structured interviews allow very limited flexibility for respondents to elaborate a 
question. Respondents are considered research objects rather than research subjects in 
this form of interviewing. Conversely, unstructured interviews yield a very rich 
understanding of the research matter but neglect structure. A semi-structured interview 
avoids both limitations since its questionnaire is both open and ‘thematized’ (Kvale, 1996). 
Another advantage of semi-structuredness is that interaction may be established between 
the interviewer and the respondent (Kvale, 1996). It fosters a ‘guided conversation’ 
between both sides involved in the interview process. Two questionnaires, one for 
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interviewing decision-makers and the other for interviewing civil society actors, have been 
used in the thesis4. They are enclosed as Appendix 2 and Appendix 3, respectively.  
 
(2) Primary documentation 
 
In the thesis primary documentation refers to written data sources. Primary documentation 
entails, amongst others, government reports, project documentation, statistical records, 
manuals, pamphlets, brochures, flyers, press releases, memoranda, letters and e-mails 
(for an overview, see Finnegan, 1996). The method uses ‘primary’ as a defining attribute 
to ascribe this type of documentation to the actors which play a prominent role in the EIA 
cases. It is distinctly different from secondary written sources, for example academic 
literature or newspaper articles. Thus, primary documents emanate from the actor 
environment. In considering the proper use of documents in research, Prior (2003: 2) has 
asserted that “we must consider them in terms of fields, frames and networks of action. In 
fact, the status of things as ‘documents’ depends precisely on the ways in which such 
objects are integrated into field of action, and documents can only be defined in terms of 
such fields”. A document is therefore not only a medium that contains information, a 
‘container of content’ (Prior, 2003), but can be seen in direct ratio to the actions and 
behaviours of its author(s).  
 Appendix 4 provides a list of the documents that have been consulted as part of 
the data collection. Three criteria have been used to find the documents: 
• Documents that were mentioned during the interviews, for example the formal written 
responses of civil society groups to the EIA Scope and Methodology Report in the 
HS2 Phase 1 project (e.g. Chiltern Countryside Group, 2012); 
• Documents that were mentioned in other documents, for instance cross-references 
made in the documentation of the A4DS project (e.g. to the 'deelrapporten' in 
Rijkswaterstaat, 2009d); 
• Online retrieval of documents by delimitation using a number of key words (e.g. 
sustainability, protest, HS2/A4, satisfaction, trust). 
    
(3) Newspaper articles 
 
In conjunction with the collection of primary documentation, the thesis will collect a 
number of newspaper articles that report on the projects. It is anticipated that newspaper 
articles provide general oversight of the events that have taken place in each case. 
Furthermore, actors involved in the two cases may feel susceptible to speaking to 
                                                           
4
 In the HS2 Phase 1 project, no decision-makers have been interviewed. This has been caused by their 
unwillingness to become involved in the research.  
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journalists in order to become more widely known amongst the readers of the 
newspapers. The newspaper articles may therefore generate additional data. In order to 
systematically navigate the news coverage associated with the cases, online searches 
based on key words (e.g. EIA, sustainability, A4, HS2) have been carried out. The online 
newspaper database Nexis® (part of LexisNexis®) has been used to retrieve the 
newspaper articles.    
 
(4) Value surveys and studies 
 
The thesis uses value surveys to inquire into the political culture of the UK and the 
Netherlands. These surveys can be used to inquire into the political cultural values of the 
populations of these two states. Value survey databases can be found and accessed 
online. The values expressed in the selected opinion areas (e.g. politics, human values) 
are aggregated at the state level. They are therefore useful for comparing the value 
orientation in the UK and the Netherlands. Whilst Appendix 5 shows the original outputs of 
the value surveys which are accessed online, Chapter 7 shows the ‘processed’ outcomes 
of the surveys. Three value survey databases were consulted:     
 
1. European Social Survey (ESS). The ESS conducts research on values in the social 
domain. A survey across a large number of European states is carried out at two-year 
intervals; 
2. World Value Survey (WVS). The WVS proclaims to be the “world’s most 
comprehensive investigation of political and sociocultural change” (WVS, 2012a); 
3. European Values Study (EVS). The EVS is similar to the WVS in its research on value 
orientation but specifically looks at the values held by the populations of European 
states.   
 
In addition to these value studies, which largely designate a quantitative assessment of 
extant values relating to political culture, qualitative studies have been consulted to inquire 
more thoroughly into individual aspects of democratic satisfaction and political trust as 
experienced in the UK and the Netherlands. These value studies benefit the analysis of 
political culture where some uncertainties in the interpretation of the value surveys exist or 
when the data are unclear. Furthermore, the studies provide insight into the merit of 
interpersonal trust and trust across civil society networks for the gestation of a public 
sphere (Habermas, 1989), particularly with regards to looking at the potential for 
collaboration or conflict between decision-makers and citizens. This additional focus on 
trust befits the theoretical insights of Sub-ection 2.2.3 that there is a possible spill-over 
between democratic satisfaction, political trust and a politically engaged citizenry.           
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(5) Observations 
 
During the fieldwork the researcher has observed the behaviour and actions of research 
subjects that were engaged in events relating to the cases. For example, in the 
Netherlands the researcher has witnessed protest against the proposed development of 
additional infrastructure around Rotterdam (intricately linked to the A4DS project); in the 
UK the researcher has visited information centres where many of the protest activities 
against HS2 (Phase 1) were organized. A highly valuable observation in the HS2 project 
concerns sitting through a meeting of the Central Chilterns Community Forum (CCCF), 
which as a public engagement mechanism fulfils a pivotal role in the empirical chapters. In 
the Netherlands the researcher has attended a meeting of Stichting Stop RW19/A4, an 
important stakeholder in the A4DS case. These observations of the social practice of 
political culture have helped develop a deeper understanding of this core concept.   
 
3.5.2 Methods for data analysis 
 
Data analysis is an important stage in the research design. It may appear from the 
structure of this chapter that data analysis succeeds previous phases of the research 
design, for example case study design or data collection. However, analyzing data is 
highly recursive, permeates most other design phases and the process of analytical 
inquiry is independent of a chronological order (Basit, 2003). Methods for data analysis 
have increasingly become dependent on the use of computer programmes in recent 
years. It is certainly safe to suggest that computer programmes have increased the 
capacity, consistency and rigour of processing sets of data. Specialized software has also 
considerably mitigated the labour intensity of processing qualitative data manually.  
Analytical inquiry however continues to be driven by the intellectual capabilities of 
the researcher. Thus, the adage “computers don’t analyze data; people do” (Weitzman 
and Miles, 1995: 3) holds true. It is imperative from this perspective that the choice for a 
particular method is justified in terms of its ability to support the researcher in grasping the 
objects of study. The thesis uses five methods for data analysis: 
 
(1) Coding textual data; 
(2) Gap analysis; 
(3) Content analysis; 
(4) News coverage; 
(5) Statistical analysis. 
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(1) Coding textual data 
 
The thesis deploys a method to code the interview transcripts. Following Tesch (1990), 
coding makes texts more manageable in the sense that it condenses or distils meaning 
through systematic analysis. It makes a substantial effort in organizing an otherwise non-
uniform catalogue of texts and in interpreting and assessing their contribution to the 
research. Several techniques related to identifying the value of texts for the research can 
be discerned, for instance by analyzing the volume of key words, the use of metaphors or 
juxtapositions, or the use of words that hint towards explanation (Ryan and Bernard, 
2003). As the method of coding textual data enables inquiry and cross-linkages among a 
number of texts, it may shed light on certain features shared among them. These can 
subsequently be used to build new theories or to test existing theories. Coding textual 
data furthermore aims to identify certain themes for the purpose of answering one or more 
research questions (Ryan and Bernard, 2003).     
Drawing on Saldaña (2009), the coding of textual data in this research has 
consisted of two cycles. As a necessary and preliminary stage in the coding process, 
codes need to be created. These codes can be words, fragments of sentences, whole 
sentences or even whole paragraphs. The first cycle, then, is to group these codes into 
what the coding software used in the thesis, NVivo®, refers to as nodes. These nodes 
serve as repositories or meeting points for the selected codes. The second cycle is to 
refine the grouping of codes into categories. Categories are therefore composed of 
several sets of codes and they can be linked to the dominant themes in the research.  
 Two broad traditions in coding textual data can be discerned, often referred to as 
free coding and tree coding (Basit, 2003). On the one hand, free coding can be associated 
with an inductive research strategy as the nodes are based on the content of the texts; 
they are formulated in vivo (‘within the living’). On the other, tree coding codes the texts on 
the basis of preconception. In tree coding the creation of nodes precede the creation of 
codes. It is called tree coding as codes are grouped into nodes that may subsequently 
branch out to several sub-nodes (Basit, 2003). Tree coding is heavily indebted to prior 
theoretical knowledge. It is therefore more appropriate to use it in an abductive scheme of 
inference than free coding. Whilst the latter is data-driven, the former is concept-driven 
(Saldaña, 2009). Appendix 6 provides an example of an interview –in its transcribed form, 
of course – has been coded by using a ‘tree’.   
 
(2) Gap analysis 
 
Central to the thesis is an investigation of whether the modes of sustainability discourse 
mobilization, principally based on institutional design and political culture and mediated 
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through different modes of public engagement in the UK and the Netherlands, are 
different in the two projects selected. As a British case is compared with a Dutch one, the 
research may reveal a difference or striking similarity between the governance of 
sustainability issues in these two states. Gap analysis therefore embeds choices made 
between ‘most different’ or ‘most similar’ case studies (Landman, 2008), respectively, 
pertaining to the analytical materialization of external validity in the research design. From 
this perspective, similarities or differences both designate the extent to which a gap 
between two objects of study can be observed. This gap may be both 
quantitative/numerical and qualitative/conceptual. In the analysis of data, then, attention 
will be focused on fleshing out these gaps.  
 
(3) Content analysis 
 
Drawing on Krippendorff (2012), content analysis deals with the interpretation of texts. As 
such it focuses its analysis on the meaning of the text as well as the underlying message 
the author of the text aims to convey. In the thesis it is used to analyze the primary 
documents – thus corresponding with the data collection method of primary 
documentation – as content analysis is ideally suited to take stock of the heterogeneity of 
texts for the purpose of analysis. Content analysis is therefore sensitive to understanding 
the context of the text, especially when it is interpreted as the result of time and space in 
which it has been written. Therefore, researchers conducting content analysis should be 
able to forge links between texts and the broader discursive and power arenas in which 
they are set (Krippendorff, 2012). Such a description of content analysis in practice 
endows researchers with a considerable amount of interpretative freedom as to how 
content can (better) be understood.        
 
(4) News coverage 
 
News coverage is used to analyze newspaper articles with respect to their coverage of the 
two projects. Newspaper articles are written data sources and, similar to the interviews 
and primary documentation, they could therefore be coded or analyzed on content. 
However, as the newspaper articles are written by journalists a different kind of analysis is 
needed. The method of news coverage is therefore used to analyze whether certain 
concepts (e.g. democratic satisfaction, public engagement or sustainability advocacy) are 
covered in the reporting of project-related events. When applied to the current research, 
news coverage is concerned with understanding the practices of, and interfaces between, 
discourses, institutions, political culture and public engagement in the events associated 
with the HS2 and A4DS projects. Particularly with respect to public engagement, it is 
85 
 
anticipated that the method may increase understanding of the dynamics involved with the 
interaction between decision-makers and civil society.  
 
(5) Statistical analysis 
 
Statistical analysis is used to ‘process’ the value surveys. In taking the UK and the 
Netherlands as the central units of analysis in this method of analysis, averages of the 
scores of certain socio-political values can be compared. As chapter 7 will show, these 
questions generally allude to citizens’ attitudes towards the conduct of politics that is 
played out at the national level. For example, average scores on values framed as ‘I trust 
the political parties of this country’ or ‘I think democracy is the best political system’ show 
how citizens feel about, in these two examples, trust and satisfaction. Therefore, statistical 
analysis is particularly useful for providing a quantitative base on which a qualitative 
inquiry into political culture in the UK and the Netherlands can further be expanded.   
 
3.5.3 Using methods to answer the research questions 
 
Methods for data collection and data analysis can be used strategically to answer the 
research questions. As the central research question is supported by six sub-questions 
(see Section 3.1), it will be answered indirectly through linking the methods to the sub-
questions (see Table 1.2). Table 3.3 shows the interrelationship between the sub-
questions, the methods for data collection and the methods for data analysis. It also links 
each combination to the type of theory set forth by Harré (1986; see also Figure 3.2). 
 
Sub-
question 
Theme of 
question 
Type of 
theory 
Methods for data 
collection 
Methods for data 
analysis 
1 Sustainability discourse 2 
Semi-structured interviews, 
primary documentation, 
newspaper articles 
Coding textual data, 
content analysis, news 
coverage 
2 
Discourse/ 
public 
engagement 
3 
Semi-structured interviews, 
primary documentation, 
observations 
Coding textual data, gap 
analysis, content analysis, 
news coverage 
3 Institutional design 1 + 2 
Semi-structured interviews, 
primary documentation, 
newspaper articles 
Coding textual data, 
content analysis, news 
coverage 
4 
Institutional 
design/public 
engagement 
3 
Semi-structured interviews, 
primary documentation, 
newspaper articles 
Coding textual data, gap 
analysis, content analysis, 
news coverage  
5 
Value 
surveys and 
studies 
1 Value surveys and studies Statistical analysis, gap 
analysis 
6 
Political 
culture/public 
engagement 
3 
Semi-structured interviews, 
primary documentation, 
newspaper articles, 
observations 
Coding textual data, gap 
analysis, content analysis, 
news coverage 
Table 3.3: Sub-questions, methods and types of theory 
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Chapter 4  Introduction to the cases: HS2 and A4DS 
 
This chapter introduces the HS2 and A4DS cases, thereby providing the necessary 
background for the forthcoming empirical analyses. In the context of environmental impact 
assessment (EIA) the cases will be referred to as projects, reflecting impact assessment 
at the project level. The terms ‘case’ and ‘project’ may at times be used interchangeably. 
The chapter aims to provide valuable background information in order to support the 
empirical analyses of sustainability discourse, institutional design and political culture 
which will be conducted in the subsequent chapters of the thesis (Chapters 5 to 7). In 
doing so, as well as to adhere to the characteristics of case study research set forth in the 
previous chapter, the projects first need to be thoroughly introduced. 
Although the processes of sustainability discourse mobilization in the HS2 and 
A4DS projects will be compared, some differences in the structures of the two projects 
can be observed. HS2 entails the construction of a new high-speed rail network, which is 
considered by some, not least by the project developer itself (HS2 Ltd, 2011a), to present 
a viable ‘green’ alternative to the adverse environmental impacts of passenger car and air 
travel. In contrast, A4DS entails the construction of a motorway connection, or what is 
branded a ‘missing link’ (Rijkswaterstaat, 2009d) which, irrespective of the answer to the 
question whether the expressed need for the connection is justified or not, makes this 
project somewhat ‘guilty by association’. That is, it is aimed at facilitating car travel. The 
proposed London-Birmingham rail link is furthermore longer and vastly more expensive 
than the motorway connection. Most importantly, at the time of writing the thesis HS2 
(Phase 1) was in the design phase, thereby still required to implement an EIA and to 
“seek the powers to construct and operate the Proposed Scheme” (Arup/URS, 2012a). 
Much in contrast, the decision to construct the A4DS has been given consent in 2011. 
These differences could impact on the roles of institutional design and political culture in 
shaping public engagement and, ultimately, in the mobilization of sustainability 
discourses.           
 Notwithstanding these observed differences, the projects are similar in many 
respects. Both projects are justified by the project developers on the basis of the expected 
need for additional infrastructure in the longer term, as well as the inability of current 
infrastructures to cope with rising demand (Ministerie van Verkeer en Waterstaat, 2004; 
HS2 Ltd and Department for Transport, 2011). This justification has been built on 
evidence provided by traffic and rail passenger models intended to forecast demand 
growth, which on their part have played a significant role in the debate between 
proponents and opponents of the projects. Furthermore, the plans to construct new 
infrastructure have sparked opposition from many different stakeholders, including 
academics, rail or road construction action groups, residents and housing organizations, 
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environmental protection groups as well as representatives from local government (e.g. 
Dialogue by Design, 2011 in the HS2 Phase 1 project). And not least, both projects 
engage with the field of sustainability, to which various documents commissioned by the 
respective project planners attest (e.g. Rijkswaterstaat, 2009d; HS2 Ltd, 2011a). 
 As argued in the previous chapter, the projects will be compared to inquire into the 
roles of institutions and political culture in mobilizing sustainability discourses. The 
implementation of EIA in both projects is premised on the latest EIA legislation from the 
EU, which is Directive 2011/92/EU for HS2 Phase 1 and which has been Directive 
85/337/EEC (as amended) for A4DS (but, as has been shown in Section 1.1, they are 
exactly the same). After having identified the role of EIA as the cornerstone of the 
sustainability policy environment in both projects, after having assumed the influence of 
external structures or constraints is infinitesimal, and after having assessed that the 
difference in some of the project characteristics will not distort lessons that can be 
learned, it can therefore be argued that the projects can be usefully compared in terms of 
investigating the potentially varying influence of (the co-production of) institutions and 
political culture, via public engagement, on the process of sustainability discourse 
mobilization.      
Before the empirical analyses are conducted in Chapters 5 to 7, the two projects 
need to be introduced. To this end, the chapter contains two broad sections. The first 
section introduces Phase 1 of the HS2 project. The second section introduces the A4DS 
project. Each section includes six sub-sections on the following aspects: (1) the history of 
the project; (2) the (proposed) scheme of the project; (3) the core objectives of the project; 
(4) the sustainability considerations of the project (including a brief description of the 
impact area); (5) the main alternatives to the projects; and (6) an overview of the 
stakeholders.     
 
4.1 HS2   
 
HS2 Phase 1 designates the first phase of a proposed nationwide high-speed rail network 
- High-Speed rail 2 (HS2) – in the UK which is to be completed in the early 2030s. The 
first phase of this network entails the construction of a rail link between the cities of 
London and Birmingham, respectively the first and second largest cities of England. In 
early 2012 the government decided to continue giving support to HS2 (HS2 Ltd, 2012c). 
The decision has followed a public consultation process and is also shaped by the 
recommendations made in a series of reports by the House of Commons Transport 
Committee, most notably the Tenth Report of Session 2010-12 (e.g. House of Commons 
Transport Committee, 2011a) where the necessity for a firm governmental commitment to 
high-speed rail has been expressed. HS2 is the second high-speed rail project in the UK, 
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following High-Speed rail 1 (HS1) which links London to continental Europe through Paris 
and Brussels. Experiences drawn and lessons learned from HS1 have played an 
important role in shaping public and expert opinion on HS2 (e.g. 51m, 2011c; Aizlewood 
and Wellings, 2011).  
As could be inferred from usage of the name ‘HS2 Phase 1’ in official project 
documentation (e.g. HS2 Ltd, 2013), plans for the construction of new high-speed rail 
infrastructure in the UK consist of multiple phases. Currently two phases have been 
identified (but see also Heathrow Hub, 2012 for plans of a third phase): (1) a phase which 
links London to Birmingham (located in the West Midlands); and (2) a subsequent phase 
which links Birmingham to the northern English cities of Liverpool, Manchester, Sheffield 
and Leeds, and possibly further north to Newcastle and to Edinburgh and Glasgow in 
Scotland (Department for Transport, 2010). Upon completion the two phases will 
constitute a ‘Y-shaped’ rail network. The thesis has specifically focused on decision-
making processes associated with the environmental impacts likely to occur in HS2 Phase 
1. However, many issues particularly related to the costs and benefits of the project take 
the wider Y-shaped network into account (see also Footnote 1 in Chapter 1). Map 4.1 
shows this network and the main cities that will be included in the scheme.   
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Map 4.1: The proposed line of route of HS2 (adapted from Department for Transport, 2010) 
 
4.1.1 A brief history of the project 
 
It can be debated when and where the idea for constructing a high-speed rail network 
between London and the North of the UK was first mentioned (e.g. Greengauge 21, 2006;  
see Table 1 in HS2 Ltd, 2013 for an overview of the 'main milestones'). The 2007 white 
paper Delivering a Sustainable Railway (Department for Transport, 2007) serves as a 
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good starting point, however. A white paper is an authoritative statement issued by the 
government to inform the public on a specific topic or to announce plans for a new policy 
initiative in a specific policy sector in the years or decades to come. The white paper has 
stressed the importance of making longer term investments in rail infrastructure so as to 
be able to increase the volume of freight and rail passengers, improve the reliability and 
safety of rail transport as well as its environmental performance, and reduce the ‘carbon 
footprint’ of the overall transport sector in the UK (Department for Transport, 2007). 
However, it has been somewhat ambivalent about the prospects of a national high-speed 
rail network to achieve these objectives, particularly those objectives pertaining to socio-
economic and sustainability performance improvements of rail transport. 
 Two years later the government’s position had changed significantly. In early 2009 
it was announced in an admission statement by the Department for Transport (DfT) 
(2009), which is the governmental department involved with the implementation of 
infrastructure schemes and transport policies, that it would go forward with the plan to 
construct new high-speed rail infrastructure in the UK. In order to do so it has created the 
company HS2 Ltd – then chaired by Sir David Rowlands – to conduct research on the 
business case and the environmental impacts of a high-speed rail link between London 
and Birmingham (HS2 Ltd, 2011a; 2012f). The DfT furthermore contracted engineering 
firm Atkins to carry out feasibility studies for high-speed rail in the UK (Atkins, 2007). In 
2010 Atkins also started carrying out studies on potential strategic alternatives to HS2 (for 
an overview of its studies on strategic alternatives, see Atkins, 2012). In the same year 
the idea for a Y-shaped high-speed rail network across Great Britain5 was formally 
presented to Parliament (Department for Transport, 2010). 
Political support for high-speed rail by the Labour Government (2007-2010) has 
more or less continued after a change of government following the the General Election of 
2010. In the 2010 Coalition Agreement, which set forth the ambitions of the coalition 
government, consisting of the Conservatives and Liberal Democrats political parties, it is 
stated that the aim is to “establish a high speed rail network as part of our programme of 
measures to fulfil our joint ambitions for creating a low carbon economy. Our vision is of a 
truly national high speed rail network for the whole of Britain” (Cabinet Office, 2010: 31). 
Under the auspices of transport minister Andrew Adonis (in power between June 2009 
and May 2010) in the Labour Government and which continued under the Conservative 
Philip Hammond (May 2010-October 2011), HS2 has increasingly been presented as an 
investment for the whole nation in the longer term. For example, it has been argued that 
                                                           
5
 Author’s note: whilst the official name of the country is United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland 
(in short: United Kingdom; abbreviated: UK), government documents and stakeholders alike often simply refer 
to it as Great Britain or Britain (and the adjective: British). Throughout the thesis these terms will be used 
interchangeably. However, as HS2 will not directly affect Northern Ireland, sometimes it is warranted to use 
(Great) Britain instead of the UK.   
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HS2 would enable northern cities to benefit from the “global magnet effect of London” [1]6. 
Similar to the envisaged link between HS2 and the benefits that it will generate, the DfT 
has set up the working title High Speed Rail: Investing in Britain’s Future to bring all 
government publications and communications relating to HS2 under the same roof. 
In putting the political ambitions for constructing HS2 into practice, in 2011 several 
important steps were made towards its realization. A public consultation was carried out to 
poll the views of citizens and stakeholders on HS2, which yielded around 55,000 
responses (HS2 Ltd and Department for Transport, 2011). In order to gauge the 
contribution of the project towards achieving sustainability objectives, compliant with UK 
environmental legislation (United Kingdom Parliament, 2004; 2009), in the same year an 
Appraisal of Sustainability was published (HS2 Ltd, 2011a). Furthermore, as part of the 
EIA an (updated) scope and methodology report on the project and draft environmental 
statement were published in 2012 and 2013, respectively (Arup/URS, 2012a; HS2 Ltd, 
2012d; 2013). Later in 2013, after an environmental statement has been issued (which 
should happen after the submission date of this thesis), HS2 will be passed on to 
Parliament in the form of the passage of a hybrid bill (Department for Transport, 2011). A 
hybrid bill is able to affect privately held interests by changing national (‘public’) legislation.       
 
4.1.2 The proposed scheme 
 
The proposed scheme of HS2 Phase 1 entails the construction of railway stations and 
infrastructure along the line of route (e.g. bridges, tracks, tunnels, viaducts) and changes 
to the landscape (e.g. embankments and cuttings). Furthermore, special purpose high-
speed trains (popularly branded 'off-the-shelf' trains by e.g. Chiltern Countryside Group, 
Interview) will run at a minimum speed of 360 kilometres per hour (kph), but so-called 
classic-compatible trains that can be used on both high-speed rail and conventional rail 
will also be procured (HS2 Ltd, 2012f). The proposed scheme encompasses the 
construction of a line of route with new rail tracks for the length of over 220 kilometres 
between London and Birmingham (HS2 Ltd, 2011a). Of the total length of the rail link 
around ninety kilometres will be in cutting (i.e. underneath ground level at varying depths), 
around forty kilometres will be tunnelled, around sixty kilometres will be on embankments 
or viaducts (i.e. above ground level) and the remaining thirty kilometres or so will be 
constructed at surface level (HS2 Ltd, 2012j).  
In order to facilitate the forecasted demand growth of rail passengers (e.g. HS2 
Ltd, 2012a), it is deemed necessary to redevelop and expand Euston railway station in the 
                                                           
6
 This reference is a newspaper article. Since ‘news coverage’ is identified as a method for data analysis (see 
Chapter 3), as part of methodological justification the newspaper articles consulted are put in a separate 
section in the References Section at the end of the thesis. To further separate newspaper article references 
from other references, in the chapters the newspaper articles will be numbered and placed between 
parentheses [1, 2, x].  
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Borough of Camden in London city centre as the southern terminus of the rail link. HS2 
Phase 1 furthermore requires the construction of a new interchange railway station in the 
outskirts of Birmingham (in Lichfield) to be able to connect the high-speed railway to 
Birmingham Airport and the National Exhibition Centre and to destinations further on the 
existing West Coast Main Line (WCML). It also requires the construction of a new 
northern terminus station at Curzon Street, somewhat northeast of Birmingham city centre 
(HS2 Ltd, 2011a). From the interchange railway station it is also possible to link Phase 1 
of HS2 to the construction of the future northbound infrastructure needed for Phase 2 of 
the overall project, which entails the two arms of the Y-shaped rail network.      
The proposed scheme also considers links between HS2 and existing 
conventional rail infrastructure, such as the Great Western Main Line (GWML), HS1 and 
the Crossrail rail link currently under construction (connecting Buckinghamshire and 
Berkshire with Essex and planned to be in operation by 2018), which is believed to 
improve connectivity between Birmingham, continental Europe and the southwest and 
southeast of England (Department for Transport, 2010; HS2 Ltd, 2012h). HS2 has also 
been linked to London Heathrow Airport, which is the largest airport in the UK and situated 
west of London city centre. The airport was originally intended to become an interchange 
station, branded ‘Heathrow Hub’ by engineering firm Arup and endorsed as such in the 
Rail Review of the Conservatives (2009) before the 2010 General Election. However, the 
proposed scheme has replaced the Heathrow Hub with a spur from the interchange 
railway station currently placed in Old Oak Commons in the Greater London area, 
northwest of the city centre. Nevertheless, the choice to bend the line of route to the West 
to serve Heathrow holds important consequences for the Chilterns as it is now crossed as 
its widest point (House of Commons Transport Committee, 2011b).          
Within the HS2 Phase 1 project framework, several route options for the proposed 
scheme were proposed (HS2 Ltd, 2012h). The option appraisal process was based on, 
amongst others, the technical feasibility of constructing the rail link, the construction costs, 
sustainability considerations and the cost-benefit ratio in terms of passenger demand 
capacity and journey time savings (HS2 Ltd and Department for Transport, 2011). 
However, all options considered ‘feasible’ crossed the Chilterns as to avoid the area it 
would have scored poorly on the construction costs as well as on considerations 
pertaining to journey time savings. Furthermore, the proposed line of route has been 
considered unable to follow existing infrastructure (such as the M40 motorway), a wish 
repeatedly expressed by civil society stakeholders in the Chilterns (e.g. Potter Row Action 
Group, Interview), as this would cause a significant reduction of blight in this and other 
areas along the line of route. This inability has been caused by the curving of existing 
motorways, which would require trains to operate at lower speeds and increase journey 
time. At the time of writing the thesis the DfT (2011) preferred Option 3 of the various 
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proposed schemes (henceforth: the ‘preferred scheme’). As will be shown, the preferred 
scheme based on Option 3 has been slightly amended as an outcome of the public 
consultation (see also HS2 Ltd, 2012d;  HS2 Ltd, 2012i).   
 The preferred scheme crosses the Chilterns Area of Outstanding Beauty (AONB) 
for approximately twenty kilometres (HS2 Ltd, 2011a), roughly covering the distance 
between the Chalfonts (e.g. Chalfont St. Giles) and Wendover. The Chilterns AONB7 is 
largely coterminous with the choice made by HS2 Ltd to identify the line of route between 
Wendover and the M25 motorway as part of the same ‘study area’ (HS2 Ltd, 2012i). 
Approximately three fifths of the line of route crossing the Chilterns will be tunnelled, either 
underground (through a bored hole) or at ground level (either through a ‘green tunnel’, 
covered with soil on three sides, or what is called ‘cut & cover’, a tunnel with a soil roof), 
and around six kilometres will be in deep or half-deep cuttings (HS2 Ltd, 2012j). This 
leaves between two and three kilometres of the line of route to be constructed at or above 
ground level. As will be shown in the empirical chapters of the thesis, much debate on the 
line of route crossing the Chilterns has revolved around the issue of tunnelling (e.g. HS2 
Ltd, 2012g). However, opposition against HS2 in the northwest of the Chilterns (Wendover 
area) have very different concerns, for instance concerns associated with the impact of 
viaducts on local accessibility, roads closures and visual impairment.          
At the time when the government made the decision to go ahead with HS2, in 
January 2012, changes to the preferred scheme in Phase 1 of the project had been 
ongoing (compare for instance Department for Transport, 2012a; and HS2 Ltd, 2012i). 
However, at the time of writing the thesis the line of route crossing the Chilterns was as 
follows. Starting from the southeast, the rail link enters the Chilterns in a bored tunnel 
(having started east of the M25) and exits this tunnel at a place called Mantle’s Wood. 
This ‘Amersham tunnel’ is then followed by, consecutively, deep and wide cuttings, a 
green tunnel between Great Missenden and South Heath, and half-deep cuttings. The line 
continues its route on an embankment and towards a viaduct, thereby crossing the A413 
road corridor and the existing Chiltern Railways railway line overhead. This viaduct is 
followed by another embankment, another green tunnel (the ‘Wendover tunnel’) and more 
half-deep cuttings before it exits the study area. Map 4.2 provides a graphical illustration 
of the line of route crossing the Chilterns. 
 
                                                           
7
 When considered appropriate, the suffix ‘AONB’ is added to ‘the Chilterns’ when specific reference is made 
to the natural resources of the area or when the AONB status of the Chilterns is important to understand 
concerns with regards to the expected adverse impacts of the HS2 line of route (see also Sub-section 4.1.4).   
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Map 4.2: Line of route crossing the Chilterns AONB (Chilterns Conservation Board, 2012b) 
 
4.1.3 Project objectives 
 
Various leading project documents have listed the objectives of HS2, either focusing on 
the line of route between London and Birmingham or on the merits of the ‘Y’ (Department 
for Transport, 2009; HS2 Ltd, 2009; Department for Transport, 2010; HS2 Ltd and 
Department for Transport, 2011). Although various objectives have been formulated, they 
will each contribute to the overarching objective of HS2 as “the fast track to prosperity” 
(HS2 Ltd and Department for Transport, 2011: 9).  The five core objectives that have been 
identified are as follows:  
 
1. Increasing economic growth; 
2. Linking the urban conurbations of Great Britain; 
3. Tackling the North-South divide; 
4. Reducing carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions; 
5. Reducing congestion. 
 
The five core objectives of HS2 are envisaged to be achieved in the longer term. 
However, underpinning these objectives are two immediate objectives of HS2 Phase 1: 
(1) new rail infrastructure to provide additional capacity required to meet a forecasted 
growth in rail passengers and (2) shorter journey times in rail travel between London and 
Birmingham (Dialogue by Design, 2011; HS2 Ltd and Department for Transport, 2011). In 
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one of the first formal parliamentary communications of the DfT regarding its intention to 
construct HS2, through a document simply titled High Speed Rail (command paper) 
published in 2010 (Department for Transport, 2010), the principles for constructing high-
speed rail in the UK have stressed both additional capacity and a reduction of travel time 
as the immediate cause for the necessity to construct a high-speed rail network between 
the North and South of the country. This can be reframed as a solution to the problem of 
crowding. Indeed, it is estimated that total passenger miles have nearly doubled between 
the mid-1990s and around 2010 and this number will further increase by a further sixty 
percent by 2024 (HS2 Ltd and Department for Transport, 2011). HS2 is therefore 
expected to facilitate future rail passenger growth.   
There is an intimate relationship between the objectives of additional capacity and 
shorter journey times, notwithstanding slight differences in the terms or technicalities of 
debate. The 2007 White Paper (Department for Transport, 2007: 62) has argued that 
“[t]he debate tends to conflate two very different issues – the need for additional capacity 
to accommodate demand growth, and the case for shorter journey times”. This statement 
implies that the debate on additional capacity should be detached from the debate on 
shorter journey times. However, the DfT (2010: 81) has argued that “high speed lines 
should only be used by high speed trains. Adding slower trains reduces capacity”, thereby 
linking the need for additional capacity to the need for high speeds (i.e. shorter journey 
times). In linking the two objectives it is therefore implicitly argued that additional capacity 
can only be realized by using high-speed trains to reduce journey times, a scheme which 
subsequently requires the rail construction without interference from trains running at 
conventional speeds (up to 200 kph). 
 
4.1.4 Sustainability considerations and objectives 
 
Proponents of HS2 have stressed the positive impact that high-speed rail will have on 
achieving sustainability objectives. The HS2 London to the West Midlands Appraisal of 
Sustainability (HS2 Ltd, 2011a) has summed up the sustainability objectives of the project. 
This appraisal of sustainability has broadly encompassed the core objective of the HS2 
Phase 1 project to reduce current CO2 emissions. Amongst others, this objective has 
referred to the prospect of reducing emissions through enabling a ‘modal split’, which 
entails the shift of travellers towards choosing rail instead of road or air transport as the 
preferred mode of transport for long-distance travel. Furthermore, the pro-HS2 advocacy 
group Greengauge 21 has been particularly vocal in supporting HS2 in terms of its 
potential to achieve sustainability objectives and address the ‘carbon challenge’ more 
effectively (e.g. 2006). 
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 However, opponents of HS2 have pointed out that the proposed scheme of Phase 
1 entails a considerable number of sustainability issues. Many of the issues pointed out 
can be classified as concerns over ecological destruction due to land use change. 
Regarding ancient woodlands, which are areas continuously wooded since the 1600s or 
earlier, the Woodland Trust (2011) has estimated that 21 ancient woodlands will directly 
be affected by the preferred scheme; another seventy woodland areas will indirectly be 
affected. Regarding other designated areas, such as wildlife sites, sites for biological 
notification and Sites of Special Scientific Interest (SSSI), altogether seven such sites will 
be affected (The Wildlife Trusts, 2012). Indirectly, the fragmentation of ecosystems is 
expected to have adverse consequences for the functioning of ecosystems.  
As stated earlier, a considerable part of the Chilterns is an AONB, the latter of 
which have been coined ‘natural treasures’ by the Department for Environment, Food and 
Rural Affairs (DEFRA) (2011), and of which there are currently 34 in England. AONBs 
have a protected status and can only be affected by planning in case of an overriding 
national interest. In the Town and Country Planning (Environmental Impact Assessment) 
Regulations 2011 (T&CP 2011) they are marked ‘sensitive area’ (Department for 
Communities and Local Government, 2011), which further confirms its special position in 
planning. Because of its proximity to London, the Chilterns play an important role in 
providing a green space in the Greater London area. According to one of the stakeholders 
involved in the campaign against HS2 Phase 1, the Chilterns are sometimes referred to as 
the “green lung of London” (Chiltern Society, Interview). Consequently, it has been widely 
argued that the impacts of HS2 will be to the detriment of the ‘outstanding natural beauty’ 
in the area. 
Besides ecological concerns relating to land use change, other ecological issues in 
the Chilterns have been identified. A dominant concern has been the location of the dump 
site of the large amount of spoil generated during construction (e.g. Chilterns 
Conservation Board, Interview). Whilst it is currently proposed to dump the spoil outside 
the Chilterns, adjacent to the M25, spoil transport from the tunnelled area to the dump site 
will include continuous lorry movements during the 10-year period of construction (2017-
2027). Civil society stakeholders have also raised concerns about the impacts of the 
bored tunnel on an aquifer underneath Amersham and on chalk streams and rivers, such 
as the River Misbourne, River Chess, particularly stressing the potential danger of these 
water bodies drying out (e.g. Chesham Society, Interview). 
Other than these ‘ecological’ concerns, a wide array of other sustainability 
concerns in the Chilterns has been expressed. A basic critical concern along the line of 
route has been the issue of property destruction, the lack of financial compensation for 
property owners living outside the ‘safeguarded zone’ (where compensation is arranged), 
or the inability to sell their blighted property. Other concerns have been more 
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geographically defined, for instance: the location of the ventilation shafts and a 
construction camp for the bored tunnel (e.g. the Chalfonts and Amersham); an increase of 
‘heavy’ construction traffic in the village centre (e.g. Chesham); lack of access for local 
businesses, for instance a family-owned garden centre (e.g. South Heath); and visual 
impairment caused by the embankment and viaduct (Wendover).     
 
4.1.5 Main alternative to the project 
 
Because a full EIA had not yet been carried out at the time of writing the thesis, 
alternatives to HS2 Phase 1 have not been formalized. However, several rail packages 
have been identified as strategic alternatives to HS2 Phase 1 (Atkins, 2012). The 
packages consist of improvements of future passenger capacity on the existing rail 
infrastructure between London and Birmingham, most notably improvements on the 
WCML and the Chiltern Line. Consistent with the studies conducted for HS2 Phase 1 in 
terms of forecasted demand growth (HS2 Ltd and Department for Transport, 2011), the 
packages are compared with ‘do-minimum’ scenarios, which take only relatively minor and 
incremental (and therefore ‘natural’) adjustments to the existing infrastructure into account 
(such as the Chiltern ‘Evergreen’ projects). Such scenarios have been deployed to 
compare major adjustments to the existing infrastructure in the future with a baseline 
situation.     
 Most support from civil society actors opposed to HS2 has been for Rail Package 
2 (RP2). Generally speaking, RP2 proposes an incremental increase of rail passenger 
capacity on the WCML (Atkins, 2012). An improvement of future capacity to meet 
forecasted demand growth in RP2 has revolved around a series of relatively minor 
changes to the WCML infrastructure (e.g. creating by-passes, extra platforms and extra 
tracks) and relatively major changes to the ‘rolling stock’, which designates changes made 
to the trains that are currently in use (HS2 Action Alliance, 2011c). The latter category 
includes, amongst others, an increase of the number of cars per train, an increase of the 
average number of trains per hour by increasing travel speeds and a rearrangement of the 
number of coaches used for standard and first class seating so that the supply and 
demand for standard seating ‘fits’.      
Those opposed to HS2 have used many conclusions of a government-sanctioned 
study published before the 2007 White Paper was published, to bolster its claims against 
the proposed rail link and in emphasizing their support for strategic alternatives to HS2 
(e.g. AGAHST Federation, 2011). In the 2006 The Eddington Transport Study, carried out 
by Sir Rod Eddington, doubts on the viability and usefulness of high-speed rail in the UK 
have been raised. These doubts have mainly referred to short inter-city distances and the 
overall dense geography of the UK, the socio-economic importance of linking urban 
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conurbations in the north and south of the UK, the low potential to reduce CO2 emissions 
from air travel or the danger of the exponential increase of CO2 emissions from rail travel 
due to very high speeds (Eddington, 2006). The study has generally advocated more 
efficient use of existing infrastructure to meet the envisaged growth in rail travel demand, 
thereby concluding that “the principle task of the UK transport system is not (...) to put in 
place very high-speed networks to bring distant cities and regions closer together”, but 
instead its task is to “deal with the resulting density of transport demand” (Eddington, 
2006: 22). 
 
4.1.6 The project stakeholders 
 
In identifying the project stakeholders in the Chilterns, the exact location of the line of 
route of HS2 Phase 1 crossing this area has played an important role.  Based on the 
location, all of the fieldwork in the Chilterns has been carried out in Buckinghamshire. This 
county consists of four local government districts but most ‘location-specific’ stakeholders, 
such as anti-HS2 action groups, were based in the Chiltern District (part of Chesham and 
Amersham parliamentary constituency). A few others were based in the Aylesbury Vale 
District (part of Aylesbury parliamentary constituency). The other two districts in 
Buckinghamshire (Wycombe District and South Bucks District) also ‘host’ parts of the 
preferred scheme but these either are outside the Chilterns or are entirely tunnelled. 
Evidently, many of the issues described earlier will be shared by everyone involved but 
has not led to the same degree of opposition as recorded in the more ‘exposed’ districts in 
the Chilterns.    
 As will be shown in Chapter 6 of the thesis, the community forum (CF) has been 
the most important institution for stakeholders to raise local concerns associated with the 
proposed scheme. HS2 Ltd has set up around 25 community forums along the line of 
route; two of these were originally situated in the Chilterns (in Amersham and Wendover, 
respectively). However, according to many of the stakeholders situated in between these 
two towns, a CF specifically focusing on this part of the line of route was necessary (e.g. 
South Heath Action Group, Interview). These stakeholders have therefore successfully 
lobbied for a third CF, this one branded the Central Chilterns Community Forum (CCCF). 
This forum has been particularly useful for identifying relevant civil society stakeholders. 
 Table 4.1 lists the stakeholders that were interviewed8 in the research 
(alphabetically ordered). The stakeholders range from organizations advocating the 
interests of a specific location, representatives of these locations, organizations 
advocating the interests of the Chilterns as a whole, regional organizations advocating 
                                                           
8
 The citations used from the interviews with civil society stakeholders in the HS2 Phase 1 case primarily 
express the opinion of the interviewees and do not necessarily represent the opinion of the organizations with 
which they are affiliated with, a member of, or working for. 
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specific interests such as wildlife conservation, national advocacy organizations (e.g. 
Campaign to Protect Rural England), an independent rail consultant and one local pro-
HS2 advocacy group (Go-HS2).        
 
Stakeholder Type of organization/affiliation Role in the HS2 (Phase 1) project** 
Amersham Action Group Local anti-HS2 action group Advocacy 
A’ham & Distr. Residents 
Ass. Amersham advocacy organization Advocacy 
Amersham Society Amersham advocacy organization Advocacy 
BBOWT Environmental advocacy 
organization Advocacy 
Chesham Society Chesham advocacy organization Advocacy 
Chesham Town Councillor Local politician in Chesham Advocacy 
Chiltern Countryside Group Local environmental organization Advocacy, counter-
expertise 
Chiltern Ridges Action 
Group Local anti-HS2 action group Advocacy 
Chiltern Society Chilterns advocacy organization Advocacy 
Chilterns Conservation 
Board AONB protection/conservation Advocacy 
Cholesbury Action Group Local anti-HS2 action group Advocacy 
CPRE National conservation organization Advocacy 
Dunsmore Society Dunsmore advocacy organization Advocacy 
Go-HS2 Local pro-HS2 organization Advocacy 
Missenden Action Groups* Local anti-HS2 action group Advocacy 
Potter Row Action Group Local anti-HS2 action group Advocacy 
Independent Rail Consultant Expert in rail infrastructure Expertise 
South Heath Action Group Local anti-HS2 action group Advocacy 
Speen Area Action Group Local anti-HS2 action group Advocacy 
Wendover HS2 Local anti-HS2 action group Advocacy 
Wendover Society Wendover advocacy organization Advocacy 
Wendover Parish Councillor Representative of Wendover Parish Advocacy 
Woodland Trust National environmental organization Advocacy, counter-
expertise 
Table 4.1: Overview of the stakeholders involved in the HS2 Phase 1 project (listed alphabetically) 
* Referring to the action groups Little Missenden Action Group and Great Missenden Action Group 
** Explanation of the roles: 
• Advocacy = advocating a certain interest in the HS2 Phase 1 planning context 
• Counter-expertise = using science to provide counter-evidence 
• Expertise = using science to provide evidence 
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4.2 A4DS 
 
The A4DS project entails the construction of the connecting part, or ‘missing link’ 
('ontbrekende schakel', see Rijkswaterstaat, 2009d) of the A4 motorway between Delft 
and Schiedam in Zuid-Holland Province, the Netherlands. For the purpose of the thesis an 
inquiry into the decision-making process of the A4DS is delimited to the time period from 
2001 until 20119. The report Kansen benutten, Impasses doorbreken10 (Achieving 
Objectives, Breaking through the Impasses) (IODS, 2001), which was published in 2001, 
can be perceived as the onset of a decision-making and public engagement process 
spanning the length of approximately ten years, ending over forty years of deadlock 
between proponents and opponents of the A4DS. These processes have ultimately led to 
the decision made in 2010 to construct the motorway connection (Rijkswaterstaat, 2010c) 
as well as the judicial review of 2011 and the following verdict from the Raad van State 
(the highest administrative court in the Netherlands) to clear any further judicial obstacles 
for its construction (Raad van State, 2011a). From this perspective the year 2001 marks a 
logical time delimitation for the inquiry in the thesis (for a justification of this choice, see 
also Heukels, 2005).  
As will be made clear in this chapter and the following empirical chapters 
(Chapters 5 to 7), the A4DS is an integral part of a larger proposal for infrastructure and 
industrial developments in what is called the study area, defined by Rijkswaterstaat 
(2009d) as the area where the potential or likely impacts of motorway infrastructure 
planning will occur (and often referred to as the 'Ruit van Rotterdam', see also Rotterdam 
Vooruit, 2009).  These developments are largely considered to take place around the city 
of Rotterdam, for which an SEA has been conducted (Ministerie van Infrastructuur en 
Milieu, 2012). From 2004, which marks the impetus provided by the Dutch government to 
construct the A4DS (Ministerie van Verkeer en Waterstaat, 2004), the need for a second 
tunnel west of the existing Beneluxtunnel underneath the Nieuwe Waterweg waterway has 
been considered (Ministerie van Verkeer en Waterstaat, 2004). The need for a more 
westbound tunnel has been informed to a great extent by the construction of the Tweede 
Maasvlakte, a land reclamation project in the North Sea for the expansion of the industrial 
port of Rotterdam. It is also proposed to construct another ‘missing link’ of the A4 
motorway between the Beneluxtunnel and areas further South (the ‘A4 Zuid’ project) 
(Ministerie van Infrastructuur en Milieu, 2012). Generating insights in these concomitant 
                                                           
9
 There is one exception to the 2001-2011 period of investigation: the interview with Stichting Batavier – a 
monitoring group – is used to illuminate how civil society has continued to engage with the A4DS after the 
decision to construct has been made.  
10
 To protect the authenticity of documents or legislation that have been used or mentioned in the A4DS case 
study, the titles of these sources will not be translated into English. Instead, an English translation will be 
inserted in the text afterwards.  
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projects is important as they have influenced expert and public opinion on the planning 
context of the A4DS project to varying degrees.  
 Map 4.3 shows the location of the A4 in the Dutch motorway system, with the 
middle interruption of the red bold line designating the missing link between Delft and 
Schiedam. Because of its prominence as a major infrastructure axis in the western part of 
the country (informally called Randstad), the Dutch government has classified the A4 as a 
‘triple-A’ connection in the national motorway system (Ministerie van Verkeer en 
Waterstaat and VROM, 2004). In this capacity, the A4 has been “positioned as a quick 
international connection, of particular relevance for the underlying connection of Schiphol 
Airport (...) with the big seaports in the Rijn-Schelde delta (Rotterdam and Antwerpen)” 
(Ministerie van Verkeer en Waterstaat and VROM, 2004: 37). As such, the rationale for 
constructing the A4DS can be perceived as being inherently systemic. From this it can 
also be deduced that broad economic incentives underlie the need for construction.  
  
 
 
Map 4.3: The A4 in the Dutch motorway system 
Note: The figure represents the Netherlands. The 
lines indicate motorways; the bold line is the A4. 
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4.2.1 A brief history of the project 
 
Ever since the 1960s it has been regularly proposed that a second major traffic 
connection is necessary between The Hague and Rotterdam (Rijkswaterstaat, 2009d). 
These two cities, respectively the third and second city of the Netherlands when 
measured in population size, are currently connected by a single motorway, the A13. 
Various concomitant developments leading to the enormous increase in car traffic in the 
post-World War II reconstruction era (e.g. income growth, increase in car ownership and 
fuel efficiency, urban sprawling) have prompted many decision-makers over the course of 
decades to consider a new major traffic connection (for some of these developments, see 
Geels, 2007). To most of them the preferred scheme was to connect two existing parts of 
the A4 motorway, an important North/South infrastructural axis in the Netherlands which is 
currently interrupted between the towns of Delft and Schiedam. Currently, traffic going 
southbound is diverted onto the A13 at the Prins Clausplein and Ypenburg junctions (near 
Rijswijk).    
The history of the A4DS project planning can be characterized by a strong 
interplay between proponents and opponents of the motorway, resulting in deadlock. The 
Trajectnota (route proposal) published in 1965 was the first formal attempt to propose a 
scheme for the connecting part of the A4 motorway (then called Rijksweg 19, and before 
that: Zoomweg) (Rijkswaterstaat, 2009d), but this proposal never resulted in actual 
construction. At a later stage, between 1968 and 1972 an embankment was created upon 
which the motorway connection would be constructed. Whilst the construction at the time 
was postponed indefinitely, because of strong political and civil opposition against the 
proposed scheme, the embankment has not been removed until construction began in 
2012. In the political desire to protect the rural area between Delft and Schiedam known 
as Midden-Delfland, The 1977 Reconstructiewet Midden-Delfland (Reconstruction Act 
Midden-Delfland) (Rijksoverheid, 1977), a national law focusing on a specific area, was 
enacted after the adoption of a parliamentary motion in 1976 which urged the government 
to look for alternatives to the proposed scheme. The act has effectively stopped 
construction of the A4DS for a number of decades. 
New developments in the A4DS project took place in the 1990s. In 1993 a second 
formal attempt was undertaken to propose a scheme for the motorway connection. 
Because of the adoption of EIA legislation in the intermittent years (in September 1987), a 
Trajectnota/Milieu-effectrapportage (TN/MER) (Route Proposal/Environmental Impact 
Assessment) was published in 1996 with the proposal to construct the A4DS on surface 
level (‘maaiveld’) (Rijkswaterstaat, 2009d). However, after the adoption of a parliamentary 
motion in 1998 the budget for the proposed scheme was used instead for the construction 
of a railway tunnel in Delft. In 2001, three years later, the programme bureau Integrale 
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Ontwikkeling tussen Delft en Schiedam (Integral Development between Delft and 
Schiedam) (IODS) was founded under the auspices of Zuid-Holland Province to ‘break 
through the impasse’ in decision-making surrounding the A4DS controversy (IODS, 2001).                              
 In 2004 the third formal attempt to construct the A4DS was started with the 
Startnotitie (Start Note) (Ministerie van Verkeer en Waterstaat, 2004). The Startnotitie re-
emphasized the need for a second major traffic connection but, contrary to its 
predecessors, argued that the A4DS should facilitate a ‘quality injection’ and ‘integral 
approach’ to embedding the road in the impact area. The TN/MER Part 1 of 2007 has 
initially compared the A4DS with three other alternatives (‘Alternatives-EIA’) 
(Rijkswaterstaat, 2007), however part 2 of the TN/MER in 2009 has reduced the 
alternatives to improving the traffic capacity of the A13 and constructing the A13/16 
motorway (Rijkswaterstaat, 2009d). One year later, in 2010, the scheme was first 
proposed in the Ontwerp Tracébesluit (Proposed Route Decision) (Rijkswaterstaat, 
2010b), then presented as final in the Tracébesluit (Route Decision) (Rijkswaterstaat, 
2010c). In 2011 all legal ploys developed by opponents to prevent the A4DS scheme from 
implementation were brought to a halt after a verdict from the Raad van State (2011a). 
Construction began in 2012 and is expected to be completed by 2015.   
 
4.2.2 The scheme 
 
The A4DS is a motorway connection (‘missing link’) for the length of approximately seven 
kilometres and will connect the northern part of the A4 motorway, which currently stops 
south of Delft (at Kruithuisweg), with the southern part in Schiedam (at Kethelplein 
junction). It will consist of five lanes with space reserved for a third lane in southbound 
direction (Rijkswaterstaat, 2010c), thereby making it a dual carriageway with the potential 
of three lanes on each side. Besides the space reserved for the actual motorway, the 
A4DS will entail the construction of an eco-duct, aqua-duct, viaduct, land tunnel and the 
redevelopment and expansion of Kethelplein junction. The line of route between Delft and 
Schiedam follows the embankment which was already created between 1968 and 1972. 
Map 4.4 shows the line of route of the A4DS as it was proposed in 2009 and which has 
become official in the Tracébesluit one year later (Rijkswaterstaat, 2010c). 
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Map 4.4: Overview of the A4DS and the impact area (Rijkswaterstaat, 2009d). 
Terms of reference: (2) = in half-deep cuttings (‘halfverdiepte ligging’);  
(3) = in deep cuttings (‘verdiepte ligging’); (4) = land tunnel 
 
Important design choices in the scheme related to the construction height of the A4DS 
(see the terms of reference of Map 4.4). Starting from Delft, the A4DS departs from 
Kruithuisweg at surface level for the length of one kilometre. After this the motorway will 
be in half-deep cuttings for the length of over approximately 2.5 kilometres, after which it 
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will continue in deep cuttings for approximately 1.5 kilometres. The last two kilometres or 
so will be in a land tunnel, which will be constructed at surface level. Upon exiting the 
tunnel traffic will arrive at Kethelplein junction.     
Much debate on the design of the A4DS, particularly on the southern side of the 
line of route shared between the cities of Vlaardingen and Schiedam, has revolved around 
the length of the green tunnel and the location of the tunnel mouth (e.g. Groenlinks 
Schiedam, Interview; Stichting Waterweg Wonen, Interview). The length of the tunnel and 
the location of the tunnel mouth influence the level of traffic noise experienced by 
residents living along the line of route. It was suggested by advocacy groups in 
Vlaardingen and Schiedam that the tunnel mouth should connect to Kethelplein junction 
and the green tunnel itself should be long enough to fully bypass the apartments in the 
residential areas of Holy (Vlaardingen) and Woudhoek and Groenoord (Schiedam). 
However, because traffic from the A20 and local traffic from Schiedam will be 
‘homogenized’ with northbound traffic on the A4, the tunnel design needs to be compliant 
with legislation regarding tunnel safety (Rijkswaterstaat, 2009a). As the tunnel mouth can 
only begin approximately 300 metres from the point where the lanes will be homogenized 
(the so-called ‘10-seconds rule’), this exposes some of the residents to unabated noise.       
 
4.2.3 Project objectives          
 
The five core objectives of the A4DS are formulated in the 2009 Trajectnota/Milieu-
effectrapportage (TN/MER) (Route Proposal/Environmental impact assessment) 
(Rijkswaterstaat, 2009d), which has predicted the environmental impacts likely to ensue 
from the proposed scheme. The objectives are formulated by Rijkswaterstaat, which is the 
project planner of the A4DS in its role as the executive agency of the Ministerie van 
Infrastructuur en Milieu (MI&M) (Department for Infrastructure and Environment). The five 
objectives are as follows:  
 
1. Improvement of a reliable and adequate traffic connection between The Hague and 
Rotterdam; 
2. Improvement of livelihood alongside the A13 and A20; 
3. Improvement of external security (relating to the transport of hazardous substances); 
4. Improvement of traffic security on the A13 and part of the A20; 
5. Improvement of local accessibility in the study area. 
 
The prime objective, improving the reliability and adequacy of the traffic connection 
between The Hague and Rotterdam, has been framed in terms of improving the ratio 
between the intensity (I) and capacity (C) of the A13 (hence, the ‘IC-ratio’). As a rule of 
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thumb, a high IC-ratio (>0.8) refers to high levels of congestion and is understood to 
compromise the reliability and adequacy of traffic connections. Rijkswaterstaat (2009c) 
has therefore argued that an acceptable IC-ratio of the A13 at all times is at 0.8 or lower 
than that, a ratio which should be achieved through constructing the A4DS. In addition to 
this, the overriding objective for any road infrastructure improvement in the Netherlands is 
to improve access (Ministerie van Verkeer en Waterstaat and VROM, 2004). This refers to 
the ambition of the government to limit journey times during peak hours to 1.5 times of the 
time spent in traffic during off-peak hours (Ministerie van Verkeer en Waterstaat and 
VROM, 2004). As the A13 is heavily congested during peak hours and thereby extends 
journey time to ‘unacceptable’ proportions, the A4DS has been deemed necessary.       
The objective of improving the traffic connection between The Hague and 
Rotterdam also reinforces another objective, which is to improve the road infrastructure 
around Rotterdam (Rotterdam Vooruit, 2009; Ministerie van Infrastructuur en Milieu, 
2012). Rotterdam is enclosed by four major motorways (see 'Kaart 2.1' in Rijkswaterstaat, 
2009d): the A20 in the North; the A16 in the West, the A15 in the South; and the A4 in 
East, which resumes its southbound direction from Kethelplein junction through the 
Beneluxtunnel. Furthermore, the study area can be characterized by many junctions such 
as, turning clockwise: Klein Polderplein (A13/A20), Terbregseplein (A16/A20), Knooppunt 
Ridderkerk (A15/A16), Vaanplein (A15/A29), Beneluxplein (A4/A15) and Kethelplein 
(A4/A20). Junctions are earmarked by the government as notorious bottlenecks in the 
national motorway system and are estimated to account for approximately 80% of the 
increase in average journey times (Ministerie van Verkeer en Waterstaat and VROM, 
2004). The A4DS would enable southbound traffic to avoid two of these junctions (Klein 
Polderplein and Kethelplein), which is expected by the project planner to improve access 
in the study area (Rijkswaterstaat, 2009d).    
     
4.2.4 Sustainability considerations and objectives 
  
The A4DS is a road infrastructure project primarily designed to expand existing capacity. 
As stated in the introductory note of this chapter, it is therefore somewhat ‘guilty by 
association’ as it involves the facilitation of motorized transport. Expanding road 
infrastructure capacity certainly does not contribute to the objective of incurring what is 
called a modal split, something which is often associated with a move towards more 
sustainable forms of transport. However, proponents of the project have argued that 
additional road infrastructure capacity helps reduce the overall amount of time spent on 
the road by means of congestion reduction. Congestion causes an increase of CO2 
emissions because of engine inefficiency due to low speeds or the wide variance in 
speeds. During the decision-making process of the A4DS preceding the decision to go 
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ahead with the proposed scheme this argument was repeatedly stressed, for instance by 
Camiel Eurlings, who was the Infrastructure and Environment Secretary11 at the time. The 
description of the A4DS as “the greenest piece of asphalt in the Netherlands” (cited in 
Stichting Batavier, 2012) has been attributed to him, particularly from the rationale to 
reduce congestion and the pollution associated with it. 
 Nearly the entire length of the line of route will cross an area called Midden-
Delfland, which is largely coterminous with Midden-Delfland municipality. The area is 
widely appreciated for its biodiversity and is considered a refuge for those who are looking 
for solitude and silence in the densely populated and car-clogged study area. It is 
furthermore appreciated for its colourful assemblage of green and blue, alternately 
provided by meadows and water (Provincie Zuid-Holland, 2012). Given the ecological and 
social functions of Midden-Delfland, the environmental statement of the project has 
identified a wide range of impacts (Rijkswaterstaat, 2009d). These impacts have related 
to, amongst others, land use, water infrastructure, noise and nature tourism in the impact 
area. The stakeholders that were interviewed for this thesis have furthermore stressed the 
critical ecological importance of reed wells in the area as bird nesting sites and the 
aesthetical value of a landscape where ditches dominate the subsided peat soil (the 
‘reversed landscape’) (e.g. Midden-Delfland Vereniging, Interview).  
Stakeholders that were involved in the project generally stressed the potentially 
irreversible impacts of the A4DS on the ecological, sustainability and social functions of 
Midden-Delfland. Whilst Midden-Delfland is not a Natura 2000 site, a status which would 
entitle it to protection at the EU level, it is part of the Ecologische Hoofdstructuur (EHS) 
(Key Ecological Infrastructure) at both the national and provincial levels (Recreatieschap 
Midden-Delfland, 2009).  The EHS designates a grid consisting of nature areas and of 
vectors linking these areas. Areas and vectors are as such important for providing space 
to existing stocks of flora and fauna. Interestingly, the embankment originally intended for 
the A4DS in the early 1970s has become an important area for many birds and bats 
species (Rijkswaterstaat, 2009d), some of which are on endangered species lists.  
 
4.2.5 Main alternative to the project 
 
Throughout the decades many plans for expanding infrastructure capacity in the study 
area have been formulated. Many ‘unofficial’ alternatives emerged from within civil 
society, reaching out to both changes in the design of the proposed scheme and changes 
in route location. For instance, in the alternative ‘A4 Met Vaart’ it was proposed to tunnel 
                                                           
11
 Informal titles are often used for describing the position of some political leaders, particularly in the British 
context. For example, the ‘Secretary of State for Transport’ is informally rebranded as ‘Transport Secretary’. 
The author has opted to use the latter format consistently throughout the thesis and to apply it to both the 
Dutch and the British case.   
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the entire length of the A4DS infrastructure and construct a canal (‘vaart’) on the tunnel 
roof (see also Box 5.2). Other alternatives have stressed the construction of road 
infrastructure in other parts of the study area, such as proposals to construct the A54 
(‘Veilingroute’) or the A14 (e.g. Van Wee and Immers, 2009; Hansen, 2010), both of which 
would circumvent Midden-Delfland. In looking for solutions beyond expanding existing 
road infrastructure capacity, it was furthermore proposed to make substantive 
improvements to the public transport network between The Hague and Rotterdam 
(Milieudefensie, 2011). However, all of these proposals were either ignored or considered 
ineligible by Rijkswaterstaat as a strategic alternative to the A4DS. 
 In complying with Dutch EIA legislation related to road infrastructure planning, 
which states that a comparison of alternatives is mandatory (see Rijksoverheid, 2012b on 
the Tracéwet), the A4DS has been compared with an alternative. The main alternative to 
the project concerned the expansion of the existing A13 in combination with the 
construction of the A13/16 motorway (Rijkswaterstaat, 2009b). The ‘A13+A13/16 project’ 
therefore consisted of expanding the capacity of existing infrastructure and constructing 
new infrastructure. The A13/16 was intended to link the A13 with the A16 motorway at the 
Terbregseplein junction, north-east of Rotterdam. This would ultimately divert a 
substantial part of the North/South traffic to the A16 west of Rotterdam, away from 
Midden-Delfland and towards the semi-industrial area north and east of Rotterdam The 
Hague Airport, which itself is north of Rotterdam. However, the potential of the 
A13+A13/16 project to achieve the project objectives was deemed inferior to that of the 
A4DS (Rijkswaterstaat, 2009a). 
 
4.2.6 The project stakeholders 
 
Ever since the inception in the 1960s of the plan to construct the A4DS, many civil society 
groups and organizations have become engaged in protesting against its construction. 
This has continued throughout the decades until in 2010 the decision was finally made to 
implement the scheme (Rijkswaterstaat, 2010c). Protest intended to prevent the A4DS 
from being constructed or to mitigate adverse impacts comprised a diverse array of civil 
society stakeholders. As a consequence, the stakeholders that were interviewed have 
reflected this diversity. They comprised ecological and sustainability advocacy 
organizations, housing organizations and local action groups, amongst others. Many of 
the stakeholders have been identified by looking at the verdict from the Raad van State 
(2011a), where all the plaintiffs were listed. Another strategy used to identify stakeholders 
has been by information obtained from other stakeholders.    
The fieldwork has been mainly carried out along the Delft-Schiedam corridor, 
comprising the municipalities of Delft, Midden-Delfland, Vlaardingen and Schiedam, which 
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are host to location-specific stakeholders (e.g. Midden-Delfland Vereniging). Such 
stakeholders were mainly involved in advocacy activities, for instance environmental 
advocacy (e.g. KNNV Delfland), defending the interests of residents living along the A4DS 
(e.g. Stichting Overleg Bewonersorganisaties (SOBO) or political parties (e.g. the Socialist 
Party (SP) in Delft). Stakeholders with a regional focus on environmental advocacy were 
mainly concentrated in Rotterdam (e.g. Milieufederatie Zuid-Holland), the largest city in 
the study area. One stakeholder was based outside the study area (Milieudefensie, in 
Amsterdam). In addition to these stakeholders, two traffic experts that provided counter-
expertise on the justification of the A4DS were interviewed.  
The stakeholders that were interviewed12 in the A4DS project are listed in Table 
4.2 (alphabetically ordered). As can be derived from many of the names, most of the 
stakeholders are either associations (‘verenigingen’), such as the Koninklijke Nederlandse 
Natuurhistorische Vereniging (KNNV), or charitable organizations (‘stichtingen’), such as 
Stichting Stop RW19/A4. Throughout Chapters 5 to 7, where appropriate, the 
stakeholders interviewed will be further introduced on the basis of their role in the 
decision-making process of the A4DS project.  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
12
 The citations used from the interviews with civil society stakeholders in the HS2 Phase 1 case primarily 
express the opinion of the interviewees and do not necessarily represent the opinion of the organizations with 
which they are affiliated with, a member of, or working for. As two interviewees have not agreed to be cited in 
this article (‘agreement’ is defined by signing an ‘implied consent form’), the interviews with them have not 
been used. 
110 
 
Name of stakeholder Type of organization/affiliation Role in the A4DS project** 
Founder of IODS* Initiating engagement in A4DS Deliberation 
Groenlinks Schiedam Political party (in Schiedam) Advocacy 
Independent Traffic Expert Civil society/non-affiliated Counter-expertise 
IODS* Programme for engagement in A4DS Deliberation 
KNNV Waterweg-Noord & 
KNNV Delfland 
Local branches of a national 
environmental organization Advocacy 
Midden-Delfland Vereniging Advocacy group for Midden-Delfland Advocacy 
Mijn Partij Political party (in Midden-Delfand) Advocacy 
Milieufederatie Zuid-Holland Regional environmental 
organization 
Advocacy, counter-
expertise 
Milieudefensie National environmental organization Advocacy, counter-
expertise 
Natuurmonumenten National environmental organization Advocacy 
Rijkswaterstaat* Infrastructure development agency Expertise, Deliberation 
SOBO Housing organization in Schiedam Advocacy 
SP Delft Political party (in Delft) Advocacy 
Stichting A4 Met Vaart Alternative to the A4DS Advocacy, counter-
expertise 
Stichting Batavier Local A4DS monitoring group Monitoring 
Stichting Stop RW19/A4 Local anti-A4DS action group Advocacy 
Stichting Waterweg Wonen Housing organization in Vlaardingen Advocacy 
Traffic Expert  Delft University of Technology Counter-expertise 
Vereniging Tegen Milieubederf Regional environmental 
organization Advocacy 
Table 4.2: Overview of the stakeholders involved in the A4DS project (listed alphabetically) 
*  Not a civil society actor 
** Explanation of the roles: 
• Deliberation = involvement in setting up the IODS deliberation 
• Advocacy = advocating a certain interest in the A4DS planning context 
• Counter-expertise = using science to provide counter-evidence 
• Expertise = using science to provide evidence 
• Monitoring = navigating post-decision developments in the A4DS project    
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Chapter 5 On sustainability discourses 
 
This chapter is the first of three empirical chapters and charts the sustainability discourses 
in the HS2 and A4DS projects. As introduced in Chapter 1 and elaborated in Chapter 2, 
this thesis envisages sustainability discourses as social narratives which manifest certain 
values in environmental decision-making (e.g. Hajer, 1995; Rydin, 1999). In planning, and 
more specifically in the conduct of environmental impact assessment (EIA), such values 
may for instance relate to the expressed need for ecological preservation, to dispositions 
on how socio-economic and ecological objectives should be reconciled, or to why it would 
be a good or bad thing whether the development in question should go ahead or be 
cancelled. It will become quickly apparent that multiple values have informed sustainability 
discourse in the cases. Consecutively, in each case study the three most dominant 
discourses have been filtered out for thorough analysis. The structure of the chapter will 
be similar to that of Chapter 6, in that the first sub-section deals with the HS2 project and 
the second sub-section deals with the A4DS project. The third sub-section will summarize 
the main findings.     
 Throughout the chapter it will become apparent that EIA exerts influence only to a 
limited extent on the discourses of stakeholders. Whilst EIA can be perceived as a 
decision-support tool to make decisions that better contribute to sustainable development, 
however defined, the sustainability discourses in this chapter are multivalent and at times 
ambiguous in their relationship with this concept. Indeed, Bond and Morrison-Saunders 
(2009: 322) have contended that, “given the broad scope of the sustainable development 
concept, (...) both its framing and its use can be manipulated by actors favouring other 
discourses (which may or may not relate to sustainable development)”. Thus, it could well 
be possible that the construction and articulation of sustainability discourses in an 
environmental problem setting has – seemingly – little to do with sustainable 
development. Furthermore, it will become apparent that the discourses are largely played 
out beyond the remit of EIA. This is an interesting observation as it shows that 
stakeholders may mobilize discourses around other domains in the planning process.   
 
5.1 HS2 
 
Ever since the initial idea for a high-speed rail network was made by the Department for 
Transport (DfT) in 2009 (Department for Transport, 2009) and consolidated into a route 
proposal in that same year (HS2 Ltd, 2009), heavy protest against it emerged in the 
Chilterns. Local action groups along the line of route affecting the area have been formed 
in the aftermath of the route proposal, such as the Chiltern Ridges Action Group. These 
groups have campaigned against HS2 side-by-side with already existing groups 
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advocating the interests of the Chilterns, such as the Chiltern Countryside Group, for 
which “preserving the character and peace of the Chilterns” (2011: 2) is one of its primary 
aims. The collected data has revealed that there are a variety of viewpoints of the 
stakeholders that can explain their involvement in, or affinity with, the anti-HS2 campaign. 
By having grouped these viewpoints based on a relative similarity that was discerned 
between them in the data analysis, three discourses have been identified: 1) justification; 
2) party politics; and 3) conservation. Table 5.1 lists the three discourses, briefly tells what 
they are about and lists some of the nodes that have been used in the textual coding of 
the interviews with relevant civil society stakeholders (see Sub-section 3.5.2). Chapter 9 
further discusses the results from applying textual coding to analyzing the sustainability 
discourses. The remainder of this section will explain the discourses in full detail.  
 
Discourse What is the discourse about? Nodes used for interview 
coding 
Justification 
HS2 has a flawed business case, 
which impacts adversely on its cost-
benefit ratio. HS2 is not ‘green’. 
e.g. ‘Costs and benefits’, 
‘Economic rationale’, ‘Evidence 
base’, ‘Journey time savings’ 
Party politics 
HS2 is used for political objectives by 
the major political parties in the UK 
Parliament.                          
‘Party politics’ 
Conservation The Chilterns should remain unaffected by infrastructure development.  
e.g. ‘Chilterns AONB’, ‘Natural 
resource’, ‘Ecological 
destruction and blight’ 
Table 5.1: The discourses in the HS2 case 
 
5.1.1. Justification 
 
~ “The great enemy of the truth is very often not the lie - deliberate, contrived and 
dishonest - but the myth - persistent, persuasive, and unrealistic” ~ (John F. Kennedy, 
cited in HS2 Action Alliance, 2010; a quote used extensively in the anti-HS2 campaign) 
 
The justification discourse has centred on the allegedly false argumentation on which the 
case for HS2 has been built. Generally speaking, as argued by some of the stakeholders 
(e.g. Missenden Action Groups, Interview), the campaign against HS2 (Phase 1) centred 
on three points: 1) its underlying justification in terms of necessity; 2) the location of the 
line of route (i.e. the ‘preferred scheme’); and 3) the proposed design of the rail 
infrastructure, involving discussion on tunnels and other mitigation measures. Whilst 
points 2) and 3) directly impact on the way HS2 Phase 1 will affect the Chilterns, thus 
invoking questions on the justification of why and how new infrastructures should cross an 
Area of Outstanding Natural Beauty (AONB) instead of being located in an existing 
transport corridor, such as those of the M1 or M40 motorways (e.g. Potter Row Action 
Group, Interview), it does not condemn HS2 per se. Much in contrast, point 1) addresses 
the underlying justification for the general concept of high-speed rail and of having this in 
113 
 
Great Britain. Stakeholders’ framing of justification is tailored to the specific case of HS2. 
Box 5.1 and Figure 5.1 present an illustrative example of such framing, after which the 
justification discourse is looked at in more detail.   
 
In the anti-HS2 campaign, the proposal for a high-speed rail network in the UK was 
often labelled a ‘white elephant’ (e.g. Cholesbury Action Group, Interview). The white 
elephant metaphor can be used in projects where large costs are involved, primarily to 
construct them but also to keep them in operation. The story goes that when the king of 
Siam (current-day Thailand) wanted to burden someone who was disloyal or 
disobedient, he gave this person a white elephant. These elephants could not be 
disposed of as they were (and are) considered sacred. It is therefore prestigious to have 
one. However, white elephants could not be used for labour and required a lot of money 
for their maintenance. Thus, a white elephant did not only lack utility but also presented 
its owner with a financial burden. When this story is exported to the case of HS2, it has 
been argued that the proposal for high-speed rail is a ‘white elephant’, “a constant drain 
on your resources, whilst it doesn’t do anything for you” (Interview). During protests 
against HS2 in the Chilterns, an inflatable white elephant was often used to enforce this 
message.  
Box 5.1: HS2 and its flawed justification: the white elephant metaphor 
 
 
Figure 5.1: Flyer depicting HS2 as a white elephant (Stop HS2, 2013a) 
 
The national action platform Stop HS2, which has described itself as the ‘national 
campaign against HS2’, has summed up the flawed justification for HS2 in three 
interrelated points (2013a): 1) no business case; 2) no environmental case; and 3) no 
money to pay for it. As will be shown later, argumentation on the business case has 
formed the backbone in the protests against HS2. The argument that there is no 
environmental case for HS2 has mainly focused on its inability to contribute to the 
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government’s objectives to reduce the emissions of carbon dioxide (CO2) and other 
greenhouse gases – this in contrast to the environmental destruction that will result from 
the lines of route. The argument that there is ‘no money to pay for it’ has stressed the 
substantial government subsidies that are needed to finance HS2 [2]13, used for both its 
construction and to keep it in operation. Although this latter point remains somewhat 
understated in the justification discourse, it has been spearheaded in alternative economic 
appraisals of the project by economic think tanks (Adam Smith Institute, 2011; Aizlewood 
and Wellings, 2011) as well as The Tax Payer’s Alliance (2011), which campaigns against 
what they envisage as the frivolous spending of public money.   
It was reported that documentation on the flawed justification for HS2 (Phase 1) 
was widely circulated amongst civil society groups that were active along the line of route 
(e.g. Chilterns Conservation Board, Interview). Another national action group, HS2 Action 
Alliance, has repeatedly claimed that the purported justification of HS2 is based on six 
myths (e.g. HS2 Action Alliance, 2010; 2011a; 2011d). These myths have subsequently 
provoked a strong counter-reaction from civil society, reactions which are correspondent 
with the nodes used in the textual coding. They have been countered as follows (the 
myths are italicized and placed between single inverted commas; the corresponding 
nodes are placed between brackets): 
 
1. ‘HS2 is a green mode of transport’. High-speed rail is unsustainable due to the high 
levels of energy needed to make very high speeds possible. Furthermore, it is 
anticipated that the ‘modal split’ will not occur (Node: ‘Evidence base’); 
2. ‘HS2 will bolster the economy of the North’. HS2 will not bring economic prosperity to 
the North of the country as economic growth will mainly occur in the Greater London 
area (see also [2]; Nodes: ‘Economic rationale’ and ‘HS2 national importance’); 
3. ‘HS2 is a sound investment’. HS2 is not value for money as the construction and 
operation costs of the high-speed rail network outweighs the benefits it will generate 
(Node: ‘Costs and benefits’); 
4. ‘HS2 is necessary to relieve crowding’. HS2 is not a necessary investment in rail 
infrastructure as there is no rail capacity problem. It is therefore a “solution looking for 
a problem” (Stop HS2, 2013b; Node: 'Evidence base'); 
5. ‘HS2 is necessary to compete with domestic air travel’. High-speed rail is not 
necessary to reduce air travel in Great Britain as demand for this latter mode of 
transport is already in decline and will be even more so when the ‘Y’ is ready by the 
early 2030s (Node: ‘Evidence base’); 
                                                           
13
 This reference (where parentheses are used) is a newspaper article. To see how newspaper articles are 
referenced, please refer to the second footnote of Chapter 4. 
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6. ‘HS2 is necessary to save journey times’. HS2 is not necessary to save journey times 
as the UK performs better on journey times between its major urban conurbations than 
many other large European states (Node: ‘Journey time savings’). 
 
The first and fifth myth represent a direct and indirect response to the sustainability 
objectives of HS2 (see Sub-section 4.1.4 and the fourth project objective in Sub-section 
4.1.3), thus perceived by stakeholders to be premised on false argumentation. HS2 Action 
Alliance (2010) has argued that speed, by its very nature, is not sustainable. The Chilterns 
Conservation Board noted that “a high-speed train uses a lot of energy. Lots of energy. 
And there is an equation that if you double the speed, you quadruple the amount of 
energy needs. (...) There is a relationship between the energy you use and the emissions 
created at the power stations” (Interview). Stakeholders furthermore argued that most rail 
passengers on HS2 will have transferred from the West Coast Main Line (WCML) but not 
from other transport modalities. Air travel, one of the most unsustainable modes of 
transport, will not yield large savings in the emission of CO2 as it shows a decline in 
passenger demand to future HS2 destinations.   
As regards the sixth myth on journey time savings, this invariably involves the 
issue of speed of travel and subsequently sparked debate on the definition of high-speed 
rail. A number of definitions are used and vary according to the minimum speed required 
for modes of rail transport to be classified as ‘high-speed’ (House of Commons Library, 
2011b), although the European Union (EU) classifies trains operating at 250 kph as high-
speed rail. This has prompted the Chiltern Society to classify HS2 as ‘ultra high-speed’ 
since its minimum commercial speed will be around 360 kph. The observed ambiguity of 
the definition of high-speed rail has furthermore led Stop HS2 to conclude that building a 
high-speed rail network in the UK is based on an erroneous assumption that the speed to 
be attained by HS2 is necessary to adhere to the incumbent definition of high-speed 
travel. That is, with having speeds of over 200 kph between its major cities, the UK 
already has an ‘extensive fast railway network’ (Stop HS2, 2012). 
Subsequently, part of the justification discourse was shaped by the flawed scheme 
of HS2. This led the Amersham Action Group to comment that “if you look at the scheme, 
the only sensible thing is to oppose it entirely” (Interview). As such the preferred scheme 
was considered incapable of catering for the present and future transport needs in the UK. 
This ineptitude was assumed by stakeholders not least due to the absence of a national 
transport strategy (e.g. Amersham Society, Interview), which would advance a long-term 
vision of the transport needs of the country and which, according to the Amersham & 
District Residents Association, “encompasses a genuine commercial requirement” 
(Interview). Another scheme-oriented account of flawed justification corresponds with the 
observation made in the The Eddington Transport Study (2006) that the principle task for 
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rail infrastructure is to facilitate the tightly connected network of urban conurbations. This 
is reflected in the Missenden Action Groups’ assertion that “in a small country we don’t 
need ultra high speed in the way that they’re doing it in France” (Interview), bearing in 
mind the long distances between the North (e.g. Lille) and South (e.g. Marseille) of France 
compared to half the distance of that between the North and South in the UK.  
However, the preponderance of criticisms targeted the underlying economic 
justification of HS2, or what has been widely called the business case of the project. This 
is reflected in myths 2 to 5 (in the fifth myth, it is in regard to the volume of air travel 
reflecting a potential rail passenger demand for HS2). Within the business case the ratio 
between the costs and benefits (‘cost-benefit ratio’) has been the guiding principle, as can 
be abstracted from a number of the project documents supporting the decision to 
construct (e.g. HS2 Ltd, 2012a; 2012b). The cost-benefit ratio reflects the expected 
financial returns that can be accrued from making an investment. As this ratio has 
prominently featured in the project documentation, it is safe to suggest that it has been an 
important evidence base for justifying the government’s decision on HS2 [3]. Mirroring this 
focus on costs and benefits, opponents of HS2 have expanded on providing counter-
evidence suggesting the project is not a sound investment (AGHAST Federation, 2011; 
HS2 Action Alliance, 2011b; 2013). Whilst in Chapter 8 the evidence base of the 
economics deployed in the HS2 project is discussed in more detail, it can be argued that 
the relationships between costs and benefits on the one hand and certain project 
components on the other (e.g. rail passenger demand forecasts, journey time savings) 
have permeated the planning process at the pre-decision stage.  
Counter-evidence on the ‘real’ cost-benefit ratio for HS2 has mainly been provided 
by the HS2 Action Alliance (e.g. 2013)14. Stakeholders in the Chilterns developed a clear 
sense of an ‘acceptable’ cost-benefit ratio. With respect to HS2, this sense became 
transposed into an assessment of whether proposed infrastructure schemes are 
economically sound. Missenden Action Groups argued that “road projects in this country 
have, are supposed to have a benefit-cost ratio of 5 or 6. The HS2’s cost-benefit ratio is, 
when properly looked at, under 1” (Interview). This comparison between road projects and 
HS2 illustrates that, according to some of the stakeholders, the project is founded on a 
poorly contrived business case. A ‘proper look’ mainly entailed a readjustment of certain 
assumptions made in the business case. Wendover HS2 argued that “we’ve caught the 
Department for Transport on quite serious errors” (Interview), particularly with respect to 
rail passenger demand forecasts and the value of time (VOT) of the journey time that is 
saved as a consequence of having shorter train journeys. Generally speaking, 
                                                           
14
 For the most recent update of the cost-benefit ratio for HS2 (Phase 1) can be found on the website of HS2 
Action Alliance (http://hs2actionalliance.org/). Note that new updates are published on a regular basis and that 
cost-benefit ratios can vary as a result of that. 
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stakeholders judged passenger numbers much too optimistic and the VOT much too high 
(see also Chapter 8).  
Journey time savings is an interesting case study within the justification discourse, 
as over half the benefits (55%) of HS2, once in operation, hinge upon it (HS2 Ltd, 2012a). 
The VOT has played an important role in discussions on which value should be ascribed 
to journey time savings. As the VOT is principally premised on “the individual’s gross 
wage” (HS2 Ltd, 2011b: 4), reflecting the resource cost of travelling in working time, the 
average annual salary used to determine the benefits of journey time savings has been a 
prime matter of concern (HS2 Action Alliance, 2013; Chiltern Ridges Action Group, 
Interview). The value of the VOT as a concept is embedded in what is known as the cost-
savings approach (Department for Transport Strategy Unit, 2012), as travelling in working 
time reflects a cost. However, issues on certain assumptions made on journey time 
savings have equally prevailed in the anti-HS2 campaign. A number of these issues have 
been filtered out:     
 
• The hegemonic role of HS2 in saving journey time. The DfT (2010) has stated that 
HS2 will be able to save 35 minutes on the journey from Birmingham to London to a 
journey time of 49 minutes. When Phase 2 is completed, journeys from Manchester or 
Leeds to Birmingham will be nearly halved to just over an hour. Whilst these savings 
are not disputed, stakeholders (e.g. Chiltern Society, Interview) stressed that an 
upgrade of the existing rail infrastructure can substantiate similar savings, such as the 
upgrades included in Rail Package 2 (RP2) (Atkins, 2012) and the ‘Optimised 
Alternative’ of action group 51M (see e.g. 51m, 2011a to get insight into the core 
tenets of the alternative).     
 
• The relative value of time savings in door-to-door journeys. Stakeholders have 
focused on time saved on the full length of a journey – e.g. home-to-office or office-to-
office – rather than on station-to-station journeys within the HS2 network. It was 
argued that the Birmingham terminus at Curzon Street will be outside the city centre 
and that Euston railway station is the ‘wrong station’ in terms of its connection with the 
High-Speed rail 1 (HS1) connection to continental Europe (Chilterns Conservation 
Board), as well as of the passenger jams the ‘bottleneck’ Euston will cause in certain 
parts of the public transport network in London. With explicit reference to Phase 1 of 
HS2, South Heath Action Group argued that the relative value of journey time savings 
is infinitesimal by stating that the “first part of the journey can be blown away 
completely if you look at the percentage of time saving on the overall journey. (...) It’s 
just so small. It’s just not worth thinking about” (Interview).  
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• The ability to be productive whilst travelling in working time. In contrast to the 
assumption of zero productivity when business people travel during working time 
(Department for Transport Strategy Unit, 2012), which is the key rationale for saving 
journey time within the cost-savings approach, trains were judged by stakeholders to 
provide an ideal working environment in their ability to cater for a moment of quiet on a 
busy day at the office (e.g. Wendover Parish Councillor, Interview). The Amersham & 
District Residents Association stated that, when “you are on the train, you open your 
laptop, you’re working. That’s what you’re doing” (Interview). Besides this anecdotal 
evidence, some stakeholders (e.g. Chiltern Society, Interview) referred to studies such 
as the Study of the Productive Use of Rail Travel Time (SPURT), which argued that 
“some 80% of rail business travellers in the UK” work on trains (Mott MacDonald Ltd., 
2009: S-1). 
 
• The future need for long-distance business travel. Most of the stakeholders that were 
interviewed challenged the need to implement schemes for long-distance business 
travel. It was widely argued that the share of business travellers in the passenger 
demand forecasting for HS2 is based on a false premise because of expected 
technological advancements in the future (e.g. South Heath Action Group; Chesham 
Town Councillor). Particularly the ability to work remotely by virtue of the Internet and 
clever software (e.g. Skype, Face Time) was stressed. Chilterns Countryside Group 
admitted that there was a shared consensus amongst stakeholders in the anti-HS2 
campaign on this issue, consisting of “very strong opinions that broadband is what is 
needed and what will be used in the future” (Interview). 
 
 
5.1.2 Party politics 
 
~ “Our Member of Parliament is a poodle” ~ (adapted from one of the interviews, referring 
to the relationship between the Member of Parliament (MP) and the Prime Minister as one 
of puppet and puppeteer) 
 
The party politics discourse has put centre-stage the perception that discussions on the 
justification of HS2 are premised on the private interests of the major political parties15. 
Moreover, prevalent inefficiencies or uncertainties in the evidence base of the project 
were directly linked to extant partisan interests. The party politics discourse has clearly 
                                                           
15
 For the first time since the Second World War there is a coalition government in the UK, consisting of the 
Conservative Party and the Liberal Democrats. It’s been installed since 2010 and has therefore possibly 
influenced the party political discourse of stakeholders. However, as the Conservative Party is the dominant 
coalition partner (and, allegedly, the Liberal Democrats are in the coalition to complement a majority of seats), 
between the lines ‘government’ can be read as ‘Conservative Party’, unless explicit references are made to 
the coalition.  
119 
 
emphasized that the political deliberations on HS2 were confined to backroom 
negotiations and realms of secrecy, which made these deliberations ineligible for public 
scrutiny. This is an interesting observation and, arguably, somewhat un-British when 
Lijphart’s (2012) assertion is accepted of the prevalence of interest advocacy and ‘tit for 
tat’ politics in the Westminster model of democracy. Also unlike Lijphart, an apparent 
consensus between political parties has been stressed as a key factor of success for HS2. 
This has been acknowledged and clearly articulated by David Rowlands (2009), chairman 
in the formative days of HS2 Ltd. He has stated that:    
 
“Britain built only one new transport network in the twentieth century, the motorway 
system. Its origins lie in a report prepared for the war time Cabinet and one which 
attracted all party agreement. (...) [Building a network of high-speed rail] will need real 
ambition and consistency of purpose across a succession of Governments. It will require 
support across the political divide of a kind our forebears showed more than half a century 
ago. (...) In the end, a truly national network can only be built by national endeavour”.  
 
When read in the context of HS2 and its justification, the quotation above seems to 
suggest that partisan divergence must be overstepped when a serious restructuring of the 
economy must be made. It implicitly argues that political issues bearing overriding national 
importance should be stripped from any private interests, thereby imprinting the idea that 
heroic political figures in times of crisis (such as the likes of Sir Winston Churchill) have 
unified the country in a similar way. The ‘national interest’ in HS2 has indeed been 
covered extensively by the collected data, for instance by the interviews (e.g. Chiltern 
Society; Chilterns Conservation Board; Speen Area Action Group), and documents that 
were used in the campaign against HS2 (e.g. AGHAST Federation, 2011; HS2 Action 
Alliance, 2013).    
Whilst it was acknowledged by stakeholders in the Chilterns that HS2 was 
supported by both the Conservative Party (i.e. the coalition) and the Labour Party, the two 
largest parties in the country, this by no means suggested that the support was perceived 
to contribute to an overriding national interest, in terms of economic growth or otherwise. 
Rather, stakeholders argued that these two political parties used HS2 as a vehicle for 
electoral success, the logic of which was bluntly expressed by the Chiltern Ridges Action 
Group as one of “screw your locals and benefit somebody that doesn’t normally vote for 
you” (Interview). As the first formal proposal for an extensive high-speed rail network in 
Britain was made under a Labour government, with Andrew Adonis as the Transport 
Secretary, stakeholders sensed that the Labour Party has a vested interest in creating 
HS2 (e.g. Wendover Parish Councillor, Interview). However, extant interests in HS2 were 
also linked to the Conservatives. As the project documentation of HS2 Ltd (e.g. 2012a) 
120 
 
explicitly sought to emphasize how high-speed rail would benefit the North, it was argued 
that future electoral gains for the Conservatives are concentrated there. The Chiltern 
Ridges Action Group perceived HS2 as a “political ploy from the Conservative Party, 
trying to wiggle votes in the North and the Midlands” (Interview), areas which traditionally 
vote Labour.   
With the coalition partners and the Labour Party in support of HS2, the feeling of 
being disenfranchised as a result of party politics featured prominently in the interviews 
(e.g. Chesham Town Councillor; Speen Area Action Group). The Councillor from 
Chesham Town argued that “in some ways as a protester you feel that you have nowhere 
to go when the three major parties support it at the national level. You know, you feel you 
have almost been disenfranchised” (Interview). The disenfranchisement argument 
therefore alludes to the impossibility to support anything different from the political parties 
in support of HS2: the Conservatives, the Labour Party and, to a lesser extent, the Liberal 
Democrats. A report from the All-party Parliamentary Group for High Speed Rail (2012), 
consisting of MPs belonging to these parties, has explicitly manifested the broad 
consensus on HS2. It was reported that in areas that traditionally vote conservative, such 
as the Chilterns, residents did not feel listened to [4].         
The United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP), a populist right-wing party and a 
declared challenger to HS2, was identified by some of the stakeholders as a viable voting 
option in future elections. For the majority of the electorate in the Chilterns, by bringing 
into prospect the conservative background of the area, perhaps “the only way to vote 
against it would be to vote for UKIP” (Amersham Action Group, Interview). Indeed, support 
for UKIP could be seen displayed behind kitchen windows and on garage doors in many 
of the population centres across the Chilterns (e.g. Amersham, Chesham, Great 
Missenden, Wendover). However, the prominence of HS2 as a contested issue did not 
surface in previous elections. Reminiscent of the need for economic growth which 
permeated the 2010 General Election, the Amersham Action Group contended that 
“voting for somebody because they didn’t approve of HS2 would have been a bit of a 
luxury” (Interview). As UKIP has never won a seat in the House of Commons as of yet, 
arguably a vote on this party could have been considered by some as a vote lost.  
For some stakeholders (but certainly not all) the electoral rules of the British 
democratic system were pinpointed as the main cause of the interest competition between 
the Conservatives and Labour. Arguably, elections based on the ‘first past the post’ 
principle were identified as an important obstacle for smaller political parties to become a 
factor of importance in political life. The Chesham Town Councillor did “not agree on ‘first 
past the post’, I do not think it is a good system. It means that small groups of people or 
people without support just don’t get represented, just don’t get representation (...). The 
Conservatives have a lot of money (...) and the Labour Party have support from the trade 
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unions. So it’s difficult to get representation and get people elected [from smaller political 
parties]” (Interview). The councillor went on to argue that political agendas are set by the 
dominant political forces, becoming inadvertently narrow as a consequence of a bias 
towards vested interests in parliamentary representation.  
 
Divided loyalty? Cabinet responsibilities versus local interests 
 
Unlike in democratic systems where there is a strict separation between the legislative 
and executive branch of government (such as in the Netherlands; see Lijphart’s (2012) 
second variable in Table 2.1), MPs can fulfil the role of Secretary of State or Minister at 
the same time. This led the Chesham Town Councillor to assert in the interview that these 
MPs generally have a ‘divided loyalty’, their political responsibility hovering between 
representing the interests of the constituents and of the cabinet. Responsibilities may 
subsequently veer to either the electorate or the cabinet, depending on affinities or 
loyalties that are circumscribed to the geographical dimension. The Councillor referred in 
particular to the Transport Secretary Patrick McLoughlin (in office since September 2012), 
MP for Derbyshire Dales parliamentary constituency. As this constituency is not affected 
by HS2, it was asserted that in his capacity as the principle advocate of HS2 “the man 
doesn’t have to look at his electorate” (Chesham Town Councillor, Interview).       
 Following this train of thought, it was argued that the existence of parliamentary 
constituencies posed a twofold problem for local interest advocacy. The first problem was 
that MPs from ‘far away’ parliamentary constituencies (such as Derbyshire Dales) were 
reported to not care about HS2, as it will neither affect their constituents’ interests nor 
divide their loyalty. For instance, the Dunsmore Society asserted that “MPs in Suffolk, 
Norfolk, they don’t care. They are not going to upset their Tory Party or Labour Party 
bosses by saying I don’t agree with it” (Interview). As one of the project objectives of HS2 
has revolved around spurring economic growth in the north of the UK (see Sub-section 
4.1.3), it was also feared by some stakeholders that the anti-HS2 campaign could not 
count on the sympathy of MPs in northern counties. The Amersham & District Residents 
Association reasoned in the interview that, “until we get Labour MPs in the North who are 
being asked questions by constituents” on the real benefits of HS2, support from these 
MPs in the House of Commons seems unlikely.     
The second problem was that the MPs of the affected constituencies were 
considered not doing enough to challenge HS2. This was purported to be caused by the 
cabinet responsibility of these MPs (e.g. South Heath Action Group, Interview; see also 
Table 2.1), as well as the reinforcement of party discipline through what is called the whip 
system [5]. A whip in the British political context is a party official that aims to enforce 
party discipline. Political inertia in advocating the local interest was directly attributed to 
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the determinant of cabinet responsibility. The Amersham & District Residents Association 
firmly argued that this is “the rule of parliamentary democracy: if you are in the 
government, you tell the government line” (Interview). Furthermore, since Patrick 
McLoughlin was the Chief Whip before becoming Transport Secretary, the Chilterns 
Conservation Board thought it very unlikely that he would oppose the Prime Minister. By 
referring to the ‘whip’ background of McLoughlin, it reasoned that “you can’t imagine 
somebody whose political career has depended on that for the last couple of years, then 
letting down the Prime Minister if he wants this railway to happen?” (Interview). 
In the Chilterns the MPs of Chesham and Amersham parliamentary constituency 
and Aylesbury parliamentary constituency (for Wendover, amongst others) – which in area 
coverage are largely coterminous with the boundaries of the AONB – fulfilled the cabinet 
responsibilities of Welsh Secretary (Cheryl Gillan) and Minister for Europe (David 
Lidlington), respectively. Subsequently, when Cheryl Gillan left the cabinet in September 
2012 during a major mid-term reshuffle, whether willingly or unwillingly [6], it was reported 
that she undertook more efforts to mitigate the adverse impacts of HS2 on her 
constituency. The Speen Area Action Group illustrated the tension between local interest 
advocacy and cabinet responsibility by envisioning a discussion between one such MP 
with cabinet responsibilities and David Cameron, who was the Prime Minister when the 
interview was held:   
 
“[MP]: ‘My constituents are not very happy about this high-speed railway’. 
[David Cameron]: ‘Well, they wouldn’t, would they, because it goes through their back 
garden’.   
[MP]: ‘Well, no, but obviously I have to represent their views’. 
[David Cameron]: ‘Don’t worry about that, [first name of MP]. Who’re they gonna vote for 
next time? They’re all conservatives, they’re not gonna vote Labour. Don’t worry, you’re 
gonna get in’” (Interview). 
 
Cabinet responsibility could well work the other way around, however. Arguably, the 
combination of a position in the cabinet and affiliation with a specific location (i.e. the 
parliamentary constituency) can influence decisions that would not have been made 
otherwise. That is, the ability for MPs to negotiate location-specific issues with the relevant 
decision-makers could lead to altered decisions [5]. It has for instance been strongly 
suspected that the ‘loop’ around Tatton parliamentary constituency in Phase 2 of HS2 has 
been advocated by George Osborne, who was its MP as well as the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer in the cabinet [7]. In the Chilterns, the choice to exit the ‘Amersham tunnel’ at 
Mantle’s Wood instead of Old Amersham was ascribed to the ‘short-circuit line’ that 
existed between Cheryl Gillan as the Welsh Secretary and her colleague from the DfT. 
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Hence, by some the new tunnel was described as the ‘Gillan tunnel’ (e.g. Missenden 
Action Groups, Interview). In levering the local interest of Amersham and Chesham 
against cabinet responsibility in the HS2 project, Cheryl Gillan was quoted as saying “I 
would defy the party whip – be very, very sure of that” (cited in [8]).        
Altogether it is safe to suggest that the political leverage that stakeholders 
attributed to MPs in advocating the local interest vis-à-vis party politics was substantial. 
Generally speaking, and in accordance with the notion of ‘divided loyalty’ between the 
official party line and local interest advocacy, it was noted that the campaign against HS2 
has been considerably influenced by a divergence between party politics and local 
interests. The Amersham Action Group argued that “in the HS2 campaign at least some of 
the ones would be campaigning for UKIP, which puts the ones who are in the 
Conservatives Party in an awkward position because they are not allowed to do it” 
(Interview). Electoral campaigns are an interesting point to take forward, as these are 
events where party politics takes precedence in defining the local interest. To illustrate this 
point, in the weeks leading up to a by-election for a seat in the Amersham Town Council, 
UKIP leader Nigel Farage argued that this event “really is the first referendum on the 
Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition's decision to press ahead with HS2” (cited in [9]).  
  
5.1.3 Conservation 
 
The conservation discourse has synthesized comments, statements and social appraisals 
that stressed the ecological and sustainability consequences of HS2 crossing the 
Chilterns. Of the three discourses presented, it is the only ‘local’ discourse. The local 
dimension of the conservation discourse is that the status of the Chilterns as an Area of 
Outstanding Natural Beauty (AONB) has often been referred to. Indeed, stakeholders in 
the Chilterns have been quite active in stressing that HS2 jeopardizes a number of local 
interests, so much so that Andrew Adonis declared in 2011 that any stagnation in the HS2 
planning process was likely to be caused by those ‘Nimbys in the Chilterns’ [6, 10]. 
Besides the orientation towards the Chilterns in this discourse, the regional and national 
stakeholders that were interviewed – Berkshire, Buckinghamshire and Oxfordshire Wildlife 
Trust (BBOWT)16, the Woodland Trust and the Campaign to Protect Rural England 
(CPRE) – have contributed to views on conservation, without having strong opinions on 
other fronts. The Woodland Trust, for instance, is involved with HS2 simply for the reason 
of “trying to get the best deal for your local environment” (Interview). 
For most of the stakeholders that advocated the interest of the Chilterns, in the 
situation where HS2 becomes irreversible, the best deal would undoubtedly be a long 
tunnel across the AONB. The South Heath Action Group contended that “the best 
                                                           
16
 This interview has been based on email correspondence. 
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possible mitigation for this area should be achieved, and that should be a tunnel under the 
Chilterns AONB” (Interview). This view has been strengthened by the Chiltern Countryside 
Group, who asserted that “we must not forget that the AONB is a national park” (Interview) 
and that on-the-ground ecological destruction and blight must be avoided at all cost. 
However, stakeholders argued that the AONB played an inferior role in the sustainability 
appraisal of HS2 and in the EIA, thus far principally expressed through its scope and 
methodology (see Arup/URS, 2012a for the reporting on this). It was furthermore asserted 
that the project documentation downgraded the AONB status of the Chilterns to that of 
‘arable farmland’ (e.g. Amersham Action Group, Interview; [11]), a development which 
does not support the claim that it is necessary to protect the value of the area from future 
infrastructure expansions. 
 Although bored tunnels were welcomed as a means to conserve the Chilterns 
AONB – in contrast to green tunnels or ‘cut & cover’ tunnels which are on the surface – 
the specific geology of the area raised doubts on their sustainability as well as their safety. 
The Amersham & District Residents Association commented that “Amersham sits on chalk 
rock aquifers” and that “nobody knows what will happen when you bore through those 
aquifers” (Interview). As regards surface-level concerns, the future quality and availability 
of natural resources has prominently featured within the conservation discourse. At the 
vanguard of expressing concern has been the Chilterns Conversation Board, as it has “a 
legal duty to oppose anything which is going to damage the Area of Outstanding Natural 
Beauty” (Interview). It was anticipated that major damage will be done to tranquillity in the 
area and the ability for people to use public footpaths and bridleways. The network of 
hedgerows will furthermore be fragmented, which affects the habitat of many insect 
species. In accordance with the general concern of the Woodland Trust, the bisection of 
ancient woodlands has been eyed by stakeholders as particularly damaging. No real 
mitigation measures to this could be foreseen, as “you can’t replace a tree which is 400 
hundred years old” (Missenden Action Groups, Interview). 
Conservation was perceived as severely impeded by assumptions and 
preconceptions made in the project documentation. The Chiltern Ridges Action Group 
noted that the project documentation preconceived that a decision was already made, 
prior to its passing in parliament (see for instance the wording used in HS2 Ltd, 2012e). 
With regards to environmental assessment, this stakeholder contested its role as a 
decision-support tool by arguing that “the purpose of defending the environment with EIAs 
and SEAs and the rest of it would never work because you wait until the government has 
done something, and then you try to get under it” (Chiltern Ridges Action Group, 
Interview). Therefore, environmental assessment did not provide a viable realm for public 
contestation. The evidence used in the 2012 EIA Scope and Methodology Report 
(Arup/URS, 2012a) was furthermore considered biased because habitat surveys were 
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based on small samples and collected in only one season, “from a very odd year” 
(Chilterns Conservation Board, Interview). As many landowners in the Chilterns denied 
access to the surveyors to do their work, the Amersham & District Residents Association 
suspected that assumptions had to be made which “have probably been to the benefit of 
them, not to the benefit of the AONB” (Interview).  
 Furthermore, the assumptions on journey time savings in the business case 
prevented a discussion on the line of route crossing the Chilterns. As the current scheme 
is preferred because of its time savings, the area will be crossed at its widest point (from 
the Chalfonts to Wendover). Embarking from the viewpoint that “drawing a straight line 
virtually between London and Birmingham perhaps was not the most sensible thing to do” 
(Wendover Parish Councillor, Interview), it was sensed that the assumptions made in the 
business case affected the likelihood of taking certain mitigation measures. In its aim to 
mitigate the noise impacts as much as possible, Chiltern Countryside Group wanted to 
discuss ‘on-track’ mitigation with HS2 Ltd. As this particular mitigation measure would 
entail a loss of speed in the operation of high-speed trains, HS2 Ltd was reportedly 
unwilling to discuss it on the grounds that it would compromise the cost-benefit ratio of the 
project. The Chiltern Countryside Group pictured this ‘non-discussion’ through the 
following short dialogue:     
 
“[HS2 Ltd]: ‘No’. 
[Stakeholder]: ‘Why? It is only a delay of a few seconds on your journey time through the 
Chilterns.’ 
[HS2 Ltd]: ‘No. It will affect the business case’” (Interview). 
 
5.2 A4DS 
 
Civil society protest against the A4DS has been going on for over forty years, more or less 
coinciding with the creation of the embankment in the period 1968-1972. Since 2001 until 
2011, the time period under investigation, sustainability discourses were principally 
informed by a new momentum in the planning process. The role of Rijkswaterstaat as the 
project planner in the A4DS project was determined by its mandate from the Ministerie 
van Infrastructuur en Milieu (MI&M)17. Much in contrast to HS2, party politics in the A4DS 
project has played only a marginal role. Arguably, this has been a consequence of the 
long project history of the A4DS and the mounting necessity for Rijkswaterstaat to 
improve the functioning of the motorway system in the study area. Definitive agency was 
                                                           
17
 Before the cabinet Rutte-I was installed, in 2010, the Ministerie van Infrastructuur en Milieu was called 
Ministerie van Verkeer en Waterstaat (Department of Transport, Public Works and Water Management). 
Although some of documents are authored by the latter, the thesis always uses the name of the former, or its 
acronym.    
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ascribed to the various Infrastructure and Environment Secretaries (since 2001: Tineke 
Netelenbos, Roelf de Boer, Karla Peijs and Camiel Eurlings), transcending partisan 
swings. The Traffic Expert that was interviewed contended that Eurlings, under whose 
leadership the decision to construct was made, had an assertive ‘spade-in-the-ground’ 
attitude towards resolving the deadlock.   
 Within the period under investigation, three sustainability discourses have been 
identified: 1) justification; 2) ecological modernization; and 3) conservation. Whilst the 
justification discourse principally focused on questions of necessity and utility of the 
A4DS, the ecological modernization was aimed at reconciling ecological and sustainability 
concerns with the idea that the construction of the A4DS was a ‘fait accompli’ (e.g. 
Groenlinks Schiedam) and which offered opportunities for Midden-Delfland, the impact 
area. In contrast to these two discourses, both of which more or less embarked from the 
idea that the rationales for infrastructure capacity expansion are things that “one cannot 
change” (SP Delft, Interview), the conservation discourse put centre-stage the irrevocable 
and irreparable damage that will be done to Midden-Delfland. Table 5.2 lists the three 
discourses in order of salience and briefly tells what they are about and lists some of the 
nodes that have been used in the textual coding of the interviews with relevant civil 
society stakeholders (see Sub-section 3.5.2). Chapter 9 further discusses the results from 
applying textual coding to analyzing the sustainability discourses. The remainder of this 
section will explain the discourses in full detail. 
 
Discourse What is the discourse about? Nodes used for interview coding 
Justification 
The A4DS is neither necessary nor 
useful for improving traffic access and 
reducing congestion in the study area. 
e.g. ‘Evidence base’, ‘Systemic 
importance’, ‘Utility and 
necessity’ 
Ecological 
modernization 
The A4DS can be made more 
sustainable by mitigating the impacts 
on the impact area. 
e.g. ‘Economic growth’, ‘Impact 
mitigation’ 
Conservation 
The A4DS impacts irreversibly on the 
impact area and its construction 
should therefore be halted. 
e.g. ‘Midden-Delfland’, 
‘Ecological destruction and 
blight’ ‘Natural resource’ 
Table 5.2: The discourses in the A4DS project 
 
5.2.1 Justification 
 
The justification discourse focused on the underlying claims for the utility and necessity of 
constructing the A4DS. It was dominated by the storyline ‘no utility and necessity’ (e.g. 
Milieufederatie Zuid-Holland), which has been premised on the perceived absence of 
legitimate claims on the utility and necessity for constructing the A4DS in the project 
documentation. In the Dutch planning context, criticisms on the lack or absence of 
justification are grouped under the oft-heard alliteration ‘nut en noodzaak’; in the A4DS 
case, specifically, the ‘no utility and necessity’ storyline was not only adopted by a diverse 
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coalition of stakeholders but it was also considered worthy to comment on by decision-
makers (e.g. IODS, 2001). Whilst the construction costs – estimated to be just under 900 
million Euros – for seven kilometres of new infrastructure were sporadically referred to, 
the key element of the justification discourse entailed the inability of the A4DS to achieve 
the project objectives (Rijkswaterstaat, 2009d; see also Sub-section 4.2.3). Put bluntly, it 
was from this sensed inability that SOBO labelled the A4DS as “one of the biggest farces 
in the history of motorways” (Interview).     
Classified as a poorly contrived ‘emergency bandage’ (SOBO) in the motorway 
system, according to a considerable number of the stakeholders the A4DS is unable to 
relief congestion, which has been the backbone for the argumentation on the need for 
construction (e.g. Rijkswaterstaat, 2009c). In spite of – or rather because of – the 
expansion of the existing infrastructure capacity, Milieufederatie Zuid-Holland foresaw that 
“traffic will grow and the junctions remain pinch points” (Interview). Thus, it was 
prospected that congestion will be in equilibrium, either with or without the A4DS. With 
reference to the stated importance of the A4DS for the motorway system in the study area 
to be better able to facilitate traffic flow (Rijkswaterstaat, 2009d), traffic experts from Delft 
University of Technology (TU Delft) have argued that a reversed situation will be the case 
(e.g. Hansen, 2009; 2010). SOBO argued that southbound traffic will invariably get ‘stuck’ 
after using the A4DS: “on the one side you get stuck on the A15 and on the other you get 
stuck on the A20” (Interview). In countering the underlying justification for additional 
motorway infrastructure between The Hague and Rotterdam, the justification discourse 
therefore emphasized the absence of utility and necessity for the A4DS.   
According to a number of the stakeholders, the A4DS is not independent from 
other large-scale road infrastructure developments in the study area. It was purported that 
previous infrastructure developments have created the ‘inevitability’ to construct. Midden-
Delfland Vereniging saw a clear link between the A4DS and the historical momentum in 
broader infrastructure developments in the past by asking the – rhetorical – question: “why 
would you extend18 the Beneluxtunnel when you are not going to construct the A4DS? 
What’s the use of that?” (Interview). It was similarly argued that Kethelplein junction will be 
unable to cater for the hefty increase in traffic, which will eventually create necessity for 
further infrastructure developments so as to alleviate this newly formed pinch point. 
Furthermore, the formal disposition of the alternative ‘A13+A13/16’ in the TN/MER was 
considered unjustified by Stichting Stop RW19/A4 (2009: 4), which argued that “The A4 
cannot function without the A13/16/2019 and which has been confirmed by the authors of 
the TN/MER!” With regards to the (fears of a) reiterating claim of necessity for additional 
                                                           
18
 Author’s note: The Beneluxtunnel has been widened in 2002 by means of boring a second hole. As such, it 
is commonly referred to as the Second Beneluxtunnel, albeit technically incorrect.   
19
 Author’s note: the alternative A13+A13/16 has sometimes been branded ‘A13/16/20’ as it involves these 
three motorways (i.e. the widening of the A13; the construction of the A13/16 and its connection with the A20 
at Terbregseplein junction). 
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infrastructure, some of the stakeholders branded the continual expansion of the motorway 
system ‘salami tactics’ (e.g. Groenlinks Schiedam, Interview). Milieudefensie argued that 
such tactics reflect strategic conduct, as “people will look at it very differently when it [the 
broader development] is presented as a number of loose projects” (Interview).   
Figure 5.2 shows in an abstract way how projects like the A4DS interlink with other 
infrastructure capacity expansion projects. Inherent in this abstract scheme of 
infrastructure capacity expansion is the occurrence of traffic growth, as this increases 
pressure on the demand for infrastructure as well as the performance of motorway 
networks. Traffic growth is presented as both natural occurrence (‘natural traffic growth’) 
and as induced by infrastructure capacity expansion (‘induced traffic growth’). The 
remainder of this sub-section will illustrate the tenets of the justification discourse by 
charting the debate on these two sources of traffic growth. 
 
 
Figure 5.2: The continuous expansion of motorway capacity 
 
Natural traffic growth 
 
The natural growth of traffic indicates that the growth of motorized vehicle movements is 
independent from the influence exerted by traffic or transport policies. It is often intricately 
linked to economic growth, for instance in the statement made by the Founder of IODS 
that “every percentage of economic growth also causes a percentage of automotive 
growth. This is a one-on-one relationship, almost a law” (Interview). Thus, traffic growth is 
depicted as an unavoidable side-effect of economic growth. It is furthermore anticipated 
that road infrastructure either facilitates or restrains traffic flow – in contrast to traffic 
growth, although traffic flow and growth are intimately related. Thus, when Rijkswaterstaat 
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(2009c: 27) noted that “traffic growth on the A13 (...) is infinitesimal”, from the perspective 
of infrastructure development it was then able to conclude that “[t]his demonstrates a lack 
of capacity” (pp.27). The assumption of natural traffic growth is not uncontested, however. 
Whereas the Traffic Expert argued that natural traffic growth is a “simplification of doing 
nothing” (Interview), Milieudefensie contended that “we don’t make any effort to ensure 
that people will not travel on those moments when it is busy” (Interview). In Chapter 8 the 
assumption of natural traffic growth will be discussed in more detail.  
 According to some of the stakeholders, the key rationale for the need to construct 
the A4DS was suspected to be the assumption of natural traffic growth. Correspondent 
with the prime objective of the A4DS (‘improvement of a reliable and adequate traffic 
connection between The Hague and Rotterdam’; see Sub-section 4.2.3), Rijkswaterstaat 
(2009c) has argued that virtually all congestion on the A13 to date is caused by the 
combination of traffic growth and capacity shortage, particularly around Klein Polderplein 
junction where the A13 and the A20 adjoin. It furthermore expects the traffic volume to 
grow by around forty percent by 2020 compared with the volume in 2000, a growth which 
itself is caused by “an assumed growth of the population, economy, number of 
households, car ownership, etc.” (Rijkswaterstaat, 2009c: 27). This reasoning stipulates 
that traffic growth is not circumscribed to the world of transport and infrastructure but that 
it is a natural occurrence, intricately linked to broader socio-economic and demographic 
drivers. The Traffic Expert from TU Delft argued that natural traffic growth “is an 
assumption that informs the optimistic prognosis of mobility and which is welcomed by the 
government to state the necessity for [improving] accessibility” (Interview). 
Natural traffic growth becomes particularly manifest when it is linked to norms of 
traffic accessibility, measured in terms of the relationship between motorway capacity and 
user intensity on the one hand and travel time on the other. The first norm pertains to the 
Intensity/Capacity Ratio (IC-ratio), a quantification of congestion, which according to the 
project documentation (Rijkswaterstaat, 2009c; 2009d) is above the threshold of 0.8 on 
the A13 and therefore unacceptable (see also Sub-section 4.2.3). This legitimates the 
construction of the A4DS, assuming it will lower the IC-ratio. However, Professor Ingo 
Hansen (2009), who works at the Design of Transport & Traffic Facilities Department at 
TU Delft, has contended that: 1) the traffic volume on the A13 only decreases by around 
two percent when the A4DS is constructed and does not significantly influence the IC-ratio 
on the A13 (based on the TN/MER, see Rijkswaterstaat, 2009c); and 2) intensity (I) is 
measured during peak hours and does not internalize the capacity (C) available during 
non-peak hours in the IC-ratio. As regards travel time, the government has formulated the 
target that travelling during peak hours may only take fifty percent longer than during non-
peak hours (Ministerie van Verkeer en Waterstaat and VROM, 2004). Given that travel 
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time is influenced by congestion and that congestion is quantified on the basis of the IC-
ratio, this norm further legitimates the construction of the A4DS.       
 
Induced traffic growth 
 
Induced traffic growth indicates that traffic grows as a result of infrastructure capacity 
expansion. As suggested by Figure 5.2, traffic growth can be induced by additional (large-
scale) road infrastructure capacity expansion projects. A rule-like link between these two 
components has been observed by some of the stakeholders. For instance, Stichting Stop 
RW19/A4 argued that “every millimetre of additional asphalt means an increase in car 
mobility” (Interview). Figure 5.2 also suggests that induced traffic is a prime catalyst for 
the natural growth of traffic (the left ‘cycle’). This means that the ‘naturalness’ of traffic 
growth is propelled by man-made interventions in the motorway system.  
The occurrence of induced traffic was – rather subtly – mentioned in the A4DS 
project documentation, as one of a number of bullet points that addressed the increase in 
traffic volume as a consequence of the A4DS. Rijkswaterstaat (2009c: iv) stated that “as a 
result of better (car) mobility and other choices made for travel destination and transport 
modality that result from this, the volume of car movements will increase in the Rotterdam-
The Hague corridor”. When this statement is reinterpreted from the perspective of induced 
traffic, it can be read that traffic will grow when it is better facilitated by the existing 
motorway infrastructure. Similar to the discussion on natural traffic growth, in Chapter 8 
the concept of induced traffic will be discussed in more detail.  
According to some of the stakeholders, an imminent consequence of the A4DS is 
that people will use cars more often as their preferred mode of transport (e.g. Groenlinks 
Schiedam, Interview; Milieufederatie Zuid-Holland, Interview). When a new motorway is 
constructed, it will therefore attract people who would otherwise travel differently or not 
travel at all. A change in the ease of motorway access is also a pertinent issue. Whilst a 
portion of the expected traffic on the A4DS is generated from the adjacent A13, which has 
been the prime objective of the project (Rijkswaterstaat, 2009d; but see Stichting Stop 
RW19/A4, 2009 for a rebuttal on its ability to achieve this objective), traffic volumes on this 
motorway before and after the construction of the A4DS are forecasted to stay roughly the 
same. Induced traffic results from additional capacity, yet places congestion in equilibrium. 
The induced increase of traffic could furthermore thwart the attainment of norms on 
congestion relief and travel time. In spite of this, it has been argued that the A4DS is 
needed to facilitate traffic flow. As regards travel time, Hansen (2009) has suspected that 
this norm comes in handy to state necessity for the A4DS, thereby arguing that:              
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“The ambition of the cabinet to reduce travel time during peak hours to a maximum of 
150% of the journey time during off-peak hours is a fiction which can be commonly used 
to demonstrate the necessity for more motorways (...). The construction of the A4 Delft-
Schiedam induces traffic and increases misery at the bottlenecks”. 
 
5.2.2 Ecological modernization 
 
The ecological modernization discourse has stressed that the construction of the A4DS 
should be as much as possible in accordance with the ecological characteristics of the 
impact area, Midden-Delfland. The Milieufederatie Zuid-Holland argued that, “if it [i.e. the 
A4DS) really has to come, then it should be a motorway that cannot be seen, cannot be 
heard and cannot be smelled” (Interview), which sums up the need for a holistic mitigation 
package. Arguably, in sharp contrast to the ‘no utility and necessity’ storyline in the 
justification discourse, the ecological modernization discourse (tacitly) accepts that the 
construction of the A4DS can be rhymed with criteria on ecological and social 
sustainability (e.g. Stichting Waterweg Wonen, Interview). Besides the use of the ‘do not 
hear, do not see, do not smell’ storyline, the ecological modernization discourse can be 
characterized by the popularization of certain alternatives to the A4DS amongst 
stakeholders. These alternatives reified the idea that infrastructure capacity expansion is 
necessary, but they detailed different routes or infrastructure designs as an attempt to 
attenuate the adverse impacts on Midden-Delfland.  
A pertinent aspect within the ecological modernization discourse is a shift of focus 
from the A4DS as a function of the motorway system in the study area towards one where 
its role in the impact area is put centre-stage. Specifically, it is advanced that the adverse 
impacts on Midden-Delfland can be mitigated provided certain measures are taken. 
Central to this shift of focus has been negotiations on a budget for doing all sorts of things 
that contribute to mitigating the adverse impacts of the A4DS. For instance, Midden-
Delfland municipality will be receiving financial compensation that is to be used for 
sustaining agricultural practices and for keeping the impact area green [12]. Sound 
barriers in Vlaardingen and Schiedam are aimed at reducing the noise impacts from traffic 
and new sports facilities will be created on the tunnel roof so as to compensate for the 
loss of existing ones. In the covenant IODS-Convenant (IODS, 2006), various 
stakeholders have agreed to these mitigation measures, instructed by earlier deliberation 
on mitigation (e.g. IODS, 2001). Principally, the covenant can be read as a ‘quality 
programme’ for Midden-Delfland. 
 Although stakeholders argued that the mitigation measures deliberated in the 
Integrale Ontwikkeling tussen Delft en Schiedam (IODS; see also Chapter 6) are 
undoubtedly better than having no mitigation at all put into effect, some perceived them 
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only as a ‘creative solution’ to make civil society protest more reticent (e.g. Milieudefensie, 
Interview). As such, it can be argued whether ecological modernization – to be understood 
as the integration of sustainability considerations into existing socio-economic structures 
and systems – is preferred over other discourses. This can be clearly illustrated by the 
comment of Stichting Waterweg Wonen, who reasoned that “we were aware that this 
motorway would be constructed, of course. (...) This has prompted us to choose for our 
own interest” (Interview), which in the case of this particular stakeholder – a housing 
association – is to negotiate the best possible deal for residents living along the alignment.      
 Arguably, ecological modernization has also been informed by its moderated view 
on the necessity to construct the A4DS. For some stakeholders that did not have a clear 
anti-A4DS mandate, it was easier to accept a package of mitigation measures rather than 
to protest against the A4DS as such. Midden-Delfland Vereniging indicated that many of 
its members would probably be dissatisfied with such protest. To meet the expectations of 
those members, it argued that “we have never explicitly stated: ‘we don’t want that road’. 
Instead we’ve advocated ‘do not hear, do not see, do not smell’” (Interview). As a 
consequence, the willingness of certain stakeholders to listen to proposals for mitigation 
reciprocated the willingness of Rijkswaterstaat to offer a wide range of mitigation 
measures. The role of Rijkswaterstaat was described by KNNV Delfland in the interview 
as one of being ‘Santa Claus’, in the sense that it was generous towards stakeholders that 
accepted mitigation in exchange for their decision assent.     
One of the striking features of the ecological modernization discourse is that for 
many stakeholders, impact mitigation was the highest attainable outcome of deliberating 
the A4DS. While reciting the names of four other stakeholders, the interviewee from 
Midden-Delfland Vereniging argued that “they all have thought: this is the most feasible 
solution and the best infrastructural design” (Interview). Others suspected foul play in the 
interaction between Rijkswaterstaat and such stakeholders, however. By calling the 
financial compensation measures “some sort of a bribe” (Interview), the Vereniging Tegen 
Milieubederf argued that Rijkswaterstaat and certain stakeholders conspired against the 
anti-A4DS campaign. In order to not become co-opted by the ‘establishment’, it 
consciously did not participate in deliberating mitigation measures. 
As mentioned in Chapter 4, alternatives such as constructing the A54 or A14 
motorway instead of the A4DS would avoid the thorny issue of bisecting Midden-Delfland. 
It can be argued that such alternatives reconfirm the need for new motorway 
infrastructures linking The Hague with Rotterdam, something which coincides with the 
broader socio-economic foundation of infrastructure capacity expansion and mobility. 
Other alternatives reconfirmed the need to facilitate travel, such as the ‘A4 met vaart’ 
alternative (see Box 5.2 and Figure 5.3), yet they proposed a different strategy on how to 
do that. This different strategy was the premise of a plan made by Milieudefensie for a 
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‘Green Metropole’ (2011). In countering the perpetual need for large-scale road 
infrastructure capacity expansion between The Hague and Rotterdam, Milieudefensie has 
argued that the conurbations of these two cities are already densely connected with each 
other. As such, the need for more enhanced travel options can therefore be better 
facilitated by expanding the network of public transport. The Green Metropole plan would 
secure the environmental value of the region, or what has been coined the ‘oxygen lungs’ 
function of the green areas between The Hague and Rotterdam [13, 14].    
 
One alternative which has emerged from within civil society is the ‘A4 met vaart’. The project title 
is a play with words: in Dutch the word ‘vaart’ can mean both ‘speed’ and ‘canal’. Basically, the 
‘A4 met vaart’ attempted to reconcile the need for additional infrastructure with the landscape 
characteristics of Midden-Delfland by first building a tunnel between Delft and Schiedam 
spanning the entire length of the A4, then placing this tunnel in a canal. This alternative was 
conceived to have the same construction costs as the A4DS (but see [15]). Originally conceived 
by a civil engineer, the feasibility of the alternative has a strong technical component. Amongst 
those in support of the ‘A4 met vaart’, knowledge on the appropriate techniques to use could be 
obtained. For instance, KNNV Midden-Delfland argued that “we are very known with the 
technique of building a tunnel with water on top of it, so that it can float with the water functioning 
both as upwards and downwards force” (Interview). The combination of tunnel and canal would 
minimize the adverse impacts that the A4DS has on Midden-Delfland. Unfortunately for the 
advocates of this alternative, Rijkswaterstaat (2009d) has never included it as an official 
alternative to the incumbent A4DS scheme in the TN/MER, as it concluded that “the added value 
for environmental quality is limited and does not weigh up against the high costs” (pp.38). 
Therefore, legally speaking, the ‘A4 met vaart’ remained “just an idea” (IODS, Interview).  
Box 5.2: The ‘A4 met vaart’ 
 
 
Figure 5.3: Illustration of the ‘A4 met vaart’ alternative (A4 met Vaart, 2013) 
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5.2.3 Conservation 
 
The conservation discourse has stressed the irrevocable and irreparable harm that the 
A4DS will inflict upon the impact area. All stakeholders that were interviewed for this 
research admitted the value of Midden-Delfland, irrespective of how ‘value’ is defined.  It 
was asserted that the critical importance of Midden-Delfland was also known amongst the 
political establishment. The Midden-Delfland Vereniging argued that “all political parties 
concerned, including the city councils of Rotterdam and The Hague and the Province [of 
Zuid-Holland] appreciate the value of this area” (Interview). The bisection of Midden-
Delfland was perceived to contradict this apparent consciousness amongst decision-
makers, however. A comparison was made between the A4DS and plans which surfaced 
in the 1960s to construct large-scale road infrastructures through historical city centres. 
Whilst most of these plans were eventually stalled – and allegedly, nowadays someone in 
support of them “would be sent to an institution as a total nutcase” (KNNV Delfland, 
Interview) – the plan to bisect Midden-Delfland has obtained approval in 2011.  
Advocating the critical importance of Midden-Delfland was hampered by the lack of 
a protected status. KNNV Delfland was aware that Midden-Delfland “is not a Natura 2000 
area. So, on legal grounds there was no case [against the A4DS], so to speak” 
(Interview). As such, it was advanced that the importance of Midden-Delfland is mainly to 
be found in providing an authentic (Dutch) landscape in an otherwise congested and 
urbanized environment (see also Provincie Zuid-Holland, 2012). The historical natural 
development of the area was portrayed to be characterized by the subsided soil consisting 
of peat and clay (e.g. Midden-Delfland Vereniging, Interview). Moreover, as has been 
confirmed by the Trajectnota/Milieu-effectrapportage (TN/MER; the environmental 
statement of the project) (Rijkswaterstaat, 2009d), particular relevance was ascribed to 
the capacity of Midden-Delfland as a habitat for meadow birds (KNNV Waterweg-Noord, 
Interview).  
By perceiving the impact area to be of critical importance, the conservation 
discourse has distinguished itself from the other two discourses simply by advancing 
‘Midden-Delfland’ as a new problem framing. The Midden-Delfland Vereniging contended 
that “even if a new motorway would be necessary, then it should not cross Midden-
Delfland. The destruction will be enormous” (Interview). Thus, transcending the question 
on whether the A4DS has merit, for instance for the performance of the motorway system 
in the study area, the conservation discourse stressed the disastrous consequences of its 
construction on Midden-Delfland. It was hoped that expressing concern on the adverse 
impacts of the A4DS would lead to the decision not to construct it.   
However, stakeholders argued that the need to conserve Midden-Delfland could 
not properly be advocated. With its orientation towards impacts, EIA was considered 
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inadequate to formulate a judgement on the expressed need for a new infrastructure 
bisecting Midden-Delfland. Somewhat veering towards the justification discourse, The 
Stichting Stop RW19/A4 argued that “an EIA looks specifically at the impacts on certain 
flora and fauna species, at the influence of emissions on air pollution and at noise 
impacts, but it doesn’t look at whether the construction of a motorway is legitimate” 
(Interview). A midterm review of the Trajectnota/Milieu-effectrapportage (TN/MER) by a 
research institute called Commissie voor de Milieueffectrapportage (Commision for 
Environmental Impact Assessment) (2006), which assesses the quality of EIAs when 
requested by the competent authority, revealed a number of inadequacies in the TN/MER 
but did not comment on the critical ecological and sustainability function of Midden-
Delfland. Perhaps this is no surprise when the procedural role of EIA is taken into 
account, in contrast to a more substantive one.    
An important shortfall in EIA has been attributed to its inability in drawing hard-
binding conclusions from the available evidence on impacts. In the A4DS project it was 
noted by stakeholders that the TN/MER did not adequately internalize evidence on impact 
magnitude. For instance, Vereniging Tegen Milieubederf commented that “expensive 
researches have been conducted, but they have not been included in the TN/MER and 
the decision-making process” (Interview). This comment has been strengthened by the 
observation made by the Stichting Natuurmonumenten that EIA does not enforce the 
‘right’ decision. It noted that “from the TN/MER it became apparent that the A4 [Delft-
Schiedam] was worse than widening the A13, but they have simply shoved that aside” 
(Interview).   
It is safe to suggest that the conservation discourse is entangled in a complex 
relationship with impacts, particularly when it comes to mitigating them. As mentioned in 
the ecological modernization discourse, compensation has played a central role in the 
A4DS planning process [16, 17]. When discussed in terms of conservation, the Vereniging 
Tegen Milieubederf thought of compensation as a financial crumb (‘fooi’) when compared 
to the budget of around 900 million Euros necessary to construct the A4DS (Interview). 
Although the justification discourse borrows from a different set of arguments than from 
the one advanced in the conservation discourse, this latter point shows that ecological 
and sustainability advocates could well have benefited from addressing questions on 
utility and necessity. That is to say, compensation was conceived by some as a clever 
way to prevent a discussion on the need for motorway capacity expansion. Other 
mitigation measures reconfirmed the view that motorway capacity expansion and 
sustainability considerations could be reconciled, such as the use of cuttings or a land 
tunnel in the design of the infrastructure.       
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5.3 Summary 
 
In the HS2 project, three sustainability discourses amongst stakeholders in the Chilterns 
have been identified: 1) a discourse on the justification of constructing HS2; 2) a discourse 
on the party politics of HS2; and 3) a discourse on protecting the Chilterns AONB against 
HS2 (i.e. conservation). In the ‘justification discourse’, the sense and nonsense of claims 
used by the government to support its decision to go ahead with HS2 was discussed. 
Premised on the formulation of a number of myths, the cost-benefit ratio of HS2 as 
foresighted in the project documentation was considered seriously flawed. In the ‘party 
politics’ discourse, the role of partisan cleavages and private political interests in the 
British political landscape were identified as a cause for the formulated need for HS2. The 
divided loyalty of MPs of the affected constituencies that have cabinet responsibility was 
advanced as a major impediment to more successful political opposition at the local level. 
In the ‘conservation discourse’, the AONB status of the Chilterns helped support the claim 
that the area should by all means remain unaffected by HS2. The irreversible damage that 
HS2 will do to the Chilterns AONB logically followed as a core discursive aspect.  
 In the A4DS project, three sustainability discourses have been identified: 1) a 
discourse on the justification of constructing the A4DS; 2) a discourse on the ability to 
reconcile motorway capacity expansion with ecological and sustainability objectives in 
Midden-Delfland (‘ecological modernization’); and 3) a discourse on the conservation of 
Midden-Delfland. In the ‘justification discourse’, the evidence base leading up to the 
expressed need for a second major traffic connection between Rotterdam and The Hague 
was contested. This contestation principally revolved around issues of traffic growth 
(natural and induced) in relation to the capacity of the motorway system in the study area. 
In the ‘ecological modernization discourse’, the need to reconcile the motorway capacity 
expansion with ecological and sustainability principles was espoused by the stakeholders. 
Reconciliation could amongst others be reached by extensive mitigation of the adverse 
impacts of the A4DS or by choosing for alternative infrastructure schemes. In the 
‘conservation discourse’, the assumption that Midden-Delfland fulfilled a critical ecological 
function in the study area was used by stakeholders to try and prevent the A4DS from 
being constructed. 
Throughout the chapter it has become apparent that EIA has played only a 
marginal role in the sustainability discourses of stakeholders. Whilst the role of 
environmental assessment in major infrastructure schemes such as HS2 and A4DS will 
become the subject of debate in the concluding chapter of this thesis, Chapter 9, at the 
moment it is suffice to note that stakeholders have moved beyond the remit of EIA to 
enforce their message. In campaigning against HS2, making claims pertaining to counter-
expertise and lobbying the local MP were considered critical activities. Correspondingly, in 
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the A4DS case counter-claims were produced by stakeholders so as to weaken the 
evidence base of utility and necessity. In the conservation discourses of both the projects, 
it was precisely a lack of substance in EIA that was noted by stakeholders. This 
observation could suggest that the prime motivation of stakeholders to have become 
involved in protesting HS2 and the A4DS is not reciprocated by the conduct of 
environmental assessment.             
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Chapter 6 On institutional design 
 
This chapter maps the institutional designs of the HS2 and A4DS projects, thereby putting 
the mode of public engagement centre-stage. In the case of HS2, specific attention has 
been paid to national and local institutions for public engagement. As is shown most 
notably in the justification discourse (see Sub-section 5.1.1), stakeholders have privileged 
a lot of their time and efforts to criticizing the evidence base of the project. However, it can 
be debated whether the institutional design of HS2 (Phase 1) has been an adequate ‘fit’ to 
what stakeholders felt were critical topics of discussion. Similarly, it is worth investigating 
whether the institutions in the A4DS project have been able to accommodate the ‘no utility 
and necessity’ storyline as espoused by stakeholders in the justification discourse (see 
Sub-section 5.2.1). For instance, this could entail an institutional design where the 
justification of the A4DS is discussed. In both the HS2 and A4DS, the role of 
environmental impact assessment (EIA) in mediating public engagement should 
furthermore be examined – regardless of whether such engagement has been on the 
grounds of environmental protest. It could well turn out that EIA must be assigned only a 
marginal role where debate on the allegedly flawed project justification is concerned. 
The UK and the Netherlands have often been depicted as democratic opposites 
(e.g. Anderson and Guillory, 1997; Lockhart, 2011; Lijphart, 2012). More specifically, they 
are conceived of as representing the majoritarian and consensual model of representative 
democracy, respectively. Although there seems to be some convergence in this respect in 
recent years (Hendriks and Michels, 2011), both states continue to provide a distinct 
interpretation of democratic representation. In a national referendum in the UK in 2011 on 
the ‘alternative vote’, a relatively small shift away from strict majority rule where voters 
would be allowed to rank electoral candidates according to preference, the overwhelming 
majority of British voters (67.9%) opposed the electoral reform (House of Commons 
Library, 2011a). In the Netherlands, it can be pondered whether the consensus politics so 
fervently celebrated by Lijphart (1968) is still in effect.  A large number of recent cabinets 
(in the period 2002-2012) have not been able to fulfil their four-year governing term (e.g. 
the cabinets Balkenende-I, -II and -IV, and Rutte-I) due to continued struggle between the 
partners in coalition. Nonetheless, the institutions that are to nurture consensus amongst 
the parties involved have remained in place and continue to exert their influence on 
democratic practice. 
 Notwithstanding these extant changes, the thesis has inquired into the projects of 
HS2 and A4DS, two instances of what may perhaps be coined ‘executive-level politics’. 
Although it is argued throughout the thesis that institutional design differences in the 
broader political realm impact on micro political processes, such as the planning of new 
rail and road infrastructure, this by no means precludes project-specific institutions that 
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deviate from the established British and Dutch ‘constitutional’ institutions as we know 
them. Furthermore, compressed within the logic of infrastructure projects writ large, HS2 
and A4DS could show similarities that do not easily compare with the constitutional 
differences in democratic representation. For instance, informed by the perceived 
exhaustion of other avenues, both projects have been marred by court battles between 
the state and the ‘anti-campaign’ on the underlying project justification (Raad van State, 
2011a; Royal Courts of Justice, 2013). This seems to suggest that political authority and 
civil society stakeholders have been unable to find common cause during the bargaining, 
negotiations and deliberations in the project, irrespective of the difference between 
majoritarianism and consensualism.     
 In following up what is stated above, this chapter will navigate the institutional 
designs of the projects. Modes of public engagement play a key role in doing so, as it has 
been argued earlier (in Chapter 2) that institutions mediate the degree of involvement of 
civil society in issues bearing strong public interest. Extant dimensions of public 
engagement in the two projects will first be identified and then elaborated upon. This is 
particularly valuable when the difference between a ‘justification-oriented’ and ‘impacts-
oriented’ form of public engagement needs to be emphasized, something which has also 
become apparent in the discourses of the projects. The chapter will summarize the 
various orientations of civil society in project planning contexts and draw out the main 
differences or commonalities that have been observed in the institutional designs of HS2 
and A4DS. 
 
6.1 HS2 
 
During the HS2 (Phase 1) planning process, ‘public engagement’ – designating the 
interplay between political authority and civil society and the capacity of the anti-HS2 
campaign to organize protest – was specifically tailored to the national scope and 
geographic characteristics of the project. This means that the rationale for public 
engagement wavered between discussing claims on HS2 and the national interest, on the 
one hand, and discussing how adverse impacts caused by infrastructure construction 
could best be mitigated. Pursuant to this difference, two dimensions in the institutional 
design of the HS2 (Phase 1) project can be identified. In the national dimension, a public 
consultation process has shaped the mode of discussion between government and civil 
society on the national importance of HS2 and, albeit to a lesser extent, also on the scope 
and methodology when assessing the environmental impacts. Civil society may perhaps 
best be rebranded as ‘the public’ in the context of the institutional opportunities granted to 
citizens to voice their opinion on HS2. In the community dimension, public engagement 
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with the project has been accommodated by institutions where the local impacts and 
mitigation measures associated with the line of route were centralized.     
 
6.1.1 The national dimension: public consultation 
 
As a result of the envisaged scope of the project in terms of its likely impacts at the 
national level, largely reflecting the economic justification as espoused in key parts of the 
project documentation (e.g. HS2 Ltd and Department for Transport, 2011; HS2 Ltd, 
2012a; HS2 Ltd, 2012b), the costs and benefits have been the core characteristics of HS2 
in the national dimension. Engagement with these characteristics have not been restricted 
to stakeholders in the Chilterns but can be found in areas along all the prospective lines of 
route of HS2 (Phase 1 and Phase 2), as well as among broader civil society (e.g. HS2 
Action Alliance, 2013), think thanks (e.g. Adam Smith Institute, 2011; RAC Foundation, 
2011) and research or academic institutes (e.g. Aizlewood and Wellings, 2011). Debate 
on the economic justification of HS2 has revolved around various interrelated issues, the 
most prominent of which have been rail passenger demand forecasting and journey time 
savings (HS2 Action Alliance, 2013; see also the 'Justification' discourse).  
The national dimension has been most prominently reflected in the public 
consultation on the need for HS2 and the ‘Y network’ that the government undertook in 
January 2012 (hence, the ‘preferred option’ was sometimes termed ‘post consultation 
route'. See e.g. HS2 Ltd, 2012d). There was also public consultation on the scope and 
methodology that were to be used in the EIA, but this has not been of decisive importance 
in the reflections of stakeholders. Notwithstanding stakeholders’ observations of a strong 
partisan undercurrent in the decision-making process (see Sub-section 5.1.2), HS2 was 
framed by the government as a ‘British’ issue – rather than as a ‘Conservative’ or ‘Labour’ 
issue, for instance. When introducing the public consultation on HS2, then Transport 
Secretary Philip Hammond (2011) exemplified this type of framing by arguing that “[o]ur 
competitors already recognise the huge benefits high speed rail can bring and are 
pressing ahead with ambitious plans. Britain cannot afford to be left behind”. The 
competitors are other countries like France and Germany which constructed high-speed 
rail schemes in recent times. As such, the national dimension has been played out in 
institutions that were tailored to the idea that HS2 is an issue of national interest [18]20.  
In the public consultation process on HS2, spanning the length of a couple of 
months in 2011, over 55,000 responses from the general public were compiled and 
analyzed by a consultancy firm called Dialogue by Design (2011) and subsequently 
                                                           
20
 This reference (where parentheses are used) is a newspaper article. To see how newspaper articles are 
referenced, please refer to the second footnote of Chapter 4. 
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submitted to HS2 Ltd21. Leading in the public consultation were seven questions. To 
varying degrees these questions related to the role and function of a high-speed rail 
network in the UK, predominantly focusing on the future state of transport and long-
distance connectivity within the perspective of economic growth. The consultation was by 
and large aimed at uncovering the potential for HS2 by canvassing public support for high-
speed rail infrastructure development in the UK and also whether a rail infrastructure 
capacity expansion project such as HS2 is an issue of national interest. Table 6.1 shows 
the seven questions used in the public consultation (adapted from HS2 Ltd and 
Department for Transport, 2011).    
 
Question 
number Full or abridged transcriptions of the questions 
1 
Do you agree that there is a strong case for enhancing the capacity and 
performance of Britain's intercity rail network to support economic growth over the 
coming decades? 
2 
Do you agree that a national high speed rail network from London to Birmingham, 
Leeds and Manchester (the Y network) would provide the best value for money 
solution (...)? 
3 
Do you agree with the Government’s proposals for the phased roll-out of a national 
high speed rail network, and for links to Heathrow Airport and the (...) Channel 
Tunnel? 
4 Do you agree with the principles and specification used by HS2 Ltd to underpin its proposals for new high speed rail lines and the route selection process (...)? 
5 
Do you agree that the Government’s proposed route including the approach 
proposed for mitigating its impacts is the best option for a new high speed rail line 
(...)? 
6 Do you wish to comment on the Appraisal of Sustainability of the Government’s proposed route (...) that has been published to inform this consultation? 
7 Do you agree with the options set out to assist those whose properties lose a 
significant amount of value as a result of any new high speed line? 
Table 6.1: The seven questions used in the public consultation on HS2 
Note: the full transcriptions can be found in (HS2 Ltd and Department for Transport, 2011: 25-26) 
 
Reciprocating the scope and focus of the public consultation on HS2 and the national 
interest, HS2 Action Alliance (2011a) drafted a comprehensive response to the seven 
questions that were advanced. This response referred explicitly to the link between the 
assumed benefits of HS2 and its ‘mythical proportions’ (see Sub-section 5.1.1). For 
adherents of the justification discourse, for example, debate on HS2 has been largely 
reduced to a discussion of the cost-benefit ratio of the project. In the Chilterns, 
stakeholders demonstrated an eager interest in discussing the cost-benefit ratio of the 
London-Birmingham rail link (e.g. Chiltern Society, Interview). However, some of them 
admitted that it has been a conscious choice by the anti-HS2 phase 1 campaign to also 
                                                           
21
 After the public consultation had been completed it transpired that a number of responses were omitted in 
the consultation analysis (see e.g. Dialogue by Design, 2012; [19]). Arguably, this omission has impacted on 
the trust relationship between the advocates of HS2 and those campaigning against it (see also Chapter 7).    
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discuss the cost-benefit ratio of the project in its entirety (e.g. Wendover HS2, Interview). 
After all, Phase 1 and Phase 2 together constitute the full ‘Y’ and are therefore intimately 
linked. 
Because the public consultation was the first serious form of communication 
between the government and the public, a considerable number of reflections on the 
seven questions could be obtained from the stakeholders in the Chilterns. One such 
reflection amounted to the instrumental use of public consultation to justify the HS2 
project, notwithstanding all the counter-evidence that contradicts its justification (e.g. 
Wendover HS2, 2010; and the interview with the same stakeholder). The Amersham & 
District Residents Association noted that the project convenors “spent the best part of a 
billion pounds already on nonsense like these consultations to keep alive a project that by 
any rational measurement should have died some time ago” (Interview). Furthermore, 
analogous to the observations made by HS2 Action Alliance (2011a), it was suggested 
that the questions were putting words in the mouths of those providing the responses. The 
MP for Chesham and Amersham parliamentary constituency, Cheryl Gillan, responded to 
the public consultation by stating that “there has been a strong feeling that the questions 
themselves have been drafted in a leading fashion to obtain positive responses for the 
scheme” (2011: 2). 
As may furthermore be abstracted from the leading questions in the public 
consultation, particularly the first two, emphasis was placed on economic growth and 
whether a high-speed rail network represents good value for money. Some of the 
stakeholders reasoned that other issues were largely ignored as a consequence. For 
instance, the stakeholder from the Berkshire, Buckinghamshire and Oxfordshire Wildlife 
Trust (BBOWT) argued that, “in relation to the public consultation, I don’t think that nature 
conservation issues were taken on at all” (Interview). Due to this perceived one-
dimensionality of the issue framing in the public consultation on the need for HS2 and on 
what such a rail network should look like, BBOWT went on to suggest that “the public 
appear less satisfied with the project after the consultation than they were before – 
presumably because they largely feel their issues have been ignored” (Interview).  
BBOWT’s observation that public satisfaction with the planning process of HS2 
has diminished because of serious flaws in the public consultation is at odds with the view 
espoused by the competent authority that the outcomes of public consultation exert 
considerable influence (HS2 Ltd and Department for Transport, 2011). For instance, the 
Department for Transport (DfT) has indicated that public consultation has played an 
important role in determining the location of the proposed line of route and certain design 
choices (e.g. with or without tunnel), something which has also impacted on the line of 
route crossing the Chilterns. In response to the recommendation of the HCTC in late 
2011, the Transport Secretary at the time, Justine Greening, argued that: 
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“Due to concerns and suggestions raised in consultation, the Government has decided to 
amend the line of route in a number of respects. These changes will help to mitigate the 
impacts of the line on the natural environment and on communities near the line, including 
in Ruislip and the Chilterns Area of Outstanding Natural Beauty” (cited in House of 
Commons Transport Committee, 2012: 1). 
 
Besides the seven questions used in the public consultation, the House of Commons 
Transport Committee (HCTC) has provided a platform for those wanting to further engage 
in discussing HS2. As the prime objective of the HCTC is to scrutinize transport policies 
and to evaluate the work carried out by the DfT, it has been willing to collate evidence 
(both written and oral) from a diverse array of civil society stakeholders as well as 
scientists and academics (see e.g. House of Commons Transport Committee, 2011b; 
2011c). Many stakeholders from the Chilterns seized the opportunity to provide evidence, 
such as the Chiltern Society who admitted that it was “drawn into this debate because (...) 
an HSR22 route through the Chilterns Area of Outstanding Natural Beauty (AONB) is 
proposed” (cited in House of Commons Transport Committee, 2011c: w215), but which 
nevertheless went on to discuss the flawed justification of HS2. However, as the HCTC 
consists of Members of Parliament (MPs), it is not apolitical but has adopted a firm 
standpoint in the HS2 debate. For example, it has shown commitment to HS2 by stating 
that “we support a high-speed rail network for Britain, developed as part of a 
comprehensive transport strategy also including the classic rail network, road, aviation 
and shipping” (House of Commons Transport Committee, 2011a: 3).  
 Whilst the public consultation on HS2, best to be interpreted as an idea or 
proposal for action, has been supported by a project document which set out its rationales 
(HS2 Ltd and Department for Transport, 2011), such a document has remained absent in 
the public consultation on the scope and methodology to be used in the EIA. However, at 
the time of writing the thesis, the draft environmental statement has been advanced by 
HS2 Ltd (2013) as the main consultative document for the environmental statement, due 
in late 2013 or 2014. Many stakeholders have made their views on the EIA scope and 
methodology known to HS2 Ltd by submitting written responses and comments (e.g. 
Chiltern Countryside Group, 2012; Chilterns Conservation Board, 2012a). It is fair to 
suggest that for most of the stakeholders the public consultation on EIA scope and 
methodology has been of less importance than the public consultation on the very idea for 
HS2. Whilst the latter provoked stakeholders to comment on justification, the former did 
not facilitate such comments to be voiced. 
                                                           
22
 HSR = High Speed Rail 
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Stakeholders noted that the absence of a leading document to accommodate 
public consultation on the scope and methodology of the EIA has violated the principle of 
access to information in environmental decision-making (e.g. Cholesbury Action Group, 
Interview), set forth in the Aarhus Convention (United Nations Economic Commission for 
Europe, 1998). According to them, the lack of information prevented a discussion on the 
impacts of HS2 compared to alternatives, such as Rail Package 2 (RP2). The Chilterns 
Conservation Board argued that “they [i.e. HS2 Ltd] have never given enough information 
about the alternatives which the Aarhus Convention requires, that it should be presented 
with alternatives at an early-enough stage to influence the decision. We were never given 
that opportunity” (Interview). Although one of the five judicial reviews submitted to the 
court by HS2 Action Alliance dealt with the lack of public participation (see Royal Courts of 
Justice, 2013 for the full judicial review), the verdict has not been in favour of the anti-HS2 
campaign. As a consequence, the public consultation on the scope and methodology of 
the EIA – as well as the implementation of a strategic environmental assessment (SEA) 
procedure – has not changed as a result of protest.          
 
6.1.2 The local dimension: community engagement 
 
~ “Seeking the best, if it comes to the worst” ~ (A view espoused by Buckinghamshire 
County Council when HS2 will be constructed. Cited in [20])  
 
The second dimension in the public engagement refers to the community engagement of 
national government, represented by HS2 Ltd, with those affected by the line of route. As 
a direct consequence of this, a different momentum in the civil society campaign against 
HS2 can be observed. The stakeholder from the Missenden Action Groups admitted that 
“I have been campaigning against as much about the waste of money as about the 
destruction of the countryside” (Interview). This admission has certainly reverberated in 
the views of many of the stakeholders. The institutions that were tailored towards 
accommodating discussions on local adverse impacts are different from the national 
public consultation in that access to them was restricted to local stakeholders. At the local 
level, opportunities for public engagement with HS2 Ltd existed mainly in the form of 
bilateral meetings and the community forum (CF). Whilst bilateral meetings designated 
one-on-one meetings between local stakeholders and HS2 Ltd, the CF was intended to 
bring several stakeholders together, based on distance or a shared affinity with 
geographical characteristics.  
This sub-section focuses explicitly on the CF. In correspondence with the 
difference between the two dominant forms of protest described earlier, i.e. justification-
oriented versus impacts-oriented forms of protest, it was asserted that “the community 
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forums are focused more on mitigating: ways in which mitigation can be and should be 
effected, rather than the economic argument” (Missenden Action Groups, Interview). This 
has meant that the CF invigorated interest in impacts as outcomes of development, 
thereby separating localized ‘line of route’ protest in Phase 1 from other forms of protest. 
As the CF institutionalized forms of communication between HS2 Ltd and local 
stakeholders, protest based on the underlying necessity claim for a large high-speed rail 
network could not be debated. Maps of the area where the line of route would cross and 
that were distributed by HS2 Ltd amongst the stakeholders participating in the CF is a 
good case in point, as they were more or less circumscribed to the villages and towns 
where these members lived.        
The civil society stakeholders that could become a member of the CF were 
selected by HS2 Ltd; as such, the forums were not open to the general public. Although 
there was no strict protocol on who should be considered for membership of the CF, 
members were generally considered to be directly affected by HS2 based on geographic 
proximity to the line of route. Under these conditions some of the stakeholders 
experienced difficulty in getting access to the CF. This difficulty was for instance 
experienced by stakeholders in Chesham, which is two miles off the line of route 
(Chesham Society, Interview; Chesham Town Councillor, Interview). However, local 
stakeholders stressed that Chesham will severely be affected by road closures and 
construction traffic, particularly on the B485 ending on Church Street. For some 
stakeholders the inability of the DfT to properly understand or assess local impacts came 
as no real surprise. The South Heath Action Group argued that the HS2 infrastructure “is 
just a straight line and drawn by somebody on the map that never left the office” 
(Interview).    
Two CFs initially covered the Chilterns AONB in the original set-up of the 
community engagement, located in the Chalfonts and Wendover. However, the 
stakeholders commented that the CFs became ineffective as a consequence of too wide a 
diversity of opinions and sentiments. This did not facilitate a productive dialogue with HS2 
Ltd, nor between stakeholders themselves. To illustrate, the Wendover Society – which 
advocates the interests of Wendover – argued that “one of the problems was that 
Wendover was linked with Great Missenden in the original community forum. But the first 
meeting was dominated by people from action groups (...) from miles away, places I’ve 
not heard of” (Interview). The geographic scope of the CF led to a sensed disparity 
between some of the forum participants, the interests of which were sometimes 
denounced as parochial to indicate that they were privately driven (and, thus, not 
necessarily in the interest of the Chilterns AONB as a whole). To resolve this divergence 
in interest advocacy, stakeholders requested and got accepted the Central Chilterns 
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Community Forum (CCCF), roughly defined as the distance between Shardeloes and 
Leather Lane along the A413.  
Stakeholders’ views on the CF were generally negative. From a more fundamental 
point of view, transcending the scope of the CF, stakeholders were unable to stress their 
dissatisfaction with HS2. Perhaps as a way to document evidence on local resistance, 
stakeholders in the Chilterns wanted to have their protest against HS2 on the record 
alongside their participation in the CF. In anticipation of a CF meeting later in the evening, 
the South Heath Action Group noted it is likely that “at the community forum tonight, 
somebody will say hopefully that we totally disagree with HS2, full stop. And we want that 
minuted” (Interview). Whilst the CF was considered unsuitable as an institution to discuss 
the very concept of high-speed rail, it was the logical action environment for stakeholders 
in the Chilterns in which to develop their engagement activities. That is to say, for 
stakeholders the participation in the CF and the minutes associated with it “allows us an 
opportunity to make our points, ask our questions and to record them” (South Heath 
Action Group, Interview), notwithstanding the widely shared feeling that the CF was an 
ineffective institution.  
 This feeling of ineffectiveness largely revolved around the suspicion that HS2 Ltd 
facilitated the CF only to comply with certain legal requirements on public participation. In 
referring to HS2 Ltd, the Chiltern Society asserted that by facilitating the CF “they want to 
be able to say they ticked the box. They want to be able to say: ‘we have met the 
community’” (Interview). Requests that were made regarding a number of things, for 
instance requests to put the minutes online or to add legends to the maps that were 
distributed in the CF meetings, were not followed up according to the stakeholders. 
Furthermore, HS2 Ltd was considered unresponsive to the ecological and sustainability 
concerns of stakeholders in the Chilterns. This unresponsiveness adversely affected the 
manner of dialogue during CF meetings. The South Heath Action Group sensed that the 
HS2 Ltd staff involved with setting up the community engagement “want to tell you what 
they want to tell you and they don’t want you to answer back. This is the overall feeling” 
(Interview). It argued that dialogue between HS2 Ltd and the stakeholders could often be 
described as adversarial. 
Amidst the many negative remarks that addressed the CF, very few remarks 
addressed the potential for stakeholders to make substantive changes through public 
engagement. As stated earlier, these changes are to be found within the remit of impact 
mitigation such as changes made to the infrastructure design. In Wendover the extension 
of a green tunnel – which will mainly mitigate noise pollution – was celebrated as a ‘victory 
of dialogue’. The Wendover Society (2012) argued that “[t]he announcement in October 
2012 that HS2 Ltd had accepted the case was a considerable relief and demonstrated 
that HS2 managers will listen and can react to strong representations”. Similarly, the 
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Wendover Parish Councillor reasoned that the extended green tunnel is “a piece of 
mitigation that I think has been done by the efforts of the community here. It wouldn’t have 
been offered free and gratis by the government, if we hadn’t had the opposition to the 
railway” (Interview). 
 Successes in stakeholder advocacy such as the one described above have been 
more exception than rule, according to a number of the stakeholders. Described as ‘pretty 
miserable affairs’ by the Chilterns Conservation Board, ill feelings towards the advocates 
of HS2 – the Prime Minister, MPs, the Environment Secretary, the DfT and HS2 Ltd – 
have persisted amongst the large majority of civil society groups opposing the rail link 
crossing the Chilterns. From the perspective of institutional design, a lack of democratic 
norms such as public contestation and participation was identified as the main barrier 
towards better public engagement. Not only has this flaw been recorded in the local 
dimension; indeed, the Campaign to Protest Rural England (CPRE), a nationwide non-
governmental organization (NGO), argued that “there’s a culture problem in HS2 Ltd” in 
terms of providing opportunities for debate and responding to queries and questions from 
the public (Interview). The Speen Area Action Group summed up this generic feeling of 
disappointment with the institutions for public engagement by stating that “we have the 
local community planning forums, the community forums and the national forums they 
should be feeding into. That was the framework we were presented to by HS2 Ltd. This is 
how it developed: without a dialogue, without any, if you like, reciprocal communication” 
(Interview). 
 As has been clearly expressed throughout this sub-section, a general feeling of 
discontent has permeated the stakeholders in their dealings with HS2 Ltd. That is to say, it 
was argued that crucial information was not available, withheld from public scrutiny or 
ambiguous [21], and consequently adversely affected the efforts of the stakeholders to 
formulate appropriate response strategies. In returning to the traffic-related impacts that 
may occur in Chesham, for example, there was little or no information available as to how 
this problem was going to be dealt with. In spite of the “spirit of engagement” that HS2 Ltd 
has associated with the CF (cited in Chesham & Amersham Conservative Association, 
2012), sometimes it took the efforts of a political heavyweight such as a MP to obtain the 
necessary information on how certain impacts were mitigated. In Chapter 7 this ‘spirit of 
engagement’ will be further elaborated when democratic satisfaction and political trust in 
the HS2 planning process are put centre-stage.   
 
6.2 A4DS 
 
The A4DS is a motorway capacity expansion project with national proportions. This is 
evidenced not least by the status of the A4 motorway as a ‘triple-A’ connection, accorded 
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by the Dutch government (Ministerie van Verkeer en Waterstaat and VROM, 2004). The 
need to expand capacity for the national motorway system as a whole has furthermore 
been underlined by Rijkswaterstaat (Rijkswaterstaat, 2012b: 4), which has stated that its 
“goal is a robust and coherent mobility system with enough capacity”. In contrast to the 
HS2 case, however, the relation between the national and the local dimension does not 
fare well with the institutional design of the A4DS planning process. Although the A4DS 
has been considered pivotal for the smooth operation of the motorway system in the study 
area and beyond (see more on this point in Chapter 8), the institutional opportunities and 
constraints within public engagement have been tailored to the local dimension.  
Notwithstanding the absence of a nationwide public consultation, two dimensions 
within the institutional design of the A4DS project have been identified: (1) a consultative 
dimension where those eligible to do so could react to key stages in the project; and (2) a 
deliberative dimension where the ecological and sustainability concerns of the A4DS 
could be discussed. Strong resemblance with the HS2 project becomes apparent when it 
is taken into account that the freedom to deliberate was confined to an expressed need for 
motorway capacity expansion (e.g. IODS, 2001). That is, the parameters of ‘true’ 
deliberation as an enhanced form of public engagement (see Chapter 2) restricted those 
adherents of the justification discourse from expressing their views on the ‘utility and 
necessity’ of the A4DS.     
  
6.2.1 The consultative dimension 
 
Consultation in the A4DS project has generally meant that stakeholders – groups as well 
as citizens – could make their viewpoints (‘zienswijzen’) known to the competent authority 
(e.g. Stichting Natuurmonumenten, 2010). Such a procedure of ex post consultation is 
usually applied in projects where the construction of large-scale infrastructures is 
concerned. Typically, Rijkswaterstaat gives notice of these viewpoints in a Nota van 
Antwoord (Note of Response) (e.g. Rijkswaterstaat, 2010a; 2010d), which is a project 
document where the viewpoints of those eligible (‘ontvankelijk’) to express them are 
collated and subsequently responded to. Eligibility is determined by the Algemene Wet 
Bestuursrecht, the law that regulates the relationship between citizens and the national 
government (to be interpreted as the bureaucracy, not the cabinet) (Rijksoverheid, 2013). 
Roughly speaking, stakeholders are considered eligible when their interest is directly at 
stake in the planning process, such as individuals or organizations (e.g. Midden-Delfland 
Vereniging, a group specific to the impact area), or of organizations whose interest is 
indirectly affected (e.g. Stichting Natuurmonumenten, a national environmental advocacy 
group).  
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In the A4DS project a Nota van Antwoord has been published for both the 
Trajectnota/Milieu-effectrapportage (TN/MER) (Rijkswaterstaat, 2010a) and the Ontwerp 
Tracébesluit, which is the proposed route decision (Rijkswaterstaat, 2010d). The majority 
of viewpoints on the proposed route decision (two thirds) stressed the assumed utility and 
necessity of the A4DS in terms of traffic management [22]. Furthermore, a considerable 
number of viewpoints (one third) expressed the feeling that economic growth prevailed 
over ecological and sustainability criteria in the goals hierarchy of the project [22]. It is 
therefore safe to suggest that consultation on the route decision facilitated, if not favoured, 
contestation against the overarching rationale of the project. As regards the TN/MER, 
which is the environmental statement of the project, Rijkswaterstaat has made a 
distinction between viewpoints addressing the alternatives (i.e. ‘A4DS’ and ‘A13+A13/16’), 
the scope of the environmental statement as well as the preferred ways to mitigate the 
expected adverse impacts.   
Although the specific focus of the TN/MER is to provide information on how the 
impacts of the two alternatives have been compared on the criteria of EIA (e.g. scoping, 
impact prediction, mitigation, et cetera), the justification for expanding the motorway 
capacity remained a salient theme of contestation. A substantial number of viewpoints 
have stressed that additional infrastructure is not sustainable and that it attests to the 
prevalence of economic growth over building a sustainable future. Furthermore, it was 
argued that additional infrastructure induces traffic both in the shorter and longer term and 
adversely affects levels of livelihood and nature. These viewpoints share resemblance 
with the conservation discourse and the justification discourse, thus combining elements 
of sustainability advocacy and the utility and necessity of additional infrastructure to 
facilitate traffic flow. Rijkswaterstaat (2010a: 61) has responded to these viewpoints by 
stating the following: 
  
“The policies of this cabinet aim to parallel or reciprocate economic growth and a 
sustainable society. The construction of new roads, which accommodates an increase in 
traffic, contributes to these policies. A prerequisite is that the effects for nature, 
environment and livelihood are internalized in the design. This prerequisite has been met 
satisfactorily in the chosen alternative A4DS”.   
 
People’s use of the consultation on the TN/MER as a springboard for putting the flawed 
justification of the A4DS centre-stage is interesting in that it may change the scope of 
protest against large-scale infrastructure projects. That is, consultation on a prima facie 
environmental document such as the TN/MER yields comments that do not reciprocate 
the scope of impact assessment. Instead, those with an interest in such projects prefer to 
focus on fundamental aspects (e.g. ‘no utility and necessity’) rather than to stress the 
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adverse impacts that they entail. As such it can be debated whether EIA is suitable for 
providing an adequate institutional milieu for civil society engagement with the justification 
of infrastructure projects – even though the initial engagement has emanated from a 
concern over ecological and sustainability impacts. The Milieufederatie Zuid-Holland 
claimed that “in the first instance EIA should provide evidence on: ‘is this motorway useful 
and necessary?’ That has never happened” (Interview). According to SOBO, the TN/MER 
does not promote a reciprocal dialogue between the project planners and stakeholders. It 
argued that debate on justification could be done only “to a limited extent. That extent 
was: the location of the infrastructure was already decided upon, so it was impossible to 
locate it to somewhere else” (Interview).     
 
Two external legislative interventions 
 
Opportunities for public engagement in the A4DS project have to some extent been 
influenced by two developments in legislation. These developments can be rightly called 
interventions, as they have been external to the legislation of major infrastructure projects 
(e.g. EIA, Tracéwet). The most pertinent change in the legal basis of the A4DS has been 
incurred by the enactment of a new law in 2010, the Crisis- en Herstelwet (Crisis and 
Recovery Act) (CHW). The CHW is meant to speed up, amongst others, infrastructural 
projects, housing projects and renewable energy projects by limiting opportunities for 
judicial review of these projects on administrative grounds (Rijksoverheid, 2012a). It is 
designed as a measure to avoid lengthy delays prior to the implementation of the 
aforementioned project categories in times of economic crisis. Indeed, when in 2012 
construction of the A4DS began, the Infrastructure and Environment Secretary at the time, 
Melanie Schultz van Haagen, commented that: 
 
“This small piece of motorway went head down in the quicksand due to slow political 
decision-making, ambivalent regulations and lingering procedures. The history of the A4 
Delft-Schiedam is a lesson for all of us; the example of how it should not be done 
anymore” (cited in Rijkswaterstaat, 2012a). 
 
The rationale for motorway construction projects to overcome crisis and spur economic 
recovery has furthermore been clearly articulated by Schultz van Haagen’s predecessor in 
the cabinet Balkenende-IV (2006-2010), Camiel Eurlings. By referring to the deadlock that 
existed in the planning process, he argued that the A4DS has been “an icon of delay. It 
will become an icon of progress, once the motorway will be there. The Crisis- en 
Herstelwet contributes to that objective” (cited in Rijksoverheid, 2009). One way to 
interpret progress within the perspective of the CHW is the pace with which decisions to 
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go ahead with projects can be made without too much deliberation going on. Thus, part of 
the CHW intends to construct new infrastructures without the need for piles of paperwork 
(‘millions of A4s’, see [23]).    
The CHW has incurred three changes in the interaction between the stakeholders 
and the planner of projects that are placed within its remit: 1) local and regional 
government have lost the right to judicially review the decision on the scheme and the 
environmental statement of the A4DS based on administrative grounds at the Raad van 
State, which is the highest administrative court in the Netherlands [24, 25]; 2) civil society 
stakeholders have lost the right to judicially review the decision on the scheme and the 
environmental statement of the A4DS based on administrative grounds at the Raad van 
State when they have failed to respond to the route decision when it was still in the 
proposal stage (Ontwerp Tracébesluit); and 3) charitable civil society stakeholders such 
environmental protection organizations that are located far away from the impact area 
have become ineligible to voice complaints against projects [23]. The new law has 
therefore limited opportunities for judicial review for local and regional government, as well 
as for civil society stakeholders.          
 As a consequence of the CHW, both government actors at the sub-national level 
and civil society stakeholders were pessimistic about their (future) role in major 
infrastructure project planning. By referring to its position within the debate on the length 
of the land tunnel and local air quality, Groenlinks Schiedam (a local political party) felt 
that it was ‘muzzled’ by the CHW and therefore associated protest against the A4DS with 
“fighting against windmills” (Interview). Under the aegis of the CHW the A4DS planning 
process was subsequently influenced by “external factors that cannot be influenced” 
(Groenlinks Schiedam, Interview), at least not by the efforts of local government actors. 
Similarly, the Milieufederatie Zuid-Holland – an environmental advocacy organization – 
argued that “the enactment of the Crisis- en Herstelwet is a sad thing (...) as more things 
can be pushed through” (Interview). As local government resistance in particularly 
Vlaardingen and Schiedam against the A4DS was sidelined, it became more difficult for 
civil society stakeholders to form a protest alliance.  
 The second development in legislation concerns the Nederlandse Samenwerking 
Luchtkwaliteit (NSL) (loosely translated: Netherlands Collaboration on Air Quality). The 
NSL has been adopted to ease compliance with the air quality targets of the European 
Union (EU). Because the Netherlands have a dense population as well as a high number 
of air polluting industries, variables which impact significantly on air quality, the NSL 
allows the Dutch government to comply with these targets by 2015 at the latest. The NSL 
furthermore permits the Netherlands to compensate transgressions of the EU air quality 
targets in certain areas with positive results in other areas. Thus, it has been concluded 
that “[t]he NSL is a sort of ‘balance’ that is aimed towards meeting the threshold values of 
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air quality” (Busscher, 2010: 6). As the NSL presents more flexibility to decision-makers to 
comply with air quality targets where and when, it facilitates large construction projects 
which are likely to have caused a spatial transgression of the air quality targets without the 
ability to compensate [26].    
 Stakeholders sensed that the A4DS and other major infrastructure developments 
in the study area (for an overview, see Ministerie van Infrastructuur en Milieu, 2012) were 
made possible by the NSL. The Vereniging Tegen Milieubederf noted that “if you look at 
the NSL, it encompasses the construction of all these new roads. (...) [Taking measures 
against] air pollution is discounted towards the future by deploying a certain method of 
measurement” (Interview). Thus, the adverse impacts on the A4DS were discounted 
towards the future. In conjunction with this, it was argued that the NSL sought to offset air 
pollution caused by infrastructure development with improvements in air quality 
elsewhere. Areas of heavy infrastructure development already experience a high level of 
air pollution, however. This led the Stichting Batavier to conclude that the NSL is intended 
to “make infrastructure possible, not to protect health” (Interview). Similar to the CHW, the 
NSL has been an external aid to the advocates of the A4DS. 
 
6.2.2 The deliberative dimension 
 
~ “The worst that can happen to them is that you don’t talk to them. Then they can’t 
control you. Then you become annoying” ~ (Stichting Natuurmonumenten, Interview) 
 
The deliberative dimension of public engagement in the A4DS project can be associated 
with the setting up of a dialogue between Rijkswaterstaat and the stakeholders. Arguably, 
it is a face-to-face approach to public engagement as some sort of communicative 
reciprocity has been strived for. As a preliminary step, Rijkswaterstaat has canvassed 
where the stakes lie in the planning process through a process which it described as 
‘ambience management’ (‘omgevingsmanagement’) (Interview). These stakes have 
mainly been concentrated in ‘institutional’ stakeholders, such as the municipalities 
involved [27], but also amongst nationally operating NGOs such as the Stichting 
Natuurmonumenten or Milieudefensie as well as amongst local action groups. After the 
stakes have been identified, in ambience management lines of communication are 
established between Rijkswaterstaat and the most prominent stakeholders. 
 Within the effort to entrench the planning process in a deliberative setting, a 
number of institutions have been deployed. These institutions have been mainly deployed 
to bring anti-A4DS protest or concerns over adverse impacts to the negotiation table, such 
as bilateral meetings with stakeholders or discussion evenings in the local library or 
theatre. Of all the deliberative institutions used 
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Ontwikkeling tussen Delft en Schiedam (Integral Development between Delft and 
Schiedam) (IODS) has been the most prominent. The stakeholder from IODS described 
its organization “a sort of plan for the area, a sort of vision of how this area can become 
future proof” (Interview). In practice this meant that stakeholders were invited to think 
together with Rijkswaterstaat about how the A4DS should look in terms of its design and 
how this should be streamlined into Midden-Delfland, the impact area. The A4DS is one 
amongst five other projects that take place between Delft and Schiedam, thereby aiming 
to give a ‘quality injection’ to Midden-Delfland (IODS, 2001; 2010).  
 As has been described in the doctoral thesis by Van der Arend (2007) on process 
managers in Dutch planning cases such as the A4DS, the IODS has emanated from the 
zeal of someone quite willing to resolve the long-standing deadlock between proponents 
and opponents of the motorway expansion. In the A4DS case this someone has been 
Marnix Norder, an elected representative from the regional government of Zuid-Holland 
Province. According to many stakeholders, the 2001 report Kansen benutten, Impasses 
doorbreken (Achieving Objectives, Breaking through the Impasses), which marks the 
onset of the deliberative aspect of the planning process, is equal to ‘Plan Norder’, thus 
bearing the name of its very creator. The IODS worked with the assumption that the A4DS 
was necessary, yet simultaneously ascribed considerable freedom to how it should be 
integrated into the landscape of Midden-Delfland. The Founder of IODS, interviewed for 
this research, added a spatial dimension to the A4DS when he argued that the planning 
proposal “does not concern 7 kilometres, but it concerns 49 kilometres. Thus, I think in 7 
times 7 kilometres instead of 7 kilometres” (Interview).  
 As this quotation attests to, the deliberative dimension of public engagement has 
been predominantly spatial in scope and focus. Since the IODS is a bundle of six spatial 
projects between Delft and Schiedam, considerable impetus has been given to this spatial 
component in public engagement (IODS, 2001). Of course, to most stakeholders the 
A4DS was not just the primus inter pares of the IODS projects; it was the only one that 
was controversial enough to warrant a campaign against it. To mitigate the anti-campaign, 
advocates of the A4DS therefore argued that it was necessary to further expand the 
spatial component of the project. The objective of giving the area a quality injection was 
furthermore consciously targeted. The public engagement manager of Rijkswaterstaat 
who was interviewed for this research reminisced that:     
 
“The Infrastructure Secretary at the time [Tineke Netelenbos] asked Norder, or perhaps it 
was Norder himself that said: ‘we have to shift our concentration away from that road. We 
have to perceive it as area development’. The secretary then said: ‘go and see what’s 
possible’. Well, then the first Plan Norder was developed and, with that, much broader 
agendas of spatial development, stimulation of the recreation sector, a new future for 
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farmers, nature development as well as an improvement of the area in terms of urban 
development between Vlaardingen and Schiedam. Thus, it became a much bigger pie” 
(Interview).   
  
Besides this spatialization of the A4DS, the IODS intended to offer each participant an 
equal opportunity to engage. Rijkswaterstaat argued that the IODS activities dedicated to 
the A4DS were ‘very open’. Some stakeholders agreed in principle with this opinion, 
thereby more or less alluding to the inherent fairness of the IODS as a procedure. KNNV 
Delfland commented that “if you look at the facts then you can’t say that it has not been 
fair. I think all the various aspects have been included in the IODS as well as many groups 
(...). You can’t say, looking back, that one of the parties did not feel represented” 
(Interview). In addition to being represented, the IODS intended to create a spirit of 
engagement where stakeholders could talk freely and without restraint on how they would 
like to see the impact area develop in the future. The Founder of IODS reasoned that:    
 
“You had to look different at that motorway. We’ve organized a session that consisted 
partially of talking, (...) and the rest was drawing. Draw how it should look like. Draw what 
you would like to see changed. Draw what your dream scenario of Midden-Delfland is in 
ten, twenty, thirty years. Because everybody had to draw, (...) the farmer was equal to the 
graduate biologist” (Interview). 
 
Interactive and innovative practices such as something as simple as drawing may to some 
indicate the openness of the IODS to suggestions emanating from civil society. However, 
some of the stakeholders argued that the strategy to reach out to all echelons of civil 
society was concocted by savvy decision-makers who wanted to silence the opposition. 
This may perhaps best be summed up by the observation that, for decision-makers to 
become successful, it is vital “to create your own opposition” (Mijn Partij, Interview). 
Indeed, an invited form of engagement was institutionalized through the use of, amongst 
others, a steering group, advisory committee and feedback group. Particularly the 
feedback group (‘klankbordgroep’) of the IODS was considered an important platform as it 
invited a plurality of stakeholders to become formally engaged in the planning process 
(e.g. IODS; KNNV Delfland). 
 As the ‘drawing example’ may indicate, stakeholders could seize considerable 
agency in steering debate within the feedback group of the IODS towards particular ends. 
This became particularly manifest in an impacts-oriented form of public engagement with 
the project. For example, those actors holding stakes in Midden-Delfland would advocate 
investments in, say, the cycling infrastructure or the appropriation of land for the creation 
of new nature. However, participation in the IODS also created commitments. To the 
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Stichting Natuurmonumenten, which is one of the oldest and largest environmental 
advocacy organizations in the Netherlands, its participation in the IODS at the strategic 
level (in the so-called ‘advisory council’) led to a serious dilemma. Although it wanted to 
contest the A4DS by comparing it with the A13+A13/16, “everyone could have witnessed 
that we agreed with the construction of the A4 [Delft-Schiedam]. So we could not 
advocate that [comparison], we couldn’t do that anymore” (Interview).  
This latter point beckons further inquiry. IODS has stated that questions on ‘utility 
and necessity’ should not permeate the deliberations, as “this is a matter for the cabinet 
and the parliament” (IODS, 2001: 5). As a consequence, many stakeholders argued that 
the spatial focus of the IODS limited possibilities to address the underlying claim of 
necessity. The Milieufederatie Zuid-Holland lamented the lack of such possibilities by 
stating that “one should only want to construct the motorway when utility and necessity is 
proven, and not to use design choices and sustainability as an excuse to construct [it]” 
(Interview). It was furthermore perceived that the purpose of providing a quality injection to 
the impact area had come to prevail during the mediating influence of the IODS. This has 
led to debate amongst stakeholders as to whether this purpose should be strived for. 
Particularly statements on the problem-solving character and spatial ‘two-dimensionality’ 
of the A4DS have been sceptically received by some stakeholders (e.g. Stichting Stop 
RW19/A4, 2009). Furthermore, the ‘do not hear, do not see, do not smell’ storyline 
addressed the local impacts of the A4DS related to noise (‘do not hear’), visibility (‘do not 
see’) and stench (‘do not smell’), thereby incurring a shift away from other impacts. The 
Stichting Stop RW19/A4 noted that “climate change is not mentioned anywhere. It doesn’t 
exist. Apparently it’s not important for the decision-makers” (Interview). 
It has been argued before that some stakeholders felt that the purpose of providing 
a quality injection was deployed to shift attention away from the utility and necessity of the 
A4DS. It was subsequently experienced that the new purpose was deployed as a sort of 
‘divide and rule’ policy. This was experienced first-hand by local politicians in Vlaardingen 
and Schiedam, as the mitigation packages for these municipalities differed substantially 
(e.g. the height of sound barriers). According to Groenlinks Schiedam (Interview), this 
difference was premised on the degree to which negotiations with Rijkswaterstaat were 
successful. The negotiations themselves were heavily influenced by whether politicians 
were willing to stop their local protest. Whilst cooperation between the stakeholders could 
generally be considered well (see also Chapter 7), they were strongly divided on the issue 
of accepting the purpose of providing a quality injection as the shared cause in 
deliberating the A4DS. For instance, in motivating its unwillingness to participate in the 
feedback group of the IODS, the Vereniging Tegen Milieubederf (the ‘association against 
environmental destruction’) stated that “we have not really participated (...) because we 
were against the deal that [another stakeholder] would get 200 hectares of agricultural 
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land to convert into nature (...) to say ‘yes’ to the construction of the A4” (Interview). The 
proposed objective of a quality injection entailed considerable benefits to some of the 
stakeholders, yet it held no benefits for others. 
    
6.3 Summary 
 
This chapter has focused on the institutional designs of the HS2 and A4DS projects. The 
concept of institutional design represents the assemblage of institutions that fulfil a key 
role in mediating public engagement in the project. The mode of public engagement in 
large-scale infrastructure projects is important for stakeholders to exercise voice, such as 
shown by many of the stakeholder appraisals. What follows from this is that an analysis of 
the mechanisms that either open up or close down public engagement is pivotal for 
understanding the manifestation of extant ideas about cooperation and collaboration with 
decision-makers in environmental problem settings. Putting one and one together, 
institutional design has as such been identified as an external factor in the mobilization of 
sustainability discourses. Table 6.2 presents an overview of the formal institutional 
designs in the two projects. A brief explanation on these findings will follow, after which 
they will be linked to EIA.  
 
Institutional 
design of the 
projects 
HS2 A4DS 
Institutions at 
the macro level 
Public consultation on the idea of 
HS2 and public consultation on the 
scope and methodology of the EIA 
Public consultation on the proposed 
route decision and public 
consultation on the TN/MER  
Institutions at 
the micro level 
Impacts-oriented deliberation in the 
CF. Focus on impact prediction and 
the identification of mitigation 
measures  
Impacts-oriented deliberation in the 
IODS. Focus on impact prediction 
and the identification of mitigation 
measures 
Table 6.2: Overview of the formal institutional designs of HS2 and A4DS 
 
However, to rightfully summarize this chapter, it is pertinent to also show the shortcomings 
of the formal institutional designs with respect to their ability to accommodate the 
sustainability discourses (see Chapter 5). The institutional designs of both projects were 
considered seriously flawed. It was reported to represent a poorly contrived means to 
express interests. The public consultation in the HS2 project did not accommodate those 
critical reflections that lamented the absence of a genuine national cause for a high-speed 
rail network. In the local dimension, the ‘spirit of engagement’ of the CF was not 
reciprocated by stakeholders due to the sensed unresponsiveness to pleas for more 
advanced mitigation measures if the plan for HS2 would go ahead. A similar judgement of 
stakeholders on the adequacy of macro institutions to accommodate the ‘no utility and 
necessity’ storyline has been observed in the A4DS case. Debate on utility and necessity 
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was hampered in particular by the enactment of the CHW and the NSL. Whilst 
stakeholders embracing the ‘do not hear, do not see, do not smell’ found solace in the 
impacts-oriented form of public engagement of the IODS, as well as the proposed quality 
injection in Midden-Delfland, those lingering on the underlying justification of the A4DS 
remained dissatisfied. Table 6.3 has summarized these findings. 
 
 
Institutional 
design of the 
projects 
HS2 A4DS 
Institutions at 
the macro level 
The public consultation did not 
provide a means to express the 
absence for a national cause for HS2 
The public consultation on (on route 
decision and the TN/MER) did not 
accommodate ‘no utility and 
necessity’ 
Institutions at 
the micro level 
The CF proved unresponsive to 
pleas for far-reaching mitigation 
measures to offset impacts in the 
Chilterns AONB 
The IODS was lenient towards 
mitigating impacts (‘hear’, ‘see’ and 
‘smell’)  but did not facilitate 
‘justification-oriented’ protest   
Table 6.3: Overview of stakeholders’ views on the flawed institutional designs 
 
Basic critical functions of democracy were considered absent in the institutional design of 
HS2. For instance, throughout Section 5.1 it could be sensed that stakeholders did not 
feel listened to and that the DfT and HS2 Ltd were envisaged as being unresponsive. The 
Speen Area Action Group captured this understanding of unresponsiveness by stating 
that “the assumption that there is a willingness to have a democratic process... that is best 
practice, that’s the ideal practice. What we’ve seen to experience is: somewhere, this idea 
has been created and there is a dogma and therefore from the onset the commitment and 
the aim has been: ‘we have to get this through’” (Interview). When the Potter Row Action 
Group furthermore claimed, from its experience in the HS2 project, that “this is not a 
democracy” (Interview), this opens up an important avenue for investigating democratic 
satisfaction and political trust. 
 In the A4DS project, the institutional design consisted of a consultative dimension 
and a deliberative dimension. The consultative dimension entailed the opportunity for 
stakeholders to react to the content and provisions set forth in key project documentation, 
such as the TN/MER and the proposed route decision. This ex post public consultation 
predominantly yielded viewpoints on the utility and necessity of the A4DS, both as an 
intervention in the motorway system and as a barrier to a more sustainable future. The 
deliberative dimension transpired within the confinement of the IODS, which positioned 
itself as a spatial plan for the impact area. Although the IODS provided a deliberative 
environment where privately held visions of the future of Midden-Delfland could be made 
known to decision-makers, a discussion on the utility and necessity of the A4DS was 
sidelined at the expense of impact mitigation. This orientation on impacts – rather than the 
merits of the A4DS for achieving the project objectives – changed the form of protest 
against the motorway capacity expansion.    
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 When the observation made by Bond and Morrison-Saunders (2009) is taken into 
account that the sustainable development concept can be used, misused and manipulated 
by actors, a twofold proposition can be made. Firstly, the localization and spatialization of 
public engagement in the HS2 and A4DS projects by the competent authority has 
privileged debate on impact mitigation. The EIAs of both projects could serve as useful 
guidance within this endeavour, as environmental statements sum up the main 
environmental impacts. However, a second proposition is that the extant modes of public 
engagement have related uncomfortably to the wishes and desires of civil society actors 
to discuss the heart of the matter: the ‘why’ of the infrastructure developments, rather than 
the ‘how’ of impact mitigation. Sustainable development can thus also be interpreted as a 
plea for development that is premised on a clear evidence base, free from what certain 
stakeholders perceive as dubious assumptions and political motives. Whether EIA 
continues to be ill-fitted to a mode of public engagement where questions on necessity are 
put centre-stage is of equal importance to the role of political culture. This will be 
investigated in the forthcoming chapter.      
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Chapter 7 On political culture 
 
This chapter deals with political culture, the second external factor which is thought to 
shape the mobilization of sustainability discourses (see Figure 2.1). Throughout the 
previous chapter it has become apparent that political culture is reciprocal to institutional 
design, the other external factor. Indeed, the statement made earlier by BBOWT that, with 
regard to the public consultation of HS2, “the public appear less satisfied with the project 
after the consultation than they were before” (Interview), triggers pertinent questions on 
how institutions mediate political culture, and vice versa. That is to say, as Figure 2.1 has 
also shown, co-production is assumed to exist between institutional design and political 
culture. For the latter, this means that its focus on the cultural orientation of civil society in 
the conduct of politics is an active contributor both to explaining certain modes of 
engagement and the institutions that encompass them.      
Before delving into the case studies, the chapter starts with an investigation of 
value surveys and studies. Surveys are often used in comparative political science 
research (see Inglehart, 1988; Skelcher et al., 2011 for an example). Pursuant to Section 
2.2 in the theoretical framework of the thesis, the values that are investigated in the 
surveys broadly relate to democratic satisfaction and political trust as well as to 
interpersonal trust. These values are subsequently used to investigate the political culture 
in the United Kingdom (UK) and the Netherlands. As stated, satisfaction and trust are 
conceptualized in this thesis as reflecting the public ‘attitudes, beliefs and sentiments’ 
(Pye, 1968) towards liberal democracy. It has as such been argued that democratic 
satisfaction and political trust influence the mode of public engagement, thereby mediating 
the practices of ‘democratic citizens’ (Kymlicka, 2002). If the preconception holds true that 
positive attitudes towards democracy attenuate the adversarial and competitive character 
of discourse, as is assumed in the formation of sustainability discourses, then the results 
from value surveys shed light on the mobilization of ideas and perceptions towards 
decision-making with a high degree of public interest.  
When prompted to comment on their attitudes towards the democratic systems in 
the UK, some of the stakeholders in the HS2 project argued that proportional 
representation in the electoral system has the propensity to support fringe political parties 
or to cause ‘hung’ cabinets (e.g. Chiltern Ridges Action Group). This assumption seems to 
express satisfaction with, and trust, in the incumbent system of strict majority rule to 
ensure the effectiveness of single-party governments, allegedly at the expense of (more) 
procedural fairness. At the same time, resonating the ‘voice’ option as depicted by 
Hirschman (1970), a lack of democratic satisfaction and political trust is theorized to cause 
perturbations in the electoral preferences of citizens. If relatively low levels of satisfaction 
and trust are reported in majoritarian democracies, this would then result in a decline of 
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the traditional hegemony of the two dominant political parties (usually on the left and the 
right). When these two points of input side and output side legitimacy (Scharpf, 1999) are 
extrapolated to the present case study, it will be interesting to analyze how stakeholder 
perceptions are formed on the basis of extant political cultural characteristics.      
 Simultaneously, it has been argued that in consensual democracies the primacy-
of-politics principle, so typical for the conduct of politics in majoritarian democracies, has 
been exchanged for a ‘displacement of politics’ (Skelcher et al., 2011). When framed 
within the context of political culture, the most pressing question is whether citizens really 
want more opportunities to become involved in making political decisions. The shift from 
‘vote-centric’ to ‘talk-centric’ institutions (Chambers, 2003) gives rise to an enhanced 
agency amongst citizens and civil society actors, yet in itself it does not answer whether 
they are more satisfied or trustworthy of politicians and other citizens than in electoral 
democracy. However, on some occasions it has been theorized that exposure to more 
rather than less democracy is conducive to positive civic attitudes towards the democratic 
conduct (e.g. Banducci et al., 1999; Bowler and Donovan, 2002). In this vein, public 
engagement can be considered an all-important ingredient for ‘good’ political culture, 
expressing high scores on democratic satisfaction and political trust.     
 Section 7.1, which presents the results from value surveys and studies, will show 
the variance in democratic satisfaction and political trust between the UK and the 
Netherlands. This comparison can be perceived as linking up with the broader tradition of 
measuring political culture, one way or the other (e.g. Almond and Verba, 1963; Inglehart, 
1988). Whilst quantitative value surveys containing large data sets are proxies of 
democratic satisfaction and political trust (‘broad but shallow’), qualitative studies usually 
contain less data but are more in-depth (‘deep but narrow’). When taken together, they 
can provide an all-round picture of political culture in the two states where the research is 
set. Subsequently, Sections 7.2 and 7.3 deal with the political cultural orientation of 
stakeholders in the HS2 and A4DS projects, respectively. Although part of the projects is 
played out at the national level, perhaps this may prove to impact only marginally in 
situations where stakeholders deal with executive agencies (such as HS2 Ltd and 
Rijkswaterstaat). Section 7.4 will summarize the main findings. 
 
7.1 Results from value surveys and studies 
 
7.1.1 Surveys on political values 
 
As stated earlier, value surveys have been consulted to provide a broad overview of the 
values of citizens that indicate their attitudes towards democracy and the conduct of 
politics more generally. Value surveys are particularly useful in either showing patterns in 
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citizen attitudes over time or to compare one population with another. The value surveys 
in this sub-section have been selected since they explicitly focus on the attitudes of 
citizens towards the domestic political situation. From the perspective of drawing a 
comparison between the UK and the Netherlands, this is an invaluable characteristic. As a 
consequence, value surveys that focus on attitudes not related to the nation-state have 
been considered ineligible. That has for instance been the case with the Eurobarometer 
value survey of the European Union (EU), which is more useful for conducting research 
on attitudes towards supranational politics. Data have been obtained from three surveys:  
 
• European Social Survey (ESS) Round 5 – 2010 (European Social Survey, 2012); 
• World Value Survey (WVS) 2005-2008 (WVS, 2012b) (World Value Survey, 2012); 
• European Values Study (EVS) EVS 2008 - 4th Wave (European Values Study, 2012). 
 
In accordance with the theory on political culture (see Chapter 2), democratic satisfaction 
and political trust represent the main themes of value inquiry. The term ‘confidence’, often 
applied in value surveys (most notably in the WVS and the EVS) can be read as 
synonymous to the concept of trust. In Tables 7.1 to 7.4, where the values are 
‘processed’, it can be read that personalized statements have been used to measure 
attitudes and value orientation – as opposed to the use of questions which can be found in 
the value surveys. As can be distilled from the tables, two types of statements prevail. 
Talking about democracy or the conduct of democracy can either relate to democracy as 
a system (i.e. a regime of institutions) or to democracy as an incumbent political authority. 
This has been clearly reflected in the statements For instance, the statements “I am 
satisfied with the democratic system” (EVS) and “I am satisfied with the government of 
this country” (ESS) relate to ‘system’ and ‘authority’, respectively. 
Seventeen values have altogether been examined: five from the ESS; five from the 
WVS; and seven from the EVS. Because three different Likert scales have been used in 
the surveys –are used to present the outcomes. The values with 11 and 10 response 
options are ‘processed’ in Tables 7.1 and 7.2, respectively. Because of the number of 
values using 4-points Likert scales, two tables (7.3 and 7.4) have been constructed. The 
statements that are formulated are stated below the tables. The choice for formulating 
these statements rather than to use the original questions posed in the value surveys is 
methodological: a low frequency disagrees with the statement and a high frequency 
agrees with it. Thus, all the statements have been drafted in such a way that high 
frequencies (in %) indicate high levels of satisfaction and trust.  
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 United Kingdom23 The Netherlands 
 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
0 (No) 5.224 8.0 13.6 12.5 9.9 0.8 1.7 2.6 2.5 3.4 
2 3.6 5.9 9.5 9.0 6.5 0.8 2.1 1.5 1.7 2.2 
3 8.1 10.1 14.0 13.1 10.2 1.8 4.5 4.4 3.8 4.4 
4 10.4 12.4 13.4 13.4 14.8 3.7 6.5 7.7 7.1 6.4 
5 11.8 13.6 14.1 14.8 11.7 6.7 11.6 10.7 10.8 8.7 
6 18.8 18.3 17.4 18.5 17.2 15.9 22.8 20.5 21.5 19.8 
7 12.4 12.4 8.3 9.3 11.1 20.4 23.7 27.9 28.7 23.6 
8 14.0 11.3 6.5 6.7 11.0 29.6 20.5 19.7 19.3 22.3 
9 10.7 6.1 2.6 2.0 5.1 16.7 6.1 4.1 3.8 7.6 
10 3.2 1.2 0.4 0.5 1.5 2.8 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.9 
11 (Yes) 1.8 0.6 0.3 0.2 0.9 0.7 0.1 0.4 0.3 0.7 
Table 7.1: Frequencies of values using 11-points Likert scales (in %) 
1 “I am satisfied with the way democracy works in this country” (ESS, B2725) 
2 “I am satisfied with the government of this country” (ESS, B26) 
3 “I trust the politicians of this country” (ESS, B4-10) 
4 “I trust the political parties of this country” (ESS, B4-10) 
5 “I trust the parliament of this country” (ESS, B4-10) 
 
 United Kingdom The Netherlands 
 6 7 6 7 
0 (No) 3.0 11.7 1.6 1.9 
2 1.9 8.1 1.7 1.6 
3 4.8 17.9 4.9 6.3 
4 6.8 16.6 6.4 12.1 
5 13.3 20.4 11.6 16.3 
6 14.5 12.1 17.8 25.6 
7 22.3 8.5 25.4 27.6 
8 19.3 3.6 17.3 7.9 
9 7.4 0.8 7.9 0.6 
10 (Yes) 6.8 0.3 5.6 0.0 
Table 7.2: Frequencies of values using 10-points Likert scales (in %)  
6 “I think that my country is democratic” (WVS, V163) 
7 “I think the government of this country is good” (EVS, Q65) 
 
 United Kingdom The Netherlands 
 8 9 10 11 12 8 9 10 11 12 
0 (No) 3.6 20.8 25.0 16.9 16.0 2.1 20.1 18.5 17.6 3.6 
2 5.8 45.4 57.2 46.9 51.9 6.2 52.8 58.2 52.7 40.3 
3 32.2 28.7 15.9 31.3 29.4 47.8 26.3 22.6 28.7 52.2 
4 (Yes) 58.4 5.0 2.0 4.9 2.7 43.9 0.8 0.7 1.0 3.9 
Table 7.3: First table on the frequencies of values using 4-points Likert scales (in %) 
8 “I think that it is good to have democracy in this country” (WVS, V151) 
9 “I have confidence in the government of this country” (WVS, V138) 
10 “I have confidence in the political parties in this country” (WVS, V139) 
11 “I have confidence in the parliament of this country” (WVS, V140) 
12 “I am satisfied with democracy” (EVS, Q64) 
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 The WVS and EVS hold data from Great Britain instead of the UK. Because ‘Great Britain’ and ‘UK’ largely 
overlap (the difference is Northern Ireland), the data are considered representative. This applies to all the 
output tables (7.1 to 7.4). 
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 For all the three value surveys design weight has been applied. According to the European Social Survey 
(2013), "Weighting European Social Survey Data", (available at http://ess.nsd.uib.no/ess/doc/weighting.pdf, 
last accessed 6 August 2013), “[t]he design weight corrects for these slightly different probabilities of selection, 
thereby making the sample more representative”. Design weight controls for different population sizes. 
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 After every statement a code has been added (e.g. B27, preceded by the value survey which has been 
consulted). These are the original codes used by the value surveys. 
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 United Kingdom The Netherlands 
 13 14 15 16 17 13 14 15 16 17 
0 (No) 4.2 1.0 35.1 25.8 32.4 1.5 0.6 7.2 8.4 10.8 
2 9.6 11.1 45.6 51.0 54.1 6.6 6.6 43.3 42.9 55.9 
3 39.7 52.8 17.0 20.0 12.6 55.0 53.1 47.8 45.4 32.4 
4 (Yes) 46.4 35.2 2.3 3.1 1.0 36.9 39.7 1.6 3.3 1.0 
Table 7.4: Second table on the frequencies of values using 4-points Likert scales (in %) 
13 “I think that it is good to have democracy” (EVS, Q66D) 
14 “I think democracy is the best political system” (EVS, Q67A) 
15 “I have confidence in the government of this country” (EVS, Q63R) 
16 “I have confidence in the parliament of this country” (EVS, Q63G) 
17 “I have confidence in the political parties in this country” (EVS, Q63Q) 
 
The tables show that for 16 out of 17 statements, the frequency in the 0 category (‘No’, i.e. 
in full disagreement with the statement) is higher in the UK than in the Netherlands. This 
indicates that the part of the population that is completely dissatisfied and distrustful is 
much larger in the UK than in the Netherlands. When results on the other extreme of the 
Likert scales are looked at, thus reflecting the answers which express full satisfaction and 
trust (i.e. all responses which are ‘Yes’), then the frequency is higher in the UK for 11 out 
of 17 statements. These outcomes suggest that the difference between full disagreement 
and full agreement on the statements is larger in the UK and the Netherlands. It is 
plausible to hypothesize that this results from the relationships between ‘us’ and ‘them’ 
that exist in majoritarian democracy. Conversely, then, the concentration of frequencies in 
the middle categories in the Netherlands is a consequence of consensus politics.  
Of course, a pertinent question is whether individuals that have mobilized into civil 
society groups opposing a government planning proposal are to be found in either one of 
the extreme response categories. The willingness to oppose such proposals already hints 
at a commitment to issues of public interest, which can be assumed to prevail amongst 
those who are (to some extent) satisfied and trustful. Yet simultaneously it demonstrates 
that these individuals have found something to protest against, which is a clear sign of 
dissatisfaction and possibly also of distrust. It is therefore quite likely that the scores in the 
mid-response categories are most useful for getting insight into the political cultures of the 
stakeholders involved in the HS2 and A4DS projects. These scores are relatively similar in 
the UK and the Netherlands.       
 As stated, the scores in the tables signify the attitudes of the British and Dutch 
population towards the political vestibule of the state – the government, the parliament 
and the political parties – and the political system which accommodates the citizens’ role 
in the conduct of democracy. They are inherent in Easton’s (1975) definition of political 
support as having positive attitudes towards ‘political objects’, of course to be interpreted 
in the metaphysical sense. However, more can be said about what constitutes political 
support and the attitudes which can be associated with it. Although Mishler and Rose 
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(2001) have argued that explanations for political trust should firmly stay within the realm 
of politics, rival theories have stressed that there is more than meets the eye. In particular, 
the fabric of civil society – social capital – has been identified as having strong 
explanatory potential for the extant differences in democratic satisfaction and political trust 
across societies (e.g. Inglehart, 1988; Putnam, 1993; Newton, 1997). The following sub-
section will take a closer look at this potential by focusing on studies of interpersonal trust 
in the UK and the Netherlands, which is a key concept within the theory on social capital. 
  
7.1.2 Studies on interpersonal trust 
 
Unfortunately, there is surprisingly little comparative research carried out on interpersonal 
trust in the UK and the Netherlands. As such, it is fruitful to construct a broad picture of 
this form of trust in these two countries by using country-specific analyses. For both the 
UK and the Netherlands, one ‘mini-case study’ will be used to explore the notion of 
interpersonal trust. What is important within this endeavour is to stress that the concept of 
interpersonal trust can be adapted to situations where micro political processes occur. 
That is, lines of trust between people also exist in projects or organizational settings. This 
will prove a vital aspect in the analysis of political culture in the HS2 and A4DS projects. 
What should particularly be stressed is that interpersonal trust can be a functional element 
in the actions and strategies of stakeholders. In the community forums (CF) and the 
Integrale Ontwikkeling tussen Delft and Schiedam (IODS) in the HS2 and A4DS projects, 
respectively, stakeholders may well have internalized interpersonal trust for goal 
maximization, driven by private interests. This could be as true as considering 
interpersonal trust in public engagement an intrinsic feature of the broader political culture.   
In the UK, projects with a community dimension (such as HS2) have been 
associated with interpersonal trust. Whilst it is perhaps safer to leave the concept of 
community undefined, it can be argued that some sort of homogeneity amongst its 
members can be discerned. By taking this as a point of departure, the principle questions 
for Walker et al. (2010) have been whether interpersonal trust is part of the community, 
whether it can be built within the community, whether it can be used to achieve particular 
ends and whether demonstrated levels of interpersonal trust in one particular community 
can be exported to other communities. When looking at projects in the UK involving 
community renewable energy (abbreviated as ‘RE’ by the authors), they have found that 
whilst close-knit communities exhibit levels of trust, interpersonal trust can be used by 
some in the community for personal gain. Purely seen from an analytical point of view, 
Walker et al. (2010: 2662) have concluded that their “research shows that [interpersonal] 
trust does have a necessary part to play in the contingencies and dynamics of community 
RE projects and in the outcomes they can achieve”.  
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As regards the situation in the Netherlands, Kickert (2003) has argued that trust is 
one among other variables that govern the relationships between people in society, but 
also in firms or other organizations. In his point of view, the Dutch seem to have a rather 
pragmatic tolerant view towards others, regardless of whether they look or behave the 
same. This pragmatism is premised on self-interest: it is expected that personal gains are 
higher under cooperation than under conflict. According to Kickert (2003), the historical 
cultural heterogeneity of the Netherlands, where various societal ‘pillars’ (e.g. Protestants, 
Catholics, socialists) existed side by side, has been decisive in determining political 
relations and traditions of consensus and tolerance. From this point of view it can be 
reasoned that interpersonal trust has become a side-product of the efforts by decision-
makers to accommodate political struggle between these pillars (Lijphart, 1968).         
 Although comparative research between the UK and the Netherlands is scant, as 
stated earlier, it is certainly true that levels of interpersonal trust differ from state to state. 
In The Spirit Level: Why Equality is Better for Everyone (Wilkinson and Pickett, 2011), it 
has been strongly argued that most of the Anglophone states in the Western hemisphere 
exhibit low levels of interpersonal trust. In contrast, particularly the Scandinavian states 
but also other countries having consensual democracy perform much better in this 
respect. Wilkinson and Pickett (2011) have identified inequality as the prime determinant 
of low interpersonal trust, but the apparent link between the type of democracy and levels 
of trust gives food for thought. Following the introduction of Chapter 6, this latter point has 
to be approached cautiously as ‘executive-level politics’ may not be conducted in the 
same fashion as is the politics in the state institutions. In the remainder of this chapter, 
interpersonal trust will feature alongside accounts of democratic satisfaction and political 
trust in two instances of politics at the executive level: HS2 and A4DS.    
 
7.2 HS2 
 
Public satisfaction with the HS2 project arguably has been a key imperative for HS2 Ltd. 
The same thing can be said about trust in the competent authority to implement it 
adequately. Indeed, one of the bosses of HS2 Ltd was quoted saying that he wants to win 
the “hearts and minds” (cited in [28]26) of the British population and the protest movement 
in particular. As this section will demonstrate, such things are more easily said than done. 
The section will first canvass the ideas of stakeholders on the subjects of democratic 
satisfaction and political trust. Subsequently, it will relate these two concepts of political 
culture to the mode of public engagement in the HS2 project, particularly with respect to 
the institutional environment of the CF. Interpersonal trust – trust between different 
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 This reference (where parentheses are used) is a newspaper article. To see how newspaper articles are 
referenced, please refer to the second footnote of Chapter 4. 
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stakeholders – is also discussed. It is important to integrate a broad overview of ideas 
about extant political cultural values into an examination of the on-the-ground levels of 
satisfaction with and trust in HS2 Ltd. This is for at least two reasons: 1) a vital link will be 
forged with Section 7.1 (on the value surveys); and 2) social appraisals of satisfaction and 
trust in the HS2 project can be better put into perspective.       
 
7.2.1 Stakeholder appraisals of satisfaction and trust 
 
Many of the stakeholders supported democracy on the principle that it was the best – or 
alternatively the least worst – political system. However, as a general remark it can be 
argued that stakeholders were aware of potential shortcomings in the conduct of 
democracy. It was commented that certain trade-offs made under majority rule could 
result in unfair or disadvantageous outcomes for the minority. Some stakeholders have 
perceived it as difficult to agree on the democratic principle ‘the majority makes the 
decisions’ when much is at stake, such as the planning of major infrastructure 
development. The stakeholder from the Amersham Action Group reasoned that “I wouldn’t 
advocate violent revolution; on the other hand I’d say I’m not always happy with the way 
things turn out either” (Interview). Such a revolution is unlikely to occur in the present-day 
democratic system, however. According to the Chiltern Ridges Action Group, it is because 
of a “very strong network of institutions that we’re protected from violent change” 
(Interview). These institutions serve to ‘check and balance’ ideas before they can get a 
chance to mature politically.   
Although some stakeholders expressed dissatisfaction with the rules of 
majoritarian democracy (most notably Chesham Town Councillor; see also Section 5.1), 
many other stakeholders preferred keeping the ‘first past the post’ principle as the way to 
practice democracy. Besides the fear of a ‘hung’ cabinet (CRAG, Interview), which would 
be a cabinet where two or more parties join forces simply to constitute a majority of seats 
in the parliament, albeit a difference in political ideology, another concern related to the 
ascendancy of fringe parties on the political left and right that could distort political 
stability. As a consequence of that, specific issues could lose their political momentum 
when there are (too) many voices in the room. In debating consensual democracy as a 
potentially viable alternative to majoritarian democracy, the stakeholder affiliated with the 
Woodland Trust claimed that proportional representation would “actually make it harder 
because it [the political landscape] will come diverse. The more diverse, the more people 
you need to speak to. I think the environmental issue-making will be sidelined (...), the 
focus will move away” (Interview).  
When moving from the democratic system to the potentially thorny issue of political 
authority, gaining its relevance as it has been precisely politicians that continue to support 
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the proposal for HS2, stakeholders did express dissatisfaction with the current coalition 
government consisting of the Conservatives and Liberal Democrats. The Amersham & 
District Residents Association commented that, on the one hand, the Liberal Democrats 
“are terrified because they’re in power”, and on the other, the Conservatives “have the 
‘dinosaurs’ and don’t know why to compromise” (Interview). According to other 
stakeholders, this imbalance has distorted the traditional ways of democratic decision-
making in the UK. At the same time, it was contended that the United Kingdom 
Independence Party (UKIP) has recently risen in popularity amongst the electorate. This 
led Amersham Action Group to conclude that casting a vote on this party “is more 
attractive now than it was” (Interview). 
In the literature on political culture, most notably the work by Inglehart (e.g. 1988), 
it has been asserted that democratic satisfaction spurs economic development (but see 
Jackman and Miller, 1996 for a rebuttal). Correspondingly, poor economic performance is 
likely to impact on feelings of satisfaction amongst citizens. The interview respondent from 
the Speen Area Action Group belaboured this point, arguing that “I imagined the 
Conservative Party had more experience and more common sense to do business and 
how to run an economy [than Labour], that they wouldn’t get us into the debt they got us 
into. And now, as far as I’m concerned, to me it’s [one and the same] political class and 
that has made me openly cynical” (Interview). From this it can be deduced that, at least for 
this particular stakeholder, the attainment of ‘political goods’ such as economic growth has 
greatly influenced its satisfaction with one of the political parties in the incumbent coalition. 
As regards trust in political parties, a shift in party loyalty has been observed. The 
Amersham & District Residents Association argued that traditional affinities have eroded 
in recent years, commenting that “people are past the point where they will trust a single 
party, that’s quite possible” (Interview). In the Chilterns, which is a stronghold of the 
Conservative Party, this observation is important because of the increased prominence of 
UKIP as a credible political alternative. As UKIP targets the same electorate as do the 
Conservatives but is also outspoken anti-HS2, this is especially true in the matter at hand. 
Furthermore, low levels of trust have been linked to a wavering willingness of the citizenry 
to hold politicians responsible for their deeds. The Dunsmore Society asserted that 
“there’s a very low level of trust in politicians in this country and a very low level of interest 
in politics in this country” (Interview). This could either mean that citizens lose political 
interest as a result of low trust in politicians, or that low trust emanates from an ingrained 
indifference of the British public towards political decision-making. 
Perhaps one explanation for the low level of political interest is the rather 
‘uncompromissory’ way of every-day democratic practice. Various stakeholders have 
stated that the two main political parties in the country, Conservatives and Labour, are 
miles away from a consensual manner of dialogue. The Dunsmore Society argued that 
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this partisan strife halts any progress. It stated that “Cameron loves to be able to sort of 
shout ‘ruderisms’ to Miliband27, who wants to shout ‘ruderisms’ at Cameron. We’re going 
nowhere” (Interview). CPRE went one step further in claiming that binary relationships 
such as between political parties are also manifested in other realms where rule 
competence is exhibited. It stated that “we don’t have a consensual approach in this 
country; we have an adversarial approach. In politics, but also in the public inquiry 
process and the court system where there’s one side against the other” (Interview). It was 
generally perceived that the two sides involved in a political dispute kept themselves busy 
with one another, much at the expense of the public interest.    
 
7.2.2 Democratic satisfaction and political trust in the project 
 
~ “The bottom line is: we don’t trust the government. Or HS2 Ltd” ~ (Chilterns 
Conservation Board, Interview) 
 
Stakeholder appraisals are important for establishing some sort of baseline regarding 
extant levels of democratic satisfaction and trust. As it can be suggested that in a country 
marred by political cynicism those involved in a spatial planning dispute with national 
proportions – such as is HS2 – are likely to be hostile towards political authority, it is 
evident that such cynicism must be embedded in a broader context. Although it can be 
expected that stakeholders fulminating against a project proposal espoused by the 
incumbent government may find it difficult to support these same politicians in other 
decision-making arenas, almost all of them embraced the system characteristics of 
majoritarian democracy. A lack of opportunities to exercise voice or to publicly contest 
HS2 on its evidence base was attributed to the hostile attitudes of the key political figures 
towards civil society. Stakeholders in the Chilterns sensed this hostility. The Potter Row 
Action Group commented that the only objective of the political establishment is “to drive 
this thing through and as soon as possible, and quash any rebellion” (Interview). 
A lack of such opportunities clearly hints towards democratic dissatisfaction. In its 
response to the public consultation, Stop HS2 (2011) went one step further in claiming 
that “a key democratic deficit, was the failure to adequately inform and consult with the 
public and businesses on the Y route” (pp.1). Another ‘democratic deficit’ was purported to 
be the usage of a hybrid bill to pass HS2 through parliament. The hybrid bill has been 
described by someone from Wormleighton, Warwickshire, who lives along the line of the 
route of Phase 1 of the project, as a ‘device’, “used by the Georgians and Victorians to 
push through canals and railways” and “throws the Town and Country Planning Act out of 
the window” (cited in [29]). Although HS2 is expected to cause ‘pain, misery and 
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 Author’s note: Ed Miliband was the leader of the Labour Party at the time of writing the thesis.  
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disappointment’ according to a planning minister of the Conservative Party (in [30]), 
Members of Parliament (MP) representing the affected parliamentary constituencies have 
not been able to express their views to the House of Commons Transport Committee 
(HCTC), which accommodated the preparation of the hybrid bill prior.  
 When turning to the CF, HS2 Ltd was widely criticized for its unresponsiveness to 
the desires and expectations of civil society stakeholders that were involved. First and 
foremost, to some it proved difficult to access the CF. The Potter Row Action Group 
sensed that the CF “was very much presented as an invitees-only” (Interview), something 
which the Chesham-based stakeholders have experienced first-hand (see Chapter 6). 
Moving beyond the issue of access, a number of malpractices were summed up in relation 
to the CF: the minutes or maps of the blighted areas were either absent, incorrect or not 
distributed on time;  the CF was rather a monologue by HS2 Ltd than a dialogue between 
HS2 Ltd and the stakeholders; and when a dialogue would start, it quickly ended with a 
‘Pavlovian’ reaction to stakeholders’ requests, the most pertinent of which was whether it 
would be feasible to build a tunnel under the entire length of the Chilterns Area of 
Outstanding Natural Beauty (AONB).  
The majority of stakeholders expressed frustration with the people working for HS2 
Ltd. By furthering the statement made earlier by the Chiltern Society that the CF was not 
much more than a ‘ticking-the-box exercise’, from the perspective of democratic 
satisfaction this predominantly related to the degree to which HS2 Ltd staff showed 
responsiveness towards stakeholders’ comments and grievances. Part of the frustration 
can simply be explained by an apparent sense of non-response, “because you write and 
ask them something, and you get this letter [back] that tells you nothing” (Potter Row 
Action Group, Interview). It furthermore took a long time for stakeholders to obtain 
responses from HS2 Ltd. The Campaign to Protect Rural England (CPRE) argued that 
“the government is kind of proud it is working forward in recent consultations, but it takes 
us half a year on something simple from HS2 Ltd” (Interview).  
With regards to the attitude and behaviour of the HS2 Ltd staff during the CF 
meetings, Missenden Action Groups argued that “they haven’t really listened to our local 
reaction or asked what the locals would choose to solve a particular problem. They 
haven’t said: ‘these are our ideas, what are your ideas? What would you do?’” (Interview). 
Some of the staff were classified as arrogant and brazen, going about in the CF without 
showing due consideration for the concerns of stakeholders. The Potter Row Action 
Group ‘addressed’ HS2 Ltd in the interview by asking “if you won’t listen to us, how can 
we give you knowledge?”, then stating that “they seem (...) not actually interested in 
what’s happening on the ground” (Interview). The Chilterns Conservation Board concurred 
with this opinion, asking the – perhaps now rhetorical – question: “what is the point of 
engaging the public if you don’t listen?” (Interview). 
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However, some (passive) sympathy for the facilitators of the community 
engagement could be discerned. Put specifically, it was argued that the quality of public 
engagement was shaped to a large extent by factors beyond the reach of HS2 Ltd. The 
respondent from the Woodland Trust, which as a nationally operating non-governmental 
organization (NGO) participated in the Environmental Forums set up to discuss broader 
ecological and sustainability issues, stated that “I believe that people that work in the 
Department for Transport and HS2 Ltd are working within a very sort of restrictive 
mandate in terms of cost and time and they’re doing the best they can (...), but that due to 
the time and cost of the consultations I think certain elements of the process may suffer in 
quality” (Interview). Although this belief did only marginally resonate in the Chilterns, it 
could be noted amongst the views of some stakeholders. For instance, the Wendover 
Parish Councillor argued that “there’s no point in being abusive to these people 
[organizing the CFs]; they’re only doing their job. They’re doing what their political masters 
have told them” (Interview). 
The unresponsiveness from HS2 Ltd, as perceived by the majority of stakeholders, 
has equally seeped into social appraisals of trust. These appraisals often permeated 
political authority in its entirety, for instance exemplified by the statement that “there is a 
complete lack of trust in HS2 Ltd, a lack of confidence in the Department for Transport 
and, well, we were quite disillusioned with our MP” (Amersham Action Group, Interview). 
A lot of the distrust can be explained by the perceived unwillingness of the Department for 
Transport (DfT) to disclose key pieces of evidence, for instance information on the loading 
factor of trains (i.e. the passenger/seat ratio on any given train). Of course, the loss of 500 
responses or so to the public consultation has not helped build confidence in the good 
intentions of the DfT (see Dialogue by Design, 2012 for the addendum). The Speen Area 
Action Group reasoned that “if you don’t play with an open deck, people are going to 
suspect. And of course the more lies and deceit that happens, like not publishing the 
number of people that are using the West Coast Main Line, the more people suspect” 
(Interview). Thus, according to this stakeholder, it has been a strategic choice by the 
competent authority which information should be available to the available public and 
which information should remain concealed. According to the Potter Row Action Group, 
such selective use of the available data “just breeds distrust” (Interview).    
 With the reported levels of democratic satisfaction and political trust held by 
stakeholders in the Chilterns, which can be regarded to be relatively low in comparison 
with the data surveys and generic appraisals of political trust, it is interesting to observe 
that levels of interpersonal trust can be considered relatively high. Whilst this may be a 
reaction to the poor working relation between the competent authority and civil society, as 
expressed in collective outbursts of protest [31, 32], it may equally be explained by 
pointing out that the campaign against HS2 is a common ‘rallying cause’ for these groups 
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(Chilterns Conservation Board, Interview). In the Chilterns, civil protest against HS2 has 
been explained as emanating from the cultural tradition of “taking on the big guy” 
(Chilterns Conservation Board, Interview). This tradition alludes to a kind of civil 
disobedience on the part of those whose (negative) freedoms are jeopardized by political 
authority. By specifically focusing on HS2, the Chiltern Society has argued that when 
proposed developments lack a clear justification, the ‘fuck-it factor’ comes into play. What 
results from this factor is that civil society groups cluster around certain issues and contest 
them vehemently. 
 Interpersonal trust materialized into various forms. The person behind the 
Cholesbury Action Group, a one-person grassroots initiative in Cholesbury & St. Leonards 
Parish, contended that “my modus operandi is to work with the other groups in the area 
and give them some of my time, my expertise or whatever” (Interview). For the purposes 
of having a consistent approach to the community engagement and obtain state-of-the-art 
information on proposed mitigation measures, stakeholders involved in the CF 
collaborated as much as possible. The South Heath Action Group noted that “there’s two 
people from each of those forums [in the Chilterns] who meet after the round of meetings 
and exchange experiences, et cetera” (Interview). On the Internet, so-called Google 
Groups and mailing lists have served as a lubricant for stakeholders to exchange further 
information and items on the ‘action agenda’. The South Heath Action Group went on to 
argue that “the email is very powerful in terms of the tactics, in terms of what’s going on 
and there is an awful lot of chat along the line of who’s doing what” (Interview). 
 It is important to note that stakeholders were heavily affiliated with one another. 
The Chilterns Conservation Board commented that “there is a tremendous affinity 
between the groups from London all the way to Birmingham” (Interview). This is most 
clearly manifested in the gestation of Stop HS2 and the HS2 Action Alliance, both of which 
are networks or federations comprising many anti-HS2 advocacy organizations. A central 
feature of these networks is that their members contribute to the protest campaign without 
necessarily being known to each other. The Chilterns Conservation Board illustrated this 
latter point by stating that “when a message comes from a certain person in Camden, with 
whom I normally do not have any working relationship, I will read it because I know that 
person knows what he’s talking about, when they’ve got something worth reading. And so 
you build a relationship” (Interview). 
 
7.3 A4DS 
 
As has been summarily stated in Sub-section 4.2.1, the planning process of the A4DS 
spans over forty years. This has been marred by a long-standing deadlock between the 
proponents and opponents of the motorway. Aside from a variety of protest activities 
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organized by the anti-A4DS campaign, such as a picnic on the embankment and the 
‘symbolic burial’ of Midden-Delfland [33], this deadlock has largely transpired within a 
decision-making context. This can for instance be exemplified by the parliamentary 
motions of 1976 and 1998, both of which at the time postponed the decision to go ahead 
with the A4DS indefinitely. However, in recent years a change in the decision-making 
context has been noted. In the AD/Rotterdams Dagblad, a regional newspaper, this point 
was fervently expressed by one of its readers. Submitted to the ‘Opinions’ section in 2009, 
after the publication of the Trajectnota/Milieu-effectrapportage (TN/MER) but before the 
Tracébesluit (Route Decision), not to mention the enactment of the Crisis- en Herstelwet 
(Crisis and Recovery Act) (CHW), this particular reader wrote that:   
 
“Brave men such as Secretary of State Eurlings and Prime Minister Balkenende (...) argue 
that the spade must go into the soil without any further discussion. The nice thing about 
the Netherlands so far is that arguments often prevail over muscle talk and demagogy. It 
is a sign of mature democracy and rational decision-making that the A4 is not yet 
constructed. It would be good for the Netherlands if it would stay this way” (cited in [34]).   
 
The quotation above is clearly indicating a feeling of dissatisfaction with the way 
democracy in the A4DS project has been practiced. Whilst at first glance it may appear 
that the political vestibule of the A4DS has been reticent in making a quick decision [e.g. 
35], it may also be understood as a healthy yet lengthy discussion on the merits and 
demerits of this motorway capacity expansion. However, some are inclined to think that 
certain features of the political culture in the Netherlands, for instance the claim that sound 
argumentation has so far prevailed over who shouts the loudest, have eroded during the 
cabinet-Balkenende IV (2007-2010), in the governing period of which the decision to go 
ahead with the A4DS has been taken. In the remainder of this section, it will be shown 
that also within the confines of the IODS – representing the deliberative setting of the 
planning process – feelings of democratic satisfaction and political trust have been 
expressed. Similar to the previous section, this will be introduced by stakeholder 
appraisals on satisfaction and trust in the general conduct of politics.    
 
7.3.1 Stakeholder appraisals of satisfaction and trust 
 
In answering the question on whether democracy is thought of to be the best political 
system (Question 3 in the questionnaire used for civil society stakeholders, see Appendix 
1), the majority of stakeholders started off by saying that democracy is either the ‘least 
worst’ (e.g. Mijn Partij) or “the best that we have invented so far” (KNNV Delfland, 
Interview). However, certain reservations were voiced as to what should be the core 
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principle of democracy. The stakeholder from the Stichting Stop RW19/A4 admitted that “I 
think that the interpretation of democracy as ‘the majority governs’ is an unsuitable form of 
democracy as the minority will not be heard” (Interview). As a panacea, the ‘Rhineland’28 
tradition of conducting democracy was espoused by this stakeholder as it is considered 
suitable for sharing power and building consensus in the democratic process. The 
Stichting Stop RW19/A4 deployed the term ‘polderen’ to describe this tradition, which is 
particularly powerful in ascribing power-sharing to the Dutch way of conducting politics.         
Discussion on the democratic principle of power-sharing is seamlessly connected 
to attitudes towards democratic satisfaction. Stakeholders often equated this type of 
satisfaction with the notion of good conduct. The Milieufederatie Zuid-Holland commented 
that “good governance is only possible when there is the possibility for stakeholder 
participation” (Interview). In relation to the context of physical and spatial planning, it 
furthermore reasoned that “the government, in its role as the competent authority, has a 
great responsibility to make decisions at the highest level, but also to build a process 
where equity on the negotiation table is ensured” (Interview). This means that the 
competent authority is proactive in engaging citizens and civil groups with policy-making. 
Ideally speaking, court battles and other forms of adversarial politics will prove 
unnecessary when interest groups engage with the issues that affect them (KNNV 
Midden-Delfland, Interview). When seen from this perspective, the influence of the CHW 
on the planning of large-scale infrastructure and, subsequently, democratic satisfaction 
merits special attention in the next sub-section.   
With regards to another aspect of democratic satisfaction, the difference between 
democracy as ‘system’ and democracy as the manifestation of political authority at one 
particular moment in time has been articulated. The democratic system was generally 
regarded as a good thing to have. For example, whilst the Milieufederatie Zuid-Holland 
admitted that “all systems have their downside”, it continued stating that “if democracy 
works the way it should work, then it is probably the best what is possible or feasible to 
have” (Interview). It has furthermore been argued by some of the stakeholders that the 
democratic system as such is not necessarily the reason that poor decisions (at least, in 
the eye of the beholder) are sometimes made. The stakeholder from the KNNV Delfland 
concurred with this argument by stating that “I could be dissatisfied with decision 
outcomes but if I take a look at the system then I can’t be dissatisfied. I think that the 
multi-party system and the necessity for majorities mitigate all extreme viewpoints and 
make decision-making acceptable for the majority” (Interview).  
Conversely, when democracy was interpreted as real-world practice, other 
appraisals were vented. Mirroring the opinion of the reader of the AD/Rotterdams Dagblad 
                                                           
28
 Author’s note: Rhineland democracy is often considered synonymous with consensual democracy. 
Conversely, Westminster democracy (a concept used in Sub-section 7.2.2) is synonymous to majoritarian 
democracy. See also Sub-section 1.5.2. 
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[34], the Milieufederatie Zuid-Holland commented that, “apparently, it is possible that in a 
democracy decisions are made not on rational grounds but, well, on prestige and ego” 
(Interview). This could be the outcome of the short-term thinking that, according to a 
considerable number of the stakeholders, prevails in democratic decision-making. The 
Stichting Natuurmonumenten thought it was ‘tricky’ that new politicians emerge at four-
year intervals, after every General Election. According to this stakeholder, politicians 
“want to score, not do something which lacks public support”, adding in a rather cynical 
tone that “to show signs of perseverance and real inquiry are often not the things that we 
[the electorate] are all waiting for” (Interview). In conjunction with this, the constant influx 
of new politicians may impact on the quality of decision-making. By referring to politicians, 
the Vereniging Tegen Milieubederf argued that “they are quite often ‘non-factual’, which 
means they don’t know anything because they have no knowledge of what is in the 
documents. Or, they’re not intelligent enough” (Interview). 
 Some sort of discrepancy in attitudes towards democratic satisfaction can be 
discerned between stakeholder appraisals of democracy as ‘system’ and democracy as 
‘practice’. However, stakeholders were generally more uniform in their attitudes towards 
political trust. The statement made by the Vereniging Tegen Milieubederf that “the state is 
manipulative and you can’t trust it” (Interview), made with reference to situations where 
the government is pitted against civil society in public policy issues, was an oddity; most 
stakeholders appraised the trustworthiness of the political establishment as high. There 
was a widely shared belief in the ability of prudent decision-makers to play with an open 
deck of cards. When such openness would not be demonstrated, perhaps this was to 
achieve a particular (higher) end. The KNNV Delfland argued that, “of course, there is an 
‘information differential’ which an administration can use (...). The government has 
enormous resources in the fields of expertise and experience than when compared to the 
resources on the other side [i.e. civil society]. So there is no equity in the process, but the 
question is whether this should be the case” (Interview).   
 Stakeholders expressed sympathy with the role of politicians both as an elected 
representative and a maker of good decisions. For example, the Milieufederatie Zuid-
Holland reasoned that “as a politician you have a broad public support base, and you are 
a representative of the people (...), so there will always be conflict that you can’t prevent 
because of the different positions fulfilled by different players” (Interview). For civil society 
stakeholders this reasoning would imply that the inability of politicians to please all parties 
involved, at least within the context of liberal democracy, was intrinsic to democratic 
representation. The Milieufederatie Zuid-Holland continued by stating that “things will 
always hurt, somewhere. But, when you look at the [decision-making] process: is the 
process good? Are all of us following the rules of the game that we have agreed to? Are 
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we doing well in this respect?” (Interview). According to this stakeholder these are 
fundamental questions of political trust.     
 
7.3.2 Democratic satisfaction and political trust in the A4DS project 
 
~ “Rijkswaterstaat is a state within a state” ~ (an oft-used slogan amongst stakeholders 
involved in the A4DS project) 
 
It has been stated that stakeholder appraisals were by and large positive towards 
democracy as ‘system’. As it is the executive agency of the Ministerie van Infrastructuur 
en Milieu (MI&M), and as such the competent authority in planning the A4DS, 
Rijkswaterstaat is not a systemic feature of democracy. Clearly, it has been a prime 
source of suspicion and of distrust, something which the quotation above suggests. With 
regards to democratic satisfaction, both Rijkswaterstaat and its employer, the MI&M, have 
been accused of poor governance. For instance, one viewpoint (‘zienswijze’) that was 
submitted to assess the proposed route decision stated that “we have demonstrated that 
the Ontwerp Tracébesluit conflicts with the written and unwritten principles of good 
governance, in particular the motivation principle, the precautionary principle, the fair-play 
principle and the proportionality principle” (MOBilisation for the Environment, 2010: 30; 
submitted on behalf of Milieuvereniging Zuid-Holland). 
Besides the formal communications of the A4DS project to the general public, for 
instance through the TN/MER and the Tracébesluit, the mode of public engagement was 
also scrutinized in light of democratic satisfaction. Being more of a spatial plan for 
reconfiguring the future of Midden-Delfland than a discussion platform of the utility and 
necessity for constructing the A4DS (IODS, 2001), the IODS was considered 
unresponsive to those stakeholders mostly adhering to the justification discourse. For 
instance, SOBO argued that its pleas for such a discussion “were left unanswered 
because they told us: your reason for being here is livelihood and that’s the responsibility 
of someone else” (Interview). Who that ‘someone else’ may be is unclear, although, as 
has been mentioned in Chapter 6, the IODS (2001) has claimed that the justification of the 
A4DS is a matter for the cabinet and the parliament.  
The executive and legislative branches of government can indeed be seen as the 
locus where ‘justification-oriented’ protest can become manifest. However, the enactment 
of the CHW has been generally appraised as an instrument to stifle citizen opposition 
against major infrastructure projects. The Milieufederatie Zuid-Holland has issued a rather 
cynical commentary when referring explicitly to the political motive behind enacting the 
CHW. It has argued that “the government does not like debate, dialogue and protest. To 
clear any obstacles for implementation as soon as possible, that is the ‘key’” 
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(Milieufederatie Zuid-Holland, 2009: 4). When turning to the IODS for ‘mitigation-oriented 
protest’, a similar disillusionment with political authority can be discerned. Explaining its 
reason for being disillusioned with the IODS, Milieufederatie Zuid-Holland (2010, no page 
numbers provided) commented it felt that it had “not been involved as an equitable partner 
in the fulfilment of the quality projects” undertaken in the IODS, something which led to the 
marginalization of its role as “co-producer of policy” and which “pushed us back in the 
traditional role of policy consumer”.  
It is perhaps safe to categorize SOBO and Milieufederatie Zuid-Holland’s remarks, 
however different they may be, as a critique on the mandate of decision-makers to 
discuss certain things with civil society. However, as regards attitudes towards the degree 
of democratic representation it can be noted that complaints were virtually absent. The 
KNNV Delfland reasoned that “there are many different parties in the feedback group of 
the IODS: residents, residents associations, the KNNV, Vereniging Midden-Delfland... You 
can’t say, looking back, that one of the parties didn’t feel represented” (Interview). 
Similarly, the Midden-Delfland Vereniging – protecting the interests of Midden-Delfland – 
thought that decision-makers treated it as a ‘serious partner’ in deliberating the potential 
adverse consequences of developments in Midden-Delfland (Interview). To some the 
IODS was understood as rapprochement between decision-makers and civil society, 
ultimately rendering the prospect of deliberative democracy a viable future scenario. The 
KNNV Delfland contended that when “consultation of the relevant residents and 
organizations will become better and more frequent, the promise of using judicial 
procedures to obstruct will decrease in necessity” (Interview). 
A highly salient theme within political trust revolved around the widely held 
perception of the existence of a concealed agenda in large-scale infrastructure capacity 
expansion. The Stichting Natuurmonumenten argued that Rijkswaterstaat has “secret 
missions or plans, invisible agendas” (Interview). In the A4DS planning process the 
infrastructure development agenda of Rijkswaterstaat was noted to bring “manipulation 
and disinformation” (Stichting Stop RW19/A4, Interview) to the fore, thereby blindfolding 
the protest movement and effectively resulting in an unfair process of public engagement. 
The perception of a manipulative and misinforming project planner resulted in a strong 
feeling of distrust. Indeed, the Stichting Stop RW19/A4 remembered the wording of a 
guiding principle for those most fervently opposed to the A4DS: “The text is from 
Rijkswaterstaat. It does not state what it states”29 (Interview). The assumption that secret 
agendas guided the A4DS project furthermore informed views on the prime interest of 
Rijkswaterstaat. In voicing a widely shared belief amongst stakeholders, the Stichting 
                                                           
29
 Author’s note: The Dutch translation is a play of words. It reads as follows: “De tekst is van Rijkswaterstaat. 
Er staat niet wat er staat”. 
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Waterweg Wonen asserted that Rijkswaterstaat has “one interest and that is the 
construction of that motorway” (Interview). 
 Although decision-makers and politicians were generally considered prudent and 
responsible in the conduct of politics, perhaps the project nature of the A4DS has been an 
impediment to that. Due to the strong scientific component in the decision-making context 
of the planning process, stakeholders have become aware that some of the scientific data 
could have been used for strategic purposes. A blatant miscalculation of the capacity on 
the A13 in 2006 – thereby impacting the Intensity/Capacity ratio (IC-ratio) of this motorway 
– certainly did not encourage trust in scientific accuracy [36]. The traffic expert claimed 
that the scientists involved in providing the traffic models steered towards creating 
necessity for the A4DS, thereby glossing over potentially valuable counter-evidence. Both 
accounts of scientific inaccuracy could be understood as a genuine lack of knowledge. 
However, trust may also have been impeded by the absolute willingness of decision-
makers to push through projects such as the A4DS, perhaps at the expense of the truth. 
KNNV Delfland told a story about a colleague-protester of the A4DS, who lost his faith in 
the political and scientific establishment of major infrastructure projects. He said that:       
 
“[Name of individual] has minimal trust in the state, because [she/he] experienced in court 
that the State Attorney lied about something. Intentionally. It was argued that the asphalt 
used [in one or other infrastructure project] was silent and that concerns over noise 
pollution lost their relevance as a consequence of this. At this stage the court tends to 
trust the state. In fact, you should be able to trust it. Later on it proved that the claim made 
by the State Attorney was incorrect and which was well-known before the court meeting. 
So, this is some form of trickery which in some instances is used by the state. It does not 
encourage citizen trust” (Interview).      
 
A practical consequence of a (tacit) feeling of distrust is the existence of Stichting 
Batavier, which was founded after the decision to construct the A4DS had been made. 
Stichting Batavier monitors whether the provisions (e.g. the height of a viaduct, the cutting 
or planting of trees) made in the Tracébesluit will be carried out by Rijkswaterstaat and the 
developer, which is an infrastructure construction consortium (called ‘A4all’). Whilst 
monitoring has partly become necessary according to the Stichting Batavier due the 
expected difficulty to convert these provisions from paper into reality, it is also necessary 
due to a sensed lack of transparency in the communication between Rijkswaterstaat and 
citizens, particularly in reaching out to those living in close proximity to the alignment. As 
an outcome of this latter point, as well as being the ‘last man standing’, the Stichting 
Batavier fulfils a function as the watchdog of the project. In describing its functionality, it 
argued that “people can go straight to Rijkswaterstaat with their questions, which has an 
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email address and a customer centre, but apparently they turn to us instead because they 
expect some sort of a non-response from Rijkswaterstaat. So they ask questions: ‘hey, 
Batavier, is this and this correct?’” (Interview). 
 There was a considerable degree of interpersonal trust amongst stakeholders 
involved in the A4DS project. Interpersonal trust became manifest in collective action and 
information exchange. The platform Hoezo Midden-Delfland Snelweg?30 (Why a Midden-
Delfland Motorway?) assembled a number of civil society stakeholders whose main 
interest in becoming involved in protest was to protect Midden-Delfland, the impact area. 
Its News Letter (e.g. hoezomiddendelflandsnelweg.nl, 2011) served to provide the latest 
update on developments in the planning process or on the location and date of future 
protest activities. Initiatives such as this platform, in conjunction with the collaborative 
space provided by the feedback group of the IODS, helped build alliances between 
stakeholders. The KNNV Delfland argued that stakeholders worked together in a 
harmonious relationship by stressing that “there was no distrust, none at all. All of us were 
really on the same page” (Interview). Stakeholders were aware that collaboration could 
benefit the success of their protest. For example, the Milieufederatie Zuid-Holland argued 
that “if you step into a process [of campaigning together], then you have to work together 
to build trust and to work on the best solution” (Interview). 
The question what is the ‘best solution’ has been a pertinent one. As a result of the 
multiple ways of answering it, opinions diverge on whether to collaborate or not. This 
could have been instructed by instrumental reasons, such as has been the case with the 
Stichting Waterweg Wonen. This housing association became involved in discussing 
impact mitigation in the planning process because its properties, concentrated west of the 
alignment in Vlaardingen, could be adversely affected by increased noise levels. Since it 
did not necessarily want to dispense with the idea of an additional motorway connection 
between The Hague and Rotterdam, it saw no reason for involvement in a more 
fundamental discussion on the traffic-related merits of the A4DS. It stated that “it is not in 
our interest that this motorway will not be constructed, simply because we don’t have an 
opinion about it. They [the environmental groups] had a pure interest in stopping this 
motorway, something we absolutely didn’t want to be associated with” (Stichting 
Waterweg Wonen, Interview). This conveys a strategic consideration of this particular 
stakeholder to not choose sides in the deadlock between Rijkswaterstaat and civil society 
groups that became engaged in protesting the A4DS for environmental reasons. 
Analogous to the observed divergence between protest based on the storylines of 
‘no utility and necessity’ and ‘do not hear, do not see, do not smell’, some distrust could 
be discerned between civil society stakeholders advocating either one of these protest 
avenues. Similar to the resentment of the Vereniging Tegen Milieubederf against a 
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 The official name of this network is a web address: http://www.hoezomiddendelflandsnelweg.nl.  
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stakeholder that supported the A4DS in exchange for additional hectares of new nature 
(see Chapter 6), the Stichting Stop RW19/A4 argued that its collaboration with another 
stakeholder ceased after the latter opted out from protesting against the construction of 
the A4DS. The collaboration did not end in good terms, however, since it suspected that 
the other party opted out in order to realize privately held goals. According to the Stichting 
Stop RW19/A4, this “is the antidote of [interpersonal] trust: they are ‘bullshitted over’” by 
Rijkswaterstaat, for instance in exchange for certain mitigation measures (Interview). For 
this particular stakeholder, this has come as no surprise. It continued by stating that “this 
has always been the preferred tactic. Of course you start to invest in trust, but you have to 
be constantly aware and keep in mind the agendas” (Interview).   
 When a common goal was agreed, for instance the goal to put the ‘why’ rather 
than the ‘how’ of the A4DS centre-stage as has been done in Hoezo Midden-Delfland 
Snelweg?, the network of which has been described by the Stichting Stop RW19/A4 as a 
‘denominator’ all could agree to, interpersonal trust was an inherent feature of stakeholder 
collaboration. One way interpersonal trust could be illustrated is by mapping stakeholder 
appraisals of the creation of a collaborative environment. The respondent from the KNNV 
Waterweg-Noord stated that “I think it is really fantastic that they [the NGOs] bring these 
groups together, because that is quite a tough job. I think they do good work” (Interview). 
Another way to illustrate interpersonal trust is by looking at the division of labour between 
the stakeholders involved. For Milieudefensie – a national environmental advocacy 
organization – there was no need to meddle with other civil society stakeholders. With 
respect to its relationship with local stakeholders, it argued that “those people are there on 
the ground, and they know what’s best. We have our national contacts and our national 
media attention, so with these we can lift the protest to a higher ground” (Interview).   
  
7.4 Summary 
 
When political culture is premised on democratic satisfaction and political trust, a 
difference between the UK and the Netherlands in these two respects can be discerned in 
the value surveys. The Netherlands generally score higher on indicators of democratic 
satisfaction and political trust. However, it can be assumed that the stakeholders 
considered in this research can be found in the mid-segment of the value spectrum; the 
UK and the Netherlands are relatively comparable in this respect. Although there is a lack 
of comparative research on (levels of) interpersonal trust in the UK and the Netherlands, 
in both countries social science research has considered it important for the organizational 
self-capacity of civil society. This is not to suggest that interpersonal trust is based on faith 
in others, as trust can be principally motivated by self-interest. 
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 In the HS2 project, stakeholder appraisals of democratic satisfaction hover 
between satisfaction with democracy as ‘system’ and satisfaction with the incumbent 
coalition government, to be interpreted as political authority. Whilst stakeholders were 
generally satisfied with the majoritarian system, they are dissatisfied with the coalition 
government. Political trust is somewhat wavering, principally caused by the partisan strife 
and the ineptitude of politicians to cater for the public good. In the HS2 project, 
stakeholders exhibited low levels of democratic satisfaction and political trust. In 
organizing the CF, HS2 Ltd did not fulfil stakeholders’ expectations of what should be a 
conduct of good governance. For instance, key information on the loading factor of the 
West Coast Main Line (WCML) was not distributed on time, thought to be motivated by 
strategic reasons. Interpersonal trust between the stakeholders was high. It was 
commented that friendly relations existed between civil society groups all along the line of 
route, as well as in the Chilterns. 
 In the A4DS project, stakeholders were very positive about the democratic system, 
arguing that there is not a better system at hand. There was substantial critique against 
politicians, however, as they primarily focus on the short term and do not possess a 
sufficient amount of factual knowledge. When the good intentions of politicians were made 
the subject of inquiry, political trust was generally high. In the A4DS project, these positive 
views went largely overboard. There was a substantial lack of consensus-building in the 
project, particularly when stakeholders wanted to discuss the flawed claim of necessity of 
expanding the motorway capacity. Political trust was low: it was assumed that secret 
agendas of infrastructure development dominated the discussions between them and 
Rijkswaterstaat; blatant mistakes and lies did not add to the feeling of trust. Similar to the 
HS2 case, interpersonal trust could generally be considered high. Although some 
incongruence existed between those adhering to ‘utility and necessity’ and to ‘do not hear, 
do not see, do not smell’, stakeholders united in a platform to try to get the best possible 
outcome, thereby exchanging information and sharing responsibilities.  
 It should have become apparent that environmental impact assessment (EIA) has 
played a less than minor role in this chapter. Stakeholder reflections were premised on the 
actions of politicians or the quality of the community engagement, but not so much on 
whether the EIA had been conducted in a satisfying and trustworthy way. Arguably, EIA 
has had no influence whatsoever in shaping the politico-cultural orientations of 
stakeholders in the Chilterns that were involved in the HS2 project. In the A4DS project, 
only marginal influence can be ascribed to the TN/MER in determining such orientations. 
An underlying question that is indirectly associated with the research question is: to what 
extent does EIA prove an adequate policy environment for investigating the mobilization of 
sustainability discourses? Whilst the ‘harvest’ of sustainability discourses that explicitly 
relate to EIA (Chapter 5) has been reduced to those that have stressed the need to 
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conserve the impact areas in the projects, and whilst the institutional designs of the 
projects can be reduced to community engagement when discussing impacts, political 
culture has not been manifested in EIA. This conclusion opens up important debate on the 
role of EIA in accommodating discourse mobilization where large-scale infrastructure 
projects are concerned, something already briefly touched upon in Chapter 6. The 
following two chapters will elaborate on this debate.      
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Chapter 8  Discussion on counter-expertise and discourse 
 
This chapter discusses the empirical findings obtained in the previous three chapters. It 
does so by linking new theoretical insights to these findings, thereby challenging the 
theoretical framework. In particular, it will provide an analysis which can potentially rival 
the model on sustainability discourse mobilization as laid bare in Figure 2.1, perhaps at 
this advanced stage in the thesis to be considered the ‘conventional’ model for guiding 
theory on this topic. The analysis privileges stakeholder reflections on the versatile use of 
science in making up the evidence base of the HS2 and A4DS projects. This is first of all 
necessary because public engagement with science – coined counter-expertise in this 
chapter – is quite different from modes of public engagement that are structured by 
institutions or the cultural orientation of civil society. Furthermore, the analysis is 
necessary because science has played its dominant part in (non-institutionalized) forms of 
protest in both projects.  
The chapter consists of two parts and a summary section (Section 8.3). In the first 
part, the roles of science and civil counter-expertise in large-scale infrastructure are 
discussed. Manifested throughout the previous chapters, most prominently expressed 
through the narrative dealing with the justification discourses in Chapter 5, casual 
reference is made to a polemic debate between the advocates of the proposed 
developments, i.e. HS2 and A4DS, and the ‘anti-campaigns’ on the evidence base of the 
projects. The different viewpoints between the formal policy discourses and the 
justification discourses in each project are teased out. Since these latter discourses have 
been instrumental in organizing protest around certain themes, it is worth looking at the 
ways in which protest has revolved around the scientific validity of the evidence 
presented. Particular attention is devoted to the role of potential scientific biases in 
strategies of formal project appraisal and how this role has been envisaged by those 
stakeholders that engaged in debating the underlying justification of the projects. As will 
be shown, stakeholders did not eschew from teasing out assumptions that are often easily 
taken for granted.   
 The second part returns to environmental impact assessment (EIA). It does so by 
focusing on the complex relationship between EIA, science, and counter-expertise, and 
whether the latter can be considered a valuable protest strategy in the procedural context 
of EIA. By making explicit reference to discourse, from an abductivist scheme of inference 
(see Chapter 3) it can and, indeed, should be discussed whether protest based on 
counter-expertise is more of an influential external factor to the mobilization of 
sustainability discourses within the procedural surroundings of EIA than are institutional 
design and political culture. Abduction aims to conclude whether the HS2 and A4DS 
projects exemplify cases where sustainability discourses are accommodated (see Table 
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3.2). As Chapter 6 and 7 have demonstrated, respectively, stakeholder reflections on 
institutional design and political culture have been formulated in relative isolation from 
EIA. Without drawing premature conclusions in this chapter, which of course is the 
principal task of Chapter 9, the prominence of the justification discourses in both projects 
beckons further inquiry into EIA and the influence exerted by counter-expertise. As this 
chapter shows, this source of influence should be seen as another potentially potent 
variable for steering the mobilization of sustainability discourses.    
 
8.1 Science and civil counter-expertise in infrastructure projects 
 
8.1.1 HS2 
 
An obvious locus of protest in the Chilterns has proved to be the location of the proposed 
line of route of Phase 1, which has mainly revolved around the perceived inadequacy of 
the preferred scheme to place it in an already existing transport corridor (e.g. Potter Row 
Action Group, Interview). Whilst it was rebutted by the Independent Rail Consultant that a 
line of route for example following the M1 motorway corridor (London-Birmingham) would 
cause much more property blight by bisecting larger population centres (e.g. Luton) than 
would the current line of route, or that the existing West Coast Main Line (WCML) train 
corridor is simply too narrow (Interview), such a locus of protest should hardly come as a 
surprise. The Chesham Society claimed that HS2 has “zero in the use for anybody in the 
Chilterns (...), it serves us no useful purpose at all” (Interview). However, interestingly, this 
stakeholder referred to the lack of broader benefits for commuters or local businesses 
rather than to the expected adverse ecological and sustainability impacts. Following the 
narrative set out in the justification discourse, civil counter-expertise has equally targeted 
the business rationale of HS2.         
Notwithstanding the many facets where scientific evidence is used, and 
subsequently contested, the cost-benefit ratio of HS2 has been most prominently 
manifested in debate surrounding the project. Either in anticipation or in reaction to the 
economic justification set forth by HS2 Ltd (e.g. 2012a; 2012b), there has been a true 
maelstrom of counter-evidence presented by civil society stakeholders on what is 
presumed to be a more accurate cost-benefit ratio. Besides the ‘usual suspects’ in 
conducting counter-expertise, such as the HS2 Action Alliance (2013), described by the 
Dunsmore Society as the “intellectual side of the campaign” (Interview), economic think 
tanks (e.g. Adam Smith Institute, 2011) or research institutes (e.g. Aizlewood and 
Wellings, 2011), organizations affiliated with government have also become involved. The 
National Audit Office (2013), for instance, has challenged what they perceive as an over-
optimistic appraisal of HS2’s economic benefits. This has been confirmed by the Major 
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Projects Authority of the Cabinet Office as well as by the House of Commons Committee 
of Public Accounts (2013), adding that the “estimated costs of High Speed 2 have 
increased substantially” (pp.10).  
The claim made by HS2 Ltd (HS2 Ltd, 2012a: 39) that “around 148,000 
passengers would use HS2 each day on the section between Birmingham Interchange 
and Old Oak Common” was heavily contested. The Potter Row Action Group ascribed 
words such as ‘laughable’ and ‘just madness’ to this claim (Interview); the Dunsmore 
Society argued that with this expected passenger demand, “we could empty Birmingham 
in two days!” (Interview). The stakeholder affiliated with the Amersham & District 
Residents Association argued that “I don’t know of a single study of any high-speed rail 
projects anywhere in Europe where the actual take-up of the demand met the 
expectations and justification documents. It just doesn’t happen” (Interview). The relatively 
recent British experience with High-Speed rail 1 (HS1) has probably been most known to 
stakeholders, where the expected passenger demand was three times higher than the 
actual demand (House of Commons Committee of Public Accounts, 2012). 
With regards to journey time savings, Sub-section 5.1.1 has provided a number of 
reasons why a case for HS2 based on this benefits category is flawed. These ranged from 
‘hard’ science (e.g. North/South train services using conventional rail can be made faster), 
via empirical evidence (e.g. business people do work on trains) to ‘soft’ science (the need 
for long-distance business travel in the future is expected to be low). The statement that 
HS2 does not affect the length of door-to-door journeys (e.g. Chesham Society, Interview) 
is interesting as it counters both the immediate objectives of providing additional seating 
capacity and saving journey time. According to Go-HS2 (Interview), a Birmingham-based 
pro-HS2 group affiliated with the regional public transport operator Centro, HS2 offers 
unparalleled opportunities to the West Midlands in becoming the most important hub in 
the national North/South transport artery. An important reason is that Phase 1 and Phase 
2 will become physically connected in the outskirts of Birmingham. However, it has been 
argued that conventional rail services to regional stations not included in the proposed 
HS2 scheme (e.g. Coventry) will become less frequent and will have more intermediate 
stops (51m, 2011b), both of which increase journey times in the ‘periphery’.  
Hovering over the argumentation on journey time savings and an increase in 
business travellers is the cost-benefit ratio, arguably the life blood of the HS2 project. HS2 
Ltd (2012a) has argued that the value of time (VOT) for business trips is at the heart of the 
project’s cost-benefit ratio and has therefore received widespread attention (e.g. Batley et 
al., 2012; Department for Transport Strategy Unit, 2012; HS2 Action Alliance, 2013). This 
is not surprising given the fact that time saved on business journeys accounts for roughly 
three quarters (£7.4 billion) of the benefits of journey time savings (HS2 Ltd, 2012a), the 
latter accounting for roughly 55% of the overall benefits. The VOT is based on an 
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estimation of the ‘resource cost’ for employers to let their employees travel during working 
time (Department for Transport, 2012b). The resource cost is predominantly based on the 
average salary of business passengers expected to use HS2. It is currently estimated to 
be around £80,000 and will steadily increase when price levels increase. Wendover HS2 
noted that, if an increase of about 2% continues during HS2’s appraisal period of sixty 
years, “you end up with a salary in real terms of about £300,000. So basically every 
business passenger is going to be earning a second rate footballers’ salary” (Interview). 
According to this stakeholder, the VOT is a ‘trick’ to boost the cost-benefit ratio since its 
growth rate is higher than the project’s discount rate of 1%.       
 
8.1.2 A4DS 
 
Inquiry into the assumed necessity for large-scale infrastructure capacity expansion 
requires a focus on the rationale for such developments. Sub-section 5.2.1 has suggested 
that the assumption of the natural growth of traffic has proved to be a particularly 
dominant rationale in the A4DS project. Project advocates could argue that the drivers of 
natural traffic growth are beyond the sphere of influence of infrastructure or transport 
policy, such as socio-economic and demographic drivers (e.g. Zimmermann et al., 1974; 
Owens and Cowell, 2011). Goodwin (2001: 21) has furthermore argued that natural traffic 
growth is traditionally assumed by traffic planners to be “an autonomous and inevitable 
trend, driven primarily by the choices of free individuals, and enabled by the steady growth 
of real income that all countries sought to provide”. From this point of view it can be 
asserted that concerted efforts to stop traffic from growing naturally are inherently unable 
to yield success.  
As mentioned earlier, Rijkswaterstaat is the executive agency of the Ministerie van 
Infrastructuur en Milieu (MI&M) and therefore responsible for developing the A4DS. 
However, the remark made by SOBO that “Rijkswaterstaat is only the developer, full stop” 
(Interview) has not been reciprocated by many of the other stakeholders. In particular, 
stakeholders claimed that Rijkswaterstaat is driven by a concealed agenda of 
infrastructure development, irrespective of which way the political wind blows (e.g. 
Stichting Natuurmonumenten, Interview). Rijkswaterstaat (2012b: 4) itself admitted that its 
goal is to establish “a robust and coherent mobility system with enough capacity to handle 
the demand expected in the medium (2008) and long term (2040)”. Arguably, the 
assumption of natural traffic growth plays a pivotal role in the repeatedly expressed need 
for additional infrastructure capacity. From this perspective it is perhaps good to 
remember that Rijkswaterstaat (2009c: 27) claimed the need for the A4DS is caused by 
traffic growth, based on “an assumed growth of the population, economy, number of 
households, car ownership, etc.”.     
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 If it is accepted that traffic growth and infrastructure capacity expansion are 
intimately related, as has been suggested in Figure 5.3, then logic suggests that 
advocates of infrastructure development such as Rijkswaterstaat benefit from accepting 
modelled forecasts of traffic growth. Such forecasts provide a recurring justification for 
realizing the agenda items associated with infrastructure development, which according to 
some stakeholders makes them ‘inevitable’ (e.g. SP Delft, Interview). Part of the same 
group of stakeholders however has argued that this justification is not only built on a 
shaky foundation, but that the underlying assumption of natural traffic growth is wrong to 
begin with. The Traffic Expert from TU Delft claimed that “the assumption of autonomous 
traffic growth is blindness, it is the limited judgement. ‘Growth is autonomous?’ No, it is not 
autonomous!” (Interview). What is more, the very concept of perpetual traffic growth has 
been the subject of contestation. Milieudefensie argued that “there is no-one who 
forecasts that traffic will grow indefinitely. Even the real experts agree that in 2040 growth 
will cease, and probably earlier” (Interview). 
 Through carefully analyzing the core tenets of the rationale for the A4DS, which 
subsequently forms the basis of the justification discourse, it should become apparent that 
these so-called ‘real experts’ are not employed by the MI&M. In the 2004 Nota Mobiliteit 
(Mobility Note), the equivalent of a white paper in the Dutch government context, mobility 
is identified as a “precondition for economic growth and social development in the 
Netherlands” (Ministerie van Verkeer en Waterstaat and VROM, 2004: 15). By embracing 
the a priori view that more mobility (i.e. traffic growth) can be expected in the future, the 
government has intricately linked the economy, mobility and the target of accessibility 
improvement by deploying the following reasoning (Ministerie van Verkeer en Waterstaat 
and VROM, 2004): 
 
• Areas of economic importance need to remain accessible; 
• More mobility leads to less accessibility; 
• Mobility reduction is not an option; 
• Infrastructure as a guiding principle. 
 
Whilst the government has realized that ‘unnecessary’ traffic needs to be avoided, for 
instance through improving information technology and communication infrastructures 
(Ministerie van Verkeer en Waterstaat and VROM, 2004), ongoing plans for infrastructure 
development in the A4DS study area have led stakeholders to fear for such unnecessary 
traffic to become induced (e.g. Vereniging Tegen Milieubederf, Interview). By concurring 
with Litman (2010) that congestion maintains equilibrium when motorway capacity is 
expanded, the Traffic Expert argued that the A4DS will simultaneously consolidate the 
current pinch points in the study area (e.g. Klein Polderplein junction) and create new 
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ones (e.g. Kethelplein Junction) due to the co-evolution of newly generated traffic and 
bottlenecks (Interview). Many other stakeholders implicitly referred to the A4DS as both 
the cause and effect of a self-fulfilling prophecy in infrastructure development. 
 
8.1.3 Reflections on prominent scientific biases 
 
In both the HS2 and A4DS projects, what could be coined the formal science-policy 
discourse of the competent authority have been vehemently challenged by civil counter-
expertise. Debate on the validity of scientific claims and their subsequent transposition 
into policy has been principally led by questions on the quality of the evidence presented. 
However, in furthering the discussion on the roles of science and counter-expertise in the 
two projects, stakeholder reflections on prominent scientific biases have surfaced. Such 
reflections stressed the manipulative character of scientific assumptions underlying the 
very evidence base of the projects. For instance, in the A4DS project the influence of a 
stringent road pricing scheme has not been evaluated (Traffic Expert, Interview), simply 
because the scientific traffic model used to forecast future traffic volumes has not 
considered this particular policy instrument. Because of this lack of consideration, 
alternatives to the proposed development could not come into full maturity. The HS2 case 
has also been rife with similar examples which attest to the role of scientific biases in 
setting some order of preference in the project documentation.          
The claim made by the stakeholders that the evidence base of both the projects is 
manipulated in favour of the incumbent development resonates in the literature on 
infrastructure development. Næss (2011) has argued that the advocates of a development 
may ‘filter knowledge’ where alternative infrastructure developments are compared with 
the incumbent policy option. In the case of road infrastructure development, such filtering 
consists of ignoring adverse impacts associated with the incumbent option, for instance 
the occurrence of induced traffic. Where the reference situation (the ‘no-build’ alternative) 
is concerned, the evidence base suffers from a ‘pessimism bias’ (Næss, 2011). Premised 
on the assumption that adverse autonomous developments in the reference situation will 
inevitably occur, such as increased demand pressure through natural traffic growth 
(Goodwin, 2011), the pessimism bias sustains the assumption that the reference situation 
is intrinsically incapable of facilitating future traffic volumes.  
By associating the pessimism bias with the unrealistic appraisal of the reference 
situation in infrastructure planning, Næss (2011) has paraphrased the ‘optimism bias’. 
This latter bias, on its part, is identified to often be a factor of influence in infrastructure 
project planning (Flyvbjerg et al., 2005). Whilst an incumbent project proposal may make 
the reference situation seem incapable of accommodating traffic and passenger volumes, 
the optimism bias prohibits the taking of a cautionary approach to what benefits can be 
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expected from the proposed development. Thus, in contrast to the pessimism bias, the 
optimism bias ascribes benefits to the incumbent option which are far from realistic. It has 
been asserted that either wishful thinking (‘the wish is father to the thought’) or the political 
motives of planners and decision-makers instruct the optimism bias (Flyvbjerg, 2007). 
When the procedural stage of comparing viable alternatives in EIA is over, or when 
assumptions on traffic and passenger growth have been promoted to statements, using 
modelled outcomes as their underlying justification, the optimism bias could take a lead 
role in stakeholders’ reflection on the flawed rationale for the development. 
Evidence on the expected traffic volume is important for justifying proposed 
developments. However, the relationship between infrastructure and the evidence base of 
proposed developments is complex. Within the manifestation of optimism bias this 
becomes particularly manifest through induced traffic (or induced travel in rail 
infrastructure), the occurrence of which marks the difference between ‘autonomous’ 
growth and growth that results from the development. Flyvbjerg et al. (2005) and Welde 
and Odeck (2011) have argued that road infrastructure projects systematically undervalue 
the influence of induced traffic. Amongst others, induced traffic impacts adversely on the 
objective to relieve congestion (Noland and Lem, 2002), identified as the prime incentive 
for construction in the A4DS project. Whilst Rijkswaterstaat (2009c) has acknowledged 
the occurrence of induced traffic, it has not linked induced traffic to sustained levels of 
congestion. In rail infrastructure projects, in contrast, induced travel is systematically 
overvalued as it is often used as proof for the public utility of the proposed development 
(Flyvbjerg et al., 2005). Competent authorities want to demonstrate that passengers are 
faced with a number of constraints in the rail infrastructure, such as (over)crowding (e.g. 
HS2 Ltd and Department for Transport, 2011), but that the proposed development will 
make the option of travelling by train more attractive.  
Pessimism and optimism biases based on induced traffic or travel growth are two 
sides of the same coin. That is, the incumbent proposal benefits from downgrading the 
reference situation and upgrading the proposed development based on expected demand. 
Costs are also a prominent cause for optimism bias, however. This is particularly true for 
construction costs, as it is often this figure that captures people’s imagination. HS2 Ltd 
(2012b) has acknowledged that it needs to approach its cost estimation cautiously 
precisely for the danger of succumbing to an over-optimistic appraisal. Stakeholders in the 
Chilterns have criticized the cost estimation of HS2 (Wendover HS2, 2010), and not 
without good reason. Whilst the construction costs for HS2 were estimated to be around 
£32 billion in the January 2012 project documentation (e.g. HS2 Ltd, 2012f), estimated 
cost increases since then have been a topic worthy of focus by the popular press (e.g. in 
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[2]31) as well as, for example, a number of concerned Members of Parliament (MP) in the 
House of Commons Committee of Public Accounts (2013). And, of course, stakeholders 
have used estimated cost increases to their advantage. Hillary Wharf, an economist of the 
HS2 Action Alliance, asked the rhetorical and also sarcastic question: "How much longer 
do they think the tax payer will listen to their bleatings about this £50 billion white elephant 
being vital to the future of the UK’s economy?” (cited in [37]). 
The claim has been made by Flyvbjerg et al. (2005) and Næss (2011) that 
strategic-political considerations contribute to the inaccuracy of infrastructure demand 
forecasts and their associated costs and benefits, seen from a multi-criteria perspective. 
These considerations have also been a contributory cause to both the pessimism and 
optimism bias. Stakeholders in the HS2 and A4DS cases generally agreed that these 
biases were politically motivated. For instance, the HS2 Action Alliance (2012) has 
asserted that the DfT deliberately used 11-year old data to bolster the VOT of every 
working hour spent travelling in order to justify HS2 as being a cost-saving attribute. 
These data stemmed from the era when the train was still an elite way of travelling. 
However, stakeholders made the important observation that an apparent power 
asymmetry exists between the competent authority and the consultancy or research 
institute which has been commissioned to forecast future demand or calculate the cost-
benefit ratio of projects. This power asymmetry prevented an objective evaluation by a 
third party of either the data input, the modelled outcomes or the actual model used. By 
referring implicitly to the A4DS case, Milieudefensie asserted that: 
 
“all the consultancies, all of them, depend on the assignments of Rijkswaterstaat. So, if 
you apply for an assignment, then you will not contest the outcomes [obtained from using 
Rijkswaterstaat’s own model] by fear of being left out of receiving future assignments. 
Rijkswaterstaat commissions the same calculations to be carried out five times and will 
take over the outcomes they find most interesting” (Interview). 
 
The model that Milieudefensie alluded to is the Nieuw Regionaal Model (New Regional 
Model) (NRM), which is used by Rijkswaterstaat (2009c) to model the impacts on traffic 
resulting from broader demographic and socio-economic scenarios provided by 
government planning bureaus. A prognosis of population growth in the middle and longer 
term is particularly important for predicting future traffic volumes, although in a publication 
issued by Rijkswaterstaat it has been cautioned that paying sole attention to prognoses 
associated with population size is too simplistic (Van der Waard, 2012). Nevertheless, it 
has been claimed that the justification of large-scale infrastructure projects relies heavily 
on population growth, because if “more inhabitants are brought into a traffic model, then 
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 This reference (where parentheses are used) is a newspaper article. To see how newspaper articles are referenced, 
please refer to the second footnote of Chapter 4. 
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the model generates more traffic. In this way, utility and necessity can be better justified” 
(Sambell, 2009: II). The relevance of the NRM for agreeing on the need for new 
infrastructures is therefore considerably influenced by assumptions on population growth.     
According to Milieudefensie (Interview), the outcomes that Rijkswaterstaat will 
eventually select for the evidence base of their projects are the outcomes that best justify 
their preferred development option. A parallel can be drawn between the A4DS project 
and the HS2 project with regards to the related assumptions of power asymmetry and the 
formulation of policy preferences. The Cholesbury Action Group argued that the 
government “made the decision [to proceed with HS2] and then they, as it were, told the 
DfT: ‘go in the corner and play with bricks, but make sure you come back with the answer 
that says high-speed rail is the right solution’” (Interview). This seems to indicate that civil 
society stakeholders suspected that the project evidence was politically biased, or that the 
role of evidence in the project was driven by political motivation. Similar to observations 
made in Chapter 6 that HS2 Ltd was confined to the political milieu in which it had to 
operate, the same observation was made regarding the scientists that engaged with 
determining the cost-benefit ratio of HS2. The stakeholder from the Amersham Action 
Group argued that:      
 
“I think the models were developed by people who were trying to do a good scientific job 
of it. The people who then applied them later tended to tweak them to get the answers 
they want. (...) Whilst basically the model underlying it can be good, they don’t model 
everything that you need for the particular calculation. If you want you can take a good 
scientific model and get out results according to where you’re lying” (Interview). 
 
8.2 The complex relationship between EIA and counter-expert protest 
 
Thus far this chapter has shown that the formal project appraisals have used science to 
support the claim that HS2 and A4DS are necessary infrastructure developments. In order 
to support such a claim, science has furnished the advocates of both projects with 
seemingly compelling decision-supporting evidence hinting at the mismatch between a 
rising public demand for new infrastructure, on the one hand, and the limited available 
capacity in the reference situation, on the other. Science has quantified such a demand in 
terms of the public utility for development, expressing the necessity to alleviate pressure 
on the existing infrastructure capacity (i.e. crowding relief and congestion relief). 
Conversely, civil society stakeholders in both of the projects have asserted that the 
evidence used to claim necessity is flawed and that certain biases are intrinsic to how the 
incumbent development option is compared with alternative options, including the 
reference situation. The justification discourses in both projects illuminate these 
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assertions, as well as doubts amongst civil society stakeholders about the validity of the 
evidence base that have arisen in tandem with the proliferation of the scientific justification 
of the projects.   
The use of ‘justification science’, to frame it as such, may have multiple uses in 
infrastructure projects. A government think tank on mobility issues in the Netherlands has 
argued that the outcomes of traffic models can be used for multiple decision-support tools, 
such as “societal cost-benefit analyses, environmental impact assessments and for 
deciding on mitigating measures in a route decision” (Martens et al., 2010: 9). This clearly 
attests to the versatile use of science in various areas of a proposed infrastructure 
development, a statement which can be made more meaningful by looking at a case. For 
instance, the aforementioned NRM traffic model used by Rijkswaterstaat has played a key 
role in the evidence base of the environmental statement of the A4DS project, the 
Trajectnota/Milieu-effectrapportage (TN/MER) (Route Proposal/Environmental Impact 
Assessment). In EIA, the outcomes of the NRM model have been especially important for 
demonstrating the difference in Intensity/Capacity ratios (IC-ratio) when choosing for 
either the A4DS or its main competitor, the ‘A13+A13/16’ (Rijkswaterstaat, 2009c). The 
IC-ratio is a quantification of congestion and therefore leading in demonstrating the merit 
for any of the proposed alternatives.  
As part of a carefully delineated list of the procedural stages of EIA (see also Table 
1.1), public engagement (or public participation) is an important aspect of EIA. Arguably, 
stakeholder engagement with EIA may not only buoy the formulation of sustainability 
discourses (Wilkins, 2003), but it may equally help define what people can expect from it 
(e.g. Rozema et al., 2012). O'Faircheallaigh (2010) has furthermore demonstrated that a 
wide variety of purposes can be attributed to EIA. However, as a consequence of this 
wide variety, for citizens and civil society groups to actually be able to influence a decision 
is only one amongst many other purposes. It is by no means guaranteed that public 
engagement will make a profound change to the incumbent project proposal. In particular, 
the ‘worth’ of public engagement with EIA is levered to a considerable extent by whether 
science is open to public scrutiny (Cashmore, 2004). The debate on the ‘civicness’ of 
science in EIA is indeed important for navigating the role of civil society stakeholders 
herein. This is especially so when civil contention is driven by the perception that there are 
flaws in the evidence base of the proposed project in question.  
It is fair to say that the conduct of counter-expertise has been of strategic 
importance for most of the stakeholders that have vehemently protested against the 
proposed developments. The Cholesbury Action Group illustrated this quite clearly by 
stating that, “okay, I’m an activist and I’m trying to stop this thing. But I’m stopping it on the 
basis of actual solid evidence-based analysis. To me that’s the only thing that matters” 
(Interview). However, interviews with the stakeholders in both projects (with e.g. Chiltern 
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Ridges Action Group and Stichting Stop RW19/A4, see also Chapter 5) have revealed 
that stakeholders did not consider EIA to represent a space where protest based on 
evidence-based decision-making could easily be vented. Quite the contrary, stakeholders 
noted that the procedural requirements of EIA which privileged a focus on the impacts of 
the projects related uncomfortably to forms of counter-expert protest associated with the 
project justification. 
Because of its focus on impact prediction and the identification of mitigation 
measures, the procedural requirements of EIA did not adequately correspond with what 
stakeholders preferred to discuss. During the sparse moments in the interviews where the 
role of EIA was pondered over, stakeholders mainly lamented the poor integration of 
alternatives into the project documentation. As mentioned earlier, Stichting Stop RW19/A4 
(2009) asserted that the ‘A13+A13/16’ is not really an alternative after all, as the ability of 
the A4DS to facilitate traffic flow is dependent on additional infrastructure. This 
stakeholder could well have based its assertion on a rather puzzling footnote in the 
TN/MER (Rijkswaterstaat, 2009d: see footnote 11 on pp.46) where the ‘A13+A13/16’ is 
presented as a bypass, necessary for taking out ‘unnecessary’ traffic bound for the A4DS. 
In conjunction with Rijkswaterstaat’s (2009c) own estimation made in the TN/MER on 
traffic-related aspects that the A4DS will singlehandedly increase motorway traffic 
between The Hague and Rotterdam by 64 percent by 2020 compared with the reference 
situation, for Stichting Stop RW/19 and others (e.g. Hansen, 2009) this served as proof 
that the construction of the A4DS does everything but achieve what it is intended to do.      
 At the time of writing the thesis, the EIA Scope and Methodology Report 
(Arup/URS, 2012a) for HS2 Phase 1 was the principal EIA document yet available to the 
public. In the public consultation following the draft publication of this document, virtually 
all of the written responses submitted have remarked that virtually no alternatives have 
been included or that these alternatives have been poorly or only marginally represented 
(e.g. Chiltern Countryside Group, 2012; Chilterns Conservation Board, 2012a). What is 
more, the draft version on the EIA scope and methodology had initially pre-empted any 
chance for alternatives to become a potent challenger to HS2 and to be taken at face 
value, stating that “[t]he Environmental Statement (ES) will provide an outline of the main 
alternatives studied by HS2 Ltd and Department for Transport (DfT) and the reasons for 
their rejection” (Arup/URS, 2012b: 18). The final (i.e. post-consultation) report on scope 
and methodology published later in 2012 has considerably mitigated the tone of its 
message, now stating that strategic alternatives will be given due consideration. However, 
stakeholders continued to show concerns over the pertinence of these strategic 
alternatives in the project documentation (e.g. Chilterns Conservation Board, Interview).          
Following all that is stated above, a topic worth discussing is to what extent EIA is 
important for mobilizing sustainability discourses, if indeed at all. The justification 
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discourses in both projects are clear manifestations of the role of science in discourse 
mobilization. If it is accepted that ‘justification science’ from e.g. traffic models or rail 
passenger demand forecasts is at the core of formal project appraisal, then further logical 
reasoning could suggest that such science represents a space in EIA where discourses 
are mobilized. However, what requires investigating is whether the conduct of counter-
expertise is able to make EIA ‘discursively’ accessible to civil society stakeholders. Yet is 
EIA more accessible than the institutional spaces for public engagement? The Central 
Chilterns Community Forum (CCCF) for HS2 and the Integrale Ontwikkeling tussen Delft 
and Schiedam (IODS) for the A4DS have at best skirted around the edges of what civil 
society stakeholders have really tried to say or contest (see also Table 6.3). Arguably, 
these modes of community engagement have poorly accommodated the sustainability 
discourses identified.        
      
Is counter-expertise a viable protest strategy in the context of EIA? 
 
In Chapter 5 it is shown that a handful of stakeholders’ reflections in both the HS2 and 
A4DS projects can be directly attributed to the conduct of EIA. In addition to those 
addressing the unfair treatment of alternatives, some of the reflections addressed the 
quality of the data upon which the environmental information was based (e.g. Chilterns 
Conservation Board, Interview; Vereniging Tegen Milieubederf, Interview). However, all 
told, they remained scarce. When EIA was discussed in relation to the project justification, 
the predominant argument was that EIA did not represent an appropriate mechanism with 
which counter claims could be vented. In the HS2 case, all three discourses (justification, 
party politics and conservation) have pointed their arrows at project characteristics for 
which EIA is not legally required32. In the A4DS case, until the verdict by the Raad van 
State (2011b) made the decision for the A4DS irreversible, stakeholders continued to 
challenge the justification of this particular motorway capacity expansion.  
A verdict by the Raad van State, the highest administrative court in the 
Netherlands, often takes the shape of a “grande finale” (Stichting Waterweg Wonen, 
Interview), indicating that a planning decision reviewed by the Raad van State can either 
repeal the decision or make it irreversible. In a press release following its verdict in the 
A4DS case, the Raad van State stated that “it is not the task of the judicial planning 
review to give its own interpretation to the societal value of interests. Its task is to assess 
whether a governmental decision is just. To assess that a decision is unjust, it is not 
sufficient for appellants to advance potential alternatives. Instead they should prove that 
the minister’s decision choice lacks a ‘certain level of justification’” (Raad van State, 
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 Author’s note: there is one notable exception: part of the judicial review of HS2 (see also the Chapter 6) has 
dealt with the absence of a strategic environmental assessment (SEA), upon instigation by 51m and the HS2 
Action Alliance.   
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2011b). However, the Traffic Expert has argued that this interpretation of justification is led 
by principles of good governance not decision quality, stating that “the Raad van State 
only looks at the procedural and juridical aspects and not at content” (Interview). When 
applied to EIA, the Raad van State’s verdict deals with its implementation and not with the 
scientific evidence therein to justify the route decision (for more information on such 
reasoning, see Craig and Jeffery, 2013). 
EIA arguably presents a key opportunity to stakeholders to discuss the destruction 
and ecological blight which the project in question could cause at the local level. Of 
course, one might argue that EIA is set up to justify decisions that are already made (e.g. 
Shepherd and Bowler, 1997). At any rate, the willingness to discuss questions on 
justification instead therefore triggers an interesting question. That is, is counter-expertise 
a viable protest strategy in the context of EIA? Or to put it differently, is protest based on 
making counter-claims to oppose the incumbent policy discourse a ‘good’ form of protest? 
Whilst it is perhaps easy to interpret this question as an implicit advice to stakeholders to 
become more successful in their protest activities, in essence it deals with the apparent 
mismatch between the ‘legal’ space provided by EIA and the conduct of counter-expertise. 
It is safe to state that the initial spark for civil society protest in both projects has been 
ignited by concerns over the expected detriment to the environment. Therefore, it is 
intriguing to see how protest has transformed in the face of the dominant problem 
perceptions. 
As the Chilterns is an Area of Outstanding Natural Beauty (AONB), it would have 
been a logical choice for situated civil society stakeholders to stress the ecological and 
sustainability impacts of HS2. However, protest in the Chilterns was by and large 
detached from any spatial connotation. The strategic choice was made to avoid the stigma 
of being driven by ‘not in my backyard’ (NIMBY) argumentation (e.g. Wendover Parish 
Councillor, Interview). This choice was compounded by the fact that the Chilterns is a 
disproportionately affluent area in the national context, particularly when compared to the 
Birmingham area. As a consequence, stakeholders were aware that their protest could be 
reproached from an economic point of view. Indeed, HS2 supporters up North have not 
refrained from using slogans such as ‘your gardens, our jobs’ or something to that effect, 
aiming to discredit the NIMBY argumentation alleged to be deployed in the Chilterns. 
Reflecting on the strategic choice not to have milked the AONB status of the area, the 
Amersham & District Residents Association argued that:         
 
“You don’t lead with that one because that’s when the NIMBY-ism just leaps to the fore. 
That’s when people say: ‘don’t listen to those people, all they care about is their own 
property and they don’t give a stuff about the economic benefits for the country (...)’. So 
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the decision was made to attempt to undermine the flawed justification and the flawed 
business case rather than dwell on the fact that it’s gonna trash a lot” (Interview). 
 
In aiming to find to what extent the protest strategy deployed by civil society stakeholders 
has been different between the two projects, this statement has been matched with a 
statement that gives an ‘iconic’ description of the strategic choice made in the anti-A4DS 
campaign or the failure to have done so. There is good reason to do this: whilst the 
passage of the HS2 hybrid bill through Parliament is scheduled at the end of 2013, prior to 
the interviews conducted, all the interviews in the A4DS case have been arranged after 
the decision to construct the A4DS has been made. And although the period of 
investigation in the A4DS case has been 2001-2011 (see also Heukels, 2005 for a 
justification), ending with the decision to construct having become irreversible, it is by no 
means unreasonable to think that the A4DS stakeholders have had the benefit of 
hindsight knowledge. Indeed, the stakeholder from the KNNV Delfland argued the A4DS 
campaign:  
 
“had to deploy a double strategy. Therefore, on the one hand [it should have been] the 
arguments against the motorway and traffic-related aspects (...), and a double strategy 
means that it should take into account that in the end the MI&M would push through the 
motorway (...). Then we would have had a much bigger chance” (Interview). 
 
The reflections are similar in that both refer to clear choices made in a unifying protest, 
thereby presenting the ‘anti-campaign’ as a unified front. The difference between these 
two reflections is that the stakeholders involved in the HS2 case continue to fervently 
attack the project’s justification, whereas their Dutch counterparts acknowledged that 
protest based on environmental grounds stood a better chance of being successful. In 
practice, this meant a reinforcement of the ecological and sustainability functions of 
Midden-Delfland, the impact area of the A4DS. The IODS Founder acknowledged, in all 
honesty, that the project advocates were quite willing to make far-reaching concessions to 
stakeholders that put a premium on an ecological and sustainability ‘quality injection’ in 
Midden-Delfland (Interview). Furthermore, the IODS Founder argued that the investment 
of all these millions of Euros in the infrastructural design of the A4DS has proved to be 
“sub-optimal for everyone involved (...). From a societal point of view, [the current design] 
is an extremely unprofitable investment. It would have been much better to inject all this 
money in quality improvement” (Interview).    
Although stakeholders in the Chilterns have argued that a bored tunnel spanning 
the entire length of the AONB would be the “best possible mitigation for this area” (South 
Heath Action Group, Interview), such a ‘tunnel lobby’ would probably only be put in 
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practice when all options have been exhausted to prevent construction from happening. 
However, also during the interviews in the HS2 case, concerns were vented whether the 
right strategy had been chosen. The Wendover Parish Councillor reasoned that the 
categorical rejection of any new North/South infrastructure development by the 
stakeholders, to strengthen the claim that the conventional rail services using the WCML 
could be upgraded in capacity and speed, could cost them dearly (Interview). Arguably, 
this is a direct consequence of conducting counter-expertise at the expense of advocating 
alternative line of route locations. Specifically, a rigid focus on proving flawed justification 
prohibited support for HS2 provided it is aligned in an existing transport corridor. The 
Wendover Parish Councillor reflected this dilemma particularly well, stating that: 
 
“There is a view developing now that with hindsight we were perhaps wrong to take that 
approach. For example, the Labour party (...), their preferred route now is that this railway 
is going to Heathrow and then up the M40 to Birmingham. We may have got more political 
support to oppose this railway by saying: ‘No, don’t go through Wendover or on the 
present line’, go to Heathrow or go up the M1 corridor’” (Interview). 
 
For the time being, at least until the passage of the hybrid bill, a widely carried change of 
strategy seems unlikely. The current momentum in protest veers towards HS2 as such, 
not to mention the concept of high-speed rail in Great Britain. This becomes especially 
evident in the nationwide visibility of networks such as Stop HS2 and the HS2 Action 
Alliance as the vestibule of a unified national front against the government’s plans. The 
HS2 Action Alliance, in particular, uses its leadership to find fault in these plans and not to 
propose a different route. According to the Chiltern Ridges Action Group, “their position is 
not to be a local supporter. Their position is to be a national action group against this 
project. So they’re not looking at tunnels or no tunnels, that kind of thing, that’s not an 
issue. They’re looking at the economic case, the environmental case. ‘Is it good for the 
economy? Is it good for travellers?” (Interview).  
Since the opportunity still exists that the hybrid bill will be opposed in Parliament, 
stakeholders in the Chilterns continue to ‘play the national card’, expressed mainly 
through the conduct of counter-expertise. Local support for a holistic approach to HS2, 
instead of one where the Chilterns AONB is put centre-stage, seems to suggest that 
stakeholders think that their alliance with the national action networks is beneficial. The 
decision made by the stakeholders to “not go down the route of choosing a different route” 
(Wendover Parish Councillor, Interview) clearly suggests this, although the underlying 
logic of this decision is debatable within the context of EIA. That is, it is precisely the 
provision of environmental information that could place the choice for a different line of 
route between London and Birmingham in a more favourable light than what is currently 
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proposed. However, a more direct form of engagement with the procedural tenets of EIA 
seems unlikely, as some may be inclined to feel that is a way of giving up protest against 
the flawed justification of HS2.  
 
8.3 Summary 
 
In both the HS2 and A4DS projects, the use of science and expertise has proved pivotal 
to evidence the underlying justification for construction. The cost-benefit ratio of the HS2 
project depends heavily on forecasts of the rail passenger demand in the future and, in 
conjunction with this, the level of the VOT. It has been argued that the forecasted 
business passenger volume using HS2 during working time offsets the costs, particularly 
since journey time savings are expressed in monetary terms through the cost-savings 
approach. The necessity for constructing the A4DS was expressed through the 
assumption that traffic grows naturally – beyond the grasp of infrastructure planners and 
transport managers. By using the IC-ratio, which quantifies congestion and sets 
thresholds on ‘acceptable’ traffic volumes, it was shown that the motorway capacity 
between The Hague and Rotterdam needs to expand in order to facilitate future volumes. 
 Stakeholders in both projects have become entangled in feuds over the evidence 
base, thereby disputing what they perceived as assumptions rather than facts. The 
concepts of optimism bias and pessimism bias were tacitly reflected in stakeholders’ 
appraisals on the projects. For instance, stakeholders in the Chilterns were convinced that 
the WCML is capable of facilitating future rail infrastructure demands by making 
incremental improvements of its passenger capacity. Furthermore, the forecasted 
passenger volumes using HS2 (e.g. on the London-Birmingham rail link) and the VOT 
were considered overly optimistic. In the A4DS case, similar observations were made. For 
example, the assumption of natural traffic growth was considered prohibitive towards 
traffic management measures which would be able to counter the unbridled growth of 
traffic in the study area. The proposed motorway capacity expansion between Delft and 
Schiedam is furthermore expected to incur a hefty increase in traffic, causing congestion 
to occur, thus undermining its objective to ensure a ‘reliable and adequate’ traffic 
connection.     
 The concerns and comments of stakeholders associated with science and expert 
knowledge have been amalgamated in the justification discourses. However, as EIA 
presents the dominant means of formal communication between the competent authority 
and stakeholders, a mismatch has been discerned between the legal mandate of EIA and 
the prevailing debate on justification. The focus of EIA on impact prediction and mitigation 
does not correspond with the desire of stakeholders to discuss the fundamental aspects of 
project planning. As such, no discursive spaces or spaces for meaningful civil society 
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engagement between the competent authority and stakeholders could be found in the 
EIAs of the projects. This will be further elaborated in the conclusions, in the next chapter. 
Time will tell whether stakeholders in the Chilterns will shift their protest emphasis towards 
impact mitigation, for instance after the hybrid bill has been approved by Parliament. 
Although to some this will undoubtedly signify a controversial step in the anti-HS2 
campaign, it may yield more success in the impacts-oriented context of EIA.  
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Chapter 9 Conclusions 
 
This chapter will conclude the thesis by answering the central research question and the 
six sub-questions. It will also evaluate whether the research aims have been achieved and 
it will evaluate the process of sustainability discourse mobilization. The chapter consists of 
two sections. In Section 9.1 the research questions will be answered (Sub-sections 9.1.1 
and 9.1.2) and it will be commented whether the aims have been achieved (Sub-section 
9.1.3). In Section 9.2 a pertinent new question will be asked, particularly in light of the 
empirical findings (Chapters 5 to 7) and the discussion (Chapter 8): does the model of 
sustainability discourse mobilization in EIA need to be revised? The chapter – and 
therefore also the thesis – will end with a brief summary of the main lessons learnt.   
 
9.1 Answering the research questions 
 
As announced, this section consists of three sub-sections. As a preamble to them and to 
properly answer the research questions, the methods for data analysis need to be brought 
in. As stipulated in Chapter 3, the methods for data analysis concerned: textual data 
coding, gap analysis, content analysis, news coverage and statistical analysis. The roles 
these analytical methods have played have been explicated in the conclusions, where 
appropriate. With regard to textual data coding, a node structure has been used to group 
the codes. Insight into the node structure helps explain how conclusions have been 
derived from the textual coding.  
Figure 9.1 shows the node structures – or ‘trees’ – used in NVivo® to code the 
interviews. It has been possible to amalgamate the code structures of both the HS2 and 
A4DS cases: the only difference in the structure between the HS2 and A4DS case 
comprises the second discourse (party politics versus ecological modernization). In 
conformity with the research questions, the parent nodes are 1) sustainability discourses, 
2) institutional design and 3) political culture. Each of these parent nodes subsequently 
branch out into three ‘child’ nodes. A number of coding examples are provided below the 
sub-nodes (placed between quotation marks. Although there are also sub-child nodes 
(see for instance Figure A6.1 on HS2, in Appendix 6), these have been omitted from this 
figure for the reason of keeping oversight. Furthermore, the parent node ‘Miscellaneous’ 
has been used in both cases (see also Figure A6.1), to cluster the codes that could not be 
reconciled with the themes of the other parent nodes but which were nonetheless 
important in the empirical analysis. Nodes that were considered miscellaneous concerned, 
amongst others, ‘political authority’, ‘civil society’ and ‘environmental assessment’.   
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Figure 9.1: the ‘node structure’ used for interview coding 
 
9.1.1 The central research question 
 
The central research question was formulated as follows: 
 
To what extent did institutional design and political culture influence the process of 
sustainability discourse mobilization in the EIAs of the HS2 (Phase 1) and A4DS 
infrastructure development projects in the United Kingdom in the Netherlands? 
 
In both the British and the Dutch case the influence of institutional design and political 
culture has been very limited. Institutions and culture have proved unable to 
accommodate debate on justification, leading up to the most important discourse. 
Furthermore, the EIA procedure itself did not accommodate the dominant views on 
sustainability. As a consequence of this, sustainability discourses mobilized outside EIA. 
The strict focus of EIA on impacts – their prediction, evaluation and mitigation, for 
example – prevented any meaningful debate on the existential aspects of the projects. In 
addition, public engagement was organized beyond the remit of EIA, where project 
approval was taken as an axiom. The gravity in the community engagement revolved 
around a discussion on impacts (mitigation), instead of the assumed necessity for 
additional infrastructure or the critical ecological functions of the respective impact areas. 
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Consequently, in its capacity as a ‘conduit’ for discourse mobilization, state-sanctioned 
modes of public engagement and deliberation did not meet the expectations of the civil 
society stakeholders involved. Whilst a portion of the stakeholders had a strategic interest 
in impact mitigation, plausibly given in by their statutory role (e.g. the Woodland Trust or 
Stichting Waterweg Wonen), the overwhelming majority felt alienated from it.          
This conclusion leaves room for interpretation and further research, the impetus of 
which will be given in Section 9.2 as an extension of the debate on civil counter-expertise. 
Essentially two explanations can be provided for the limited influence observed. On the 
one hand, it can be argued that institutional design and political culture have had no 
chance to make much of an influence in EIA because of their distance from the project 
level. Notwithstanding the fact that the state has been the competent authority in both the 
HS2 and A4DS project, high-profile projects of national significance remain entrenched 
within ‘executive-level politics’. The difference between majoritarian and consensual forms 
of representative democracy has had little to do with how EIA works and is 
operationalized; conversely, in both projects the community engagement and deliberative 
procedures were used to discuss how impacts could be mitigated rather than avoided. 
Similarly, democratic satisfaction and political trust – designating attitudes mainly towards 
the democratic system or the ‘regime’ – are at a considerable distance from the 
procedural stages of EIA, such as scoping, impact prediction and the identification of 
mitigation measures. The political cultures of the project stakeholders therefore did not 
mobilize sustainability discourses in EIA.  
 On the other hand, it is safe to argue that the legal requirements of EIA limited 
meaningful public engagement and that discourses therefore mobilized beyond these 
limits. This does not rule out the mobilizing influence of institutions and/or political culture. 
A clear example is provided by the party politics discourse in the HS2 case. Stakeholders 
in the Chilterns considered the electoral rules of the British majoritarian system to be 
adversely impacting on local interest advocacy. Members of Parliament (MP) who held 
cabinet responsibility had to forsake the interests of their electorate in favour of respecting 
the party line. Indeed, ‘government’ has dominated in the textual coding of the party 
politics discourse. The prevalence of ecological modernization in the A4DS case serves 
as another example, where the Integrale Ontwikkeling tussen Delft en Schiedam (Integral 
Development between Delft and Schiedam) (IODS) took the form of a neo-corporatist 
structure typically espoused by the consensual democratic system. The storyline ‘do not 
hear, do not see, do not smell’ could be regarded as a product of Dutch consensus 
politics. That being said, both discourses did not find the space to gestate within the 
institutional surroundings of EIA.    
 While investigating the process of sustainability discourse mobilization, an 
underlying research objective has been to compare the UK with the Netherlands within the 
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chosen objects of study. The deployment of the ‘gap analysis’ method attests to this. After 
having analyzed the findings, it can be concluded that limited difference could be 
observed between the two states. This conclusion falsifies the idea that institutional 
design differences and the expected variance in political culture would impact 
substantively on the mobilization of sustainability discourses in the projects. As 
justification and conservation issues were of equal importance in both cases, the main 
difference pertained to the discourses of party politics and ecological modernization. Yet 
although the party politics discourse in the HS2 case is directly attributable to 
dissatisfaction with the due representation of the local interest in the House of Commons, 
its mobilization may also be caused by the geographic scale of HS2. Similarly, whilst 
ecological modernization may seem a Dutch ‘invention’, its proliferation may be caused by 
to the imminence of the decision to construct (see more on scale and time in Section 8.2). 
That is, a new discourse coalition was formed when feelings of defeat started to creep in. 
This leads to uncertainty as to what extent other external factors have helped mobilize 
discourses. 
 
9.1.2 The sub-questions 
 
In the introduction six sub-questions were formulated (see Table 1.2). In Table 3.3 these 
questions have been linked to the typology on theory (Harré, 1986), where a distinction 
has been made between theory for either observation, representation or cognition (see 
Figure 3.2). The difference between these three types will become manifest in answering 
the questions: the answers of the 5th question on the value surveys and part of the 3rd 
question on institutional design have been observed; the sustainability discourses and the 
prominence of institutions are represented in the data; and, whilst helped by these 
methods, the assumed reciprocity between institutional design, political culture, public 
engagement and sustainability discourses is a case of more cognitive research.         
 
1. Which sustainability discourses held by the civil society stakeholders can be 
identified? 
 
In the HS2 case, three discourses were identified: 
 
1. The justification discourse, which clusters all the reflections and social appraisals 
of stakeholders that questioned the underlying necessity for the high-speed rail 
network to be constructed, as well as the evidence base of the necessity claim, for 
instance evidence based on rail passenger demand forecasts and journey time 
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savings. Stop HS2’s slogan ‘No business case, No environmental case, No money 
to pay for it’ has functioned as an important storyline in the discourse; 
2. The party politics discourse, which clusters all comments relating to the role of 
national politicians in the HS2 case, most notably the role played by the local MPs. 
Amongst others, stakeholders questioned the representation of local interests in 
Parliament due to the strict party discipline throughout the rank-and-file and the 
difficulty of changing the electoral landscape. The ‘Conservatives’ filled a dominant 
position in the discourse; 
3. The conservation discourse, which clusters everything related to the status of the 
Chilterns as an Area of Outstanding Natural Beauty (AONB). The Chilterns AONB 
was often referred to as ‘national heritage’ or ‘natural treasure’ and as such should 
not be adversely affected. If HS2 were to go ahead, the line of route should be 
entirely tunnelled to counter ecological destruction and property blight.       
 
In the A4DS case, three discourses were identified: 
 
1. The justification discourse, which clusters all the questions and comments 
revolving around the ‘utility and necessity’ for constructing the A4DS. The objective 
of a reliable and adequate system of traffic handling between The Hague and 
Rotterdam was aimed to be achieved by constructing the A4DS. Stakeholders not 
only disputed the claim of necessity by reference to the ‘do-nothing’ alternative, but 
they also debated the assumption of natural traffic growth and the induced traffic 
that would result from construction; 
2. The ecological modernization discourse, which clusters all ideas which subscribe 
to the need for additional motorway capacity between The Hague and Rotterdam 
but which supported alternatives to the A4DS. All alternatives proposed the 
construction of new infrastructure outside Midden-Delfland, the A4DS impact area. 
The storyline ‘do not hear, do not see, do not smell’ supported the discourse; 
3. The conservation discourse, which clusters all appraisals on the critical ecological 
and sustainability function of Midden-Delfland. Stakeholders asserted that the area 
provides refuge to people looking for silence and solitude amidst the heavily 
urbanized conurbations of The Hague and Rotterdam. Midden-Delfland was 
furthermore considered critical for preserving important flora and fauna.    
 
The methods for data analysis (coding textual data, content analysis and news coverage) 
have revealed that the justification discourse was the most salient discourse in both 
cases. In the textual coding, words like ‘necessary’, ‘need’, ‘evidence’ but also ‘bogus 
argument’ or ‘nonsense’ in addition to case-specific words accommodated this discourse. 
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In addition to this, UK (regional) newspapers regularly reported on anti-HS2 protest, for 
instance in the running-up to the judicial reviews or to convince politicians to vote against 
the project. Dutch newspapers similarly reported on protest activities, but they also 
reported on project alternatives in which the impact area would remain unaffected. From 
the content analysis – i.e. consulting primary documents – a constellation of all three 
discourses emerged in both cases, although the party politics discourse in the HS2 case 
mainly existed in the interviews.          
 
2. To what extent are sustainability discourses in the projects accommodated by the 
different modes of public engagement? 
 
All the identified discourses developed and matured outside the ‘formal’ spaces of public 
engagement, except for the ecological modernization discourse in the A4DS project. The 
formal space in the HS2 case was the community forum (CF), where the local impacts of 
HS2 Phase 1 were discussed. It did not accommodate on either the project justification, 
the political mandate of the project or the vital necessity to save the AONB from becoming 
affected. Whilst participating in one of the sessions of the Central Chilterns Community 
Forum (CCCF), the author observed that the more fundamental mitigation issues (such as 
a Chilterns-wide bored tunnel) could not be debated. In the A4DS case, the IODS did not 
accommodate debate on justification and conservation. For instance, the IODS argued 
that the issue of justification “is a matter for the cabinet and the parliament” (IODS, 2001: 
5), although this directly affects conservation issues as well. However, the IODS did 
accommodate ecological modernization principally by advocating the message that the 
A4DS could be constructed within ecological and sustainability limits.  
 To answer this sub-question, the methods used for analysis were textual coding, 
gap analysis, content analysis and news coverage. The interviews, primary documents 
and newspaper articles revealed little consideration from stakeholders as to how public 
opinion was formed. This is no real surprise, however, as it has been concluded that five 
out of six discourses mobilized in isolation from either the CCCF or the IODS. That is, it is 
difficult to find evidence for something that has not happened. But there is one exception: 
the storyline ‘do not hear, do not see, do not smell’ featured prominently alongside the 
IODS. Chapter 8 has furthermore shown that civil counter-expertise has prevailed as the 
mode of public engagement in both projects, in order to satisfy the demand for discussing 
necessity. This means that no gap between the UK and the Netherlands could be 
discerned.           
 
 
205 
 
3. Which institutions and institutional design choices have played a central role in the 
projects? 
 
In the HS2 case, the majoritarian system of the UK has impacted on the mobilization of 
the party politics discourse, although this system has not necessarily impacted on the 
project itself. In general, in both cases the institutions for community engagement – the 
CF in the HS2 case, the IODS in the A4DS case – have had a decisive impact on the 
projects. They are very comparable insofar as they have accommodated the focus on 
impacts rather than other contentious project areas that stakeholders were willing to 
discuss. In the methods for analysis (coding textual data, content analysis and news 
coverage) the institutions have been prominently manifested. Stakeholders recognized 
that the role of the CF/IODS in the project deliberation was the only direct means for them 
to engage with the competent authority. However, it also served the purpose of meeting 
other likeminded stakeholders and to mobilize collective action.   
 
4. To what extent have the different institutional designs of the projects been able to 
influence the mode of public engagement? 
 
In the HS2 case, stakeholders have by and large commented negatively on the CF. In the 
interviews stakeholders referred it as ‘pretty miserable’ and argued that it did not create 
any space for anything other than impact mitigation. It was also sensed that HS2 Ltd 
considered the CF a good platform to justify the government’s decision to construct and to 
take away locally carried concerns over the expected adverse impacts. If the sustainability 
discourses are to be considered a reflection of what stakeholders wanted to talk about, 
then it can be concluded that the CF did not influence the mode of public engagement. A 
similar conclusion can be drawn in the A4DS case with regards to discussing issues on 
justification and conservation. However, the IODS mobilized debate on ecological 
modernization, particularly associated with the question on how the physical infrastructure 
of the A4DS could be embedded in the impact area as sustainable as possible.    
 
5. What are the survey results of certain criteria involved with democratic satisfaction and 
political trust in the UK and the Netherlands? 
 
The survey results obtained from the European Social Survey (ESS), the World Value 
Survey (WVS) and the European Values Study (EVS) show that there are notable value 
differences between the UK and the Netherlands. More respondents have positioned 
themselves in the extreme categories (i.e. full satisfaction/full dissatisfaction) in the UK 
than in the Netherlands, although the ‘fully dissatisfied’ greatly outnumber those with full 
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satisfaction. From this it can also be expected that the standard deviation, which reveals 
variation from the average of a population, in the UK is higher than in the Netherlands. A 
question that naturally follows is whether this variation and subsequent divergence in 
value orientation results from the adversarial character of majoritarian democracy, as 
suggested by the literature (see also Section 2.2). It is hypothesized that political value 
orientation is strongly accentuated by winning or losing in the electoral context.      
 However, it is assumed that the stakeholders in both the projects do not hold 
extreme values. When looking at the scores in the mid-segment in the value surveys 
(categories such as ‘rather satisfied’ or ‘not very satisfied’), the UK and the Netherlands 
are relatively comparable. The author has become aware throughout the fieldwork that 
additional quantitative research is needed to bolster this claim. There is an apparent 
incongruence between the quantitative data in the survey results and the qualitative data 
obtained from the fieldwork. The added value of this sub-question could have been 
considerably strengthened by asking stakeholders to reflect on the 17 values abstracted 
from the value surveys.     
 
6. To what extent have democratic satisfaction and political trust been able to influence 
the interaction between decision-makers and civil society stakeholders? 
 
In the HS2 case, it has proved difficult to compare levels of democratic satisfaction and 
political trust relating to national politics (e.g. the Prime Minister, MPs or the deliberations 
in Parliament) with levels of satisfaction and trust at the project level. The incongruence 
has mainly been caused by the role of HS2 Ltd as the executive agency of the 
Department for Transport (DfT). However, it is safe to state that stakeholders in the 
Chilterns were not very satisfied with HS2 Ltd members of staff that were in charge of the 
CCCF. If ‘decision-makers’ is expanded to also include MPs and other national politicians, 
then dissatisfaction and distrust seeped into stakeholders’ appraisals of the poor 
representation of local interests at the national level. Indeed, the answer of sub-question 5 
may suggest that the influence of political culture has played a rather marginal role in the 
research. However, textual codes on the ‘divided loyalty’ of MPs or on the feeling of ‘being 
disenfranchised’ (used in Chapter 6) hint at a distorted relation between decision-makers 
and civil society stakeholders. 
 In the A4DS case, the same difficulty has been registered on the difference 
between perceptions towards national politics and those specific to the project context. 
Yet whilst Rijkswaterstaat is the executive agency of the Ministerie voor Infrastructuur en 
Milieu (MI&M), stakeholders expressed dissatisfaction with the largely autonomous role of 
Rijkswaterstaat in infrastructure development. This role was considered political in that 
Rijkswaterstaat actively supported the assumption that infrastructure development is 
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necessary, irrespective of the support for development in government or Parliament. 
Furthermore, stakeholders expressed distrust with the quality and accuracy of the 
information received from Rijkswaterstaat and the ways in which it dealt with stakeholder 
advocacy of alternatives to the A4DS. Reflections on the representation of stakeholder 
interests in the IODS were mixed. On the one hand, the ‘open’ character of the IODS 
feedback group led to the inclusion of a diverse group of stakeholders. On the other, it 
was argued that the IODS closed down debate (on ‘utility and necessity’) when the 
planning process neared its conclusion.   
 
9.1.3 Aims achievement 
 
The introduction has set out three research aims. In light of the drawn conclusions, it can 
now be assessed whether these aims have been achieved. The first aim was to 
understand the ‘fit’ between the mobilization of sustainability discourses and EIA. 
Uncertainty arises as to whether this aim has been achieved. It has been concluded that 
there was no such thing as a ‘fit’ between EIA and sustainability discourse mobilization. 
Whereas institutional design and political culture did mobilize sustainability discourses 
only to a limited extent, the strict procedural interpretation of the EIAs in the selected 
cases did not mobilize sustainability discourse mobilization to begin with. Whilst the 
absence of fit between discourse mobilization and EIA could be framed as the negative 
way to finding truth, alluding to ‘trial and error’ and the falsification criterion (Popper, 
2002), a more pessimistic view would be to regard the conclusions as evidence for the 
conceptual mismatch between EIA and sustainability discourse mobilization. The following 
section will elaborate on this debate through the application of the abductivist approach to 
conducting research.    
 The second aim was to understand the relationship between sustainability 
discourses and its institutional and cultural contexts. This aim has been achieved. If the 
party politics discourse in the HS2 case is closely examined, the idea has been proffered 
that dissatisfaction with the observed ‘divided loyalty’ of MPs and therefore also distrust in 
their intentions to duly represent the local interest is a function of the majoritarian system 
(Lijphart, 2012). Conversely, whilst the discourse of ecological modernization has become 
popular the world over in recent decades, the neo-corporatist negotiation structure 
between states and interest groups in certain sectors is reported to be particularly strong 
in the Netherlands (see e.g. De Vos and Van Tatenhove, 2011 on one such sector). Thus, 
the manifestation of these discourses provides understanding on the case-specific 
institutional and cultural contexts. However, this particular aim achievement will benefit 
substantially from applying institutional design and culture to science, expertise and 
evidence-based decision-making. It is safe to argue that the scientific ‘dissensus’ in both 
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projects is caused by the absence of the institutions and cultures necessary for a more 
civic-oriented conduct of science.  
 Somewhat related to the second aim, the third research aim has been to 
understand the institutional and politico-cultural influences on public engagement in the 
cases. Yet correspondent with the first aim, uncertainty remains as to whether this aim 
has been achieved. In comparative research which comprises cases from the UK and the 
Netherlands, an assessment of whether this aim is achieved invariably involves an 
evaluation of whether their institutional and politico-cultural differences have influenced a 
difference in public engagement. Stakeholders have resorted to conducting counter-
expertise (e.g. science-led debate on the adequacy of the existing infrastructure capacity 
or on future passenger/traffic demand), which concerns a mode of public engagement that 
is not circumscribed to institutions and political culture per se. As the conclusions attribute 
the proliferation of counter-expertise amongst stakeholders to the use of science so 
typically to be found in planning proposals for new infrastructures, this dominant mode has 
not been influenced by anything institutionally or culturally predetermined.        
 
9.2 Sustainability discourse mobilization revisited? 
 
The conclusions seem to leave no doubt: institutional design and political culture have 
influenced sustainability discourse mobilization in the two cases only to a limited extent; 
and, on top of that, the sustainability discourses have mobilized in isolation from EIA. It 
has been concluded that the main discourse – the justification discourse – has matured 
within non-institutionalized spaces used by civil society groups conducting scientific 
counter-expertise. A relevant question that follows these conclusions is whether or not the 
concepts intrinsic to sustainability discourse mobilization can be linked to one another in 
any meaningful way. Furthermore, the function of EIA as a test bed for sustainability 
discourse mobilization should be evaluated. In sum, should the answers to these 
questions be sought in revising the incumbent conceptualization of sustainability 
discourse mobilizing, thus reconfiguring the roles of institutional design and political 
culture in EIA, or should cases be sought that are not ‘hijacked’ by controversial science?     
As will be shown in this section, debate on the presumed interplay and potential 
(yet impossible-to-prove) causality between the core concepts in sustainability discourse 
mobilization is shaped to no small extent by the philosophical foundation of the thesis. 
That is to say, the choice to use the critical realist approach and to combine this with an 
abductive scheme of inference influences debate on the very process of sustainability 
discourse mobilization. It is in this context important to note that critical realists, who thus 
assimilate a positivist ontology with a constructivist epistemology (see also Chapter 3), 
want to believe in the existence of a ‘world out there’ independent from human 
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representation. But, as the name already suggests, they are critical about whether this 
belief is realistic (e.g. Easton, 2010a). In order to manage the uncertainty that ensues 
from applying critical realism, the thesis has elected to use abduction rather than induction 
or deduction as the preferred scheme of reference. The role of abduction will become 
clearly manifest in this ex post evaluation.        
The conclusions this thesis has presented have shown that institutions and the 
attitudes of stakeholders towards politics – i.e. political culture – have not mobilized 
discourses in the EIAs of the projects. The expected gap between the UK and the 
Netherlands has furthermore turned out to be narrow, at least in the cases under 
investigation. Such ‘negative’ conclusions, if framed as such, may lead some to argue that 
the process of sustainability discourse mobilization as suggested in Figure 2.1 is not 
correct. As a minimum, it is uncertain whether sustainability discourses can be mobilized 
within the context of EIA. However, it can also be argued that the great virtue of abduction 
is its flexible approach to dealing with uncertainty (Danermark et al., 2002).  
In this thesis, for example, the first uncertainty has arisen over the extent to which 
institutional design and political culture mobilize sustainability discourses in infrastructure 
development projects. The second uncertainty relates to the procedural limitations of EIA 
for discourse mobilization. However, this might a good basis for considering the role of 
strategic environmental assessment (SEA) in discourse mobilization (e.g. Runhaar, 2009). 
Arguably, proposed strategic developments may be characterized by relatively open 
futures where a wider range of alternatives is subject to negotiation. It is hence different 
from EIA, which in some way represents the ‘dirty end-politics’ at the project level.     
Uncertainty that arises in research using an abductivist scheme of inference 
results either from a misconceived premise or from the mismatch between the premise 
and the results obtained from studying the selected cases. In the former, a new premise 
should be sought. In the latter, the premise is not rejected when it is concluded that the 
wrong cases have been selected. When this latter situation is looked at more closely, it is 
still possible to hold onto the premise that institutional design and political culture mobilize 
discourse, principally by shaping public engagement in the context of EIA.  
By using the same structure as has been used in Table 3.2, Table 9.1 compares 
abduction with induction and deduction, both of which have been the hegemonic schemes 
of inference in social science research thus far. As can be read in the table, an inductivist 
is able to clearly state that the premise is incorrect. It is quite possible that inductivist 
researchers would not arrive at the premise to begin with, as it would not be supported by 
the results obtained in the empirical investigation. A deductivist is able to conclude that 
institutional design and political culture have not been able to do what they were expected 
to do – that is, in this research, providing spaces for discourse mobilization in EIA. 
Provided no mistake has been made in obtaining the results, the premise should be 
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revised or rejected altogether. Much in contrast, in abduction it can be concluded that the 
case under investigation has not proved suitable for testing the premise. This conclusion 
does not reject the truth claims of the premise, but instead invites for further investigation 
through choosing a different case.            
 
Induction Deduction Abduction 
Premise (case):  
The EIAs of the projects 
accommodate the process of 
sustainability discourse 
mobilization 
Premise (rule):  
Institutional design and political 
culture mobilize sustainability 
discourses in EIA 
Premise (rule): 
Institutional design and 
political culture mobilize 
sustainability discourses in 
EIA 
Phenomenon (result):  
Institutional design and 
political culture did not 
mobilize sustainability 
discourses in the EIAs of the 
projects 
Phenomenon (case):  
The EIAs of the projects did 
not accommodate the process 
of sustainability discourse 
mobilization 
Phenomenon (result): 
Institutional design and 
political culture did not 
mobilize sustainability 
discourses in the EIAs of the 
projects 
Conclusion (rule):  
Institutional design and 
political culture do not 
mobilize sustainability 
discourses in EIA 
Conclusion (result):  
Institutional design and political 
culture did not mobilize 
sustainability discourses in the 
EIAs of the projects 
Conclusion (case): 
The EIAs of the projects did 
not accommodate the 
process of sustainability 
discourse mobilization 
Table 9.1: Induction, deduction, abduction and discourse mobilization 
 
The flexible approach of abduction to uncertainty is principally manifested in the ‘both-and’ 
perspective (Danermark et al., 2002), which proposes change either at the beginning 
(premise) or ending (case) of the process of inference. Where the selection of a different 
case is proposed, this thesis could have selected cases where science and expertise are 
much less articulated than in the HS2 and A4DS projects. Projects where public 
engagement is led by concerns over, say, landscape aesthetics or the cultural-historical 
value of the impact area are potentially good examples. Perhaps the premise needs minor 
tweaking, for instance by broadening the scope of ‘in EIA’ to ‘in environmental 
assessment’ or even ‘in environmental policy’. This broadened scope would not affect the 
intellectual argument made in the thesis, however, as the assumed interplay between 
institutions, culture and sustainability discourses remains at the heart of the matter.       
However, a pertinent consequence of the ‘both-and’ perspective of critical realism 
is that the premise could also be wrong. For instance, in the context of EIA it could have 
been considered unrealistic to assume that institutional designs and political cultures are 
able to mediate a procedure which is essentially driven by procedural requirements. The 
stages of EIA – e.g. scoping, impact prediction or the identification of mitigation measures 
– relate uncomfortably to discursive orientations that are brought about by external 
influence. Furthermore, civil society stakeholders whose forms of protest revolve around 
the more fundamental aspects of project planning are likely to become dissatisfied with 
EIA. In its verdict on whether or not to authorize the A4DS project, the Raad van State 
(2011a) illustrated this point by stating that “it is not the task of the judicial planning review 
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to give its own interpretation to the societal value of interests” (see also Chapter 8). With 
regards to the role of EIA in the planning process, this effectively means that the plans of 
government are shielded against interest advocacy and concerted civil action provided the 
right procedural requirements are met.   
 In both the HS2 and the A4DS cases debate on the justification of the proposed 
projects prevailed. The discourse area on justification has been instructive in shaping the 
opinions and ideas of those directly campaigning against the projects. This has become 
particularly apparent in the HS2 (Phase 1) project, where virtually all stakeholders opted 
to oppose rather than to deliberate the impact mitigation. At the same time it has been 
shown that EIA has not provided space for any meaningful civil society engagement with 
the science, expertise and evidence base of the projects. Such engagement took the form 
of non-institutionalized counter-expertise, which effectively meant that the debate on 
justification was played out beyond the remit of EIA. In the HS2 case, the HS2 Action 
Alliance (e.g. 2013) put the flawed justification of the business case centre-stage in its 
protest. In the A4DS case, traffic experts from Delft University of Technology (TU Delft) 
argued that the construction of this presumed ‘missing link’ would cause traffic problems 
rather than solve them (e.g. Hansen, 2009; Van Wee and Immers, 2009). In both EIAs, 
however, these ‘dissident’ counter-scientific voices in the room were sidelined. 
 Following this line of reasoning, the abductivist approach encourages the original 
premise (rule) to be revised when it proves inadequate. Much in the style of Figure 2.1, 
Figure 9.2 provides an alternative model of sustainability discourse mobilization, specified 
to the justification discourse. The revised premise is that the conduct of science, the 
production of expert knowledge and evidence mediate the manifestation of civil society 
engagement with large-scale rail and road infrastructure development. Institutional design 
and political culture have not impacted significantly on the modes of public engagement, 
particularly since the expected variance between these modes in the UK and the 
Netherlands has been marginal. This suggests that institutional and cultural differences 
lose their prominence in the face of large-scale infrastructure development. Furthermore, 
the scientific claims in the project documentation have proved more important in shaping 
debate than have the incumbent institutions and extant cultural orientation towards 
politics. Indeed, civil counter-expertise in its capacity as the hegemonic mode of public 
engagement indicates the prominence of science and expertise at the expense of 
institutional design and political culture.      
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Figure 9.2: The mobilization of the justification discourse 
 
In order to pin down how ‘science, expertise & evidence’ impacts on the mode of civil 
counter-expertise in large-scale rail or road infrastructure development, a number of 
mediating factors need to be taken into account. These mediating factors have been 
identified in the empirical investigation and the discussion of the findings. As Chapter 8 
has demonstrated, time will tell whether certain themes of contestation will linger. It is 
quite likely that stakeholders in the Chilterns will adopt a storyline somewhat equivalent to 
‘do not hear, do not see, do not smell’ when efforts to halt construction have failed (e.g. 
Dunsmore Society, Interview). Whilst debate on ‘utility and necessity’ in the A4DS project 
prevailed until the very end, the ascendency of the ecological modernization discourse in 
the period 2001-2011 gave attestation to the shifting momentum towards impact mitigation 
and quality improvement. Some stakeholders sensed that advocating the interests of the 
impact area would be most successful. Therefore, strategic considerations instruct the 
choice of which aspects of the project to address.  
 Both projects have been central government initiatives and have therefore been 
played out on the highest political stage. However, a pertinent issue that requires further 
inquiry is how the project scale impacts on civil counter-expertise. Scale can be 
interpreted in a physical sense but also in the political sense (Dikeç, 2012), for instance by 
referring to the degree and spread of public interest in the project development. As it has 
been argued that emotive situated protest can be bolstered by what is called 
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‘disinterested’ centres of counter-scientific claims-making (Holifield, 2009), thus without 
any spatial connotation, scale may influence the extent to which this endures. Repeated 
usage of the notions of ‘regional development’ or ‘the national interest’ in the HS2 case, 
such as by prominent advocates of the project (e.g. Hammond, 2011), may well have 
buoyed the mobilization of ‘scientized’ protest at the expense of impacts-oriented protest. 
Furthermore, when local stakeholders become submerged in broader protest networks, 
the project scale may lead them to up-scale or re-spatialize (or even de-spatialize) their 
protest to avoid possible accusations of ‘NIMBY-ism’. 
 The interpretation of scale presented above is seamlessly connected to civil 
society, a third mediating factor. In both projects the disinterested centres of counter-
science, or what Holifield (2009) has called ‘outsiders’, have coalesced with situated civil 
society actors. In the HS2 project for example these outsiders were the rail experts of the 
HS2 Action Alliance; the traffic experts from TU Delft fulfilled that particular role in the 
A4DS project. Whilst situated actors have campaigned against the respective projects 
because of the likely adverse local impacts, the prevalence of the justification discourse 
attests to the strength of their cross-linkages with the outside world. In both projects the 
relatively open borders of the problem framing permitted the mobilization of a scientific 
counter-public (Hess, 2011). Scientific counter-publics emanate from a subordinate 
position when compared to incumbent project stakeholders (e.g. DfT, HS2 Ltd, 
Rijkswaterstaat) and propose alternative socio-technological trajectories. 
 A plausible fourth mediating factor resides in the manifestation of authority as a 
source of trust or distrust. This factor borrows the element of trust from the literature on 
political culture but links these specifically to the conduct of science, expertise and 
evidence-making. Perhaps the most intriguing aspect here is how non-elected 
representatives can shape and manage relations of trust. In the A4DS project, terms such 
as ‘manipulation’ or ‘concealed agendas’ were attributed to Rijkswaterstaat by a 
substantial number of stakeholders. A similar orientation amongst stakeholders could be 
discerned in the HS2 project, where every fact advanced by the DfT and HS2 Ltd was 
rigorously checked by the HS2 Action Alliance (e.g. 2013). Arguably, civil counter-
expertise is premised on a lack of trust and counter-experts become the new scientific 
authority where this lack is most emphatic. This may then lead to the conclusion that 
project developers can induce public support by making their science more trustworthy.  
 
So, what have we learned from this thesis? 
 
The conclusions and the subsequent discussion on the process of sustainability discourse 
mobilization may lead us to evaluate what we have learned from the research conducted 
in this thesis. A principal finding is that the evidence base of infrastructure projects is 
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strongly associated with the expert use of science. Such evidence is subsequently 
deployed to claim necessity for infrastructure development. Either willingly or unwillingly, 
civil society stakeholders have organized their protest around pertinent themes of 
contestation – for example around journey time savings or induced traffic. Situated 
stakeholders, designating those having an affinity with particular localities (i.e. the impact 
areas: the Chilterns and Midden-Delfland), join the professionals that hold a leadership 
position in a counter-scientific lobby against the development in question. These 
stakeholders ‘jump on the bandwagon’, so to speak. The proliferation of science in 
infrastructure projects has culminated in a discourse where concern over the justification 
of the development has prevailed.    
 EIA has proved a robust deliberative procedure and relatively immune to outside 
influences. From time to time critique was voiced by stakeholders that the scope of the 
EIA was too narrow, that the baseline study was conducted improperly or that only a 
limited range of mitigation options were proposed by the competent authority. However, 
when compared to the – according to the stakeholders – lamentable state of the evidence 
base, this critique was a drop in the ocean. The immunity of EIA showed itself in the 
absence of spaces for meaningful engagement with the issues on which stakeholders felt 
further debating would be appropriate. Public engagement in EIA was not mediated by 
institutional design and political culture, as previously thought. Instead, the civil society 
campaigns transpired in ‘non-lieus’, non-institutionalized spaces for engagement with 
science and expertise. Given that the project advocates wanted to discuss impact 
mitigation, this led to a ‘dialogue of the deaf’ (Van Eeten, 1999).          
This finding does not necessarily invalidate the potential influence exerted by 
institutional design and political culture on sustainability discourse mobilization. However, 
what it does do is to invalidate the claim that they permeate issues of public contention 
everywhere and all the time. It is without a doubt that representative democracy continues 
to infiltrate the life-worlds of civil society stakeholders, to which the party politics discourse 
in the HS2 gives clear attestation. Yet it seems to skirt around the edges of the 
fundamental debate on the legitimacy of project development in light of the latest scientific 
evidence. Similarly, democratic satisfaction and political trust are useful for navigating 
citizens’ attitudes towards national political leaders (regime) and democratic institutions 
(system), or perhaps even the very principle of democracy, but it does not grasp the 
tenets of ‘executive-level politics’. HS2 Ltd (i.e. DfT) and Rijkswaterstaat have represented 
the state in the two cases under investigation, but they are specialized agencies inhabited 
by unelected representatives.      
 That being said, the pertinence of satisfaction and trust as two lubricants for 
building amicable relations between authority and civil society persists. Arguably, the 
willingness of stakeholders to become immersed in counter-expertise was fed by the 
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categorical yet unarticulated denial of the specialist agencies in the national administration 
to make their science more open and plural in character. This denial did not only breed 
dissatisfaction with the legitimacy of the project evidence base, but also led stakeholders 
to distrust the agencies responsible for providing the evidence. Scientific distrust 
adversely affected the working relationship between HS2 Ltd and the stakeholders in the 
Chilterns under the remit of the CCCF, further compounded by factors of time, physical 
and political scale, and the ‘scientization’ of organized civil society.      
 The most important take-home message of this thesis is that sustainability 
discourses do not just ‘happen’. They are mobilized, either through things (events, 
concepts, principles, processes, et cetera) specific to a certain place and time or through 
more universalistic developments. The thesis has investigated whether the external 
factors of institutional design and political culture were able to influence the mobilization of 
discourses in the EIAs of two purposefully selected cases. Whilst this did not happen, the 
attempt was not in vain. Other external factors drove the discourse mobilization, such as 
the conduct of science and the use of expert knowledge. This is a relevant observation, as 
it gives impetus to further valuable research on the promulgation of ideas about 
sustainability.     
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Appendix 1 Original declaration of informed consent as used in the fieldwork 
+++  
   
 
Declaration of Informed Consent by Interviewee to participate in the 
research ‘Public consultation process of the proposed HS2 railway line 
crossing the Chilterns’ 
 
Purpose of this declaration: In order to protect the human right to privacy of interviewees, their 
right to be informed, and right to be protected from any harm that might occur. It is also intended to 
encourage transparency and accountability for this research project.  
 
Please answer the questions below to indicate what it is that you are prepared to consent to, and 
then sign at the bottom. The interview can then be conducted on the basis you have specified, and 
the interviewer can countersign prior to the interview taking place. 
 
I confirm that: (please tick boxes) Yes No 
I have read the introduction to this research and I understand the 
reasons why the research is being conducted.    
I agree to give the face-to-face interview to the researcher.   
I understand that there is no payment for participation in this study.   
I understand that my anonymity will be protected.   
I agree to the interview being recorded (subject to no comments being 
attributed or used in any way without my prior agreement).   
I would like to know the findings and results of this study.   
On the basis of the answers given above, I willingly agree to participate 
in this research study.   
 
 
Signed (interviewee): ………………………………..…………………….. Date: ….………..…  
 
Signed (interviewer): ………………………………..……………………... Date: ….………..…  
 
If there are any queries or if there is need for clarification, please contact Jaap Rozema (Tel. 01603 
591340, email: j.rozema@uea.ac.uk). 
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Introduction to the research ‘Public consultation process of the proposed 
HS2 railway line crossing the Chilterns’  
 
As part of my PhD (doctor of philosophy) at the University of East Anglia (UEA) in Norwich, I will 
conduct research public engagement related to sustainability decision-making in two cases 
involving public consultation and environmental impact assessment (EIA), in the Netherlands and 
the United Kingdom (UK). In the Netherlands I have conducted research on a case related to the 
construction of a connecting part of the A4 motorway, which is currently interrupted for the length of 
seven kilometres. In the UK I will conduct research on HS2 Phase 1, the proposed railway line 
between London and Birmingham (West Midlands). I will focus on the proposed line of route (the 
‘Preferred Option’) crossing the Chilterns, which is an Area of Outstanding Natural Beauty (AONB).  
 
My research focuses on a comparison between the democratic institutions of the UK (and/or 
England) and the Netherlands. I envisage an institution as a ‘rule of the game’ which informs the 
decision-making process. Institutions therefore play a very significant role in the research. 
Furthermore, I think that institutions are shaped by the ‘political environment’ of the country. With 
regards to the institutions of representative democracy, I think that they are very different in the UK 
than from those in the Netherlands. I assume that the observed institutional differences at the 
national level also seep into the ‘institutional character’ of the two cases.    
 
A second aspect of the research relates to the interdependence of the political norms and rights 
which are supported and respected by the stakeholders involved in democratic decision-making. I 
have called this aspect ‘political culture’. Political culture means that participants in decision-making 
are part of, and influenced by, the political norms and rights as well as the dominant views on 
participation in public decision-making. Satisfaction with democracy and trust in the conduct of 
politics are expected to impact significantly on political culture. However, such impacts are not 
easily measurable and may best be investigated through qualitative inquiry, for example through 
interviewing. 
 
I would also like to know how the institutional character and political culture of a country, which play 
a part in the case of the proposed HS2 line of route crossing the Chilterns, influence views on 
sustainability. Sustainability may mean different things to different people; it is an abstract concept. 
I hypothesize that different stakeholders in a process of public consultation, with or without 
engagement in the EIA, develop a range of views on sustainability and how it must be anchored in 
decision outcomes. I hypothesize that institutions and political culture can shape how certain views 
on sustainability are formed and vented publicly. 
 
I am predominantly interested in institutions that are able to facilitate public engagement in the 
public consultation process and the EIA. Part of the interview questions are therefore based on 
public engagement. I am also interested in views on democratic practice and functioning, 
democratic satisfaction and trust in politics, and whether the decision-making and public 
consultation processes have been fair. Finally, I am interested in views on sustainability in the case 
of the HS2 line of route that will cross the Chilterns.        
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Appendix 2 Original questionnaire used for decision-makers 
 
+++ 
 
Interview questions for decision-makers involved in the A4DS project 
 
(To be filled in by interviewer): 
 
- Name of interviewee: 
- Name of organization: 
- Location of organization 
- Location of interview: 
- Date of interview: 
- Organizational level: national / regional (county) / local 
- Type of organization: executive agency / planning authority / national political party    
 
• General information: 
 
1. What does your organization do? 
Answer: 
 
 
2. What was your organizations’ role in the EIA? 
Answer: 
 
 
• Public participation in the EIA: 
 
3. To what extent does your organization think there were opportunities for public participation 
in the EIA? 
Answer: 
 
 
4. To what extent did your organization get involved in developing opportunities for public 
participation? 
Answer: 
 
 
5. To what extent does your organization think the opportunities for public participation were 
fair?  
Answer: 
 
 
6. To what extent did your organization trust the other authorities involved in the EIA? 
Answer: 
 
 
7. To what extent did your organization trust the public participants involved in the EIA? 
Answer: 
 
 
8. To what extent does your organization think decision consensus is reached in the EIA? 
Answer: 
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• Perceptions of sustainable development: 
 
9. How would your organization define the concept of sustainable development? 
Answer: 
 
 
 
10. How does your organization think about a trade-off between objectives in sustainable 
development? 
Answer: 
 
 
11. To what extent does your organization think EIA is a tool to promote sustainable 
development? 
Answer: 
 
 
12. To what extent does your organization think the current project is sustainable? 
Answer: 
 
 
13. To what extent has your organizations’ perception of sustainable development changed 
during the EIA? 
Answer: 
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Appendix 3 Original questionnaire used for civil society stakeholders 
 
+++ 
 
Interview questions for civil society stakeholders involved in the HS2 Phase 1 project 
 
(To be filled in by interviewer): 
 
- Name of interviewee: 
- Name organization (if applicable): 
- Location of organization: 
- Location of interview: 
- Date of interview: 
- Type of organization: individual / association / charitable organization / company 
- Government funded: yes / no 
 
• General information: 
 
1. Generally speaking, what do you or does your organization do? 
Answer: 
 
 
2. What was your or your organizations’ statutory role in the public participation and the EIA 
thus far? 
Answer: 
 
 
• PART 1 – Political culture: 
 
3. To what extent do you or your organization believe in democracy as a political system to be 
desired? 
Answer: 
 
 
4. To what extent are you or your organization satisfied with the democratic system in your 
country? 
Answer: 
 
 
5. To what extent do you or your organization think it is possible to influence the decision-
making process? 
Answer: 
 
 
6. To what extent do you or does your organization trust other people or organizations in the 
decision-making process? 
Answer: 
 
 
7. To what extent do you or does your organization think norms are shared between and 
among decision-makers and civil society? 
Answer: 
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• PART 2 – Public engagement in the public consultation and the EIA (thus far): 
 
8. To what extent do you or does your organization think there have been opportunities for 
public engagement in the public consultation and the EIA (thus far)? 
Answer: 
 
 
9. To what extent do you or your organization think the available opportunities for public 
engagement in the public consultation and the EIA (thus far) have been fair?  
Answer: 
 
 
10. To what extent do you or does your organization trust the relevant rule-competent 
organizations and agencies involved in the public consultation and the EIA (thus far)? 
Answer: 
 
 
11. To what extent does you or your organization trust the other civil society stakeholders 
involved in the public consultation and the EIA (thus far)? 
Answer: 
 
 
12. To what extent do you or your organization think consensus in the project is reached in the 
public consultation and the EIA (thus far)? 
Answer: 
 
 
• PART 3 – Perceptions towards sustainability: 
 
13. How would you or your organization define sustainability? 
Answer: 
 
 
14. How do you or your organization think about the possibility of trading off between various 
objectives within sustainability? 
Answer: 
 
 
15. To what extent do you or does your organization think public consultation and EIA are 
decision-support tools that can promote sustainability? 
Answer: 
 
 
16. To what extent do you or your organization think the project is sustainable? 
Answer: 
 
 
17. To what extent has your perception or your organization’s perception towards sustainability 
changed during the public consultation and the EIA (thus far)? 
Answer 
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Appendix 4 List of primary documents used for analysis 
 
Author Document title 
51M 
Two documents as part of the 51m Submission to the 
Transport Select Committee: 1) Appendix 1: Optimised 
Alternative to HS2 – The Scope for Growth on the Existing 
Network; 2) Chapter 8: Capacity and Service Disbenefits 
AGHAST Federation A Better Railway for Britain 
All-Party Parliamentary 
Group for High-Speed 
Rail 
Report of the Inquiry into Britain’s Rail Capacity 
Arup/URS HS2 London to West Midlands EIA Scope and Methodology Report 
Atkins Because Transport Matters: High Speed Rail 
Atkins High Speed Rail Strategic Alternatives Study – Update Following Consultation 
Chesham & Amersham 
Conservative 
Association 
"HS2 Ltd confirm to Cheryl that Chesham Road will Not be 
used as Main Route for Construction Traffic" 
Chiltern Countryside 
Group 
Written Response from the Chiltern Countryside Group to the 
Department for Transport Public Consultation on 'High Speed 
Rail: Investing in Britain's Future', February 2011 
Chiltern Countryside 
Group 
Written Response from the Chiltern Countryside Group to the 
HS2 London to West Midlands Environmental Impact 
Assessment Scope and Methodology Consultation, May 2012 
Chilterns Conservation 
Board 
Comments on Draft EIA Scope and Methodology Report for 
High Speed 2 (London to West Midlands) 
Chilterns Conservation 
Board "HS2 in the Chilterns Route Revisions January 2012" 
Department for 
Transport Britain’s Transport Infrastructure: High Speed Two 
Department for 
Transport Delivering a Sustainable Railway 
Department for 
Transport High Speed Rail 
Department for 
Transport "HS2 Revised Line of Route Maps" 
Department for 
Transport 
Scheme Development High Speed Rail Consultation: 
Government Hybrid Bills 
Department for 
Transport 
TAG UNIT 3.5.6: Values of Time and Vehicle Operating 
Costs 
Department for 
Transport Strategy Unit 
Review of the Value of Time Assumptions for Business 
Travellers on HS2 
Dialogue by Design High Speed Rail: Investing in Britain’s Future. Consultation Summary Report 
Dialogue by Design High Speed Rail: Investing in Britain’s Future. Addendum 
Gillan, C Submission to the Consultation on HS2 on Behalf of the Constituency of Chesham and Amersham 
Hammond, P 
"Foreword", in HS2 Ltd and Department for Transport 
(editors), High Speed Rail: Investing in Britain’s Future. 
Consultation 
Hansen, I A 
A4 Delft-Schiedam heroverwegen. Bijdrage aan het 
Colloquium Vervoersplanologisch Speurwerk, 25 en 26 
November 2010 
Hansen, I A "Besluit tot Aanleg A4 Delft-Schiedam (Geachte minister 
223 
 
Eurlings,)" 
hoezomiddendelflands
nelweg.nl "Nieuwsbrief 21 Juni 2011" 
House of Commons 
Transport Committee 
High Speed Rail: Government Response to the Committee's 
Tenth Report of Session 2010–12 
House of Commons 
Transport Committee 
High Speed Rail: Tenth Report of Session 2010–12. Volume 
I: Report, Together with Formal Minutes 
House of Commons 
Transport Committee 
High Speed Rail: Tenth Report of Session 2010–12. Volume 
II: Oral and Written Evidence 
House of Commons 
Transport Committee 
High Speed Rail: Tenth Report of Session 2010–12. Volume 
III: Additional Written Evidence 
HS2 Action Alliance Consultation on High Speed 2: Submission by HS2 Action Alliance 
HS2 Action Alliance High Speed Rail (HS2). Justifying HS2: A Case of Myths not Reality 
HS2 Action Alliance More Capacity on WCML: An Alternative to HS2 
HS2 Action Alliance Overestimation of Value of Business Travellers Time – The Facts 
HS2 Action Alliance Rebutting the Six Myths about HS2 
HS2 Action Alliance Why the Business Case is Flawed and HS2 is not in the National Interest 
HS2 Ltd Draft Environmental Statement London-West Midlands 
HS2 Ltd Economic Case for HS2: Updated Appraisal of Transport User Benefits and Wider Economic Benefits 
HS2 Ltd Government Green Light for High Speed Two 
HS2 Ltd High Speed 2 London to West Midlands: Appraisal of Sustainability - Post Consultation Route Refinements 
HS2 Ltd High Speed Rail London to the West Midlands and Beyond: A Report to Government by High Speed Two Limited 
HS2 Ltd High Speed Rail: Investing in Britain’s Future. The Government’s Decisions 
HS2 Ltd HS2 Cost and Risk Model 
HS2 Ltd HS2 London to the West Midlands Appraisal of Sustainability 
HS2 Ltd High Speed 2 London to West Midlands: Appraisal of Sustainability - Post Consultation Route Refinements 
HS2 Ltd Options for Additional Tunnelling through the Chilterns 
HS2 Ltd Review of HS2 London to West Midlands Route Selection 
and Speed 
HS2 Ltd Review of Possible Refinements to the Proposed HS2 London to West Midlands Route 
HS2 Ltd Review of Property Issues 
HS2 Ltd Summary of Effects of HS2 London to West Midlands Route Refinements 
HS2 Ltd The Economic Case for HS2: Value for Money Statement 
HS2 Ltd Valuing the Benefits of HS2 (London – West Midlands) 
HS2 Ltd and 
Department for 
Transport 
High Speed Rail: Investing in Britain's Future. Consultation 
IODS De Schop in de Grond, We gaan beginnen... 
IODS IODS-Convenant 
IODS Kansen benutten, Impasses doorbreken 
Milieudefensie Bouwen aan een Groene Metropool: Een Duurzaam Mobiliteitsplan voor de Regio Rotterdam – Den Haag 
Milieufederatie Zuid-
Holland 
Nieuwsbrief December 2009. Crisis- en Herstelwet: Maken of 
kraken? 
Milieufederatie Zuid- Persbericht. A4 Delft-Schiedam: IODS veranderde Spelregels 
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Holland 
Ministerie van 
Infrastructuur en Milieu 
Ontwerp-rijksstructuurvisie: Bereikbaarheid Regio Rotterdam 
en Nieuwe Westelijke Oeververbinding. Plan-MER MIRT-
verkenning Regio Rotterdam en Haven: Duurzaam 
Bereikbaar 
Ministerie van Verkeer 
en Waterstaat 
Startnotitie. Startdocument voor de Aanvulling op en 
Actualisatie van de Trajectnota/MER in het Kader van de 
Tracé/m.e.r.-procedure van de Rijksweg A4 Delft-Schiedam 
Ministerie van Verkeer 
en Waterstaat en 
VROM 
Nota Mobiliteit: Naar een Betrouwbare en Voorspelbare 
Bereikbaarheid 
MOBilisation for the 
Environment 
Beroepsschrift tegen TB A4 Delft-Schiedam - M03. Utrecht, 
14 November 2010 
Rijkswaterstaat "Aanleg A4 Delft-Schiedam na Bijna 60 jaar van Start" 
Rijkswaterstaat Nota van Antwoord: Zienswijzen Trajectnota/MER A4 Delft-Schiedam 
Rijkswaterstaat Ontwerp Tracébesluit A4 Delft-Schiedam. DEEL I - Besluittekst 
Rijkswaterstaat Rijkswaterstaat: Annual Review 2011 
Rijkswaterstaat TN/MER A4 Delft-Schiedam. Deelrapport Verkeersveiligheid 
Rijkswaterstaat Tracébesluit A4 Delft-Schiedam. Deel I - Besluittekst 
Rijkswaterstaat Tracébesluit A4 Delft-Schiedam. Deel V - Nota van Antwoord Ontwerp Tracébesluit A4 Delft-Schiedam 
Rijkswaterstaat Trajectnota/MER Stap 2 A4 Delft-Schiedam. Hoofdrapport 
Rijkswaterstaat Trajectnota/MER A4 Delft-Schiedam. Stap 1: Alternatieven MER 
Rijkswaterstaat Trajectnota/MER Rijksweg 13/16 Rotterdam 
Rijkswaterstaat Trajectnota/MER Stap 2 A4 Delft-Schiedam. Deelrapport Verkeer 
Stichting Batavier “Geachte Leden van Provinciale Staten” 
Stichting 
Natuurmonumenten Zienswijze Ontwerp Tracébesluit A4. 10 Mei 2010 
Stichting Stop 
RW19/A4 
Gewoon blijven tanken of Toch Maar na gaan denken? 
Zienswijze van Stichting Stop RW19/A4 op de 
Trajectnota/MER A4 Delft-Schiedam, Stap 1 en Stap 2 
Stop HS2 "HS2 expected to have an Effect on Local Elections." 
Stop HS2 "HS2 Facts" 
Stop HS2 "Is There an Alternative to High Speed 2?" 
Stop HS2 Stop HS2 Consultation Response July 11 - Final 
The Wildlife Trusts HS2 EIA Scope and Methodology Consultation: Response from The Wildlife Trusts (England) 
Wendover HS2 Financial Analysis of HS2: Multiplying an Unknown by an Uncertainty for 75 Years 
Wendover Society “HS2 Update" 
Woodland Trust Woodland Trust Response to the High Speed Rail: Investing in Britain’s Future - Consultation 
225 
 
Appendix 5 Original outputs of the value surveys 
 
This appendix contains the original outputs of the values that are used in Chapter 7. The 
outputs are grouped on the basis of the value survey they belong to. 
  
• European Social Survey (ESS) 
 
Statement: “I am satisfied with the way democracy works in this country” (B27) 
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Statement: “I am satisfied with the government of this country” (B26) 
 
 
 
Statement: “I trust the politicians of this country” (B4-10) 
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Statement: “I trust the political parties of this country” (B4-10) 
 
 
 
Statement: “I trust the parliament of this country” (B4-10) 
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• World Value Survey (WVS) 
 
Statement: “I think that it is good to have democracy in this country” (V151) 
 
 
Statement: “I have confidence in the government of this country” (V138) 
 
 
 
Statement: “I have confidence in the political parties in this country” (V139) 
 
 
 
Statement: “I have confidence in the parliament of this country” (V140) 
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Statement: “I think that my country is democratic” (V163) 
 
 
 
• European Values Study (EVS) 
 
Statement: “I am satisfied with democracy” (Q64) 
 
Scores for Great Britain: 
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Scores for the Netherlands: 
 
 
Statement: “I think the government of this country is good” (Q65) 
 
Scores for Great Britain: 
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Scores for the Netherlands: 
 
 
Statement: “I think that it is good to have democracy” (Q66D) 
 
Great Britain: 
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Scores for the Netherlands: 
 
 
Statement: “I think democracy is the best political system” (Q67A) 
 
Scores for Great Britain: 
 
 
Scores for the Netherlands: 
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Statement: “I have confidence in the government of this country” (Q63R) 
 
Scores for Great Britain: 
 
 
Scores for the Netherlands: 
 
 
Statement: “I have confidence in the parliament of this country” (Q63G) 
 
Scores for Great Britain: 
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Scores for the Netherlands: 
 
 
Statement: “I have confidence in the political parties in this country” (Q63Q) 
 
Scores for Great Britain: 
 
 
Scores for the Netherlands: 
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Appendix 6 Coding example 
 
This appendix shows how the transcripts of the interviews have been coded. In Chapter 3 
it has been explained that the thesis has used tree coding to code the transcripts of the 
interviews. Figure A6.1 shows the ‘coding tree’ which has been used to code the 
interviews in the HS2 case. A similar coding tree has been used for the A4DS case, of 
course tailored to its specific context (e.g. ‘Chilterns AONB’ is replaced with ‘Midden-
Delfland’).   
 
 
Figure A6.1: Example of the coding tree used in the HS2 case 
 
Below is a full transcript interview, selected from one the interviews conducted in the HS2 
case. The highlighted pieces of text indicate that this is a code. To a number of these 
codes nodes have been added (put between parentheses, printed bold and in fully 
capitalized) to show to which (parent) nodes they belong to. All the nodes from Figure 
A6.1 have been used.    
 
+++ 
 
Transcript Interview with the Chilterns Conservation Board 
 
“You want me to say something about me and my organization?” 
 
Interviewer: Yes. 
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“So, my job is the chief officer of the Chilterns Conservation Board. I’ve been working here 
for nearly 20 years now and the Board was set up by government [POLITICAL 
AUTHORITY] to promote the conservation and enjoyment of the Chilterns Area of 
Outstanding Natural Beauty [CHILTERNS AONB]. So we have a statutory duty to 
promote conservation.”  
 
Interviewer: Since ’65, right? 
 
“Well, the AONB designation was created in ’65. The Board was only created in 2004 and 
before that we were listed as a local organization for a very long time. But we’re only given 
the legal duties in 2004. We have a Board of Members, several of them are appointed by 
the Secretary of State to represent the national interest [INTEREST ADVOCACY] and 
then the remainder are local representatives from the Councils. So it’s a Board of all local 
people but we are charged with that dual responsibility of maintaining the national 
importance of the area and reflecting local opinion [INTEREST ADVOCACY]. It’s a key 
issue I think for HS2, and, whatever the role is of civil society, because (...)33 as a local 
civil series of organizations that reflect our interests. Government will say it has to reflect 
the national interest. So it’s a different civil society voice [CIVIL SOCIETY]. Normally you 
will expect that the national interest overrides the local interest. The difference here is that 
this is national heritage, it has a national designation so we can do both: we’re reflecting 
the national interest and ...” 
 
Interviewer: You’re wearing two hats. 
 
“Exactly. So, we can’t get dismissed as just a local opinion [DEMOCRATIC 
SATISFACTION]. This is national heritage and it is the duty not just of us as the Board 
but of the government to care for it. And that’s a problem for it, because it looks like it’s 
undermining its own designations. Which it is. Let me get back to the Conservation 
Board’s role: we are set up by government [POLITICAL AUTHORITY], we have 
government money, we have local authority money and we are supposed to advice 
government. Which we do. So it gives us a difficulty when we are therefore opposing what 
the government wants [PUBLIC ENGAGEMENT], and rather more difficulty for using 
government money to oppose what the government wants. So there is a limit to how 
involved we can become.”  
 
Interviewer: And what kind of language you may want to use, for instance. 
 
                                                           
33
 When a ‘(...)’ is used, it indicates that the recording at that particular moment proved inaudible.  
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“Yes, we use very careful language. Which is why the network of several organizations is 
so important [CIVIL SOCIETY]. Because some have more freedom to speak up than 
others. On the other hand, they don’t have an influence necessarily and we do. So we 
have to decide where best to put our emphasis and our resources, and in so doing to 
know where the others can put their money. So for example, HS2 Action Alliance is 
extremely effective at lobbying [INTEREST ADVOCACY] in all kinds of ways which would 
be quite unacceptable for us to do. It can generate money from private individuals, from 
lawyers, lobbyists, which we could not do. And so it makes it easier in some way for us to 
know where to put our efforts.” 
 
Interviewer: Also because I think [name of individual], she had a contact prior to her life 
with Action Alliance. I think she was a consultant of some sort. 
 
“That’s right. One of the roles that we have to play is to give reassurance to all of these 
groups that they’re doing the right things and doing it the right way, that they’re doing a 
good job. So a lot of them are small and working in isolation, that they haven’t done this 
kind of thing before. So apart of, if you like, the technical job we have to do, we have to do 
the networking, give people comfort and confidence to keep ... to carry on, it’s easy to get 
disheartened. Especially when it’s us against the government [POLITICAL TRUST] with 
all their money and their power. So this is why we like to get out and about and to work 
with [name of individual] and [name of individual] who runs the Stop HS2 campaign and 
[name of individual] in the Chiltern Society. So we appear at a lot of events, we endorse a 
lot of literature, we do a lot of press releases. Because it does a statement that this 
government body [POLITICAL AUTHORITY] is with them. It beliefs it has a case and is 
willing to stand its grounds. It would be easy for government-funded bodies to push the 
sign (...) the politicians, told to shut up. So for example in this great debate about what is 
the right thing or wrong thing to do, you don’t find the Department of Environment, it’s 
called DEFRA in this country, the Department for the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs 
[POLITICAL AUTHORITY].” 
 
Interviewer: And also the Environment Agency? 
 
“Yes, well the government department’s top level has a number of agencies which deliver 
work for it, one of which is the Environment Agency, Forestry Commission, Natural 
England, some others. DEFRA has been silenced, it says nothing. The government 
agencies [POLITICAL AUTHORITY] so called, some of them have been told not to say 
very much, so in public they’ll say virtually nothing. Behind the scenes they’ll be doing a 
bit of technical work, but in terms of policy or politics or lobbying they’re not doing anything 
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(...), which has made our job rather more difficult, because some will say, ‘well, the 
Conservation Board says X, but that is not supported by Natural England’. And it looks as 
(...) makes us look weak and that has been a constant problem.”  
 
Interviewer: And the Campaign to Protect Rural England? Is that a farmer’s organization?  
 
“No, oh no. No. CPRE is very much people that are concerned about the quality of the 
environment [SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT] in rural areas. Maybe a few are 
landowners, but a lot of its support is actually people live in towns.”  
 
Interviewer: It’s not necessarily a conservative party’s ...? 
 
“No, no it’s not political, but you might argue that its membership probably more likely 
votes conservative than liberal. No, it certainly doesn’t represent landowners or farming 
interests, no. So the CPRE has been pretty vocal and it has a different agenda 
[INTEREST ADVOCACY] from the rest of us. It’s a national organization, so inevitably it 
sees life differently. I think it’s fair to say that the national spokespeople in London have 
not seen eye to eye with the branch network in the counties, in Oxfordshire, in 
Buckinghamshire, in Northamptonshire, they’ve been pretty upset that some of the things 
that have been said nationally [INTEREST ADVOCACY] are their CPRE colleagues in 
London, who probably have a sneaky sympathy for railway development, as we all have 
to a certain extent.” 
 
Interviewer: As opposed to cars. 
 
“Yeah. But they have not been decipherous enough in opposing High-Speed 2 
specifically. That’s been a problem. In terms of other national civic bodies [CIVIL 
SOCIETY], probably no. National Trust has been involved at the margins, because not 
many of its properties are affected but one very important property is at Hartwell near 
Aylesbury.”  
 
Interviewer: They look at the archaeological value? 
 
“Their concerns are twofold: one is direct impact on their properties, it so happens the one 
at Hartwell is a hotel which has been given to the National Trust and the profits are given 
to the National Trust and the railway goes through the grounds of this hotel. So its earning 
power will be much diminished, it’s a very expensive [COSTS AND BENEFITS], 400 or 
500 Euros per night and upwards. But you can’t charge 500 Euros a night if there’s a 
239 
 
railway next door, so its reputation is severely damaged and the setting of the hotel, it 
goes through a registered park and garden, the (...) fabric of the park is damaged as well. 
And its wider concern is that the Chilterns has been damaged [ECOLOGICAL 
DESTRUCTION AND BLIGHT], and that undermines the designation. And it’s weary that 
further North where the route is announced, north of Birmingham, more of its properties 
will be affected, perhaps more directly than here. So it’s preparing itself for a bigger 
campaign, possibly. There are other national organizations, notable national 
organizations. Woodland Trust, very very against this because this railway will destroy 
ancient woodland [ECOLOGICAL DESTRUCTION AND BLIGHT]. Are you familiar with 
the definition of ancient woodland? Well, for the record: (...) ancient woodland is very little 
bit left in Britain and England and ancient woodland is defined as woodland that has 
existed continuously since at least 1600. So there is not very much left.” 
 
Interviewer: Pine oak? 
 
“Oh, all sorts of woodland. Ancient woodland [NATURAL RESOURCE] in the South you 
would expect oak to be a major component, but not necessarily. In this part of the world 
there is no ancient pine woodlands. So it can destroy some ancient woodland. In some 
other places it will divide it so you get fragmentation of woodland, which is a bad thing. 
And in other places it will affect their setting. In order words, it will for example stop 
colonization of adjacent areas by species that survive currently only in ancient woodlands. 
So if you do more planting on the other side of the railway, some species can’t migrate 
and get across, so they are isolated. For that reason the Woodland Trust is very much 
against it. You’ve then got the network of Wildlife Trusts [CIVIL SOCIETY]. These are all 
membership organizations, as you probably know. National Trust has got 3 and a half 
million members, Woodland Trust I guess several hundred thousands, and you then have 
the network of county-based Wildlife Trusts, and collectively they’ve got a million 
members and all Wildlife Trusts affected are against the railway for the same reasons I 
guess as the Woodland Trust. It’s very bad for nature conservation, it damages habitats 
[ECOLOGICAL DESTRUCTION AND BLIGHT]. It’s a sense of also: we don’t care about 
wildlife and our environment because we are prepared to destroy it for the sake of this 
railway, which we don’t believe has a good case. It would be different (...) the railway was 
needed, that there is no alternative, that it was affordable, that there is a good business 
case for it [EVIDENCE BASE]. In which case our argument might look quite weak, but 
none of those things exist. We don’t believe it’s needed, it’s certainly not affordable, the 
business case is extremely weak. So we don’t feel we should sacrifice the environment, 
that’s very much the Wildlife Trust’s line. So there’s a representation of public concern 
[INTEREST ADVOCACY], if you like through the organizations that they’ve chosen to 
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support. All the big players are against it, all of them. Because it’s the nation’s debate, 
isn’t it, to what extent does the government represent the public opinion [DEMOCRATIC 
SATISFACTION]? Or does it, is it better represented through organizations locally, or 
those organizations that people choose to support? (...) membership of political parties is 
very small. It’s tiny. Tiny. The RSPB has got five times more members than a political 
party and therefore passes (...).” 
 
Interviewer: Probably the biggest organization, civil organization is the car drivers’ 
organization, it’s the biggest in Germany, it’s the biggest in the Netherlands, probably one 
of the biggest in the UK. 
 
“Here we’ve got, well there is the Royal Automobile Club. It’s a rescue organization (...), 
but there, I think it’s called the RAC Foundation. There’s one side which rescues and 
another side which represents the interests of motorists. They’re very against the railway, 
not because they are necessarily pro-car. What they’re saying is there is no national 
transport strategy; this railway does not fit with all the other needs, other transport needs. 
So they’re saying the roads need a lot of investment, they’re not getting it, because it’s all 
going to High-Speed 2. An equal message which we’re all giving the government, there 
may be a case for high-speed rail but you have got to map out all the transport needs first 
and then decide where this is the priority [EVIDENCE BASE]. We have never done that. If 
you base this on public opinion, base it on user groups, high speed rail has no place at all. 
But we do want money spent on the roads. The railway priorities are short-distance 
commuting networks, the railways we use every day to get to work. And to put more 
money into infrastructure that reduces our need to travel. That’s the broadband or to 
enable home-working, or to have the jobs where people live rather than having to 
commute long distances. All kinds of things you can do to reduce the need to travel and to 
reduce the need to travel long distances. So we don’t have a national transport strategy. 
So in terms of the articulation of public opinion [INTEREST ADVOCACY], I would say it, 
wouldn’t I, all of it is saying this railway is not (...), which is why it’s so frustrating the 
government carries on. Which rather suggests there’s another part of civil society which is 
at work, which is those who firmly believe that railways is a good thing and have a vested 
interest, the big construction companies for example, or the Chambers of Commerce in 
Manchester or Leeds. But they’re looking after their own interests, but we all have to pay 
the price, literally pay the price.  (...) we’ll lose the environment [SUSTAINABLE 
DEVELOPMENT] that we currently have.”  
 
Interviewer: Would you say that, (...), do you feel it’s even possible to oppose a plan which 
is advanced by the government, rather than it is a split decision perhaps between 
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opposition and government within the House of Commons. Would you say that civil 
society opposition in general is fruitful...?  
 
“Yes. Well we, in the case of the Conservation Board we have a legal duty to oppose 
anything which is going to damage the Area of Outstanding Natural Beauty [CHILTERNS 
AONB]. So we have to oppose it. Is it constructive and fruitful? I think there is a tradition 
in the history of Britain. Fighting, taking on the big guy. It’s not so long ago that the Third 
Runway Heathrow, which has had many parallels, of course, was thrown out. There was a 
difference in party political interest [PARTY POLITICS]. But nonetheless, there was a 
sense of government wanting this to happen, it would have happened. But through civil-
based opposition [PUBLIC ENGAGEMENT], including court action and direct action and 
lobbying and so on, that was stopped. Whether or not it’s going to come back again is 
another question. But there is another part of the railway story of course. One of the 
reasons for having this high-speed railway was because you would no longer need a third 
runway on Heathrow because you could take the train rather than fly. Which was an 
argument that was put forward by politicians because it sounded good. In practice, it was 
completely misleading. The number of people flying internally in Britain [HS2 NATIONAL 
IMPORTANCE] is tiny. Very few of those flights using the third runway would ever switch 
to a railway. So it’s a bogus argument used to support what was a contentious 
proposition. But all parties went for it. They realized that argument didn’t stack up so they 
don’t refer to it anymore. The argument then became: this was going to transform the 
economy of the north of England [ECONOMIC RATIONALE]. But there is no evidence as 
far as we are aware anywhere in the world that high-speed rail generates economic 
activity. And if there is any evidence is that the economic activity moves to the rich area. 
People go in our case to London, not the other way around.” 
 
Interviewer: Which is counter-productive. 
 
“It’s the opposite of what people want [DEMOCRATIC SATISFACTION], because what it 
will turn into is a commuter line for people in Birmingham going to work in London. The 
similar argument is that if you generate a network like this, when we go back to the 
experience in Germany and France is that where it did generate economic activity, it was 
by displacement. Because a lot of the German and French high-speed railway stations are 
not in the city centres. They are in the outskirts. So it creates jobs around the railway but 
they all come from the city centre. That’s probably counter to job creation, economic 
generation. But in fact there is zero sum [ECONOMIC RATIONALE].” 
 
Interviewer: It is either gentrification or displacement. 
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“Yes, it’s a pure displacement. Which is almost certainly what will happen in Birmingham. 
So for example, if they run a high-speed railway from London to Birmingham that will stop 
at the airport, in the outskirts, there will be regeneration around the airport, but a lot of that 
will have moved out of central Birmingham. Or would have gone to central Birmingham 
(...). So it’s counter-productive [EVIDENCE BASE]. So that became the argument for the 
high-speed railway, but that has been resisted and shown to be bogus. The next strand of 
the argument was that it is better for the environment: fewer emissions, particularly 
emissions around the airport, fewer people driving. But then again there is absolutely no 
basis for that and if you, as we have done ... A high-speed train uses a lot of energy. Lots 
of energy. And there is an equation that if you double the speed, you quadruple the 
amount of energy needs [EVIDENCE BASE]. So until we have an entirely green 
renewable energy network, there is a relationship between the energy you use and the 
emissions created at the power stations. As you will you know, we have a lot of gas, a lot 
of coal and by 2027 it will have changed, but not a lot.” 
 
Interviewer: The question is obviously where does the electricity comes from. If you have 
to build coal-fired power plants now to feed HS2, rather than to get it from windmills, which 
is highly unlikely because you need lots of capacity, ultimately this is much worse for the 
environment.    
 
“The other thing is about railways it needs lots of infrastructure. You need new stations, 
you need power to run it and you need the track and tunnels and all the rest of it. There is 
a lot of embedded carbon in the infrastructure and there is a lot of energy needed for the 
stations, for the power plants, for the offices, for the trains themselves [EVIDENCE 
BASE].” 
 
Interviewer: And for the one million lorries with spoil. 
 
“So there is a lot of embedded carbon already. But there was a study done, I’m sure it was 
in (...) North-West America that had suggested the amount of energy needed to create a 
running railway is probably in excess of running an aircraft between the same 
destinations. So the runway already exists, once you get off the runway you don’t need 
any more infrastructure until the other end. So aviation is doing quite a good job of getting 
emissions down. A long way to go, but it’s quite going to get it down. And part of the 
debate here is: what are the emissions per passenger mile? And car emissions are going 
way down as you probably know. It’s an EU priority to get emissions down to a 110 grams 
per passenger kilometre by 2015. So over long distances the cars tend to have multiple 
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occupancy and they have very efficient engines. The emissions per kilometre are lower or 
comparable with high-speed trains. And the way aircrafts are going, they will still be worse 
than trains but they are not that much worse. Because they’re going to (...) bigger aircraft. 
Because the other thing with the train is: to keep your passenger kilometre emissions 
down, you need a very high loading factor. And they won’t have, they won’t be full. They’ll 
be running half-empty trains, so it’s conceivable, and this is not unrealistic, that the 
emissions per passenger kilometre from a half-empty high-speed train are worse than 
going by car and comparable with flying in twenty or thirty years’ time, and much worse 
than by coach [EVIDENCE BASE]. So, that argument is thrown to people.  
 
The other facet to that is: how do you value the natural environment into the business 
case [ECONOMIC RATIONALE]? How are you going to value on wildlife, on the 
landscape, on historic heritage? Very difficult. But there are ways of doing it.”  
 
Interviewer: Willingness-to-pay, for instance. 
 
“Willingness-to-pay is a slightly dodgy one.”  
 
Interviewer: Hedonic pricing as well? House prices? 
 
“Well, you can do it, actually you can do that around here. You can say: ‘why do you live 
here and not somewhere else?’ Because it’s more expensive here and there is a 
difference in the prices because it was nice here and (...). You certainly can do that. There 
are methodologies for it but they are not applying it to High-Speed 2, because it will 
undermine the business case. So the actual monetization of environmental impacts is not 
in the business case [COSTS AND BENEFITS], although they have monetized things like 
convenience, time saved, things that are not real monetary values, but they assigned one 
to it. So they are only choosing those qualitative characteristics which suit their case. And 
then, I think it was over fifty percent of the benefits of high-speed rail are notional, they’re 
not real. As you’ll probably know, the bulk of that is time saved. The argument is: every 
minute on a train you cannot be productive. Well, I’m sure today you’ll work on the train 
when you go back [EVIDENCE BASE]. We all do it. And this is no 2012 but 2027; 
technology will be even better. It’s fantastic now; it will be even better. There is an 
argument, bizarre as it may seem, that the time on the train for many people is more 
productive than being in an office or a meeting, because you can concentrate, you can 
read, for example a report. In my case I can’t sit in an office and read a report for an hour: 
too many interruptions. In a train I can sit down and concentrate on that report. So it’s very 
valuable time to me. It’s a completely ridiculous argument.” 
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Interviewer: Again, it’s counter-productive? [name of an individual] told me everything 
within forty minutes is not worth the hassle to take out the laptop and actually opening it.  
 
“There is a psychology about this. We talked to a chap from one of the local railway 
companies, I can’t mention it because it’s going on the record [laughs], who is responsible 
for passenger services and he has to know where this cut-off is between what’s a short 
journey, what’s a slightly longer journey because he has to decide whether to put a buffet 
car on a train. Or a drinks trolley. Because if is a short journey he doesn’t need to bother. 
The longer he does. He reckons that cut-off point was around 45 to 50 minutes. In other 
words, you’re quite right above that you settle down, you take your time, you get stuck into 
whatever it is you want to do. Shorter than that you stare out of the window, you fiddle 
with your phone and you daydream. So in fact we may be denying a lot people what 
would have been productive time on the train, (...) from one hour and ten minutes to fifty 
minutes [EVIDENCE BASE]. Strange as that may seem.”  
 
Interviewer: The government would say: “you can still choose existing infrastructure”? But 
if too many people that, then that may run counter to the justification of building the 
railway. 
 
“Is that not the experience in the Netherlands, that you do have a high-speed train 
between, I don’t know, Brussels and Amsterdam, but you have an older service which 
runs on the existing tracks? The same is true of the high-speed services in Kent. The 
international one to Paris and Brussels. HS1. It’s expensive [COSTS AND BENEFITS], 
going to the wrong station in London. Which is annoying because it means everybody has 
got a twenty minute walk extra to where they want to be. One way of forcing people onto 
these trains is that they make the existing services slower and more expensive. But it still 
doesn’t change. The other interesting thing of course for the railway is: the business 
passengers for long distances aren’t really more than 20, 25 percent of the travellers. So 
75 percent are leisure travellers who don’t want to pay anymore than they have to 
[ECONOMIC RATIONALE]. 5 Euros would make a difference. Because business 
travellers (...), related to their work or their employers paying their fare. So 75% of 
passengers, at least, are price-sensitive and will go for the cheaper option. And of the time 
differences as it is with High-Speed 2 is so small, it’s twenty minutes or less, less 
probably. You probably know the West Coast Main Line franchise, the big squabble 
between Virgin and FirstGroup. Both of them have promised faster services. So at the 
moment the services is one hour and ten minutes, really. The timetable says one hour 
twenty, but actually you probably know, if you say the journey is one hour and twenty 
245 
 
minutes and a sudden percentage of your trains are later than that, you get fined. So they 
build ten minutes into the timetable to avoid the fine. In practice they can do it in 1 hour 
and ten, but they say one hour and twenty. They’re never late. So it’s one hour and ten for 
most of them. In fifteen years from now it will be an hour.”  
 
Interviewer: Because they want to increase it to a 140 miles per hour, I read. 
 
“That’s right, Virgin wants to knock ten minutes off I think, FirstGroup said it will at least 
five, but anyway the point is it’s just over an hour. And the stations that you can go to or 
where you want to be: have you been to Birmingham? New Street is right next to the 
shopping centre. Curzon Street, ten or fifteen minutes walk away. Down the hill, far, some 
of these trains are four hundred metres long, so if you go towards the back end of the 
train, 400 metres.... If you’re leaving for example, if you’ve arrived in Birmingham, to get 
where you wanted to go, which I guess is the city centre, you’ve got to walk 400 metres, 
go to the barriers, 8 or 9-minute walk up the hill, so you’re 10-15 minutes ...  But that’s the 
10 or 15 minutes that you just paid to use a high-speed train to get you there more quickly 
[EVIDENCE BASE].” 
 
Interviewer: Would you say a train passenger, the average leisure train passenger, there 
is a huge price elasticity? If the price goes by thirty percent you would lose more than 
thirty percent of your passengers.  
 
“Well, the other thing is (...), is that you have to persuade people to get on the train who 
would not otherwise have travelled at all. The ticket has to be really cheap. So every 
percentage of demand you want to grow has to be even more price-sensitive. So you 
might only put a pound or two on the price, but you would lose a disproportionate number 
of passengers, because they will just say ‘I'm not going to do the journey at all’. So it stops 
when they’ll say ‘I’ll get the bus or car or walk, or they’ll just wouldn’t do the journey at all’.” 
 
Interviewer: And people use the car for many other reasons than price.  
 
“I think there’s a lot in that. Because what has not been done? It’s either to conduct a 
survey of passengers. Nobody has ever said to passengers: ‘do you want to high-speed 
trains or trains with this particular route?’ That’s how in a way a company works who 
wants to find out if people will buy a certain car or soap, you know. You do consumer 
surveys. Never been done for high-speed rail. The other part they have never asked the 
public what are the price thresholds: at what point would you say ‘of course I will get to 
London for this price’? So they don’t know where these thresholds lie, but they have built 
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an entire business plan based on X number of people travelling for a certain price, and 
there is no evidence to support that reasoning. We keep saying: in Holland, in the 
Netherlands, it’s the best example where they had this choice, they didn’t choose the 
choice they were supposed to. And the Dutch behave like the British [EVIDENCE BASE]. 
 
I’m going off the track there, but there was an interesting article in a magazine recently, it 
was about economic growth is not based on countries, it’s based on the new series of city-
states.” 
 
Interviewer: Back to Italy. 
 
“Amsterdam was a very good example, or Venice or Dubrovnik. The city, where the 
economy of the city is different from the economy of the country. So London is a very 
good example, Paris probably. And they will grow at the expense of the rest of the 
country. And their economic infrastructure needs are fit first because it’s argued that that’s 
in the country’s best interest. In practice, it’s only in the interest of the city, it’s counter-
productive for the rest of the country [ECONOMIC RATIONALE]. HS2 is a good example 
of that. It’s all London-centric, London will get a disproportionate amount of the 
expenditure and the jobs, everywhere else will suffer relative to that. And then they argue 
‘we will have got to feed London because that’s where all the money and the jobs are’. It’s 
a cycle and you can’t break it.”  
 
Interviewer: Is there a strong ‘London lobby’ behind HS2? 
 
“No, no. The argument [EVIDENCE BASE] is from the northern cities who are worried 
their prosperity relies on good links with London. There’s an argument they prosper more 
if they weren’t linked [laughs cynically]. Because all the evidence is that if you join a poor 
city and a rich city, the rich city will benefit. And there is another argument that: why would 
twenty minutes on a rail journey trigger economic development [ECONOMIC 
RATIONALE]? What is it in the mind of a business that says ‘if I can save twenty minutes 
on a particular journey, I can create more wealth, more jobs?’ I can’t understand that 
relationship.   
 
If people say: ‘well phase 1 is just to make sure.... there’s also phase 2. In order to make 
the Y, we need the first leg as well’. So let’s say, well it may seem it doesn’t pay off, but 
believe us you can get to Manchester or to Leeds. Then you definitely see the whole 
picture.  
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This is the argument from politicians [POLITICAL AUTHORITY], is that the national 
prospect is better if you’ve got a high-speed network and therefore you have to have as 
many cities connected as possible. There is no evidence of that. Even in Japan where 
they have these trains for nearly forty years, there is no evidence for ... The other 
interesting part is that ... You’ll probably know the high-speed alignment going to 
Birmingham and in due course to Manchester and Leeds, but beyond that there won’t be 
high-speed trains, they have to run on the existing track. But the classic-compatible trains 
can’t go as fast on the existing track as the existing trains. The journey time to Scotland, 
from Manchester and Leeds, will be slower than that. This is bizarre [EVIDENCE BASE].” 
 
Interviewer: Because the trains used for high-speed rail after Birmingham, they have to 
slow to such a certain speed that the original on the West Coast Main Line goes faster.  
 
“They can’t go around a sharp corner. Where you go very fast, you have very rigid trains.” 
 
Interviewer: I think this is often called path dependency: you’re so much dependent on 
decisions taken in the past that the future is kind of blurred. Because of the legacy of the 
past you have to make certain steps in the future.  
 
“That’s our fear: that once you start you can’t stop. Which is what the Spanish experience 
is to a great extent. Look what happened: they spent a hundred and twenty billion Euros 
on a network, half of which a net that no-one ever uses. But the argument of all the cities 
in the second phase was: what about us, when is it our turn? We’ll be building more and 
more high-speed railways. The reality was it was only about Madrid-Barcelona, Madrid-
Seville. The same will happen here: Glasgow and Edinburgh and Cardiff and Bristol will 
say ‘why haven’t we got...?’. Or Norwich. But there is a very good example of: Norwich is 
not particularly well-connected; Edinburgh is not particularly well-connected; Cambridge 
isn’t brilliantly connected. But those are three of the most successful cities in Britain. Other 
things made them successful. Birmingham, Manchester have got fantastic transport 
networks, so if they’re suffering it’s not due to transport infrastructure but other reasons. 
Twenty minutes on a railway is not a panacea for that [EVIDENCE BASE].”  
 
Interviewer: I wanted to know, could you tell me the difference between Stop HS2 and the 
Action Alliance? To me they’re relatively comparable. 
 
“They have different starting points. I suppose in an ideal world they might have been one 
organization but there are in fact four. 51M are local authorities. There is something called 
AGAHST, which is an acronym for all local groups: Action Groups Against High Speed 
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Trains [CIVIL SOCIETY], something like that. I don’t think they’ve got a website, but it’s a 
federation of all small groups that are sceptic, including the one here in Great Missenden. 
Then there is the Stop HS2 campaign, which is [name of individual] and [name of 
individual], who are, they too have supporters and members. And HS2 Action Alliance. 
You would expect the local parties to have their own grouping (...), and that makes a lot of 
sense and politically they have to do it that way. I suppose there was an argument that all 
the community groups  [CIVIL SOCIETY] should come together under one banner. In 
Britain we don’t do things like that, it’s far too sensible [laughs]. Lots of different starting 
points, too many personalities. And actually it’s a good thing, because you have to be 
driven, you have to want to do this. Of course it means big personalities. But it works, or 
we made it work. So there are lots of small action groups, based on villages or 
communities.” 
 
Interviewer: Amersham Action Group... 
 
“Amersham Action Group. And they meet under the AGAHST banner, and they agree on 
sort of a agenda, sort of a direction. Then the Stop HS2 campaign is very much about 
lobbying [INTEREST ADVOCACY]; the websites; briefing; nudging here, poking there, 
you know: find little ways of making  [PUBLIC ENGAGEMENT]... and therefore making a 
much louder noise than a number of people would suggest. That’s absolutely fantastic. 
Very good in searching things and quotes and such. Then you’ve got the HS2 Action 
Alliance, which is a, I think is a company of [name of individual], and they are real experts 
on the railway industry. [name of individual] and [name of individual] [CIVIL SOCIETY] 
know the railway industry and they have tremendous influence and access to money. 
They work hard to get it, but they’ve got access to rich people. And so they are able to 
employ professional lobbying companies and so on. And they’re the ones who’ve probably 
made the biggest impact, but with the least public profile. They tend to work from behind 
the scenes: direct lobbying of MPs; briefing of journalists; it’s very effective stuff indeed. 
But it’s expensive. And [name of individual] is just superb in orchestrating that. So all have 
their different niche. It’s a debatable point whether as a sort of reflection of civic desire 
[INTEREST ADVOCACY] whether we would be more effective as one organization or is it 
better having several organizations coming at different angles. We’ll never know.” 
 
Interviewer: Is there trust between local-based organizations and national-based 
organizations and do you think that the interests involved in the networks are well-
represented and divided along all those local groups? The Ruislip folks and then the 
Chilterns folks and then the Kenilworth folks, do they all feel...? 
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“There is a tremendous affinity between the groups from London all the way to 
Birmingham [CIVIL SOCIETY]. I think it is hardly because we’ve been doing this a long 
time, we’ve got to know each other. Since three or four years now, I guess. It seems like 
forever, but probably three years. So when a message comes from a certain person in 
Camden, with whom I normally not have any working relationship with before, I will read it 
because I know that person knows what he’s talking about when they’ve got something 
worth reading. And so you build a relationship, and some of these people I’ve never met, 
but I’ve written to a hundred times. But it’s been quite an effective (...) And that’s, I 
suppose it takes slightly longer to get to know people and to build up trust and there are a 
lot of people whom I’ve met around here, in the Chilterns, through so many events, and I 
have worked closely with them and we have all worked with each other and that 
accelerates that degree of trust [INTERPERSONAL TRUST]. I would go as far as to say 
that a lot of friendships have been built. Such is the degree of trust, interdependence. So 
that’s been a very good thing, actually. It gives us a rallying cause.”  
 
Interviewer: Besides the formal public engagement based on the seven questions, is there 
also informal public engagement? And how does this relate to trust between civil society 
groups and the government?  
 
“It’s an interesting question. Well, the bottom line is we don’t trust the government 
[POLITICAL TRUST], or HS2 Ltd. There’s been too much ill feeling about the way the 
process has been managed and some things that politicians have said about us, we have 
heard (...). So the trust is certainly not there. One of the interesting dilemmas, confusions, 
is: what is the difference between government as represented by the Department for 
Transport and government as represented by HS2 Ltd as a company? Because there 
should be a big difference between the government and a developer. HS2 Ltd is a 
developer, like a big company. And we can’t see the difference sometimes, we don’t know 
what is a political statement, we don’t know what the reporting lines are. We don’t know 
very clearly, at least: what is the Board of Directors of HS2 Ltd? How does it report to the 
Secretary of State? What is their mandate? How transparent is it? What degree of 
authority have they got to act independently? We don’t know. So sometimes when we’re 
dealing with HS2 Ltd we don’t know whether we’re dealing with the government or with 
HS2. Sometimes when the answer from HS2 Ltd it is very obvious that actually it’s the 
officials of the Department of Transport who have crafted the response. When, for 
example, we go ... we have done several times is meet government ministers: HS2 Ltd 
officials sitting on the meeting, and they speak with one voice. In fact, they should be 
separated [POLITICAL TRUST].” 
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Interviewer: Because they’re not elected representatives?  
 
“Yes. So in HS2 Ltd some of the staff are civil servants working for the government 
[POLITICAL AUTHORITY], paid for by the government. Some are employees of HS2 Ltd, 
we don’t know which are which. So we don’t know which ones are government employees 
and which ones are not. Very complicated, they shouldn’t be like that. So there’s no trust 
[POLITICAL TRUST]. It’s also very obvious that HS2 Ltd has not been given enough time 
to do the job properly. This is a massive project. You would expect several years of 
planning, environmental surveys, design options, consultation, all what the Aarhus 
Convention requires. They’ve done it so fast that they can’t do that properly. So the 
consultation process is too short; not enough information is provided; they’ve never given 
enough information about the alternatives which the Aarhus Convention requires, that it 
should be presented with alternatives at an early-enough stage to influence the decision. 
We were never given that opportunity. All these things, you see, we were given a lot of 
information about the preferred option, very little information about the alternatives. You 
couldn’t do a proper comparison, that’s right. Very complicated. And I think it’s also fair to 
say that the nature of the consultation process we had last year was a fix, was more of a 
presentation, a promotional exercise than it was a listening exercise [PUBLIC 
CONSULTATION].” 
 
Interviewer: Like pseudo-participation? 
 
“Pseudo. So they asked questions: they didn’t really care what the answer was, because 
as you may know there were tens of thousands of responses. So you could ask what is 
the point of engaging the public if you don’t listen? Which is why we have no trust. If 90% 
of the responses were negative you would think the government would say: ‘well, we 
perhaps don’t have this right’. But they didn’t, they just ignored it. And as we now know 
the responses were even more heavily weighted against. It made no difference. It was a 
waste of time [PUBLIC CONSULTATION].” 
 
Interviewer: Is HS2 Ltd a technocratic agency in the sense that they understand their 
profession very well, construction or civil engineers for instance, but they’re not really 
facilitating when it comes to engagement? 
 
“I think it’s fair to say that it was a very small group of people, surprisingly small. And they 
were not really experts in anything. Managers. So over time they have brought in more 
experts, more technocrats, more technically-based people and they have now got to the 
stage where they are employing consultants. Big international consultants to provide civil 
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engineering support. And as part of the process internally they have brought in a hired 
people to do the consultation with communities [PUBLIC CONSULTATION]. You would 
think they were experts of community engagement. Certainly the experience so far is that 
they’re not. They just wanted a job, a bit unkind slightly, but they are plainly not experts. 
So all the community forums meetings we’ve had, there are I think it’s between (...), I think 
there are 25, 26, something like that, all the way along the line. And there are three here 
in the Chilterns. There were two, there are now three. They have all been pretty miserable 
affairs. A lot of acrimony, a lot of argument both over how ... I think it’s fair to say that 
actually we’ve become experts, literally, in understanding about ways, about visual impact 
assessment, environmental assessment [PUBLIC ENGAGEMENT]. We know quite a lot. 
The other interesting thing is: this is about a reflection of civil society. Because this railway 
has annoyed so many people, a lot of experts living locally have volunteered to help. Like 
[name of individual]. We have not far from here a professor of acoustics who is helping 
out. So he’s as good as anybody HS2’s got. Actually locally we have a tremendous 
technical resource to draw on. In some cases better than the people that are hired by 
HS2. So when we have these debates, these formal meetings and they are trying to say 
‘this is how things look’, we then say: ‘well, it could look like that’. And we know this 
because we have experts [PUBLIC ENGAGEMENT]. Which has made them, the 
meetings very adversarial and they have assumed little knowledge on our part which is 
immensely irritating. As you can imagine.”  
 
Interviewer: It’s belittling as well. 
 
“It’s very belittling, and we are upset about courtesy and politeness and they have made 
some terrible mistakes. So the personal relationships are not good. We don’t trust them as 
individuals, they don’t like us. So that makes these meetings very difficult [POLITICAL 
TRUST], and the way working now of course is lots of emails and lots of websites stuff 
and reports, electronic versions. So in theory there should be a lot of information floating 
about that we can use for the meetings. But they won’t give them to us. And that has 
compounded the degree of the lack of trust. For example, they draw up agendas for the 
meetings that generally last two hours. Their agendas involve one and a half hours of 
presentations, and a half a hour for us. So we have said: ‘enough! We want one and a half 
hour, you can have thirty minutes’. If they circulated the presentations in advance, as you 
would do for any meeting: papers first; you read them; you understand them; you discuss 
them... We would have saved so much time. They know that, but they won’t do it. 
Because it means that there is more time for us to discuss matters at the meetings, and 
they obviously want to waste our time. They want to tick the box [PUBLIC 
CONSULTATION]. Exactly. So it’s the degree of distrust is continuous and continuous 
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[POLITICAL TRUST] and yet we have made these points to the cabinet ministers, our 
ministers of state, our MPs. They don’t care. They don’t listen.”  
 
Interviewer: Justine Greening, the previous Transport Secretary has left a few weeks ago. 
Has the situation changed? 
 
“Justine Greening was OK as an individual but she knew nothing about transport. And 
wasn’t a very experienced politician, I think that wasn’t helpful. The new Secretary of State 
[POLITICAL AUTHORITY] we don’t know but he has spent the last two and a half years 
being Chief Whip for the government, which means he has his job was to make sure the 
Prime Minister’s wishes were fulfilled.” 
 
Interviewer: Like making coffee? 
 
“Well, he might well have done. I couldn’t possibly comment [laughs]. You can’t imagine 
somebody whose political career has depended on that for the last couple of years, then 
letting down the Prime Minister if he wants this railway to happen? The Secretary of State 
will try and make it happen. The indication we’re getting is that the Prime Minister is not as 
keen as he once was and we know the Treasury is becoming really very annoyed. It’s so 
expensive for such a poor case [COSTS AND BENEFITS], but politically is quite hard to 
get themselves out of the position they’ve got themselves into.” 
 
Interviewer: [Name of individual] told me high-speed rail has been Lord Adonis’ idea, who 
is from Labour. Apparently, this is a conservative heartland. Could the line change the 
electoral map of Britain?  
 
“This is such a strong conservative area, it’s inconceivable that it will not return 
conservative politicians [PARTY POLITICS]. Certainly Westminster. And the local 
councils we may get, as we have here, we have an anti-HS2 councillor now. I don’t think 
that will translate into changes to the national government. But there may be more larger 
constituencies in London and other parts of the line where it makes a difference. And the 
next election is very close. As it will be, losing a few seats may make the difference. So 
they will be worried. I think there is also a worry amongst the Conservative Party, I’m 
going off briefly here, really, but that (...) The Conservatives [PARTY POLITICS] are 
generally being seen as the pro-countryside. Lots of them are landowners, and lots of 
them live in the countryside. Labour tends to have, all the socialist parties have their 
power based in the cities, it tends to be the way. But the government has got a reputation 
for being anti-countryside, anti-environment, that it is alienating its own voters and HS2 is 
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a good example of that. Where it seems not to care that it is destroying a lot of 
countryside, it damages a lot of farms, it can damage a lot of places that people enjoy, like 
the Chilterns [ECOLOGICAL DESTRUCTION AND BLIGHT]. So it’s a vote-loser rather 
than vote-winner. We think. So, just finishing your point is that: the trust, the degree to 
which we can work with national institutions, government institutions, is very weak. There 
is a low base. I can’t see that changing. We don’t trust them, they don’t like us 
[POLITICAL TRUST], we are undermining their case. And they know we have a very 
good case so they can’t ridicule us, they can’t make us look stupid. We have a very good 
case. Our relationship with other national institutions, like I was saying earlier ones like the 
National Trust, the CPRE, the Woodland Trust, is very good. There is a huge degree of 
sympathy between us and this is the sort of area where these organizations get their 
members from. So they’re in tune with us. So that degree of national and local working is 
extremely good and is getting stronger [CIVIL SOCIETY]. No doubt.”  
 
Interviewer: What do you expect from the EIA? Would you expect the EIA to be another 
perfunctory tick-the-box exercise or do you think there’s intelligently looked at, for instance 
at the alternatives to HS2? 
 
“Well, the interesting thing is, as you may know, because it was one of the legal avenues, 
is that they pursued an EIA which looks at the environmental impacts of this route. You 
don’t have to look at alternatives [EVIDENCE BASE]. The strategic environmental 
assessment [ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT], at a higher level, you have to look at 
alternatives. And you have to consult on the alternatives. But they’re not doing that. There 
is no SEA. They’re arguing the Appraisal of Sustainability, which they did in 2011, offered 
the same thing. Obviously it does not. Nowhere near the same. We have made a formal 
complaint to the EU. I say ‘we’ the campaigner groups, not the Board. And we are in 
sympathy, we’ve helped but it’s not in our name. The position is that the European Union 
has said: ‘you may have a case, but the process is not finished. When the process is 
finished we’re in a better position to know whether there is complied with the EU 
regulations’. They have come to the view that they have complied with it so far. So maybe 
through what is to come, and the hybrid bill, they ultimately can fulfil the SEA regulations 
[EVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT]. Our argument is today they haven’t, and therefore 
there are potential grounds for legal action. What I think is more likely in the short term is 
that the EIA, which has been ill-founded, it’s not the way they’re proposing to do it is not 
good enough, certainly for a project with that scale. There is no alternative and even when 
they’re just looking at this one route they’re not doing it thoroughly enough. For example, 
they’re only using one season’s field data. When they go out into the field to gather data 
about certain species they’re basing it on one season. And we’ve had a very odd year, 
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you know. There is not enough data [EVIDENCE BASE]. And we know a lot of 
landowners who have refused permission for them to go on their land. So it’s just small 
samples. So we’ve said that’s not enough data. You would normally for a project of this 
size do two or three year’s data gathering. That’s a good example of how poor the EIA is. 
So the environmental statement which follows will itself be weak. It won’t be having 
enough data to substantiate the statements they will make. I could well foresee a legal 
challenge saying the environmental statement [ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT] is 
unsound.”  
 
Interviewer: There should be an alternative in an EIA, right? 
 
“I’m not sure it’s a requirement. I don’t think it is. In an SEA, it is a requirement. You have 
to show why, and an SEA, you have got to identify some of the impacts and show how 
you would avoid them, which inevitably means some of the impacts can only be avoided 
by not building it, or building it somewhere else. So some of the impacts will be: ‘you’re 
affecting outstanding natural beauty [CHILTERNS AONB], how are you going to avoid 
that?’ Don’t build it, or put a tunnel underneath it. But all these alternatives have not been 
assessed.”  
 
Interview: Often there’s a hidden alternative, which is the reference situation. But project 
planners often use the notion of autonomous growth to show the justification of the 
project. 
 
“That’s what they’ve done. They’ve said we can do that and the train would be full and we 
can build a high-speed railway line. We will build another railway line and it should be high 
speed. We all say, particularly through 51M, you can upgrade what we’ve got. And you 
can do it incrementally, so you’ve always got a match between demand and supply. 
Which is much more sensible as economic investment [ECONOMIC RATIONALE]. And 
now we know that those trains on the existing lines are pretty empty anyway. So there’s 
plenty of scope to grow business on the existing line and speed it up and make it a better 
quality.”  
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Acronyms 
 
All the acronyms used in the thesis are listed hereunder. In every chapter the acronym will 
be introduced, irrespective of whether it has appeared at an earlier stage. 
 
A4DS   –  A4 Delft-Schiedam 
ACF   –  Advocacy Coalition Framework 
AONB   –  Area of Outstanding Natural Beauty 
BBOWT  –  Berks, Bucks & Oxon Wildlife Trust 
CCCF   –  Central Chilterns Community Forum 
CHW   –  Crisis- en Herstelwet 
CF   –  community forum 
CO2        –  carbon dioxide 
DCLG   –  Department for Communities and Local Government 
DEFRA  –  Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs 
DfT   –  Department for Transport 
EHS   –  Ecologische Hoofdstructuur 
EIA   –  environmental impact assessment 
ESS   –  European Social Survey 
EU   –  European Union 
EVS   –  European Values Study 
GWML  –  Great Western Main Line 
HCTC   –  House of Commons Transport Committee 
HS1   –  High-Speed Rail 1 
HS2   –  High-Speed Rail 2 
I/C ratio  –  Intensity/Capacity ratio 
IODS   –  Integrale Ontwikkeling tussen Delft en Schiedam 
KNNV   –  Koninklijke Nederlandse Natuurhistorische Vereniging 
kph  –  kilometres per hour 
LPA   –  local planning authority 
MI&M   –  Ministerie van Infrastructuur en Milieu 
MP   –  Member of Parliament 
NEPA   –  National Environmental Policy Act 
NGO   –  non-governmental organization 
NIMBY  –  ‘not in my backyard’ 
NRM   –  Nieuw Regionaal Model 
NSL   –  Nederlandse Samenwerking Luchtkwaliteit 
RP2   –  Rail Package 2 
SEA  –  strategic environmental assessment 
SSSI   –  Sites of Special Scientific Interesy 
SOBO   –  Stichting Overleg Bewonersorganisaties 
SP   –  Socialist Party (in the Netherlands) 
T&CP   –  Town and Country Planning (Environmental Impact Assessment)  
   Regulations 
TN/MER  –  Trajectnota/Milieu-effectrapportage 
TU Delft  –  Delft University of Technology 
UK   –  United Kingdom 
UKIP   –  United Kingdom Independence Party 
UNECE  –  United Nations Economic Commission for Europe 
US  –  United States (of America) 
VOT   –  Value of Time 
WCED  –  World Commission on Environment and Development 
WCML  –  West Coast Main Line 
WVS   –  World Value Survey 
256 
 
Definitions 
 
The definitions presented here correspond with a number of concepts which appear in the 
thesis. Although many of the definitions of the concepts can be traced back in Chapters 1 
to 3 and in the conclusion, the empirical chapters of the thesis (Chapters 5 to 7) deal with 
the concepts more implicitly. As the type of research conducted in this thesis prohibits an 
all too strict interpretation of the definitions set forth in this glossary (or because it is 
undesirable), it is advised by the author to allow for some contextual freedom when 
deploying them.  
 
Note: The references provided serve as suggestions for further reading.    
 
• Abduction – A scheme of inference to inquire into the plausibility of a theory or 
theoretical premise (Danermark et al., 2002) 
 
• Case study research – Investigating a social entity for the purpose of making analytical 
generalizations (Yin, 2009) 
 
• Civil society – a community consisting of individuals and organizations that are 
committed to political issues of high public interest (Putnam, 1993) 
 
• Counter-expertise – a conduct of science which follows the same rules of scientific 
inquiry but questions the validity of the evidence that is presented by the competent 
authority (Hommes et al., 2009) 
 
• Critical realism – A research approach which believes in a social reality which 
independent from human observations but accepts that causality between events, 
entities and concepts cannot be proven (Sayer, 1992) 
 
• Deliberation – A system of social interaction where decisions are reached based on 
the acceptance of all (Bohman, 1998) 
 
• Democracy – A political system in which the people rule (Held, 2006) 
 
• Democratic performance – Qualitative measure of performance based on the norms 
and rights inherent in liberal democracy (Foweraker and Krznaric, 2000) 
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• Democratic satisfaction – Qualitative indicator of the public attitude towards 
democratic institutions (Anderson and Guillory, 1997) 
 
• Discourse – A “specific ensemble of ideas, concepts and categorizations that is 
produced, reproduced and transformed in a particular set of practices and through 
which meaning is given to physical and social realities” (Hajer, 1995: 44) 
 
• Discourse analysis – Analysis of discourses, premised on the idea that “that social 
phenomena are never finished or total” (Jørgensen and Phillips, 2002: 24) and that the 
ideas that underlie social reality need to be examined 
 
• Discourse coalition – Civil society actors that work together to make claims exerting to 
political and scientific authority for the purpose of strengthening their discourse 
 
• Epistemology – A concept which deals with the question ‘how can we know social 
reality?’ (Corbetta, 2003) 
 
• Inference – Reaching conclusions or mapping consequences within a certain level of 
causal uncertainty (King et al., 1994) 
 
• Institutional design – “the creation of an actionable form to promote valued outcomes 
in a particular context” (Goodin, 1996: 31) 
 
• Interpersonal trust – The degree of trustworthiness of the relationship between citizens 
that are unknown to one another (Uslaner, 2002) 
 
• Mechanism – A concept which denotes the interaction and reciprocity between 
concepts, entities and events in social reality (Easton, 2010a) 
 
• Methodology – A concept which details the methods for data collection and analysis 
(Corbetta, 2003) 
 
• Ontology – A concept which deals with the question ‘what is social reality?’ (Corbetta, 
2003) 
 
• Political culture – "the set of attitudes, beliefs and sentiments which give order and 
meaning to a political process and which provide the underlying assumptions and 
rules that govern behavior in the political system" (Pye, 1968: 218) 
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• Political trust – Public attitude towards democracy as expressed through the degree of 
trust between decision-makers and civil society (Inglehart, 1988) 
 
• Public – “one or more natural or legal persons, and, in accordance with national 
legislation or practice, their associations, organizations or groups” (United Nations 
Economic Commission for Europe, 1998: Article 2.4). 
 
• Public engagement (mode of) – The ways in which engagement is organized, the 
institutional spaces that accommodate engagement activities as well as the criteria 
used to select civil society actors for an ‘invited’ form of public engagement (Fung and 
Wright, 2003). 
 
• Social appraisal (mostly referred to as ‘stakeholder appraisal’ in the empirical 
chapters) – “concerns the ways in which knowledges, understandings, and evaluations 
are constructed” (Stirling, 2008: 265) 
 
• Storyline – A semantic tool (such as a slogan, motto, message or symbol) which 
unifies a discourse coalition (Hajer, 1995) 
 
• Sustainability – Interchangeable with sustainable development. Note that both 
sustainability and sustainable development can mean different things to different 
people  
 
• Sustainable development - a development is sustainable when it ensures “that it 
meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations 
to meet their own needs” (World Commission on Environment and Development, 
1987: Article 27) 
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